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OF    THE 

No.      6 

Division 

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,  BOOKSELLEI 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


GIFT  OF 


DANIEL    C.     OILMAN 


. 


a/r/Z'     ' 


LECTURES 


ON   THE 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


BY 


NATHANIEL  W.  TAYLOR,  D.  D., 

LATE   D WIGHT   PPwOFESSOK    OF   DIDACTIC   THEOLOGY 
IN   YALE   COLLEGE. 


"  Of  Law  there  can  be  no  less  acknowledged  than  that  her  seat  is  the  bosom  or 
God  — her  voice  the  harmony  of  the  world." 


VOL.   I. 


NEW    YOEK; 
PUBLISHED  BY  CLARK,  AUSTIN  &   SMITH, 

3  PARK  ROW  &  3  ANN  STREET. 
1859. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1859,  by 

Noah  Porter,  Samuel  G.  Buckingham,  and  Walter  T.  Hatch. 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York. 


NEW  YORK: 
C.  A.  Alvord,  Printer  and  Stereotyper,  15  Vandewater  street. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  Moral  Government  of  God  was  the  great  thought  of  Dr. 
Taylor's  intellect,  and  the  favorite  theme  of  his  instructions 
in  theology.  It  occupied  his  mind  more  than  any  and  every 
other  subject.  lie  was  ever  ready  to  enter  upon  the  investi- 
gation of  any  truth  that  was  nearly  or  remotely  connected  with 
this.  He  was  never  weary  of  grappling  with  such  inquiries, 
whether  they  were  suggested  for  the  "first  time  by  his  own 
ingenuity,  or  had  been  discussed  with  greater  or  less  success 
for  centuries  by  speculative  and  earnest  men.  To  vindicate 
the  ways  of  God  to  man,  was  the  object  to  which  all  his  ener- 
gies were  consecrated,  and  upon  which  were  expended  the 
ardor  of  his  glowing  soul  and  the  force  of  his  strong  and 
steadfast  will.  Those  secondary  objects  which  the  majority  of 
men,  even  students  and  theologians,  esteem  important,  were 
freely  sacrificed  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  commanding 
purpose.  To  this  the  whole  living  man  was  consecrated  with 
an  activity  and  intensity  which  have  not  often  been  equaled. 

This  object  directed  all  his  studies.  All  his  investigations 
had  their  starting  point  from  this  central  theme,  and  how- 
ever far  he  may  seem  to  some  to  have  wandered  in  the 
maze  of  scholastic  distinctions  or  subtle  refinements,  he  never 
lost  the  clue  by  which  he  returned  to  the  subject  of  his  great 
argument.  Hence  his  interest  in  psychology.  He  studied 
man  as  an  intellectual  and  moral  being,  that  he  might  under- 
stand God's  government  over  him.  It  was  in  the  light  of 
man's  relations  to  God,  that  he  sought  to  know  what  are  his 
capacities,  what  his  obligations,  what  his  present  condition,  and 


IV  INTRODUCTION. 

what  liis  future  destiny.  With  the  same  intent  he  investi- 
gated with  a  passionate  interest  the  nature  of  civil  govern- 
ment, the  authority  of  human  law  in  all  its  varieties,  and  the 
principles  by  which  the  various  forms  of  human  society  are 
organized  and  held  together.  He  reasoned,  that  man  being 
the  subject  of  all  these  societies,  duty  being  the  obligation 
common  to  all,  and  law  the  expression  of  the  authority  by 
which  they  are  sustained — they  must  furnish  analogies  to  that 
moral  government  of  God  which  comprehends  the  universe 
within  its  dominion.  That  he  might  understand  this  "civi- 
tas  Dei"  this  "kingdom  of  God,"  he  studied  law,  authority, 
and  justice  in  their  essential  nature  and  constituent  elements. 
Indeed,  concerning  theology  itself,  he  would  have  adopted 
with  few  qualifications  the  definition  given  by  Leibnitz,  uQuce 
est  quasi  jurisjprudentia  qitcedam  specialis,  sed  eadem  funda- 
mentalis  ratione  ceterarum.  Est  enim  velut  doctrina  qucedam 
de  jure  publico  quod  obtinet  in  rej?ubUca  Dei  in  homines."* 
Above  all,  he  diligently  and  earnestly  sought  to  find  in  the 
Scriptures  a  true  and  consistent  system  of  principles  in  respect 
to  the  government  of  God ;  and  to  develop  such  a  system  from 
the  Scriptures  as  should  be  also  consistent  with  the  teachings 
of  reason  and  conscience,  he  considered  the  great  duty  of  the 
student  and  the  teacher  of  theology.  Iiis  views  of  theology  as 
the  science  which  has  this  for  its  object,  were  elevated  and 
even  sublime.  The  enthusiastic  language  in  which  he  was 
accustomed  to  express  himself  on  this  inspiring  theme,  will 
not  soon  be  forgotten  by  those  who  have  heard  him  speak. 

He  tried  every  system  of  theology  by  this  test :  what  are 
the  principles  concerning  the  moral  government  of  God  on 
which  it  rests,  or  what  are  the  views  of  God's  authority  over 
man  which  it  inculcates?  If  its  principles  were  judged  to 
be  defective,  vague,  obscure  or  false — if  the  system  did  not 
i  commend  itself  to  the  conscience'  by  asserting  those  truths 
to  which  the  conscience  responds,  it  was  rejected  wholly  or 

*  Diss,  de  Aete  Combin.,  pp.  20,  21,  ed.  Erd. 


INTRODUCTION.  V 

in  part,  whatever  was  the  authority  of  the  theologian  or  of  the 
church  whose  name  it  bore. 

It  was  not,  however,  solely  nor  chiefly,  from  the  relations  of 
this  subject  to  scientific  theology,  that  he  regarded  it  as  of 
such  commanding  importance.  His  interest  in  this  as  in  all 
other  subjects,  even  in  theology  itself,  was  founded  in  a  strong 
conviction  of  its  practical  usefulness.  While  he  was  a  pastor, 
he  wrote  two  sermons  on  the  Moral  Government  of  God,  in 
order  to  vindicate  the  authority  of  His  law,  the  justice  of  His 
retributions,  and  the  necessity  of  an  atonement.  His  interest  in 
this  subject  was  increased  by  the  illustration  of  the  practical 
importance  of  just  and  well  settled  principles  in  regard  to  it, 
which  was  developed  in  the  Unitarian  controversy.  He  con- 
stantly and  earnestly  insisted,  that  by  the  Christian  preacher 
no  subject  needed  to  be  so  well  understood,  to  enable  him  suc- 
cessfully to  defend  and  enforce  the  great  truths  of  the  gospel. 
In  his  intercourse  with  his  fellow-men  and  in  the  conduct  of  his 
own  life,  he  manifested  a  loyalty  to  the  King  of  Heaven,  even 
in  connection  with  the  most  trivial  events,  which  lent  a  charm 
to  all  the  manifestations  of  his  character.  In  times  of  a^o- 
nizing  sorrow,  he  would  utter  great  truths  concerning  God's 
administration,  its  glory  and  goodness,  which  showed  that  his 
principles  on  these  subjects  were  his  daily  sustenance  and  com- 
fort. One  of  the  most  impressive  scenes  of  his  last  days  was 
the  utterance  at  parting  with  a  friend,  in  tones  of  almost  se- 
raphic ardor,  of  the  ascription  of  the  apostle,  "  Now  unto  the 
King  eternal,  immortal,  invisible,  the  only  wise  God,  be  honor 
and  glory  forever  and  ever." 

The  writers  to  whom  Dr.  Taylor  was  most  indebted,  and 
whose  principles  he  sought  to  apply,  to  complete,  and  in  some 
cases  to  correct,  were  Bishop  Butler  and  Jonathan  Edwards. 
Bishop  Butler  suggested  the  principles  and  the  course  of 
argument  concerning  the  benevolence  and  equity  of  God's 
government,  which  were  matured  by  him  into  a  more  exact 
system,  and  carried  only  to  their  legitimate  conclusions.  Presi- 
dent Edwards  was  often  in  his  hands,  and  the  careful  reader  of 


VI  INTRODUCTION. 

these  volumes  will  see  the  relation  of  many  of  the  discussions, 
to  the  teachings  of  that  prince  of  New  England  divines,  and 
to  the  whole  current  of  what  is  called  New  England  theology. 
The  works  of  all  the  New  England  divines  were  the  familiar 
hand-books  of  his  reading.  He  was  also  entirely  at  home  with 
the  writers  on  natural  theology,  for  which  the  English  church 
in  other  times  was  so  distinguished.  From  all  of  these  authors, 
and  the  bold  and  energetic  workings  of  his  own  mind,  he  rea- 
soned out  the  system  of  principles  and  conclusions  which  is 
found  in  these  volumes. 

These  lectures  were  not  delivered  in  precisely  the  same  order 
and  continuous  succession  in  which  they  are  now  presented 
to  the  reader.  They  were  given  in  different  portions,  as  parts 
of  a  course  of  theological  instruction,  each  in  its  assigned 
position,  and  were  separated  from  each  other  by  the  discus- 
sion of  other  topics.  It  was  thought  expedient,  however,  to 
arrange  them  in  a  continuous  series,  so  as  to  present  a  com- 
plete and  connected  view  of  all  that  he  wrote  on  this  fun- 
damental topic  in  theology.  To'  the  lectures  on  moral  gov- 
ernment, have  been  appended  other  essays  and  lectures  on 
subjects  that  are  naturally  connected  with  this. 

The  first  section  embraces  the  discussion  of  the  essential 
nature  of  moral  government,  preliminary  to  any  inquiries  as 
to  what  is  the  actual  government  of  the  universe,  as  we  dis- 
cover it  by  the  light  of  nature.  Section  second  treats  of 
that  government  as  it  is  made  known  by  the  light  of  nature, 
and  discusses  some  of  those  questions  of  fact  concerning  the 
actual  administration  of  the  universe,  which  are  appropriate 
to  natural  theology.  The  last  four  lectures  of  this  section 
present  a  brief  view  of  the  necessity  and  evidences  of  reve- 
lation, so  far  as  the  light  of  nature  and  the  lessons  of  human 
experience  furnish  the  materials  for  an  argument.  Section 
third  contains  an  extended  discussion  of  the  government  of 
God  as  exhibited  in  revelation.  Such  a  discussion  should,  in 
one  view  of  the  subject,  according  to  the  opinions  expressed  in 
the  first  section  by  the  author,  comprehend  a  complete  system 


INTRODUCTION.  Vii 

of  revealed  theology.  It  in  fact  gives  us  only  his  views  of 
the  nature  of  the  Jewish  Theocracy,  as  being  a  representation 
or  visible  manifestation  of  the  unseen  kingdom  of  God,  and 
a  careful  examination  of  the  law  of  God  as  it  is  revealed  in 
this  theocracy,  and  by  the  direct  teachings  of.  the  Scriptures. 
The  opinions  of  the  author  in  respect  to  some  of  the  most 
important  doctrines  of  the  Scriptures,  are  however  given  with 
great  distinctness,  in  connection  with  the  treatment  of  his 
principal  theme.  Indeed,  the  most  superficial  reader  of  these 
lectures  cannot  fail  to  see  in  them  all,  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end — even  the  most  abstract  and  metaphysical — a  distinct  and 
direct  reference  to  the  doctrines  of  atonement  and  justification. 
In  the  Appendix,  will  be  found  an  essay  on  "Justice,"  which  has 
a  double  interest,  as  a  vigorous  handling  of  the  theme  in  its 
relations  to  civil  society  and  the  rights  of  man,  and  also  in  its 
bearings  upon  certain  theological  theories  of  the  atonement. 
The  essay  on  "  the  Providential  Government  and  Purposes  of 
God"  is  intimately  related  to  the  just  and  exact  understanding 
of  his  moral  government.  The  discussion  of  the  question,  "  In 
what  sense  God  can  purpose  opposite  events,"  naturally  arises 
in  every  attempt  to  vindicate  the  Holy  One  from  responsibility 
for  moral  evil.  The  essay  on  "  the  Penalties  of  the  Civil  Law" 
is  explained  by  its  relation  to  the  lecture,  out  of  which  it  arises. 
The  discussion  of  Miracles  seems  to  be  required  by  the  lectures 
in  the  first  volume  that  treat  of  the  philosophical  possibil- 
ity and  truth  of  the  Christian  revelation.  The  Lectures  and 
Appendix  present  the  views  of  the  author  upon  some  of  the 
most  important  questions  involved  in  the  nature  and  the 
evidences  of  natural  and  revealed  theology.  These  views  it 
seemed  desirable  to  collect  and  arrange  in  a  single  work. 

The  opinions  expressed  are  given  to  the  reader  as  the  author 
believed  and  taught,  and  in  the  language  in  which  he  uttered 
them.  His  style  was  formed  in  the  school  of  Butler  and  Ed- 
wards, and  owes  some  of  its  peculiarities  to  the  constant  repe- 
tition of  those  definitions  and  distinctions,  which  he  wished  to 
impress  upon  the  ear  and  to  fix  in  the  minds  of  the  pupils 


Vlll  INTRODUCTION. 

who  heard  him.  His  style  was  adapted  to  the  ear,  and  not  to 
the  eye ;  it  was  formed  in  and  for  the  lecture-room,  not  for  the 
printed  page.  Practiced  critics  and  editors  will  easily  under- 
stand how  difficult  it  is  to  condense  or  correct  such  a  style. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  some  of  Dr.  Taylor's  friends  and 
pupils  to  know,  that  the  first  lecture  in  the  second  volume 
was  written  only  a  few  months  before  his  death.  It  is  almost 
the  last  word  concerning  the  importance  of  a  correct  and 
vigorous  theology  which  he  was  permitted  to  write,  and  may 
be  viewed  as  his  dying  testimony  on  this  most  important 
theme.  K  P. 

Yale  College,  Jan.  19,  1859. 


CONTENTS 


SECTION  I. 


WHAT    IS   A  PERFECT    MORAL    GOVERNMENT  ?    OR,   MORAL 
GOVERNMENT   IN   THE   ABSTRACT. 


LECTURE   I. 

PAGE 

Can  we  determine  the  nature  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government? — A  perfect  Moral  Govern- 
ment denned. — The  definition  explained  and  vindicated  in  the  following  particulars : 
I.  Moral  Government  is  an  influence  on  moral  beings. 
II.  Moral  Government  implies  a  moral  Governor. 

III.  Moral  Government  is  designed  so  to  control  the  action  of  moral  beings,  as  to  se- 

cure the  great  end  of  action  on  their  part 

IV.  The  influence  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  is  the  influence  of  authority 1 

LECTURE   II. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law.— The  nature  of  such  a  law.— First,  It  is  a  decisive  rule  of  action  to  subjects.— Sec- 
ondly, It  must  require  benevolence  as  the  best  kind  of  action,  and  must  forbid  selfish- 
ness as  the  worst  kind  of  action. — Viewed  in  relation  to  these  objects,  and  to  the  agent 
who  exercises  them,  these  affections  are  supreme,  intelligent,  morally  free,  permanent, 
and  predominant 16 

LECTURE   III. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law. — The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded. — Third  characteristic  of  the  law  so  de- 
manded in  a  perfect  Moral  Government,  viz. :  it  requires  benevolence  and  forbids  selfish- 
ness.—Relation  of  predominant  to  subordinate  action.— Benevolence  and  selfishness  de- 
fined.— These  constitute  the  only  kind  of  action  possible  to  a  moral  being. — Manner  in 
which  the  law  requires  and  forbids  subordinate  action. — Benevolence  and  selfishness  the 
only  morally  right  and  wrong  actions ...    - 47 

LECTURE   IV. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law. — The  nature  of  law  further  unfolded. — 4.  It  must  express  the  Lawgiver's  prefer- 
ence of  the  action  required,  to  its  opposite,  all  things  considered — 5.  It  implies,  that  the 
Lawgiver  can  be  satisfied  with  obedience,  and  with  nothing  but  obedience,  on  the  part  of 
the  subject— 6.  It  expresses  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  his  highest  disap- 
probation of  disobedience G9 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE  V. 

PAGE 

Y.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law.— The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded.— 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Gov- 
ernment involves  sanctions. — The  relations  of  a  Moral  Governor  to  his  kingdom  more 
particularly  considered.— Legal  sanctions  defined.— They  establish  or  ratify  the  authority 
of  the  Moral  Governor. — Thoy  consist  in  natural  good  promised  to  obedience,  and  in 
natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience. — They  establish  the  Moral  Governor's  authority 
as  its  decisive  proof. — They  become  decisive  proof  of  the  Moral  Governor's  authority 
by  manifesting  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and 
highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.— It  is  not  incredible  that  God  in  the  Scriptures 
should  express  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of 
disobedience  to  His  law 82 

LECTURE   VI. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law. — The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded. — 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Gov- 
ernment involves  sanctions,  (continued.) — 5th.  Legal  sanctions  the  necessary  proof  of 
the  Moral  Governor's  authority  as  the  necessary  manifestations  and  proofs  of  his  benev- 
olence in  the  form  of  his  approbation  of  obedience  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  dis- 
obedience.— This  shown  by  proving  (1,)  that  legal  sanctions  are  in  some  respect  neces- 
sary as  the  proof  of  the  Moral  Governor's  authority ;  (2,)  that  they  are  necessary  for 
this  purpose,  as  the  necessary  proofs  of  his  benevolence  ;  and  (3,)  that  they  are  necessary 
proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  high- 
est disapprobation  of  disobedience. — The  (1)  and  (2)  of  these  arguments  are  treated  in 
this  lecture. — (1.)  Legal  Sanctions  are  necessary  in  some  respect  as  proof  of  the  Moral 
Governor's  authority. — Argued  from  the  import  of  the  phrase  legal  sanctions ;  from  the 
nature  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government ;  from  the  nature  of  a  law  or  rule  of 
action  without  sanctions ;  from  the  fact  that  conformity  and  nonconformity  to  a  rule 
without  sanctions  would  subvert  the  Moral  Governor's  authority. — (2.)  They  are  neces- 
sary as  proofs  of  the  Governor's  authority  as  they  are  the  necessary  proofs  of  his  benev- 
olence.—Eeason  given  why  attempts  to  prove  the  benevolence  of  God  from  the  light  of 
nature  are  so  unsuccessful 105 

LECTURE  VII. 

Y.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law.— The  nature  of  the  law  further  unfolded.— 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Govern- 
ment involves  sanctions.— 5th.  The  necessity  of  legal  sanctions  shown.— (3,)  because 
they  are  the  necessary  proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  forms  of  his  highest  approbation 
of  obedience  and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.— This  is  argued ;  first,  from  the 
insufficiency  of  another  mode  of  proving  his  benevolence ;  second,  from  the  nature  of 
legal  sanctions  as  already  explained ;  third,  from  the  view  of  the  sanctions  of  the  supreme 
law  of  the  state.— Remaeks  :  1.  Christianity  is  not  a  selfish  system  of  religion ;  2.  What 
it  is  to  make  light  of  the  divine  threatenings ;  3.  They  who  deny  the  view  now  given  of 
the  sanctions  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  cannot  prove  the  benevolence  of  God 127 

LECTURE  VIII. 

Y.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of 
law. — The  nature  of  the  law  further  unfolded. — Seventhly.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral 
Government  involves  the  requisite  sanctions  of  the  Moral  Governor's  authority. — 6th. 


CONTENTS.  XI 

Legal  sanctions  include  the  highest  possible  degree  of  natnral  good,  &c,  and  the  highest 
possible  degree  of  evil.— Objections.— Punishment  ought  to  terminate  with  sin  ;  if  all 
should  disobey,  all  ought  not  to  be  punished;  incredible  and  impossible  that  God  should 
adopt  a  moral  system  with  such  liabilities.— Conclusion 160 


SECTION    II. 

THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD  AS  E^OWN  BY  THE  LIGHT 

OF  NATURE. 


LECTURE   I. 

Thesis  to  be  established  in  three  leading  propositions.— First,  God  administers  a  Moral  Gov- 
ernment in  some  sense ;  for,  1,  men  are  moral  beings ;  2,  God  has  given  them  a  law. — 
Shown  from  the  manifestation  of  the  tendencies  of  action  to  good  and  evil.— No  oppos- 
ing evidence.— Perversion  of  a  design  does  not  disprove  the  reality  of  the  design ;  nor 
the  fact  that  such  perversion  was  foreseen;  nor  that  the  perversion  is  universal. — The 
perversion  observed  may  bo  temporary. — Tendency  to  wrong,  not  greater  than  to  right 
action. — Cause  of  the  certainty  but  not  of  the  necessity  of  such  perversion. — The  only 
proper  method  of  reasoning. — Conclusion 1 S4 

LECTURE  II. 

3.  First  leading  proposition  continued.— God  enforces  conformity  to  his  law  by  authority.— 
(a)  He  assumes  the  right  to  give  a  law.— (6)  He  dispenses  good  and  evil  as  powerful  in- 
ducements ;— for  good  and  evil  are  the  proper  effects  of  right  and  wrong  action  ;— as  self- 
complacency  and  remorse  are  enjoyed  and  suffered  ;  reflection  can  be  avoided  only  in 
part; — (c)  The  providence  of  God  in  other  ways  works  against  evil  and  for  good  by  dis- 
cipline, restraint,  sickness,  disappointment,  death.— Forebodings  of  evil  after  death. 203 

LECTURE   III. 

Second  leading  proposition.— God's  administration  is  equitable— proved  by  showing,  1.  That 
God  has  given  the  best  law,  2.  That  he  distributes  good  and  evil  equitably.— In  opposition 
to  this  proposition,  the  unequal  distribution  of  good  and  evil  has  caused  the  chief  diffi- 
culty.—Various  theories  resorted  to. — Is  the  difficulty  real  ?— (a)  Greater  difficulties  in 
denying  God's  equity  than  in  admitting  it.— (ft)  No  proof  against  it;  for  God  is  not  in- 
equitable in  treating  men  better  than  they  deserve,  nor  in  treating  them  worse.  More 
rational  to  regard  this  distribution  as  explicable  in  some  unknown  way.  God  may  be 
administering  a  moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy. — (c)  There  is  satisfactory 
proof  for  his  equity— the  arguments  probable  and  cumulative 217 

LECTURE  IV. 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz.  :  God  administers  an  equitable  moral  govern- 
ment.— The  possibility  of  a  future  state  precludes  all  objections  against  the  Divine 
equity. — No  presumption  against  a  future  state. — No  proof  the  soul  is  material. — No 
evidence  that  death  destroys  the  soul.— Direct  proofs  of  a  future  state.— Kind  of  evi- 
dence furnished. — No  cause  known  which  can  destroy  the  soul. — Every  thing  which  has 
begun  continues  to  exist.— The  present  state  unsuitable  to  the  natural  perfection  of  man. 
— Argument  from  man's  moral  nature  decisive 230 


Xll  CONTENTS. 


LECTURE   V. 

PAGE 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  administers  an  equitable  moral  govern- 
ment.— God  administers  his  moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy. — Explana- 
tion.— Proof  1.  The  manner  in  which  he  administers  good  and  evil  harmonizes  with  such 
an  economy. — 2.  Distribution  of  good  and  evil  proves  a  design  to  recover. — (a)  A  virtu- 
ous life  the  happiest.— (b)  Gifts  of  God  tend  to  gratitude.— (c)  Natural  evils  prove  the 
same  design. — (d)  The  present  a  state  of  discipline. — (e)  The  happiness  of  man  in  his 
own  power. — {/)  Without  forgiveness,  reclaiming  influences  vain.  God's  favor  can  be 
secured  only  on  the  terms  which  Christianity  prescribes,  whether  Christianity  is  or  is 
not  from  God 245 

LECTURE   VI. 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  administers  an  equitable  moral  govern- 
ment; also,  God  administers  a  moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy.— Proof  3. 
"We  must  suppose  God  to  administer  his  government  in  the  way  of  exact  retribution,  or 
through  an  atonement. — One  of  these  is  true,  or  God  is  deficient  in  power,  or  malignant 
in  intention. — Just  conception  of  Benevolence  in  God. — What  is  Justice  in  God. — Infi- 
dels have  false  views  of  both.— Dispensations  of  God's  Providence  prove  him  not  to  ba 
weak. — The  equity  of  a  moral  government  can  be  consistent  with  mercy  only  through 
an  atonement. — Alternative  for  the  unbeliever 268 

LECTURE   VII. 

Third  leading  proposition :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — This  proved  by  his  benev- 
olence.— Different  opinions  in  respect  to  the  method  of  proving  his  benevolence. — If  it 
cannot  be  proved  by  the  right  of  nature,  it  cannot  be  proved  at  all. — The  Scriptures  as- 
sert and  assume  that  this  benevolence  is  manifest  by  the  light  of  nature 276 

LECTURE   VIII. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — The  be- 
nevolence of  God  may  be  proved,  1.  From  his  natural  attributes. — Nature  of  the  argu- 
ment.— 2.  From  his  works. — Preliminary  definitions  and  explanations. — God  is  proved  to 
be  perfectly  benevolent,  by  showing,  {a)  that  the  present  system  may  be  the  best  pos- 
sible; (b)  that  it  is  the  best  possible.— Prop,  (a)  considered.— Objection  from  existence 
of  evil. — Evil  is  natural  and  moral. — Natural  evil  considered  in  the  sufferings  of  infants, 
of  animals,  and  of  men  as  moral  beings 2SS 

LECTURE  IX. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — God  is  be- 
nevolent, because  the  present  system  may  be  the  best  possible. — Objection  from  the  exist- 
ence of  moral  eviL — There  may  be  an  impossibility,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  it  should 
be  prevented.  Assuming  that  a  moral  system  may  be  the  best,  1.  It  may  be  impossible 
to  prevent  all  sin  under  a  moral  system.— 2.  If  this  is  not  true,  it  may  be  impossible  un- 
der the  best  moral  system 302 

LECTURE   X. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz.:  God  governs  with  rightful  authority.— God  is 
benevolent. — 2.  The  present  system  not  only  may  be,  but  is  the  best  possible  to  the 
Creator. — (a)  It  is  better  than  none. — Happiness  greater  than  misery  in  this  life. — Ee- 
sults  in  a  future  world. — (b)  It  is  the  best  possible. — No  proof  that  a  better  could  be 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

adopted.— The  present,  in  its  nature  and  tendencies,  is  the  best  conceivable,  and  there- 
fore the  be6t  possible. — This  argued  under  two  heads;  1.  From  its  general  form  as  a 
moral  system,  in  respect  to  the  kind  of  beings  and  the  kind  of  influence  used.— 2.  From 
its  particular  forms  as  a  moral  system,  as  involving  influences  from  the  nature  and  ten- 
dencies of  moral  action,  from  moral  government,  from  an  equitable  moral  government, 
and  the  same  with  a  gracious  economy. — Kemark 326 

LECTURE   XI. 

APPLICATION    OF    THE    ARGUMENT     FROM     NATURE,    TO    PROVE     THAT 
CHRISTIANITY    IS    FROM    GOD. 

Nature  of  Divine  Revelation. — Argument  for  its  necessity.— Different  views  of  the  grounds 
of  this. — I.  Not  necessary,  because  man  cannot  discover  moral  and  religious  truth ; 
but  II.  Necessary,  1.  To  make  known  the  truth  in  the  most  perfect  method,  espe- 
cially by  language.— Absurdity  of  objecting  to  this  medium.— 2.  To  receive  the  prac- 
tical influence  of  such  truth. — The  experiment  by  the  light  of  nature  decisive,  shown 
by  the  ancient  philosophers. — Their  views  scanty,  vacillating,  erroneous. — Practical  in- 
fluence feeble  on  themselves  and  others. — Prevalence  of  immorality. — Their  teachings 
and  example  limited 350 

LECTURE  XII. 

Argument  for  necessity  of  revelation  continued :  Prop.  2  continued. — Revelation  necessary 
to  secure  the  practical  influence  of  the  truth. — Argued  from  the  state  of  Pagan  na- 
tions at  present.— From  the  influence  of  Deism.— Deists  greatly  indebted  to  Christian- 
ity.— The  influence  of  their  systems  is  feeble,  scanty  and  uncertain,  denies  the  holiness 
and  justice  of  God.— Their  views  of  sin  and  repentance  defective.— Their  morality 
superficial. — Men  are  not  made  better  by  them. — Little  zeal  for  reforming  men  by 
them.— Give  no  comfort  in  death.— Prop.  3.  Revelation  necessary  to  make  known 
truth  undiscoverable  without  it.— Conclusion 865 

LECTURE   XIII. 

DreECT  Argument.— Question  proposed.— Preliminary  remarks.— 1.  Question  to  be  decided 
by  human  reason.— Limits  of  reason.— Perversion  of  reason.— 2.  Rational  to  believe  in 
divine  origin  of  Christianity  on  low  evidence. — Relation  of  Christianity  to  our  character 
and  life'. — Conclusions  from  this  principle. — a.  Unjust  to  demand  high  degree  of  evi- 
dence.— b.  Shows  the  true  cause  of  Infidelity. — c.  The  most  promising  method  of  con- 
vincing men  of  the  truth. — rf.  The  reasonableness  of  faith  in  unlearned  men. — 3.  Com- 
mon facts  and  principles  must  be  assumed  by  all  parties  as  premises  of  argument- 
Illustrations.— How  common  premises  may  be  fixed  and  agreed  on.— Argument  stated  in 
four  propositions. — First  two  have  been  previously  proved 382 

LECTURE  XIV. 

Direct  Aegixment  continued.— Two  remaining  propositions  considered.— Prop.  3.  The  im- 
portance of  revelation  renders  it  probable,  if  not  certain,  that  God  would  give  a  revela- 
tion.—Opposed  by  some.— Their  views  discussed.— Man  not  competent  to  decide  on  the 
manner,  &c,  of  revelation.— Recapitulation  of  argument  on  necessity  of  revelation. — 
Prop.  4.  That  which  claims  to  be  a  revelation,  is  what  it  claims  to  be.— Conclusion. 403 


THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


SECTION  I. 

WHAT  IS  A  PERFECT  MORAL  GOVERNMENT! 

OK 

MORAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  ABSTRACT. 

LECTURE     I. 

Can  we  determine  the  nature  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government ?— A  perfect  Moral  Government 
defined. — The  definition  explained  and  vindicated  in  the  following  particulars : 
I.  Moral  Government  is  an  influence  on  moral  beings. 
II.  Moral  Government  implies  a  moral  Governor. 

III.  Moral  Government  is  designed  so  to  control  the  action  of  moral  beings,  as  to  secure  th« 

great  end  of  action  on  their  part. 

IV.  The  influence  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  is  the  influence  of  authority. 

Moral  Government  may  be  said  in  general  terms  to  be  the 
government  of  moral  beings  by  the  influence  of  authority.  It 
may  be  distinguished  into  different  kinds,  as  it  is  vested  in 
different  administrators,  and  is  administered  over  different 
communities.  The  more  prominent  of  these  different  kinds 
of  moral  government  are  the  government  of  God  over  his 
moral  creation,  which  is  above  every  other — the  government 
of  the  state  or  civil  government,  and  the  government  of  the 
family  or  parental  government. 

We  may  suppose  that  both  parental  and  civil  governments, 
as  manifestly  indispensable  in  some  form  to  man's  present 
well-being,  are  alike  the  ordinances  of  a  benevolent  Deity, 
and  subservient  to  the  end  of  that  higher  system  in  which 
men  are  more  directly  the  subjects  of  God's  moral  dominion. 

For  the  purpose  however  of  distinguishing  the  different 
kinds  of  moral  government,  so  far  as  to  aid  us  in  our  present 
Vol.  I.— 1  1 


2  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

inquiry,  we  may  suppose  the  family  and  the  state  each  to  ex- 
ist as  a  distinct  and  independent  community,  and  to  be  under 
a  jurisdiction  peculiar  and  appropriate  to  itself.  As  members 
of  these  particular  communities,  men  would  be  under  a  neces- 
sity of  acting  in  one  manner  rather  than  in  another,  to  secure 
the  highest  well-being  of  the  whole.  As  bound  by  such  a  ne- 
cessity, and  capable  as  moral  beings  of  so  acting  as  to  defeat 
this  great  end,  and  to  produce  the  opposite  result  in  misery, 
they  are  the  lit  subjects  of  moral  government,  and  actually  as 
members  of  the  family  and  the  state,  live  under  such  a  gov- 
ernment. 

Our  first  notion  of  moral  government  is  obviously  derived 
from  that  which  is  parental,  and  is  extended  and  modified  in 
that  conception  which  we  form  of  the  government  of  the 
state.  Since  however,  both  are  marred  by  undeniable  imper- 
fection, we  can  appeal  to  neither  as  a  perfect  example  of  moral 
government.  Nor  can  it  be  pretended  that  we  have  any  ex- 
ample of  a  perfect  moral  government,  which  in  the  present 
world  is  fully  unfolded  to  our  inspection  in  all  the  detail  of 
its  administration,  and  in  all  the  completeness  of  its  issues. 
The  most  that  can  be  claimed  is,  that  there  is  such  a  govern- 
ment entered  upon — one  in  the  actual  progress  of  administra- 
tion— one  which,  though  not  fully  achieving  its  own  perfect 
end,  the  highest  conceivable  well-being  of  all — is  yet  so  dis- 
tinctly characterized  by  a  strict  adherence  to  the  principles 
of  equity,  though  modified  in  their  application  by  a  gracious 
economy,  as  clearly  to  reveal  its  absolute  perfection. 

By  a  perfect  moral  government  then,  is  here  meant  not  a 
moral  government  which  actually  secures,  but  one  which  in 
its  true  nature  and  tendency  is  perfectly  adapted  to  secure,  and 
which  unperverted  would  secure  the  great  and  true  end  of 
such  a  government,  even  the  highest  conceivable  well-being 
of  its  subjects.  We  may  suppose  such  a  government  to  exist, 
and  the  end  which  it  is  designed  and  fitted  to  accomplish,  to 
be  partially  or  wholly  defeated,  solely  through  perversion  by 
its  subjects.  Such  perversion  however,  would  in  no  degree 
obscure,  but  necessarily  imply  the  absolute  perfection  of  the 
system.  Nor  if  we  suppose,  that  on  account  of  the  foreseen 
perversion  of  a  perfect  system,  it  would  be  better  in  relation 
to  actual  results  to  adopt  another  system,  still  the  adoption  of 
the  latter  could  be  justified  only  on  the  ground  of  the  foreseen 


THE    ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS.  3 

perversion  in  fact  of  the  former,  and  would  therefore  imply  its 
absolute  perfection.  We  may  further  suppose  that  an  abso- 
lutely perfect  system  of  moral  government  would  be  adopted 
by  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  notwithstanding  he  should  fore- 
see some  degree  of  actual  perversion  and  counteraction  of  its 
tendencies  ;  for  it  might  still  be  true,  that  he  should  also  fore- 
see that  the  actual  results  of  such  a  system  wrould  be  far  bet- 
ter than  those  of  an  imperfect  system,  even  the  best  possible 
which  he  can  secure. 

Can  we  then  know  what  are  the  essential  elements  of  a 
perfect  moral  government — those  elements  which  must  consti- 
tute such  a  government  in  the  hands  of  an  infinitely  perfect 
Being,  the  knowledge  of  which  must  be  of  the  highest  con- 
cern to  us,  as  the  subjects  of  such  a  government?  I  answer, 
that  there  is  no  subject  which  mankind  generally  better  under- 
stand ;  none  which  they  are  under  a  more  imperious  necessity 
of  understanding  than  moral  government  in  some  of  its  exist- 
ing forms ;  none  of  whose  reality  they  have  a  more  constant 
and  sure  conviction ;  none  of  whose  nature  in  all  essential  re- 
spects they  have  a  more  adequate  comprehension.  There  can- 
not be  an  existing  state  of  man,  as  related  to  man,  there  can- 
not be  a  social  state  (and  without  this  man  can  exist  to  no  im- 
portant purpose),  from  which  the  idea  of  a  moral  government 
and  the  full  conviction  of  its  reality  and  necessity  can  be  sepa- 
rated. This  conviction  begins  almost  with  our  existence,  even 
so  early  as  when  the  mother  by  some  look  or  action  first  im- 
presses the  mind  of  the  child  with  the  necessity  of  submitting 
his  will  to  her  will.  Thus  the  condition  of  human  infancy 
places  us  from  the  beginning  in  society,  and  naturally  and 
necessarily  introduces  subjection  to  superior  wisdom,  power 
and  goodness.  From  the  dawn  of  the  intellect,  our  parents 
jn-escribe  things  to  be  done,  and  forbid  things  not  to  be  done, 
approving  and  disapproving,  rewarding  and  punishing  accord- 
ing to  our  doings.  Thus  they  early  assume  authority  over  us, 
aiming  at  one  comprehensive  result  in  all  our  doings — that 
of  bringing  our  will  into  conformity  with  theirs. 

Now  why  is  this,  and  who  does  not  know  why  it  is  ?  It  is 
because  no  family  could  subsist,  much  less  be  prosperous  and 
happy  without  it.  No  matter  how  powerful  may  be  the  mo- 
tives in  other  forms  of  exhibition,  to  promote  the  harmony  and 
well-being  of  the  domestic  circle — no  matter  how  strong  the 


4  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

mutual  affections  which  prevail,  nor  how  wise  and  good  the 
counsels  and  advice  which  are  given,  it  would  all  be  naught, 
were  there  no  law,  no  authority,  no  calling  to  account,  no 
retribution,  that  is,  no  moral  government.  Why  is  this?  Let 
the  appeal  be  made  to  any  parent  who  has  the  heart  of  a 
parent.  Why  is  it,  that  he  governs  his  children  by  authority; 
why  assume  this  prerogative  as  unquestionable?  Is  it,  that  he 
takes  pleasure  in  so  doing  for  its  own  sake  ?  Is  it,  that  he 
loves  for  its  own  sake,  to  restrain  their  liberty,  to  cross  their 
inclinations  and  often  to  inflict  suffering?  Or,  is  it  because 
he  knows  their  incompetence  to  govern  themselves  as  well  as 
lie  can  govern  them — because  he  knows  their  ignorance,  their 
passion,  their  waywardness,  and  because  he  knows,  that  he 
should  be  wanting  in  affection  and  a  due  parental  oversight 
and  guardianship,  if  he  did  not  do,  what  he  so  surely  knows  to 
be  for  the  best?  In  a  word,  is  it  not  because  he  knows  the 
necessity  to  the  well-being  of 'the  family ',  of  maintaining,  do  what 
else  he.  may,  parental  authority  f  What  parent,  what  child, 
what  human  being  does  not  understand  the  nature,  the  design, 
and  the  necessity  of  moral  government  ?  Who  does  not  know 
all  this,  as  it  results  from  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  as 
surely  as  he  knows  the  necessity  of  food  and  of  common  air, 
which  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  human  body? 

If  we  pass  from  the  family  to  the  state,  we  iind  the  same 
familiar  and  well-known  thing,  having  a  wider  range,  and  a 
higher  end  ;  though  more  rigorously  maintained  in  its  adminis- 
tration, and  more  fully  developed  in  its  nature  and  essential 
characteristics.  Born,  as  most  men  are  under  some  form  of 
civil  government,  they  learn  what  it  is  for  some  ruling  power 
to  exercise  authority  over  many,  as  the  necessary  means  of  a 
nation's  welfare.  Here  we  find  for  the  most  part  a  great  vari- 
ety of  statutes  and  enactments,  having  respect  to  the  overt 
doings  of  men,  but  all  based  on  one  fundamental  law;  all 
implying  its  existence,  and  its  supreme  obligation, — the  law  of 
subjection  to  the  powers  that  be.  We  find  a  sovereign  Will 
— a  Moral  Governor — and  the  great  fact  assumed,  conceded, 
and  acted  upon— the  absolute  necessity  of  authoritative  law — 
of  a  supreme  unquestionable  right  to  govern.  We  find  a 
necessity  of  it  to  the  existence  and  well-being  of  the  state — 
yea,  to  the  prevention  of  utter  anarchy  and  wretchedness — 
which  no  one  in  his  senses  can  doubt,  dispute  or  deny.     Sup- 


NECESSARY    TO    TITE    STATE.  5 

pose  what  else  we  may,  either  in  respect  to  him  who  governs 
or  those  who  are  governed ;  the  authority  of  law  must  be 
recognized  and  maintained,  or  all  is  lost.  Whatever  sacrifice 
may  be  involved — whatever  may  be  lost  or  gained,  this  one 
thing — this  indispensable  means  of  the  public  weal  must  be 
maintained.  And  who  does  not  understand  the  nature,  the  de- 
sign, the  necessity  of  civil  government  ?  Who  does  not  know, 
that  without  it  human  society  could  not  exist — much  less  attain 
any  tolerable  degree  of  prosperity  and  enjoyment?  What 
could  be  done  without  the  fundamental  law,  claiming  submis- 
sion to  authority — and  what  would  this  law  be  without  author- 
ity sustained  by  sanctions — without  judges,  courts,  trials,  ex- 
ecutive officers,  sentences  passed  and  executed,  and  a  sovereign 
will,  from  which  the  whole  emanates.* 

I  might  exhibit  the  same  thing,  as  it  shows  itself  and  its 
necessity,  in  lower  and  feebler  forms,  in  all  the  relations  of 
life.  In  our  friendships,  how  much  depends  on  the  discharge 
of  certain  duties ;  how  are  we  held  under  responsibility,  and 
failing  here,  how  are  we  judged  unworthy,  and  cast  away.  In 
neighborhood  intercourse,  in  private  circles,  in  the  forms  of 
politeness,  and  even  in  street  civilities,  who  does  not  know, 
what  it  is  to  be  responsible  to  the  will  of  another,  who  does  not 
know  that  in  these  matters  there  is  a  law,  that  a  record  is  kept, 
that  offenders  are  marked,  that  there  is  a  tribunal,  a  judgment 
and  a  retribution  ?  Indeed  were  there  two,  and  only  two  vol- 
untary beings  in  the  universe,  in  all  respects  equals  and  exist- 
ing together  for  their  mutual  well-being,  the  will  of  one  in 
certain  respects,  would  be  law  to  the  will  of  the  other,  involv- 
ing the  right  to  enforce  it,  and  with  power  involving  an 
actual  enforcement,  by  appropriate  sanctions.  It  is  the  right 
of  one  in  many  cases,  to  have  his  will  done  by  another ;  and, 
wherever  this  right  exists,  especially  with  power  to  enforce  it, 
we  have  an  exemplification  of  the  essential  characteristics  of 
moral  government,  whether  this  right  extends  to  an  individual, 
a  family,  an  empire  or  a  universe. 

We  all  know  then,  what  moral  government  is,  and  that  men 
cannot  exist  in  society  without  it.  In  that  form  of  it  called 
civil  government,  the  lowest  culprit  in  his  prison  knows  its 

*  In  a  representative  government,  I  need  hardly  say,  that  the  sovereign  will  is 
that  of  the  people  manifested  through  their  representatives. 


b  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

general  nature,  its  principles,  its  end,  and  its  absolute  neces- 
sity to  this  end,  as  well  as  the  judge  who  condemns  him.  Not 
one  of  us,if  we  could  not  rely  on  its  protection,  would  dare  to 
go  through  the  streets  of  our  city.  Without  moral  government, 
we  should  no  sooner  venture  into  human  society  than  venture 
into  a  den  of  wolves.  These  things  are  enough  to  show  how 
necessary  moral  government  is  to  man,  and  how  well  too  the 
thing  itself  is  understood  by  man. 

But  if  neither  parental  nor  civil  government  furnishes  a 
perfect  specimen  of  moral  government,  how  can  one  know  in 
what  its  perfection  consists  ;  or  what  such  a  government  would 
be  in  the  hands  of  a  Being  of  infinite  perfection  ? 

I  answer  that  we  are  able  to  trace  with  entire  accuracy  the 
essential  imperfections  of  every  human  specimen,  and  thus  to 
determine  what  is  essential  to  constitute  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment. Knowing  the  end  of  a  moral  government,  what  is 
fitted  to  defeat  it,  and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  what  is 
adapted  to  that  end  and  necessary  to  it,  we  can  to  tin's  extent 
decide,  what  is  not  and  what  is,  essential  to  the  perfection  of 
such  a  system.  Man  may  not  be  qualified  to  give  absolute 
perfection  to  such  a  system,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  he  can- 
not conceive  of  its  perfection.  Suppose  that  an  absolutely 
perfect  watch  has  never  been  made,  and  never  can  be  by  man, 
does  it  therefore  follow,  that  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  such 
perfection  as  within  the  reach  of  the  power  and  skill  which  man 
does  not  possess  ;  or  that  man  himself  cannot  specify  the  very 
changes  in  the  materials  or  the  structure,  which  would  give  it 
absolute  perfection?  What  is  supposable  in  such  a  case,  we 
claim  to  be  true  in  that  under  consideration.  We  are  so  well 
acquainted  with  the  subject,  that  we  know  wherein  the  imper- 
fection in  the  work  of  man  consists,  and  can  trace  it  to  its  cause. 
We  know  so  well,  what  are  the  true  object  and  end  of  a  moral 
government,  we  know  so  well  that  by  some  things  that  end 
must  be  defeated,  and  we  know  so  well  that  other  things  are 
perfectly  adapted  to  secure  that  end ;  we  know  so  well  wherein 
all  human  forms  of  moral  government  are  imperfect,  and  so 
well  that  such  deficiencies  could  not  mar  a  moral  government 
in  the  hands  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being ;  we  know  so  well 
what  are  the  principles  of  moral  action,  and  what  are  the 
means  most  perfectly  fitted  to  influence  moral  beings — in 
short,  we  know  so  many  things,  that  we  can  be  at  no  loss 


IS    AN    INFLUENCE    ON    MORAL    BEINGS.  7 

to  decide  what  a  moral  government  must  be  in  all  essential 
respects,  when  administered  by  a  perfect  God. 

I  am  not  saying,  that  we  can  tell  all  that  God  will  or  will 
not  do  in  such  an  administration,  but  that  we  can  decide  what 
he  will  and  will  not  do,  in  certain  important  and  essential 
respects.  I  hope  to  show  you,  that  there  is  truth  on  this  sub- 
ject which  man  can  know,  and  from  which,  in  its  bearings  on 
his  immortal  interests  he  cannot  escape,  and  that  while  there  is 
such  a  God  as  Jehovah  is  clearly  revealed,  we  are  not  doomed 
to  look  out  on  his  ways  and  his  doings  as  on  chaos  and  dark- 
ness, but  that,  with  an  effulgence  as  broad  as  his  own  creation, 
and  as  clear  as  the  light  which  is  poured  over  it,  he  shows  an 
end  and  a  system  of  means  worthy  of  such  an  author — a  moral 
creation,  comprising  beings  made  in  his  own  image,  with  ten- 
dencies and  sure  results  that  will  "  answer  the  great  idea  of 
him  who  made  it." 

I  assume,  then,  what  I  shall  hereafter  attempt  to  prove, 
and  what  is  properly  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  explanation, 
that  a  moral  system,  or  a  community  of  moral  beings,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  any  other  system  not  moral,  is  the  best  means 
of  the  best  end,  and  that  a  perfect  moral  government  over 
such  a  community  is  the  necessary  means  of  accomplishing 
this  end,  and  is  therefore  dictated  and  demanded  by  perfect 
benevolence.  I  now  propose  to  define  and  explain  what  I 
intend  by  a  perfect  moral  government;  and  to  justify  the 
definition. 

By  a  perfect  moral  government  I  intend — 

The  influence  of  the  authority,  or  of  the  rightful 
authority  of  a  moral  governor  on  moral  beings,  designed  so 
to  control  their  action  as  to  secure  the  great  end  of  action 
on  their  part,  through  the  medium  of  law. 

In  explaining  and  justifying  this  definition,  I  propose  to 
consider  the  several  parts  of  it,  more  or  less  extensively,  as  the 
case  may  seem  to  require. 

I.  A  moral  government  is  an  influence  on  moral  beings,  or, 
on  beings  capable  of  moral  action. 

While  this  will  be  readily  admitted,  there  are  some  things 
involved  in  it,  which  demand  consideration.  One  is,  that  the 
influence  of  moral  government  being  an  influence  on  moral 
beings  and  designed  to  control  moral  action,  is  as  diverse  in 
its  nature  from  the  influence  of  physical  causes,  as  moral 


8  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

action  is  from  a  physical  effect ;  or  as  a  moral  cause  is  from  a 
physical  cause.  It  is  an  influence,  which  is  designed  aud 
fitted  to  give,  not  the  necessity,  but  merely  the  certainty  of  its 
effect;  and  which  leaves  the  moral  liberty  of  the  subject 
unimpaired.  Hence,  it  is  not  essential  to  this  influence  that  it 
actually  secure  the  kind  of  action  which  it  is  fitted  to  secure. 
A  perfect  moral  government  may  exist  with  all  its  influence, 
and  yet  be  wholly  counteracted  in  its  designed  effect  on  its 
subjects,  since  it  is  obvious  that  such  a  government  may  be 
maintained  over  subjects  in  revolt  as  well  as  over  subjects  who 
are  loyal.  Rebellion  against  government,  cannot  exist  when 
there  is  no  government.  A  perfect  moral  government  then,  as 
a  government  over  moral  beings,  in  respect  to  any  cause  of 
action  giving  the  necessity  of  action,  leaves  every  subject  as 
free  to  perform  the  action  which  it  aims  to  prevent,  as  to  per- 
form that  which  it  aims  to  secure. 

II.  A  perfect  moral  government  implies  a  moral  gov- 
ernor. 

In  this  respect  a  moral  government  differs  from  a  moral  sys- 
tem, as  a  species  differs  from  a  genus.  A  moral  system  may 
be  conceived  to  exist  either  with  or  without  a  moral  governor. 
We  can  conceive  of  moral  beings,  who  should  act  under  the 
direct  influence  of  motives,  so  far  as  these  reach  the  mind  in 
the  perceived  nature,  tendencies  and  consequences  of  action, 
though  there  were  no  influence  of  a  superior  being  sustaining 
the  relation  of  a  ruler  or  moral  governor.  The  direct  influence 
of  motives,  as  these  are  thus  apprehended  by  the  mind,  and 
that  influence  which  results  from  the  character  and  relation 
of  a  moral  governor,  though  different,  may  yet  coexist ;  and 
either  may  be  supposed  to  exist  without  the  other.  The 
former  without  the  latter  would  simply  imply  a  moral  system 
without  a  moral  government.  The  latter  with  or  without 
the  former,  would  imply  a  moral  system  in  that  particular 
form  which  includes  a  moral  government.  The  peculiar  influ- 
ence therefore,  which  arises  from  the  character  and  relation  of 
a  moral  governor,  whether  other  influences  combine  with  it  or 
not,  is  the  essential  constituting  influence  of  moral  govern- 
ment. So  far  as  moral  beings  act  under  the  peculiar  influen- 
ces of  a  moral  governor,  so  far  and  no  farther,  do  they  act 
under  the  influence  of  moral  government. 

III.  The  influence  of  a  perfect  moral  government  is  designed 


PROMOTES    THE    GREAT    END    OF    ACTION".  9 

so  to  control  the  action  of  moral  beings,  as  to  secure  the  great 
end  of  action  on  their  part. 

It  will  be  admitted  that  this  influence  is  designed  to  control 
the  action  of  moral  beings  in  relation  to  some  end  which 
depends  on  their  action  in  a  community  of  such  beings,  and 
which  is  the  best  end,  and  in  this  sense  the  great  end  of  such 
action.  What  then,  is  this  end  ?  I  answer — It  is  the  produc- 
tion of  well-being,  even  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and  the 
prevention  of  misery,  even  the  highest  misery  of  all.  A  moral 
being  is  capable  of  performing  two  and  only  two  kinds  of 
moral  action,  and  as  a  subject  of  moral  government,  is  under 
an  absolute  necessity  of  performing  one  or  the  other  in  all 
action.  He  cannot,  as  a  moral  being,  be  inactive.  His  nature 
and  relations  necessarily  exclude  alike  inaction  and  all  neu- 
trality of  action,  or  action  in  which  he  does  not  act  morally. — 
Again,  the  nature — the  peculiar  powers  and  properties  of  a  moral 
being — show  that  he  is  qualified  to  perform,  what  no  other 
being  is  qualified  to  perform — that  kind  of  action,  which  tends 
to  produce  the  best  conceivable  end  of  all  action,  the  highest 
conceivable  well-being  of  all  sentient  beings,  both  of  himself  and 
of  all  others.  It  is  this  nature  of  a  moral  being,  which  gives 
to  his  existence  its  peculiar  value — its  pre-eminent  worth,  com- 
pared with  the  nature  of  any  other  being.  It  is  this,  which,  as 
a  creature,  raises  man  to  companionship  with  his  Creator  and 
with  creatures  the  most  exalted,  and  brings  him  under  obliga- 
tion to  act  with  them  in  principle,  in  purpose  and  in  all  sub- 
ordinate and  executive  doings,  for  the  accomplishment  of  the 
great  end  of  all  action  here  on  earth,  and  amid  the  scenes 
of  eternity. 

Exalted  thus  by  his  nature  as  a  moral  being,  he  is  by  the 
same  nature  qualified  to  act  in  a  manner  which  tends  to 
defeat  the  great  end  of  his  creation,  and  to  bring  on  himself 
and  on  all  other  beings,  unmingled  and  perfect  misery.  And, 
what  adds  inconceivable  importance  to  such  a  being  is,  that  he 
cannot  avoid,  as  we  have  said,  acting  in  one  or  the  other  of 
these  two  modes  of  acting  now  specified.  Even  in  every  sub- 
ordinate action,  he  acts  from  principle,  he  acts  with  or  in  the 
form  of,  a  supreme  elective  preference.  These  existing  to- 
gether are  often  called  his  action ;  and  its  tendency  as  moral 
action  is  the  tendency  of  his  action  in  its  principle ;  or  rather, 
l* 


10  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

the  tendency  of  the  action  in  principle  is  its  true  tendency.* 
To  neglect  to  act  in  that  mode  which  is  fitted  to  secure  the 
great  and  true  end  of  all  action  on  his  part,  viz.,  the  highest 
well-being  of  all — is  not  only  to  sacrifice  and  defeat  that  end, 
but  it  is  necessarily  to  act  in  that  mode,  which  in  its  true  ten- 
dency is  fitted  to  produce  the  opposite  result — the  highest 
misery  of  all. 

Every  thing  of  real  significance  in  the  being  of  a  moral 
agent,  viewed  in  relation  to  himself  and  to  other  beings,  every 
thing  virtuous  and  praiseworthy  in  the  use  of  his  exalted  pow- 
ers, every  thing  vicious  and  blamable  in  the  abuse  of  them, 
every  thing  that  is  dignified  and  honorable,  every  thing  that 
is  mean  and  disgraceful,  every  thing  that  affords  inward  peace 
and  triumph,  every  thing  that  brings  remorse  and  despair — 
every  good  and  every  evil  to  himself  and  to  others — all,  all 
depends  on  action.  The  highest  happiness  and  the  highest 
misery  of  all,  all  that  blesses  and  all  that  curses,  life  and 
death,  are  in  the  power  of  action.  Such  issues,  according  to 
the  true  nature  and  tendencies  of  things,  depend  on  the  action 
of  moral  beings. 

Here,  then,  the  design  of  a  perfect  moral  government  is 
manifest.  The  design  of  the  pendulum  of  a  clock  to  control 
and  direct  its  motion,  so  as  to  mark  the  divisions  of  time  as 
the  true  end  of  the  machine,  is  not  more  obvious  than  is  the 
design  of  a  perfect  moral  government  so  to  control  the  action 
of  moral  beings,  as  to  secure  the  great  end  of  action  on  their 
part,  viz.,  the  production  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and 
the  prevention  of  the  highest  misery  of  all. 

IY.  The  influence  of  a  perfect  moral  government  is  the 
influence  of  authority. 

By  the  influence  of  authority,  I  mean  that  influence  which 
results  from  that  right  to  command,  which  is  founded  in  com- 
petence and  disposition  to  govern  in  the  best  manner,  and 
which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey.  In  other  words,  it  is 
the  influence  of  a  right  to  command  which  imposes  an  ob- 

*  A  man  may,  in  subordinate  action,  love  his  children,  and  seek  their  temporal 
welfare.  But  if  in  so  doing,  he  prefers  as  he  may,  this  welfare  of  his  children,  or 
any  other  limited  good,  to  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  then  his  action  as  a  whole 
tends  to  destroy  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and  to  produce  their  highest  misery. 
For  such  action  is  essentially  constituted  by  a  principle,  which  would  produce  this 
twofold  result,  rather  than  sacrifice  the  welfare  of  the  children. 


IS    THE    INFLUENCE    OF    AUTHORITY.  11 

ligation  to  obey,  as  this  right  results  from  competence  and 
disposition  to  give  and  maintain  the  best  law.  Intelligent 
voluntary  beings  never  act  voluntarily  without  acting  from 
a  regard  to  their  own  well-being.  Instead  however,  of  re- 
lying wholly,  or  even  partially  on  their  own  wisdom  or 
judgment,  in  respect  to  the  best  mode  of  action,  or  the  mode 
in  which  they  ought  to  act,  they  may  rely  partially  or  even 
wholly  on  the  decision  of  superior  wisdom  and  superior  good- 
ness. It  is  true, that  the  subjects  of  a  moral  government  may 
possess  such  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  action 
on  their  part,  as  to  know,  irrespectively  of  any  decision  of  the 
moral  governor,  that  their  own  highest  well-being  as  well  as 
that  of  all  others  can  be  secured  only  by  conformity  to  the 
law  of  his  government.  In  this  way  natural  good  and  evil 
as  directly  known  to  result  from  the  nature  and  tendency  of 
different  kinds  of  action,  may  concur  with  the  influence  of  au- 
thority to  secure  their  conformity  to  the  law.  But  in  that  con- 
formity to  law  which  is  secured  by  the  single  influence  of 
natural  good  and  evil  as  motives,  there  is  no  recognition  of  the 
moral  governor's  authority.  The  influence  of  authority  is  not 
the  direct  influence  of  natural  good  and  evil  reaching  the  mind 
through  the  known  nature  and  tendency  of  action.  It  is  that 
influence  which  results  from  one's  having  a  right  to  command 
by  virtue  of  the  superior  power,  wisdom  and  goodness,  which 
qualify  him  to  govern  in  the  best  manner.  So  far  as  this  in- 
fluence reaches  moral  beings,  whether  resisted  or  unresisted 
by  them,  they  are  under  the  influence  of  moral  government. 
Where  this  influence  does  not  exist,  there  is  nothing  which 
can  be  called  moral  government. 

Of  the  truth  of  the  present  position,  the  slightest  attention 
to  the  subject  will  satisfy  us.  If  we  suppose  a  parent  or  a 
civil  ruler  to  be  without  that  right  to  command  which  imposes 
an  obligation  to  obey,  we  cannot  regard  him  as  having  author- 
ity, or  as  administering  a  moral  government — or  at  most  only 
in  pretense.  Nor  can  we  suppose  one  to  possess  this  right 
and  exercise  it  through  the  medium  of  law,  without  admitting 
the  existence  of  that  which  is  called  a  moral  government.  It 
is  then,  this  influence — the  influence  that  results  from  the 
right  to  command  which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey,  which 
is  an  essential  element  of  moral  government.  This  is  the  in- 
fluence of  authority. 


12  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

The  nature  of  this  influence  will  be  more  manifest  if  we 
look  at  the  basis  or  source  of  the  right,  viz.,  the  competence 
and  disposition  of  one  to  govern  in  the  best  manner.  These 
qualifications  vest  him  with  the  right  to  govern,  as  they  fur- 
nish or  constitute  the  evidence  or  proof  that  he  will  govern  in 
the  best  manner,  or  that  his  law  is  the  best  law,  and  will  be 
sustained  as  a  decisive  rule  of  action  to  subjects.  Such  a  gov- 
ernor ought  to  be  obeyed.  Moral  obligation  is  the  binding 
influence  of  that  necessitv,  which  a  moral  bein^  is  under  of 
performing  that  action  which  is  decisively  proved  to  be  the 
best  action,  or  to  be  best  fitted  to  the  great  end  of  all  action 
on  his  part,  viz.,  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  both  of  others 
and  of  himself.  Xow  the  competence  and  disposition  of  the 
moral  governor  to  give  and  maintain  the  best  law,  is  decisive 
proof  that  the  law  which  he  gives  is  the  best  law,  and  that  the 
action  which  he  requires  is  the  best  fitted  to  the  great  end  of 
all  action,  and  as  such  is  the  best  and  necessary  means  of  the 
best  end.  These  qualifications  of  the  moral  governor  there- 
fore, as  decisive  proof  that  he  will  govern  in  the  best  manner, 
become  a  ground  of  obligation  on  the  part  of  subjects  to  obey 
his  law. 

It  is  true  that  the  subject,  in  submitting  to  the  influence  of 
authority,  acts  from  a  desire  of  the  highest  well-being  of  others 
and  of  himself,  as  truly  as  he  would,  were  he  influenced  by 
the  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  action  irrespect- 
ively of  the  influence  of  authority.  The  two  influences  may 
and  often  do  coexist.  Still,  they  are  different  influences.  If 
the  nature  and  tendency  of  action,  as  directly  apprehended 
by  the  mind,  or  learned  by  experience,  may  be  one  kind  of 
evidence,  the  character  of  an  infinitely  perfect  lawgiver  may 
be  another  kind  of  evidence  that  the  action  required  is  the 
best  kind  of  action.  If  evidence  from  both  sources  exists, 
then  the  highest  evidence  supposable  in  the  case  exists.  If, 
however,  we  suppose  the  evidence  from  the  character  of  the 
lawgiver  only  exists,  this  is  sufficient  and  decisive  evidence 
that  the  action  required  by  his  law  is  the  best  action,  and 
ought  to  be  done.  That  this  evidence  is  peculiarly  fitted  to 
impress  the  human  mind,  when  compared  with  any  other,  we 
may  have  occasion  to  show  hereafter.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the 
exclusive  competence  and  disposition  of  the  moral  governor 
to  give  and  maintain  the  best  law  being  fully  evinced,  consti- 


THE    RIGHT    OF    THE    GOVERNOR.  13 

tute  sufficient  and  decisive  proof  that  the  law  requires  the 
best  kind  of  action.  This  fact  being  established,  the  necessity 
of  the  action  required  to  the  great  end  of  all  action,  viz.,  the 
highest  well-being  of  all,  is  also  established.  This  necessity 
of  the  action  required,  results  in  the  obligation  of  the  agent 
to  perform  the  action.  Without  the  manifest  necessity  of  the 
action  to  the  great  end  of  all  action,  nothing  can  be  conceived 
to  be  true  of  it  which  can  bind  the  agent  to  its  performance. 
With  the  necessity  of  the  action  to  this  end,  nothing  can  be 
conceived  to  set  aside  his  obligation  to  its  performance.  So 
far  therefore,  as  there  is  any  thing  in  respect  to  the  character 
or  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor,  which  creates  obligation 
to  obedience  on  the  part  of  subjects,  it  is  the  manifestation  of 
his  competence  and  disposition  to  govern  in  the  best  manner, 
as  a  proof  that  he  will  so  govern. 

In  opposition  to  the  view  now  maintained,  the  right  to  gov- 
ern is  supposed  by  some  to  rest  on  other  grounds  than  com- 
petence and  disposition  to  govern  in  the  best  manner.  Thus, 
the  right,  in  certain  cases,  is  supposed  to  rest  on  some  peculiar 
relation.  For  example,  the  right  of  the  parent  to  govern  his 
children,  is  supposed  to  rest  simply  on  the  relation  of  the  pa- 
rent. This  is  obviously  mistaking  the  evidence  of  the  right 
for  the  basis  of  the  right.  Every  such  general  doctrine  or 
truth  as  that  now  referred  to,  must  be  determined  by  some 
general  principle.  The  general  principle,  that  parents  will 
govern  their  children  better  than  others  will  govern  them,  is 
justly  inferred  from  the  parental  relation,  and  is  therefore,  the 
true  basis  or  ground  of  the  parents'  right.  This  is  obvious  ; 
for  if  we  reverse  the  principle — if  wTe  adopt  the  principle 
that  others  than  parents  will  govern  children  better  than  pa- 
rents, the  right  to  govern  them  would  rest  in  other  hands. 
Again,  it  is  often  maintained  that  the  right  of  a  Creator  to 
govern  his  creatures,  rests  simply  on  his  relation  as  their  Crea- 
tor. The  error  in  this  case  must  be  obvious  to  every  one  who 
distinguishes  this  single  relation  from  the  moral  character  of 
a  Creator.  If  we  suppose  him,  then,  to  be  a  selfish  or  malig- 
nant being,  having  only  the  designs  of  such  a  being  to  accom- 
plish by  the  conduct  of  his  creatures,  how  could  the  mere  act 
of  creation  give  him  the  right  to  govern  ?  He  could  not  possess 
even  the  right  to  create  beings  for  his  own  selfish  purposes ; 
how  then,  could  submission  to  the  will  of  such  a  Creator  be  the 


14:  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

duty  of  his  creatures  ?*  It  is  true  that  the  act  of  creation 
may  by  its  effects  be  supposed  to  evince  the  goodness  of  the 
Creator,  and  so  become  evidence  of  his  qualification  to  govern 
in  the  best  manner,  and  the  ground  of  his  rightful  authority. 
But  the  act  of  creation  may  also  by  its  effects  be  supposed  to 
evince  the  malignity  of  the  Creator,  or  to  leave  his  designs 
and  his  character  in  concealment  and  in  doubt.  The  act  of 
creation  does  not  necessarily  involve  his  goodness.  The  act 
of  creation  therefore,  simply  considered,  cannot  be  an  ade- 
quate basis  for  the  right  to  govern. 

To  sustain  the  right  of  civil  jurisdiction,  various  expedients 
have  been  resorted  to,  all  of  which  confirm  the  view  now  main- 
tained. Thus  "  the  divine  right  of  kings"  has  been  a  favorite 
doctrine ;  and  to  exhibit  and  enforce  the  right  to  rule,  civil  rulers 
have  assumed  the  exalted  titles  of  "  sacred  majesty,"  "  God's 
vice-regent,"  "  God's  anointed,"  "  God's  representative  ;" 
have  claimed  descent  from  gods,  and  exacted  divine  worship, 
and  have  pretended  to  have  secret  intercourse  with  some  di- 
vinity, or  to  be  gods  themselves.  All  this  clearly  betrays  the 
principle  now  maintained,  as  that  which  in  the  view  of  those 
who  govern  and  of  those  who  are  governed,  is  the  true  basis 
of  the  right  to  govern. 

Some  evidently  rest  the  right  to  govern  by  law  simply  on 
the  power  to  execute  its  sanctions.  This  theory  obviously 
places  the  entire  influence  of  moral  government  in  the  influ- 
ence of  natural  good  and  of  natural  evil,  as  the  one  is  prom- 
ised to  obedience  and  the  other  threatened  to  disobedience  ; 
viewed  only  as  motives  to  persuade  to  the  one  and  dissuade 
from  the  other.  According  to  this  view,  might  gives  right, 
and  the  veriest  tyrant  with  power  to  execute  the  sanctions  of 
law,  combined  with  the  most  fell  malignity,  has  a  righteous 
claim  for  the  unqualified  submission  of  his  subjects.  On  this 
scheme  there  can  be  no  fixed  standard,  no  permanent  and  es- 
sential elements  of  right  and  wrong  moral  action.  All  moral 
distinctions  are  subverted,  and  any  being  having  the  power, 
would  have  the  right  to  fill  the  universe  with  misery.  This 
monstrous  theory  of  moral  government  is  the  legitimate  con- 
sequence of  the  selfishness  of  this  selfish  world,  looking  only 
at  natural   good  and  evil  in  the  form  of  legal  reward  and 

*  Cicero  says,  that  all  religious  and  pious  affection  must  cease,  if  love  and  be- 
nevolence be  denied  to  God. — De  Nat.  Deorum  L,  144. 


THE    RIGHT    OF    TIIE    GOVERNOR.  15 

penalty,  as  the  only  motives  to  secure  obedience  and  prevent 
disobedience  to  law.  No  account  is  made  of  the  essential  ele- 
ment of  a  moral  government,  the  influence  of  authority.  The 
right  to  govern,  which  results  from  competence  and  disposition 
to  govern  in  ttie  best  maimer — the  right  which  imposes  an  ob- 
ligation to  obey,  is  unknown,  and  obedience  and  disobedience 
to  a  moral  governor  as  having  this  right,  are  impossible. 

EEMAEK. 

In  view  of  the  nature  of  rightful  authority,  how  desirable  it 
is  that  men  should  be  placed  under  this  influence. 


WHAT  IS  A  PERFECT  MORAL  GOVERNMENT? 


LECTURE     II. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law. — 
The  nature  of  such  a  law. 
First,  It  is  a  decisive  rule  of  action  to  subjects. 

Secondly,  It  must  require  benevolence  as  the  best  kind  of  action,  and  must  forbid  selfishness 
as  the  worst  kind  of  action. 
Viewed  in  relation  to  these  objects,  and  to  the  agent  who  exercises  them,  these  affections  are 
supreme,  intelligent,  morally  free,  permanent,  and  predominant. 

I  have  said  that  a  moral  government  is — I.  An  influence  on 
moral  beings  ;  II.  That  it  implies  a  moral  governor  ;  III.  That 
it  is  designed  so  to  control  the  action  of  moral  beings,  as  to 
secure  the  great  end  of  action  on  their  part ;  IY.  That  it  is 
the  influence  of  authority.     I  now  proceed  to  say — 

Y.  That  a  perfect  moral  government  involves  the  exercise 
of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law. 

Here  the  question  arises,  what  is  law — the  law  of  a  perfect 
moral  government  f 

Generally  speaking,  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government, 
is  the  will  of  the  moral  governor  concerning  the  action  of  his 
subjects,  promulgated  as  an  authoritative  and  perfect  rule  of 
action  to  them.  In  this  general  answer  to  the  question,  there 
would  be  perhaps  a  universal  agreement  in  opinion,  while 
in  respect  to  its  particular  import,  there  might  be  diversity. 
Hence  the  question  demands  an  answer  in  several  important 
particulars.     I  proceed,  then,  to  say — 

That  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government,  is  the  promul- 
gated will  of  the  moral  governor,  as  a  decisive  rule  of  action 
to  his  subjects,  requiring  benevolence  on  their  part  as  the  best 
hind  of  action,  and  as  the  sum  of  obedience,  forbidding  selfish- 
ness on  their  part  as  the  worst  hind  of  action  and  the  sum  of 
disobedience,  expressing  his  preference  of  the  action  required  to 
its  opposite  all  things  considered,  his  satisfaction  with  obedience 
and  with  nothing  but  obedience  on  the  part  of  subjects,  and  his 


THE    LAW    A    DECISIVE    RULE.  17 

highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  highest  disapprobation  of 
disobedience;  and  including  the  appropriate  sanctions  of  the 
moral  governor's  authority. 

This  definition  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government,  I 
shall  attempt  to  support  in  the  following  particular  propo- 
sitions : 

1.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  is  the  promulgated 
will  of  the  moral  governor  as  a  decisive  rule  of  action  to  his 
subjects.  The  will  of  the  moral  governor  must  be  promul- 
gated, that  it  may  be  known  by  the  subject,  since  there  can  be 
no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  latter  to. obey  the  will  of  the 
former,  if  it  cannot  be  known.  At  the  same  time,  the  will 
of  the  lawgiver  being  clearly  promulgated,  ignorance  of  the 
law  becomes  voluntary,  and  can  be  no  excuse  for  disobedi- 
ence. This  will  must  be  promulgated  as  a  decisive  ride  of 
action  to  subjects.  Beings  who  have  the  prerogative  of  decid- 
ing the  question  of  duty  for  themselves  irrespectively  of  the 
decision  or  will  of  another,  are  not  under  law  to  another.  A 
rule  of  action  propounded  to  others  for  consideration,  leaving 
the  question  of  duty  wholly  to  their  judgment  of  the  nature 
and  tendency  of  action,  is  not  a  law.  Law  differs  widely  from 
wholesome  counsel  or  good  advice ;  and  one  of  its  essential 
characteristics  is,  that  it  is  a  rule  of  action,  determining  what 
ought  to  be  done.  Without  this  conception  of  a  rule  of  action, 
that  of  law  cannot  be  formed.  Law,  therefore,  instead  of  leav- 
ing the  question  of  duty  to  the  judgment  of  its  subjects,  to  be 
founded  on  other  evidence,  is  an  authoritative  decision  of  the 
question,  from  which  there  is  no  appeal. 

This  conception  of  law  is  founded  in  the  truth  of  things. 
The  right  to  command  which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey, 
results  from  competence  and  disposition  to  give  and  maintain 
the  best  law.  When  a  rightful  sovereign  therefore,  in  the 
form  of  promulgated  law  decides  what  the  subject  ought  to  do, 
the  right  of  the  subject  to  rejudge  the  decision,  or  to  decide 
for  himself,  is  wholly  superseded.  Whatever  other  rights 
real  or  imaginary,  the  subject  may  be  supposed  to  possess  in 
other  circumstances,  as  a  subject  of  law,  he  can  possess  none 
which  is  inconsistent  with  this  right  of  the  sovereign.  The 
right  to  rule  vests  in  him,  because  its  exercise  by  him  is  neces- 
sary to  the  general  good.  As  the  subject  then,  can  possess  no 
right  inconsistent  with  the  general  good,  so  he  can  possess 


18    MORAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  ABSTRACT. 

none  inconsistent  with  that  right  of  the  sovereign,  which  is 
demanded  by  the  general  good.  He  cannot  therefore  even 
raise  the  question  of  duty,  without  usurping  a  right  which  he 
has  not — nay  more,  without  invading  a  right  which  pertains 
exclusively  to  the  sovereign — one  of  the  most  sacred  and  invi- 
olable of  all  rights,  the  right  of  deciding  that  action  or  conduct 
of  subjects,on  which  the  highest  well-being  of  each  and  of  all 
depends.  To  suppose  otherwise,is  to  divest  the  law  of  a  right- 
ful sovereign  of  its  peculiar  and  essential  characteristic  as  a 
rule  of  action,  and  to  degrade  it  to  the  level  of  mere  advice. 
It  is  to  commit  the  question  of  what  ought  to  be  done  by  the 
subject, to  the  incompetent  judgment  and  self-will  of  one  who 
is  bound  to  conform  his  decision  to  that  of  unerring  wisdom 
and  goodness.  It  is  to  suppose,  that  the  subject  of  the  best 
law  is  not  bound  to  obey  it,  but  has  a  right  to  disobey  it,  and 
to  make  war  on  the  general  good.  Law  then,  the  law  of  a 
perfect  moral  government,  decides — settles  the  question  of 
duty  on  the  part  of  its  subjects,  by  superseding  absolutely  and 
wholly  the  right  of  decision  on  their  part. 

2.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  must  require  be- 
nevolence as  the  best  kind  of  action,  and  forbid  selfishness  as 
the  worst  kind  of  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings. 

The  general  proposition,  that  benevolence  is  the  best  kind 
of  action,  and  selfishness  the  worst  kind  of  action  conceivable 
on  the  part  of  moral  beings,  can  scarcely  be  supposed  to  need 
the  support  of  formal  argument.  In  this  general  view  of  the 
two  kinds  of  action  however,  the  mind,  we  think,  but  imper- 
fectly appreciates  the  intrinsic  worth  of  the  one  as  moral 
worth,  and  the  intrinsic  evil  of  the  other  as  moral  evil.  A 
thorough  and  sucessful  analysis  of  the  essential  elements 
which  constitute  the  one  the  best,  and  the  other  the  worst 
kind  of  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings,  will,  I  think, 
greatly  serve  to  heighten  our  estimate  of  the  moral  worth, 
excellence,  and  rectitude  of  the  one,  and  of  the  moral  evil, 
pravity,  and  turpitude  of  the  other,  and  thus  reveal  more  dis- 
tinctly to  our  admiration  the  attractive  lineaments  and  clus- 
tering beauties  of  the  one,  and  to  our  abhorrence  the  repulsive 
aspect  and  manifold  deformities  of  the  other. 

It  is  proposed  then,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  a  per- 
fect moral  government  must  require  benevolence,  and  forbid 
selfishness  on  the  part  of  its  subjects,  to  show,  by  unfolding 


MORAL    PREFERENCES    SUPREME.  19 

some  of  the  essential  elements  of  these  only  two  kinds  of 
moral  action,  that  the  one  is  the  best  and  the  other  the  worst 
kind  of  action  conceivable  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  inas- 
much as  one  is  perfectly  or  in  the  highest  degree  fitted  to 
prevent  the  highest  misery,  and  to  produce  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  and  of  the  agent  himself; 
and  the  other  is  perfectly  or  in  the  highest  degree  fitted  to 
prevent  the  highest  well-being,  and  to  produce  the  highest 
misery  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  and  of  the  agent  himself. 

I  propose  to  consider  these  different  acts  of  a  moral  being : 

(1.)  As  they  are  related  to  other  sentient  beings  than  the 
agent /  and, 

(2.)  As  they  are  related  to  the  agent  himself. 

Let  us,  then,  contemplate  these  acts — 

(1.)  As  they  are  related  to  other  sentient  beings  than  the 
agent. 

I  here  remark — 

In  the  first  place,  that  each  of  these  acts  is  a  supreme  affec- 
tion ;  in  other  words,  it  is  an  elective  preference  of  its  object 
as  supreme.  By  this,  I  mean  to  distinguish  each  of  these 
acts,  not  only  from  the  other  characteristics  flbove  specified, 
and  from  all  involuntary  or  constitutional  preferences,  but 
even  from  all  subordinate  and  executive  preferences  which  are 
voluntary  or  elective. 

Benevolence  then,  as  the  act  of  a  moral  being,  is  an  elec- 
tive preference  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  sentient 
beings  as  his  supreme  object.  Selfishness,  as  the  act  of  a 
moral  being,  is  an  elective  preference  of  the  world,*  as  his 
supreme  object.  To  explain  further,  every  elective  preference 
of  an  object  as  supreme,  is  a  choice  between  those  objects  and 
those  only  which  can  come  into  competition  as  objects  of 
election  or  choice,  and  also  a  preference  of  every  object  which 
is  implied  in  or  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  supreme  ob- 
ject. Now,  with  the  object  of  the  benevolent  preference, 
viz.,  the  highest  good  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  the  highest 
good  of  the  agent  can  never  come  into  competition  as  an  ob- 


*  By  the  term  world,  I  here  mean  every  possible  good,  which  as  an  object  of 
choice  by  a  moral  being,  can  come  into  competition  with  the  highest  well-being,  and 
with  what  is  necessary  to  or  implied  in  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  sentient 
boings. 


20  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

ject  of  election  or  choice,  for  the  highest  well-being  of  the 
agent  depends  on  the  highest  well-being,  or  rather  on  his 
choice  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings.  But 
with  the  exception  of  his  own  highest  well-being,  and  with 
what  is  necessary  to  or  involved  in  it  (e.  g.,  his  own  virtue, 
which  cannot  be  an  object  of  choice*,)  every  other  good  to 
thdagent,  including  the  non-existence  of  evil  in  many  forms, 
even  all  worldly  good  can  come  into  competition  with  the 
highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings  as  an  object  of  prefer- 
ence. The  benevolent  preference  then,  is  not,  and  cannot  be 
a  preference  to  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings,  to 
the  agent's  own  highest  well-being,  nor  of  his  own  highest 
well-being  to  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings.  It  is 
a  preference  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings,  to 
all  other  good,  including  the  non-existence  of  all  evil,  which 
can  come  into  competition  with  their  highest  well-being  as  an 
object  of  choice.  In  this  preference  therefore,  the  agent  pre- 
fers the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings  to  any  and 
every  good,  including  the  non-existence  of  all  evil,  which  can 
be  preferred  by  him  to  their  highest  well-being.  It  is,  of 
course,  not  indeed  an  uninterested,  but  a  disinterested  affection, 
it  being  its  true  nature  and  tendency  as  a  benevolent  prefer- 
ence, to  sacrifice  all  good,  and  to  submit  to  and  incur  all 
evil,  on  his  part,  which  can  be  necessary  to  secure  the  high- 
est well-being  of  all  other  beings.  Nor  does  it  stop  here.  A 
moral  being,  in  preferring  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other 
sentient  beings  as  his  supreme  object,  prefers  every  thing  to 
its  opposite,  which  is  necessary  to  or  implied  in  the  existence 
of  this  object  of  his  preference.  Particularly  he  prefers  to 
its  opposite,  every  thing  in  their  condition  and  circumstances 
which  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  this  object,  especially 
the  perfect  virtue  of  all  other  moral  beings,  as  the  known  neces- 
sary means  of  their  highest  well-being.  He  also  prefers  to  their 
opposites,  the  non-existence  of  the  highest  misery,  and  of  all 
misery  or  unhappiness  on  the  part  of  all  others,  with  the  non- 
existence of  all  causes  and  means  of  these  evils ;  especially  he 
thus  prefers  the  non-existence  of  the  vice  or  wickedness  of  all 


*  One's  own  virtue  maybe  the  object  of  a  constitutional  preference  to  its  oppo- 
site, but  not  of  an  elective  preference  or  choice,  since  this  would  imply  the  absurdity 
of  choosing  his  choice. 


MORAL  P REFERENCES  SUPREME.         21 

other  moral  beings,  as  the  cause  or  means  of  their  highest 
misery.  Thus  we  see  the  perfect  adaptation  of  benevolence, 
considered  as  an  elective  preference  of  the  highest  well-being 
of  all  other  beings  as  supreme,  to  secure  this  object,  unclogged 
by  any  regard  of  the  agent  to  his  own  highest  well-being,  and 
to  any  less  happiness  on  his  part,  and  involving  a  preference 
to  its  opposite  of  every  thing  else  which  can  be  necessary  to, 
or  implied  in  the  existence  of  the  object  of  his  preference, 
the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  sentient  beings. 

We  shall  now  see,  that  from  the  nature  of  selfishness  as  an 
elective  preference  of  its  object  as  supreme,  the  facts  are  far 
otherwise.  With  the  object  of  the  sellish  preference,  viz.,  the 
world,  as  the  supreme  object,  the  highest  well-being  of  the 
agent,  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  and 
the  non-existence  of  the  highest  misery  of  all  such  beings, 
are  necessarily  in  competition  as  objects  of  choice.  The  agent 
in  preferring  the  world  as  his  supreme  object,  necessarily  pre- 
fers the  non-existence  of  his  own  highest  well-being  to  the  non- 
existence of  the  highest  well-being,  and  the  existence  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  to  the  absence  or 
non-existence  of  the  object  of  his  selfish  preference.  Nor  is 
this  all.  A  moral  being  in  preferring  the  world  as  his  supreme 
object,  necessarily  prefers  every  thing  else  to  its  opposite, 
which  can  be  necessary  to,  or  implied  in  the  attainment  of  his 
supreme  object.  He  therefore  prefers  to  its  opposite  every 
thing  in  the  condition  and  circumstances  of  all  other  sentient 
beings,  which  can  be  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  his  ob- 
ject ;  particularly  the  non-existence  of  the  perfect  virtue,  and 
the  existence  of  the  perfect  vice  or  wickedness  of  all  other 
moral  beings,  together  with  the  non-existence  of  all  other 
causes  or  means  of  their  happiness,  and  the  existence  of  all 
other  causes  or  means  of  their  unhappiness  or  misery,  to  the 
absence,  or  non-existence  of  his  supreme  object.  It  is  of 
course  the  true  tendency  of  the  selfish  preference  on  the  part 
of  a  moral  being,  to  destroy  all  good — all  happiness  and  the 
means  of  it,  and  to  produce  all  evil — all  misery  and  the  means 
of  it — on  the  part  of  all  other  sentient  beings,  which  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  the  object  of  the  preference. 

This  view  of  selfishness  as  a  principle  of  action  on  the  part 
of  a  moral  being,  is  abundantly  recognized  in  the  language  of 
common  life,  particularly  in  that  of  the  Scriptures.    (Yid.  Jas. 


22    MORAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  ABSTRACT. 

iv.  4.)*  It  places  its  object — the  world — above  every  other 
object  in  its  affections ;  and  will  therefore  destroy  the  highest 
good  and  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  if 
necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  object.  Though  it  may 
not  always  reveal  itself  in  the  form  of  malice  or  hate,  still  it 
lives  and  acts  in  the  mind  with  constant  and  reckless  neglect 
and  contempt,  and  therefore  with  practical  opposition  and 
hostility  to  all  other  good  than  its  own  object.  It  is,  of  course, 
as  a  principle  of  action,  nothing  but  a  principle  of  malevolence, 
in  the  only  true  and  essential  form  of  malevolence.  Such  is  it 
in  its  essential  nature ;  nor  is  it  less  odious  and  destructive  be- 
cause, though  it  assume  not  the  mere  terrific  form  of  infuriate 
malice  or  hate  in  its  overt  doings,  it  carries  on  its  work  with 
heartless  indifference  and  open  scorn  for  the  highest  good,  and 
the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings. 

Thus,  each  of  these  two  kinds  of  moral  action — benevolence 
and  selfishness — considered  simply  as  an  elective  preference  of 
its  object  as  supreme,  places  that  object  in  choice,  in  affection 
and  in  purpose,  above  every  other  object,  which  can  come  into 
competition  with  it  as  an  object  to  be  sought.  It  involves,  of 
course,  an  unqualified  determination — a  full  purpose  of  heart — 
to  sacrifice  any  good,  the  sacrifice  of  which,  and  to  produce  any 
evil,  the  production  of  which,  may  be  necessary  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  its  object.  At  the  same  time,  no  state  of  mind  on 
the  part  of  a  moral  being  is  of  such  sure  and  infallible  tendency 
as  a  cause,  to  go  out  into  the  full  production  of  its  effect,  as 
the  elective  preference  of  an  object  as  supreme.  ]STor  does  a 
moral  being  aim  at  or  seek  any  object  as  supreme,  except  in 
either  the  benevolent  or  the  selfish  preference.  All  other  acts 
of  will,  on  the  part  of  such  a  being  fix  on  their  objects  in  sub- 
servience to  the  accomplishment  of  his  supreme  object;  and 
therefore  terminate  in  these  objects.  It  is  only  in  the  elective 
preference  of  an  object  as  supreme,  that,  a  moral  being  so  fixes 
his  will  upon,  and  so  directs  his  affections  to  that  object — so 
concentrates  thought, and  desire,  and  feeling  upon  it,  as  to  be 
unqualifiedly  willing — even  fully  determined,  to  sacrifice  any 
and  every  good,  and  to  incur  any  and  every  evil  which  may 
be  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  that  object.     But  this  he 

*  "  The  friendship  of  the  world  is  enmity  against  God."  "  The  minding  of  the 
flesh  is  enmity  against  God." 


MORAL    PREFERENCES    INTELLIGENT.  23 

does  in  each  elective  preference  of  an  object  as  supreme,  Be- 
nevolence then,  as  an  elective  preference  of  its  object  as 
supreme,  is  in  one  respect  the  action  and  the  only  action  of  a 
moral  being,  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to  prevent  the  highest 
misery,  and  in  its  stead,  to  produce  the  highest  well-being  of 
all  other  sentient  beings  ;  and  selfishness,  as  an  elective  pref- 
erence of  its  object  as  supreme,  is,  in  one  respect,  the  action 
and  the  only  action  of  a  moral  being,  which  is  perfectly  fitted 
to  prevent  the  highest  well-being,  and  to  produce  the  highest 
misery  of  all  other  sentient  beings.  Benevolence,  then,  as  an 
elective  act,  and  as  related  to  other  beings,  is  the  best  kind  of 
action  in  this  respect,  and  selfishness  as  an  elective  act,  and 
as  related  to  other  beings,  is  in  this  respect,  the  worst  kind  of 
action  conceivable  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being. 

I  remark — 

In  the  second  place ;  that  each  of  these  moral  acts  is  an 
intelligent  preference  of  its  object  as  supreme.  By  this,  I 
mean,  that  in  each  of  these  elective  preferences,  the  mind  acts 
with  an  intellectual  apprehension  of  the  objects  of  its  choice. 
In  either  case,  the  will  and  the  affections  are  fixed  on  an  object 
as  supreme,  not  with  ignorance,  but  with  knowledge; — not 
amid  the  darkness  of  error,  but  under  the  light  of  truth.  The 
agent,  whether  he  acts  for  weal  or  for  woe,  knows  what  he  is 
doing.  lie  has  apprehended  the  twro  great  objects  of  moral 
choice,  their  nature,  relations  and  tendencies.  All  that  knowl- 
edge or  truth  can  do,  is  done.  He  knows  the  object  at 
which  he  aims,  in  distinction  from  that  at  which  he  does  not 
aim.  The  end  at  which  he  aims — the  end  to  be  accomplished, 
is  clearly  to  be  distinguished  from  the  end  not  to  be  accom- 
plished ;  and  is  ever  held  in  distinct  vision  before  him.  Thus 
every  conceivable  security  is  furnished,  that  his  supreme  ob- 
ject will  never  be  mistaken ; — that  his  supreme  object,  or  any 
thing  involved  in  or  necessary  to  its  existence,  will  not  be 
forgotten  or  lost  sight  of;  nor  in  any  way  neglected  by  being 
unthought  of  or  out  of  mind  ;  nor  that  the  opposite  object  will 
be  sought  in  its  stead.  What  higher  or  more  invaluable 
security  than  this,  can  be  given,  that  the  benevolent  prefer- 
ence will  act  for,  and  thus  accomplish  its  object — and  what 
higher  or  more  fearful  security  than  this,  that  the  selfish  pref- 
erence will  act  for,  and  thus  secure  its  object?  How  salutary 
and  excellent  the  intellectual  element  in  the  one;   how  de- 


24  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

structive  and  fatal  the  same  element  in  the  other !  And 
further — by  this  intellectual  element — this  adequate,  and  con- 
stant, and  sure  apprehension  of  the  object  of  the  preference, 
the  mind  is  prepared  to  decide  at  once,  to  a  vast  extent,  with 
its  prior  knowledge  of  subordinate,  executive  actions,  the  fit- 
ness of  such  action  to  promote  or  to  defeat  its  supreme  object. 
How  is  this  decision,  in  a  vast  majority  of  cases,  made  with  the 
quickness  of  instinct ;  and  on  this  account,  is  the  fitness  of  the 
benevolent  preference  to  good,  and  the  fitness  of  the  selfish 
preference  to  evil,  increased !  Thus  it  may  be  said,  that  all 
that  is  valuable  in  being  wise  to  do  good,  is  combined  ^in  the 
one,  and  all  that  is  destructive  in  being  wise  to  do  evil,  is  com- 
bined in  the  other,  as  each  is  an  intelligent  preference.  Indeed, 
were  it  not  so,  the  mind  could  have  no  supreme  object  or  end. 
It  would  have  no  steady  aim,  and  could  be  guided  by  nothing. 
It  would  be  like  a  ship  in  the  darkest  tempest,  without  helm 
or  compass  ;  while  this  constant  intellectual  apprehension  and 
aim  clears  away  every  cloud,  lights  up  the  star  of  direction, 
and  like  the  unerring  needle,  ascertains  and  guides  the  course. 
Being  thus  an  intelligent  act — combining  the  perfect  employ- 
ment of  the  intellect  for  its  own  purpose,  how  is  the  fitness  of 
each  moral  preference  to  secure  its  object,  perfected  in  another 
respect?  It  is  the  benignant  tendency  and  fitness  of  the  be- 
nevolent preference,  active  with  unqualified  and  unerring  aim 
for  its  object  in  the  light  of  truth;  and  it  is  the  malignant 
tendency  and  fitness  of  the  selfish  preference,  active  with  un- 
qualified and  unerring  aim  for  its  object,  under  the  same  light ! 
One  is  the  act  of  a  moral  being,  with  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil,  aiming  to  prevent  misery,  even  the  highest  misery, 
and  to  produce  the  highest  good  of  all  other  beings ;  the  other 
is  the  act  of  a  moral  being  with  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil, 
aiming  to  destroy  the  highest  good,  and  to  produce  the  high- 
est misery  of  all  other  beings  !  As  intelligent  action  then,  be- 
nevolence, in  another  respect,  is  the  best  kind  of  action,  and 
selfishness  the  worst  kind  of  action  conceivable  on  the  part  of 
a  moral  being. 

I  remark — 

In  the  third  place,  that  each  of  the  elective  preferences  un- 
der consideration,  is  a  morally  free  action.  A  moral  being 
has  power  to  make  either  of  these  preferences  in  the  circum- 
stances in  which  he  acts,  instead  of  the  other;  and  is  also 


MORAL    ACTS    PREVENT    THEIR    OPPOSITES.        25 

under  an  absolute  necessity  of  making  the  one  or  the  other. 
By  making  one  therefore,  he  prevents  the  other  in  the  only 
possible  way  of  preventing  it.  Now  each  of  these  elective 
preferences  has  its  peculiar  tendency — the  one  its  beneficial 
tendency,  the  other  its  destructive  tendency — considered  sim- 
ply as  an  elective  preference  of  its  object  as  supreme ;  and 
so  it  would  be,  though  the  actual  opposite  of  each  preference 
were  nothing  more  than  its  own  non-existence.  But  the 
actual  opposite  of  each  is  not  its  own  non-existence.  A 
morally  free  being  is  not  merely  under  the  necessity  of  mak- 
ing one  of  these  preferences  or  not  making  it,  that  is,  of  mak- 
ing one  or  making  no  preference.  If  he  does  not  make  the 
one,  he  does  and  must  make  the  other.  Make  which  he  may, 
he  does  more  than  make  it — he  prevents  the  opposite  prefer- 
ence which  otherwise  must  be  made.  Moral  agency  must 
serve  one  of  two  masters,  when  by  serving  one  his  designs 
are  accomplished,  while  the  same  service,  preventing  all  ser- 
vice to  the  other,  defeats  his  designs. 

In  this  view,  free  agency  is  the  grand,  not  to  say  the  most 
momentous  element  in  the  nature  of  a  moral  being,  as  related 
to  the  happiness  and  misery  of  other  beings.  By  giving  ex- 
istence to  one  positive  cause,  whether  of  immense  good  or  im- 
mense evil  to  them — to  one  of  which  such  a  bein^  must  <rive  ex- 
istence — he  prevents  the  other.  If  a  free  moral  agent  makes 
the  benevolent  preference,  he  not  only  gives  existence  to  a  posi- 
tive cause  of  immense  good  to  all  other  beings,  but  in  so 
doing  he  prevents  the  selfish  preference  in  its  stead,  and  so 
prevents  a  positive  cause  fitted  to  destroy  all  happiness,  and 
to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings.  If  such  a 
being  makes  the  selfish  pritferenceJciQ  not  only  gives  existence 
to  a  cause  of  immense  evil  to  other  beings,  but  in  so  doing  he 
prevents  the  benevolent  preference  in  its  stead,  and  so  pre- 
vents a  cause  fitted  to  prevent  all  misery,  and  to  produce  the 
highest  Avell-being  of  all  other  beings. 

We  are  familiar  with  the  precept,  "Cease  to  do  evil,  and 
learn  to  do  well."  Now,  were  a  moral  being  merely  to 
cease  to  do  evil,  the  simple  act  of  ceasing  from  another  ac- 
tion so  fitted  to  destroy  happiness,  and  to  produce  misery, 
would  possess  high  worth  and  excellence.  In  like  manner, 
great  pravity  and  turpitude  would  pertain  to  the  simple  act 
of  ceasing  to  do  well.  But,  acting  morally,  he  can  no  more 
Vol.  I.— 2 


26  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

cease  to  do  evil,  without  doing  well,  than  darkness  can  cease 
without  light ;  and  he  can  no  more  cease  to  do  well,  without 
doing  evil,  than  light  can  cease  without  darkness.  There  is 
for  a  moral  being,  no  neutral  ground  to  stand  on.  A  moral 
being  must  be  good,  or  he  must  be  wicked.  He  must  be  for 
the  greatest  good,  or  against  it.  He  must  be  benevolent  or 
he  must  be  selfish.  Such  is  the  nature  of  free  moral  agency, 
that  he  must  prevent  himself  from  being  the  one  by  being  the 
other ;  that  by  becoming  in  principle  an  angel  of  mercy,  he 
must  prevent  himself  from  becoming  in  principle  a  demon  in 
malignity ;  and  by  becoming  in  principle  a  demon  of  malig- 
nity, he  must  prevent  himself  from  becoming  in  principle  an 
angel  of  mercy.  In  this  respect  then,  what  worth  and  excel- 
lence in  the  one  kind  of  action,  what  pravity  and  turpitude 
in  the  other!  Benevolence,  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being, 
prevents  selfishness,  with  all  its  fitness  to  cause  ruin  and 
wretchedness  and  woe  to  all  other  beings.  Selfishness,  on 
the  part  of  a  moral  being,  prevents  benevolence,  with  its  fit- 
ness to  prevent  the  highest  misery,  and  to  secure  the  highest 
good  of  all  other  beings.  What  else  than  benevolence  can 
prevent  a  cause  of  so  much  evil  %  "What  else  than  selfishness 
can  prevent  a  cause  of  so  much  good  ?  As  morally  free  ac- 
tion then,  viewed  as  related  in  this  respect  to  the  happiness 
and  misery  of  other  beings,  benevolence  is  the  best  kind  of 
action,  and  selfishness  is  the  worst  kind  of  action  conceivable 
on  the  part  of  a  moral  being. 

I  remark — 

In  the  fourth  place,  that  each  of  the  elective  preferences  of 
which  I  speak,  is  a  permanent  state  of  mind.  By  this  I  do 
not  mean  that  it  is  immutable,  nor  that  it  never  changes ;  but 
that  it  remains  in  all  practical  doings.  Indeed,  when  once 
formed,  it  never  changes,  nor  can  change,  unless  the  mind 
changes  denovo  between  the  two  great  objects  of  moral  choice. 
This  the  mind  is  exceedingly  unapt  to  do,  chiefly  because 
the  preference  of  an  object  as  supreme,  has  a  peculiar  ten- 
dency to  perpetuate  itself,  by  confining  thought  and  feeling 
to  its  object,  and  engrossing  the  whole  mind  with  it.  It 
thus  strengthens  feeling,  and  strengthens  itself,  and  becomes 
permanent,  so  far  as  it  can  be,  with  a  physical  possibility 
and  yet  with  the  lowest  probability  of  change.  It  is  with 
these  qualifications  to  be  viewed  as  an  abiding  or  fixed,  as 


MORAL    PREFERENCES    PERMANENT.  27 

opposed  to  a  fitful  or  fluctuating  state  of  mind.  As  soon  as  it 
exists,  and  without  use  or  custom,  it  is  a  supreme  affection 
fixed  on  its  object  as  the  chief  good — as  the  portion  of  the  soul 
— and  is  thus  in  its  very  beginning  what  philosophers  have 
called  it — a  habit  of  the  mind — in  one  form  of  it,  the  efa 
tovMovtoq  of  Pythagoras,  or  "  the  habit  of  what  ought  to  be." 
It  is  formed  to  be  permanent — to  be  engrossed  with  and  ever 
intent  on  its  object — to  be  ever  present  in  the  mind  in  relation 
to  its  object,  that  its  object  may  never  be  disregarded,  nor  fail 
to  be  attained  for  want  of  constancy  or  fixedness  of  affection. 
Here  then,  in  the  permanency  of  the  supreme  elective  prefer- 
ence of  a  moral  being,  wTe  have  another  element  of  its  fitness  to 
secure  its  object.  Without  this  element  or  characteristic,  there 
could  be  no  such  thing  as  moral  character,  the  most  momentous 
fact  in  respect  to  moral  beings,  nor  any  manifestations  of  char- 
acter in  practical  doings — none,  of  course,  in  its  results  of  good 
and  evil.  All,  in  principle,  would  be  unfixed,  fitful,  and  fluc- 
tuating— at  most  an  incessant  series  of  transitions  from  one  su- 
preme affection  or  elective  preference  to  the  other.  Neither 
would  abide  long  enough  to  produce  results.  An  essential 
element  of  moral  character,  whether  good  or  bad,  would  be  ut- 
terly wanting,  because  an  essential  element  of  fitness  to  either 
good  or  bad  results  would  be  utterly  wanting.  A  constant 
fluctuation,  as  opposed  to  permanency  in  these  preferences, 
would  render  that  which  has  {he  highest  conceivable  worth 
utterly  worthless,  and  that  which  is  in  the  highest  conceiv- 
able degree  injurious,  utterly  harmless.  The  absolute  nature 
of  each  might  remain  the  same;  but  neither  having  a  relative 
nature,  or  sustaining  any  relation  to  any  being  or  thing,  could 
be  either  useful  or  injurious,  either  good  or  evil,  either  right 
or  wrong.  Whatever  be  supposed  in  opposition  to  perma- 
nence in  these  preferences,  so  far  as  it  is  supposed,  it  anni- 
hilates all  the  good  of  the  one,  and  all  the  evil  of  the  other ; 
for  so  far  it  annihilates  its  existence,  while  with  the  element 
of  permanence  in  each,  there  is  the  continuance  of  all  that  is 
good,  useful  or  right,  in  the  one,  and  all  that  is  evil,  injurious 
or  wrong,  in  the  other.  How  then,  is  the  peculiar  and  exclu- 
sive fitness  of  the  benevolent  preference  to  prevent  the  highest 
misery,  and  to  promote  the  highest  good  of  all  other  sentient 
beings  perfected  by  its  permanency  in  the  mind  of  the  agent? 
How,  by  the  same  element  of  the  selfish  preference,is  disclosed 


28  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

its  peculiar  and  exclusive  fitness  to  destroy  the  highest  good, 
and  to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings  %  Who 
does  not  see  in  the  permanency  of  the  benevolent  principle  a 
signal  worth  and  excellence  to  approve  and  admire  ;  and  in  the 
same  characteristic  of  the  selfish  principle,  a  signal  deformity 
and  odiousness  to  disapprove  and  abhor  \  The  benevolent  pref- 
erence once  formed  by  a  moral  being  partakes  as  it  were  of 
his  own  immortality,  and  still  lives  and  still  acts  to  carry  out 
its  own  blessed  issues  forever.  The  selfish  preference  formed 
by  the  same  being,  alike  ceaseless  in  its  activity  and  duration, 
remains  to  accomplish  its  results  in  wretchedness  and  woe  for- 
ever. Who  shall  measure  the  worth  of  permanence  in  the 
one,  and  thefearfidness  of  permanence  in  the  other  ?  The  one, 
like  the  principle  of  self-preservation,  which  every  moment 
guards  and  perpetuates  life  and  its  blessings,  is  ever  present 
to  guard  and  promote  the  highest  well-being  of  a  sentient 
universe ;  the  other,  alike  permanent  and  effective,  is  ever 
present  to  devastate  and  make  wretched  that  universe.  As 
permanent  action  then,  and  viewed  in  relation  to  the  happi- 
ness and  misery  of  all  other  beings,  benevolence  is  the  best 
kind  of  action,  and  selfishness  is  the  worst  kind  of  action  con- 
ceivable on  the  part  of  a  moral  being. 

I  remark — 

In  the  fifth  place,  that  each  of  the  elective  preferences  un- 
der consideration,  is  a  predominant  act  or  state  of  the  mind. 
I  call  it  predominant,  as  it  controls  and  directs  all  other  action 
of  the  being  in  subservience  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  end 
or  object.  Fixed  on  its  object  or  end  as  supreme,  its  direct 
and  peculiar* tendency  is,  whether  the  object  be  good  or  bad, 
to  employ  every  power  of  the  agent  in  subordinate  action  for 
the  accomplishment  of  its  object.  It  brings  into  requisition 
the  whole  inner  and  outer  man,  the  intellect,  susceptibility, 
will,  and  heart,  in  all  the  various  forms  of  thought,  feeling, 
affection,  volition,  with  all  the  powers  of  executive  action, 
and  all  in  subservience  to.  the  supreme  object.  The  labors, 
the  toils,  and  the  hardships  of  self-denial  in  one  case,  are 
made  easy  and  light  by  a  willing  mind  and  a  ready  hand, 
while  in  the  other,  to  invade  and  destroy  the  rights,  the  peace, 
the  happiness  of  others,  is  a  work  of  alacrity  and  exultation. 
Thus  an  apostle  suffers  the  loss  of  all  things,  and  the  hero 
desolates  kingdoms;    and  each  is   a  cheerful  martyr  to  his 


ONE    OF    THESE    NECESSARY.  29 

cause.  Thus  the  supreme  preference,  in  its  true  tendency, 
takes  absolute  dominion  in  the  soul,  and  reigns  with  control- 
ing  sway  over  the  entire  productive  energy  of  the  agent. 

While  such  is  the  peculiar  and  exclusive  characteristic  of 
the  benevolent  and  selfish  preference,  every  moral  being  is 
doomed  by  a  necessity  of  nature,  to  place  himself  under  the 
absolute  dominion  and  control  of  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
preferences.  It  is  an  ordinance  of  his  very  being,  that  he  can- 
not serve  both  these  masters,  and  must  serve  one.  The  pref- 
erence of  one  of  the  only  two  objects  of  moral  choice,  excludes 
the  other  from  all  thought  except  to  oppose  and  resist  it,  and 
therefore  shuts  off  all  controlling  influence  frofn  it  as  an  object 
to  be  attained,  as  it  were  by  its  utter  annihilation,  and  so  con- 
secrates his  whole  being  to  the  attainment  of  the  supreme  ob- 
ject, lie  thinks,  he  feels,  he  wills,  he  acts;  he  lives,  or  as 
the  case  may  be,  he  dies  for  it.  Such  is  the  nature — such  the 
tendency  of  each  of  the  two  great  moral  principles  or  prefer- 
ences of  a  moral  being,  as  a  predominant  principle.  What 
now  is  it,  as  the  benevolent — what  as  the  selfish  principle  in 
its  relation  to  the  happiness  and  misery  of  other  beings  ?  What 
is  it  in  a  being,  whose  exaltation  in  the  scale  of  being  likens 
him  to  his  Maker,  in  the  nature  and  greatness  of  powers  to  pro- 
duce results  in  happiness  and  misery  ?  What  is  it  for  a  being, 
like  an  archangel  strong — strong  in  intellect,  in  emotion,  in 
will,  in  executive  power,  to  be  under  the  constant  and  entire 
dominion  of  perfect  benevolence  ; — or  what  instead,  to  be  un- 
der the  constant  and  absolute  dominion  of  unqualified  selfish- 
ness !  In  the  one  case,  what  high  devisings  and  plans  of 
wisdom,  what  desires  and  affections  of  heart  absorbed  and 
glowing  with  their  object — what  intensity  and  strength  of  firm 
resolve,  what  ceaseless  activity  of  all  productive  energies, 
devoted  to  the  prevention  of  the  highest  misery  and  the  pro- 
duction of  the  highest  well-being  of  all !  In  the  other  case, 
what  a  like  devotion  of  the  same  exalted  powers,  to  the  de- 
struction of  the  highest  well-being,  and  the  production  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all !  Look  now  on  the  actual  results  as  real, 
and  learn  the  benignant  dominion  of  benevolence — the  terrific 
dominion  of  selfishness.  Survey  the  broad  field  of  eternity, 
cheered,and  brightened,and  blessed  with  the  fruits  and  harvests 
of  the  joyous  activities  of  reigning  benevolence  ;  and  then,  the 
same  field  made  desolate,  and  dark,  and  dead  in  the  woes  of  reign- 


30  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

ing  selfishness.  See  in  the  one  principle  the  brightest  image  of 
that  infinite  uncreated  excellence,  that  makes  heaven ;  see  in 
the  other  the  very  spirit  that  would  convert  all  into  the  dark 
world  of  hell.  Measure  now,  in  relation  to  other  beings,  the 
perfect  fitness  of  the  one  to  good,  and  the  perfect  fitness  of  the 
other  to  evil,  as  the  predominant  and  reigning  principle  of  a 
moral  being.  What  so  manifest  in  the  form  of  absolute  knowl- 
edge, as  that  benevolence  is  the  best,  and  selfishness  the  worst 
kind  of  action  which,  on  the  part  of  such  beings  can  be  conceived. 

I  now  proceed,  as  I  proposed,  to  consider — 

(2.)  The  nature  of  benevolence,  and  of  selfishness,  as  the  ofae  is 
related  to  the  happiness,  and  the  other  to  the  misery  of  the  agent. 

My  design  is  to  show,  that  benevolence  on  the  part  of  a 
moral  being  is  perfectly  fitted  to  give  him  the  highest  happiness 
of  which  he  is  capable  from  action ;  and  that  selfishness  is  per- 
fectly fitted  to  give  him  the  highest  misery  of  which  he  is  capa- 
ble from  action. 

These  things  will  appear,  if  we  consider  some  of  the  essen- 
tial characteristics  of  each  of  these  kinds  of  action. 

In  the  first  place  ;  benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being 
is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  to  him  the  highest  happiness,  and 
selfishness  the  highest  misery,  of  which  he  is  capable  from  the 
objects  of  action.  By  the  object  of  action  I  mean  all  that 
which  a  moral  being  in  the  elective  preference  of  his  supreme 
object,  may  be  truly  said  to  will  or  choose,  that  is,  the  object 
itself  and  the  necessary  means  of  obtaining  it.  With  this  ex- 
planation of  the  object  of  action  in  view,  I  proceed  to  show  that — 

Benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being  is  perfectly  fitted  to 
secure  to  him  the  highest  happiness  of  which  he  is  capable  from 
any  object  of  action.  This  may  be  shown  thus :  there  is  no 
conceivable  object  of  action  from  which  a  moral  being  is  capa- 
ble of  deriving  so  much  happiness,  as  from  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  all  other  beings,  including  what  is  necessarily  involved 
in  the  existence  of  this  object  of  preference,  particularly  the 
non-existence  of  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  sentient  beings, 
and  the  perfect  virtue  of  all  other  moral  beings.  But  benevo- 
lence is  the  action  and  the  only  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral 
being,  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  this  object  or  end  of 
action.  Benevolence  therefore  is  the  action  and  only  action  on 
the  part  of  a  moral  being,  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  to 
him  the  highest  happiness  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any 


CORRECT   CONCEPTION    OF    GOOD    OR  J5VORTH.       31 

object  of  action.  Now  the  necessary  and  perfect  means  of  a 
good  end,  has  all  the  worth  or  value  of  the  end  itself.  Benev- 
olence then,  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  as  the  necessary 
and  perfect  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  beings, 
and  as  such  the  necessary  and  perfect  means  of  the  highest 
happiness  to  himself,  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object 
of  action,  has  all  the  worth  or  value  to  him  of  his  highest  hap- 
piness from  any  object  of  action.  No  equal  worth  or  value  to 
a  moral  being  can  be  conceived  to  pertain  to  any  other  action, 
on  account  of  its  relation  to  the  object  of  action.  Or  thus: 
while  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  which  would  have 
no  object  of  worth  or  value  to  him,  could  itself  have  no  worth 
or  value  to  him,  the  worth  or  value  of  action  on  the  part  of 
such  a  being  to  him  is  at  least  equal  to  the  worth  or  value  to 
him  of  its  object ;  and  the  worth  or  value  to  him  of  its  object,  is 
equal  to  the  worth  or  value  of  the  happiness  of  which  he  is  ca- 
pable from  the  object  of  action.  In  the  present  case,  the  action 
is  benevolence ;  and  the  happiness  of  which  the  agent  is  capa- 
ble from  the  object  or  end  of  the  action, is  the  highest  of  which 
he  is  capable  from  any  object  or  end  of  action.  Benevolence 
therefore,  has  to  him  a  worth  or  excellence  equal  to  that  of  the 
highest  happiness  which  he  can  derive  from  any  object  or  end 
of  action,  and  has,  of  course,  the  highest  worth  or  value  to 
him,  compared  with  any  action  conceivable  on  his  part,  in 
relation  to  the  object  or  end  of  action. 

The  same  thing  will  appear,  if  we  consider  more  particularly 
the  import  of  the  word  good,  or  what  it  is  that  constitutes 
worth,  value,  excellence.  The  goodness,  or  the  worth,  or  the 
value,  or  the  excellence  of  a  thing,  is  not  the  absolute  nature, 
but  the  relative  nature  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  predicate; 
or,  more  particularly,  it  is  the  real  nature  of  that  of  which 
it  is  predicated,  as  related  to  sentient  being.  Even  happiness 
itself  is  not  good,  or  has  no  worth  or  value,  except  as  related 
to  a  sentient  being  who  can  enjoy  it.  Were  there  no  being 
capable  of  happiness,  and  could  there  in  the  nature  of  things 
be  no  such  being,  nothing  could  be  good,  nothing  could  pos- 
sess worth,  value,  or  excellence;  for  there  could  be  neither 
happiness,  nor  the  means  of  happiness,  nor  yet  even  the  idea 
or  notion  of  either.  Nothing  is  good  but  happiness  and  the 
means  of  happiness,  including  the  absence  of  misery  and  the 
means  of  its  absence.     Were  every  thing  as  it  is — were  God 


32  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

and  his  vast  creation  as  they  are,  with  the  single  exception  of 
all-  capacity  of  happiness  and  all  possibility  of  such  capacity 
— all  would  be  utterly  worthless.  All  the  worth  or  value  of 
man  or  of  any  other  moral  being,  consists  in  his  capacity  of 
happiness  and  of  that  self-active  nature  which  qualifies  him 
to  produce  happiness  to  other  beings  and  to  himself.  All  the 
worth,  or  value,  or  goodness,  or  excellence,  which  pertains  to 
action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  is  its  fitness  or  adaptation 
to  produce  these  results.  The  best  kind  of  action,  therefore, 
on  his  part,  is  that  which  is  exclusively  and  perfectly  fitted  to 
produce  the  highest  happiness  of  others,  and  his  own  highest 
happiness.  This  kind  of  action  in  its  relation  to  the  happi- 
ness of  others,  and  its  relation  at  least  in  one  respect,  to  the 
happiness  of  the  agent  himself,  is  benevolence  or  benevolent 
action.  This  kind  of  action  is  good,  not  simply  as  it  is  per- 
fectly fitted  to  produce  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other 
beings,  but  also  as  by  being  thus  fitted  to  produce  the  highest 
happiness  of  all  other  beings,  it  is  perfectly  fitted  to  pro- 
duce the  highest  happiness  of  the  agent,  of  which  he  is  capa- 
ble from  any  object  or  end  of  action.  Its  being  perfectly 
fitted  to  produce  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings, 
constitutes  its  worth  or  value  to  them,  and  it  is  the  same  fit- 
ness on  which  the  highest  happiness  of  the  agent  in  the  case 
depends,  and  which  constitutes,  in  one  respect,  the  worth  or 
value  of  the  action  to  him  /  for  his  highest  happiness,  so  far 
as  it  depends  on  the  objects  of  action,  depends  on  the  object 
of  this  action,  and  so  depends  on  the  action  itself,  as  exclu- 
sively and  perfectly  fitted  to  produce  the  object  on  which  the 
highest  happiness  to  himself,  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any 
object  of  action,  depends.  While  therefore,  in  the  manner  ex- 
plained, the  worth  or  value  of  the  action  to  the  agent  himself, 
in  one  respect,  essentially  depends  on  or  consists  in  the  relation 
of  the  action  to  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings,  it 
also  depends  on  the  relation  of  the  action  to  his  own  happiness. 
Were  the  agent  wholly  unsusceptible  to  happiness  from  the 
happiness  of  others,  and  as,  therefore,  lie  must  be  wholly  in- 
different to  their  happiness,  he  must  be  wholly  indifferent  to 
benevolence  on  his  own  part  as  the  means  of  their  happiness. 
Benevolence  in  such  a  case  could  possess  no  worth  or  value 
to  him,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  But  being  capable  of 
higher  happiness  from  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings 


WORTH    OF    HIS    ACT    TO    TnE    BENEVOLENT.        33 

than  from  any  other  object  of  action,  and  benevolence  being 
the  only  action  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  the  highest  happiness 
of  all  other  beings,  it  is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  to  him  the 
highest  happiness  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object  of 
action  ;  and  of  course,  the  highest  happiness  of  which  he  is 
capable  from  any  action  on  account  of  its  relation  to  the  ob- 
ject of  action. 

And  now,  what  is  the  worth  or  value  of  this  kind  of  action 
on  the  part  of  a  moral  being  to  himself?  It  is  not  identical 
with  the  worth  to  him  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other 
beings,  or  with  the  worth  to  him  of  his  own  happiness  from 
their  happiness.  But  the  worth  of  the  action  to  him  is 
equal  to  the  worth  to  him  of  either  the  highest  happiness  of 
all  other  beings,  or  of  his  own  happiness  from  their  highest 
happiness.  The  worth  to  him  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all 
other  beings,  is  its  fitness  to  give  him  the  highest  happiness 
of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object  of  action  ;  and  the 
worth  to  him  of  benevolent  action  is  its  perfect  and  exclusive 
fitness  to  produce  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings, 
and  herein  its  perfect  fitness  to  secure  to  him  the  highest 
happiness  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object  of  action. 

Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  worth  or  value  of  benevolence  on 
the  part  of  a  moral  being,  that  the  highest  happiness  of  all 
other  beings,  or  that  his  own  happiness  as  the  direct  effect  of 
this  object  actually  exist;  for  the  action  has  the  same  nature 
— the  same  fitness  to  produce  these  results,  whether  they  are 
actually  produced  or  not.  Nor  in  estimating  the  worth  of  be- 
nevolence to  the  agent  are  we  to  view  him  as  under  the  con- 
trolling dominion  of  the  selfish  principle,  when  his  suscepti- 
bilities to  the  happiness  of  others,  and  to  his  own  happiness 
from  it  are  rendered  dormant  and  dead  by  the  influence  of 
that  principle.  But  we  are  to  view  the  mind  in  the  perfect 
exercise  of  its  powers,  especially  when  its  susceptibilities  to 
happiness,  in  the  full  play  of  their  perfect  activity,  give  their 
perfect  results.  To  appreciate  then,  the  worth  or  value  of  be- 
nevolence on  the  part  of  a  moral  being  to  himself,  we  must 
measure  the  worth  or  value  of  that  happiness  which  such  a 
being  in  the  perfect  use  of  his  high  powers  and  capacities, 
would  derive  from  the  non-existence  of  the  highest  misery, 
and  the  existence  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings, 
as  the  actual  and  true  product  of  his  own  action.  What  a  < 
a*  3 


34  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

source  of  happiness  to  a  moral  being  were  such  an  object. 
What  but  comparative  insignificance  and  vanity  were  happi- 
ness from  the  only  other  object  of  action — the  world — on  the 
part  of  such  a  being.  What  other  action  on  his  part  can 
afford  him  such  happiness  from  the  object  of  action,  and  pos- 
sess in  this  respect  such  worth  or  value  to  him  as  that  which 
should  prevent  the  highest  misery,  and  produce  the  highest 
blessedness  of  God  and  of  his  sentient  creation.  "What  worth, 
what  excellence,  would  such  a  scene  of  moral  b'eauty  and 
magnificence,  with  all  its  blessedness,  give  to  the  action  which 
was  its  true  and  proper  cause. 

I  now  proceed  to  say,  that — 

Selfishness  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being  is  perfectly  fitted  to 
secure  to  him  the  highest  misery  of  which  he  is  capable  from 
any  object  or  end  of  action.  There  is  no  conceivable  object 
or  end  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  from  which  he  is 
capable  of  deriving  so  much  misery,  as  from  the  highest  mis- 
ery of  all  other  beings,  including  what  is  necessarily  involved 
in  the  object  of  his  preference;  particularly,  the  non-existence 
of  the  highest  happiness  of  all  other  beings,  and  the  perfect 
vice  or  wickedness  of  all  other  moral  beings.  Selfishness,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  the  action  and  the  only  action  of  a  moral 
being,  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  this  object,  or  this 
result  of  action,  to  other  beings.  Selfishness  therefore  is  the 
action,  and  the  only  action  on  his  part,  which  is  perfectly 
fitted  to  secure  to  him  the  highest  misery  of  which  he  is  capa- 
ble from  any  object  or  end  of  action.  JSIow  the  necessary  and 
perfect  means  of  a  bad  end,  is  as  bad — as  evil — as  is  the  end 
itself,  to  the  being  whose  end  it  is.  Selfishness  then,  on  the 
part  of  a  moral  being,  as  the  only  and  perfect  means  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  with  all  that  is  involved  in 
this  evil,  and  as  such  a  means,  the  only  and  perfect  means  of 
the  highest  misery  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object 
or  end  of  action,  is  as  great  an  evil  to  him,  as  is  the  object  or 
end  itself,  or  as  is  his  own  highest  misery  from  any  object  or 
end  of  action. 

The  remarks  already  made  respecting  the  word  good,  muta- 
tis mutandis,  apply  to  the  word  evil.  The  word  evil,  like  the 
word  good,  is  a  relative  term  ;  that  is,  it  denotes  the  nature  of 
that  of  which  it  is  a  predicate,  as  related  to  sentient  being. 
Even  misery  or  suffering  is  evil  only  as  related  to  a  sentient 


EYIL    OF    HIS    ACT    TO    THE    MALEVOLENT.  35 

being,  who  can  experience  or  feel  it.  Nothing  is  evil  bnt  mis- 
ery or  suffering,  and  the  means  of  it,  including  the  absence  of 
happiness  and  the  means  of  its  absence.  All  the  evil  which 
pertains  to  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  is  its  fitness 
or  adaptation  to  produce  misery  or  suffering  to  other  beings 
and  to  himself.  The  worst  kind  of  action  therefore  on  the  part 
of  a  moral  being,  is  that  which  is  exclusively  and  perfectly 
fitted  to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  and 
his  own  highest  misery.  This  kind  of  action  in  its  relation  to 
the  misery  of  others,  and  in  its  relation  at  least  in  one  respect 
to  the  misery  of  the  agent  himself,  is  selfishness.  This  kind  of 
action  is  evil,  not  simply  as  it  is  perfectly  fitted  to  produce  the 
highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  but  also,  as  being  on  account 
of  this  very  fitness,  or  in  this  very  fitness,  perfectly  fitted  to 
produce  the  highest  misery  of  the  agent,  of  which  he  is  capa- 
ble from  any  object  or  end  of  action.  While  therefore  the 
evil  nature  of  the  action  as  an  evil  to  the  agent,  depends  on  its 
relation  to  the  highest  misery  of  others,  it  also  depends  on  the 
relation  of  the  action  to  himself.  Were  the  agent  entirely 
unsusceptible  to  misery  from  the  misery  of  others,  and  there- 
fore necessarily  entirely  indifferent  to  their  misery,  he  must 
also  be  utterly  indifferent  to  selfishness  on  his  own  part  as  the 
means  of  their  misery.  Selfishness  on  his  part,  in  such  a  case, 
could  be  no  evil  to  him.  It  is  obvious  then,  that  one  essential 
element  of  the  evil  of  selfishness  to  the  agent,  is  its  perfect  fit- 
ness to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  and  in 
this  respect,  or  on  this  very  account,  its  perfect  fitness  to  give 
him  the  highest  misery  of  which  he  is  capable  from  any  object 
or  end  of  action ;  and  of  course  the  highest  misery  of  which  he 
is  capable  from  any  action, on  account  of  its  relation  to  the  ob- 
ject or  end  of  action. 

The  evil  of  this  kind  of  action  to  the  agent  is  equal  either  to 
the  evil  to  him  of  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings,  or  to 
the  evil  to  him  of  his  own  misery  from  their  highest  misery. 
Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  intrinsic  evil  of  the  action,  that  the 
actual  results  in  misery  to  others  or  to  himself  actually  exist. 
But  to  appreciate  the  evil  to  himself  of  selfishness  on  the  part 
of  a  moral  being,  we  must  measure  the  evil  of  that  misery 
which  such  a  being  in  the  perfect  unperverted  action  of  his 
powers  and  capacities,  would  derive  from  the  non-existence  of 
the  highest  happiness,  and  the  existence  of  the  highest  misery 


36  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

of  all  other  beings,  as  the  actual  product  of  his  own  action. 
"What  a  source  of  misery  to  such  a  being,  were  such  an  ob- 
ject or  end  of  action  fully  accomplished!  What  other  action 
on  his  part  can  bring  to  him  so  much  misery  from  the  ob- 
ject of  action,  and  in  this  respect,  be  so  great  an  evil  to  him, 
as  that  action  which  should  destroy  the  highest  blessedness  of 
this  sentient  universe,  and  fill  it  wuth  wroe  ? 

Thus  it  appears,  that  benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral 
being  is  perfectly  fitted  to  secure  to  him  the  highest  happi- 
ness, and  selfishness,  the  highest  misery,  of  which  lie  is  capa- 
ble  from  the  objects  or  ends  of  action.  Benevolence  then,  as 
related  in  this  respect  to  the  agent's  own  happiness,  is  to  him 
the  best  kind  of  action,  and  selfishness  as  related  in  this  respect 
to  the  misery  of  the  agent,  is  to  him  the  worst  kind  of  action. 

I  remark — 

In  the  second  place  ;  that  benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral 
being  is  perfectly  fitted  to  afford  him  the  highest  happiness, 
and  selfishness,  the  highest  misery,  of  which  he  is  capable  from 
any  action,  as  each  is  intelligent  action.  This  characteristic  or 
element  of  the  two  kinds  of  action  in  its  relation  to  the  happi- 
ness and  misery  of  all  other  beings  than  the  agent,  we  have 
already  considered.  We  now  contemplate  it  in  its  relation  to 
the  happiness  and  misery  of  the  agent  himself.  Next  in  de- 
gree to  that  happiness  or  that  misery  of  which  the  mind  is 
capable  from  the  action  of  the  will  and  the  heart,  are  that  hap- 
piness and  that  misery  of  which  it  is  capable  from  the  action 
of  the  intellect  in  the  form  of  knowledge.  This  happiness  and 
this  misery  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  depend  on  what  is 
known,  or  on  the  objects  of  knowledge,  and  the  use  made  of  it. 
Now  a  moral  being,  in  all  moral  action,  whether  he  acts  for 
good  or  for  evil,  for  weal  or  for  woe,  acts  intelligently.  What- 
ever he  does — whatever  object  he  aims  at,  whatever  results  he 
produces,  he  acts  not  in  ignorance,  not  under  mistake,  not  with 
doubt,  but  with  knowledge.  The  two  great  objects  or  ends  of 
all  moral  action  are  known — known  in  their  nature,  known  in 
their  difference,  known  in  all  their  vastness,  as  the  highest 
happiness,  and  the  highest  misery  of  all  sentient  being.  The 
will,  the  heart,  the  entire  susceptibility,  and  productive  energy 
— the  whole  man,  acts  not  in  the  darkness  of  ignorance  or  error, 
but  in  the  light  of  truth.  In  respect  to  the  most  momentous 
agency  in  the  universe  of  causes,  moral  action,  he  knows  what 


INTELLIGENT   ACTION   VERY   GOOD    OR   EYIL.       37 

is  true,  what  is  false,  what  is  good,  what  is  evil,  according  to 
the  eternal  and  immutable  nature  of  things.  Act  as  he  may, 
he  acts  with  a  just  and  adequate  view  and  comprehension  of  all 
that  need  be  known,  that  the  great  end  of  all  being — of  all  ex- 
istence may  be  accomplished  or  be  defeated.  And  now  what  is 
such  knowledge  to  such  a  being — what,  if  he  acts  morally 
right ;  what,  if  he  acts  morally  wrong.  Knowledge,  how  de- 
lightful, joyous,  in  the  one  case — how  exquisitely  painful  in  the 
other !  How  diverse  these  acts,  with  the  same  results,  done  in 
the  darkness  and  blind  stupidity  of  mere  physical  agencies  or 
causes!  This  perfect  knowledge  with  right  moral  action — such 
knowledge  rightly  used,  applied,  employed  for  its  true  end,  we 
see  at  once  is  the  light  of  life  to  the  soul.  The  knowledge  of 
all  that  can  bless  and  of  all  that  can  curse  a  sentient  universe — 
knowledge  of  all  that  ought  to  be  and  ought  not  to  be,  with 
knowledge,  that  all  on  his  part  which  ought  to  be  is — such 
knowledge  is  the  constant  associate  of  perfect  benevolence  in 
a  moral  being — in  its  absolute  certainty,  its  clear  and  cloudless 
effulgence,  enlightening,  directing,  quickening  all  his  spiritual 
activities  to  their  true  result  in  the  perfect  blessedness  of  all — 
who  shall  value  its  objects,  who  shall  measure  its  extent,  who 
unfold  its  perfection,  who  utter  its  joys  !  A  moral  being,  per- 
fect, immortal,  ever  living,  ever  acting  under  the  approving 
eye  of  Omniscience,  and  "seeing  as  he  is  seen,  and  knowing  as 
he  is  known  !" 

What  now,  is  such  knowledge  to  a  moral  being  of  the  op- 
posite character  ?  Knowledge  consciously,  deliberately,  and  wil- 
fully resisted,  hated,  perverted — knowledge,  while  it  excludes 
all  ignorance  that  might  palliate  guilt  or  mitigate  its  pangs, 
reveals  the  full  measure  of  both.  Knowledge,  when  ignor- 
ance were  bliss — light  a  thousand-fold  more  terrific  than 
deepest  darkness — light  revealing  a  moral  being  to  himself  in 
the  work  of  destroying  all  good,  and  producing  all  evil !  What 
degradation  in  rank,  what  perversion  of  faculties,  what  frustra- 
tion of  the  high  end  of  his  being,  what  ruin  to  others,  what 
self-ruin — himself  knowing  all,  and  yet  doing  all — living,  act- 
ing amid  the  wreck  and  wretchedness  of  his  own  work,  and 
knowing  all  only  to  be  wretched  in  all  he  knows ! 

I  remark — 

In  the  third  place,  that  another  element  of  fitness  in  each 
of  the  two  kinds  of  action  specified,  to  secure  its  result  to  the 


o8  MOKAL    GOTEENMEXT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

agent,  is  that  it  is  his  own  action.     The  same  action  duly  con- 
templated by  one  who  is  not  its  author,  would  afford  him  as 
the  action  were  good  or  bad,  a  high  degree  of  pleasure  or  a 
high  degree  of  pain.     But  how  would  this  pleasure  or  pain 
be  augmented  were  the  action  his  own/     The  action  has  now 
a  new  element.     It  is  his  action.     The  mere  fact,  that  that 
which  gives  us  pleasure  or  pain  is  ours,  and  more  especially 
that  it  is  ours  by  production  or  authorship,  is  a  source  of  a 
high,  distinct  and  peculiar  pleasure  or  pain.     We  value  happi- 
ness, or  we  value  natural  beauty  or  excellence  the  more  be- 
cause it  is  our  own;  and  we  abhor  misery,  or  we  abhor  natural 
deformity  or  worthlessness  the  more  because  it  is  our  own. 
In  respect  to  an  action  or  work  which  is  our  own,  which  has 
high  worth  or  excellence,  the  fact  is  more  striking  and  ob- 
vious.    Who  that  has  read  with  pleasure  and  learned  to  ap- 
preciate Milton's  "  Paradise  Lost,"  would  not  be  aware  of  a 
new  and  peculiar  pleasure,  were  that  immortal  poem  the  pro- 
duct of  his  own  genius  ?     In  view  then  of  an  action  charac- 
terized by  such  unparalleled  worth  and  excellence  as  perfect 
benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  an  action  perfectly 
fitted  to  prevent  the  highest  misery,  and  to  produce  the  highest 
happiness  of  all  other  beings,  perfectly  fitted  to  please  and  bless 
God  and  his  sentient  creation — to  say,  "  I  have  done  it,"  must 
be  a  source  of  happiness,  which  in  this  respect,  can  have  no 
parallel,  as  the  effect  of  any  or  all  other  action  conceivable. 
For  a  being  capable  of  this  happiness,  to  lose  it,  how  great  the 
loss ;  to  secure  it  and  perpetuate  it  in  the  perfect  exercise  of 
his  exalted  powers  forever,  what  a  possession  for  immortality ! 
On  the  contrary,  the  opposite  action  of  a  moral  being,  for 
the  same  reason,  is  in  a  high  degree  painful.     It  is  his  own 
action.     No  one  can  duly  contemplate  such  action  in  its  fear- 
ful and  fell  malignity,  even  as  the  act  of  another  being,  with- 
out a  painful,  revolting  abhorrence.    How  then,  must  the  pain- 
fulness  of  this  emotion  be  augmented  when  the  action  is  his 
own.     The  action  has  now  another  element.     It  is  his  action, 
and  the  emotion  is  not  mere  abhorrence,  but  it  is  self-abhor- 
rence, with  that  oppressive  painfulness  which  admits  of  no 
alleviation.     Were  it  but  the  act  of  another,  that  would  afford 
sensible  relief.     But  the  whole  weight  and  burden  of  author- 
ship  fall  on  him.     The  destruction  of  the  highest  happiness, 
and  the  production  of  the  highest  misery  forevermore,  is  the 


MORAL    ACTION    IMPLIES    MORAL    LIBERTY.        39 

measure  of  the  evil,  of  the  turpitude  of  his  own  act.  It  is 
his  act,  which  can  never  be  undone  ;  or  rather,  in  view  of  its 
remediless  result,  it  is  his  act  being  done  forever,  and  there- 
fore, with  the  ruin  ever  before  him,  he  sees  himself  the  con- 
tinued perpetrator  of  this  deed  of  death.  In  view  of  such  an 
act — such  a  work,  to  be  obliged  to  say,  "I  have  done  it" — 
this  is  one  element  of  that  unqualified  self-abhorrence  which 
completes  the  misery  of  a  moral  being,  on  account  of  wrong 
moral  action.  What  an  inheritance  were  this,  when  apart — 
alone,  in  the  reflective  solitude  of  eternity  ! 

I  remark — 

In  the  fourth  place,  that  another  element  in  each  kind  of 
moral  action,  is  that  it  is  done  with  moral  liberty.  An  in- 
telligent agent,  we  may  suppose,  would  reflect  on  a  neces- 
sary action  having  the  same  relations  to  the  happiness  and 
misery  of  other  beings  as  a  free  action,  with  emotions  of  pleas- 
ure in  the  one  case,  and  of  pain  in  the  other.  But  how  would 
the  pleasure  in  the  one  case,  and  the  pain  in  the  other  be 
heightened  in  view  of  the  action,  as  done  with  power  to  do 
the  opposite  in  its  stead — done,  when  otherwise  the  opposite 
must  be  done — done,  when  do  which  he  may, he  does  more, 
he  avoids  doing  and  so  prevents  the  opposite  action.  What  a 
determination  then,  is  that  of  free-will  in  moral  action !  We 
all  know  how  moral  liberty  burdens  the  soul  with  moral 
responsibility.  If  it  discharge  that  responsibility,  what  joy 
and  triumph  it  finds  in  so  doing !  If  it  violates  it,  how  the 
violation  remains  to  oppress  and  crush  the  spirit!  What 
power  of  life  and  death  to  the  soul,  in  moral  liberty !  Where- 
fore is  this?  It  is  that  moral  liberty,  compared  with  what 
would  be  without  it,  in  one  case  doubles  the  happiness,  and 
in  the  other  doubles  the  misery,  of  which  the  agent  is  cap- 
able from  action  jvs  it  is  related  to  its  objects. 

Consider  this  in  respect  to  benevolence  or  benevolent  action. 
Either  of  two  positive  actions — the  one  with  its  tendency  to 
the  highest  conceivable  good,  or  the  other  with  its  tendency 
to  the  highest  conceivable  evil  of  other  beings,  is  possible  to 
the  agent.  The  action  in  respect  to  the  objects  of  action,  is 
elective ;  and  determines  one  of  these  great  issues  of  action, 
and  so  prevents  the  other.  The  agent  is  under  the  absolute 
necessity  of  doing  one  positive  action  or  the  other  positive 
action  ;  and  when  he  can  do  either  instead  of  the  other,  does 


40    MORAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  ABSTRACT. 

that  which  in  its  true  tendency  blesses  all,  and  in  so  doing 
prevents  the  doing  of  that  which  in  its  true  tendency  curses 
all.  His  therefore,  must  be  the  twofold  joy  of  this  twofold 
achievement.  And  is  there  then  no  peculiar  joy  in  avoiding 
and  so  preventing  the  evil  in  such  a  case  ?  Who  does  not 
know  the  joy  of  escaping  death,  wThen  life  and  death  are  placed 
in  an  even  balance  ?  And  is  there  no  peculiar  joy,  when  right 
and  wrong  moral  action  with  their  respective  tendencies  and 
results  are  thus  poised  on  moral  liberty,  in  doing  the  right 
when  otherwise  the  wrong  wTould  and  must  be  done?  What  a 
deliverance  from  evil  is  thus  effected,  in  the  accomplishment 
of  good !  What  a  sublime  power  in  a  moral  being  is  the 
wdll  acting  right,  when  otherwise  it  must  act  wrong !  Look 
through  heaven  and  earth,  what  other  power  is  sublime — what 
other  is  there  to  admire — in  what  other  to  rejoice !  Power 
necessitated  to  act  with  a  sure  result  for  the  highest  happiness 
or  for  the  highest  misery  of  all,  and  free  to  act  for  either  instead 
of  the  other,  and  acting  right !  How  is  the  conscious  joy  of 
acting  right  heightened  by  the  conscious  and  equal  joy  of  not 
acting  wrong — becoming  the  twofold  joy,  that  of  action  per- 
fectly fitted  to  bless,  and  that  of  avoiding  action  perfectly 
fitted  to  curse  a  sentient  universe  !  It  is  the  moral  liberty  of 
action,  giving  to  the  self-complacency  of  virtue,  a  signal,  unsur- 
passed element  of  joy — even  the  twofold  blessedness  within,  of 
electively  preventing  a  hell  and  creating  a  heaven  without. 
What  other  action  conceivable  can  afford  such  happiness  to  a 
moral  being  ? 

Let  us  now  briefly  contemplate  selfishness  or  selfish  action 
as  done  in  the  exercise  of  moral  liberty.  Here  the  same  ele- 
ment so  benign  in  benevolent  action,  becomes  only  a  fearful 
and  deadly  evil.  In  this  kind  of  action  there  is  also  a  twofold 
performance,  involving  a  tw7ofold  issue.  How  great  the  evil, 
in  evil  done  and  in  good  prevented.  The  agent  by  his  one  act, 
spreads  the  broad  field  of  sentient  existence  with  desolation, 
misery  and  wToe,  not  where  otherwise  there  had  been  nothing, 
but  where  otherwise,  by  his  own  opposite  act  he  had  diffused 
life,  joy  and  perfect  blessedness  to  all.  By  his  one  act  he  has 
both  destroyed  the  good  and  produced  the  evil.  His  there- 
fore must  be  the  twofold  misery  of  this  twofold  deed  of  death. 
And  is  there  no  additional  peculiar  misery  in  an  act,  which 
while  it  produces  so  much  evil  also  destroys  so  much  good, 


MORAL    ACTION,    PREDOMINANT    ACTION.  41 

when  the  agent  might  as  well  have  prevented  the  evil  and 
produced  the  good  ?  To  stand  at  this  fountain  of  life  or  of 
death  to  all,  and  by  one  act  to  open  the  stream  that  shall  flow 
forth  in  desolation  and  woe  unmingled,  remediless,  eternal, 
when  I  might  instead  by  another  act,  cause  the  rivers  of  pleas- 
ure and  of  the  fullness  of  joy  to  flow  forevermore — to  do  that 
which  is  thus  fitted  to  curse,  instead  of  that  which  is  thus 
fitted  to  bless  all  sentient  being — it  is  this,  which  gives  to  re- 
morse one  of  its  peculiar  elements  of  unecjualed  agony.  What 
a  fearful  power  is  free-will,  acting  morally  wrong !  Who  shall 
measure  the  conscious  agony  of  acting  morally  wrong,  enhanced 
by  the  equal  agony  of  not  acting  morally  right  in  its  place ! 
Here  is  no  necessity  to  alleviate  what  could  not  be  avoided — 
but  conscious  freedom — conscious  moral  liberty,  with  the  two- 
fold agony  of  the  twofold  work  of  destroying  the  highest  hap- 
piness, and  of  producing  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  beings 
— the  twofold  agony  within,  of  preventing  a  heaven  and  of 
producing  a  hell  without !  What  other  action  can  give  such 
misery  to  a  moral  being? 

I  remark — 

In  the  fifth  place ;  that  another  element  in  each  kind  of 
moral  action,  is  that  it  is  predominant  action.  Under  this  re- 
lation, it  is  what  is  commonly  called  the  governing  principle  of 
the  mind,  inasmuch  as  in  its  true  nature  and  tendency,  it  reigns 
over  the  wdiole  man,  controlling  and  directing  all  other  action 
in  subservience  to  the  accomplishment  of  its  object  or  end. 
We  have  already  contemplated  this  relation  of  the  two  kinds 
of  moral  action  to  the  happiness  and  misery  of  others  than  the 
agent.  Nor  is  there  perhaps  any  other  relation  under  which 
the  one  more  impressively  reveals  itself  as  the  means  of  happi- 
ness, and  the  other  of  misery  to  the  agent  himself. .  As  a  pre- 
dominant principle,  whether  the  morally  right  or  the  morally 
w^rong  principle,  it  sways  and  determines  all,  all  thought,  all 
feeling  or  emotion,  all  desires,  all  volitions,  all  subordinate  and 
all  executive  action — the  whole  inner  and  outer  man.  It  is  the 
grand  central  power,  which  takes  under  its  dominion  the  en- 
tire productive  energy  of  a  moral  being.  It  thus  employs 
powers  the  most  exalted — powers,  which  in  comparison  de- 
grade all  others — powers  unparalleled  for  good  and  for  evil — 
cither  for  the  best,  or  for  the  worst  conceivable  results  of 
power. 


42  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

Contemplate  then,  a  moral  being  placing  benevolence  on 
the  throne,  and  giving  it  perfect  dominion  over  himself.  Yon 
see  in  such  a  being,  one  made  to  live  and  to  act  for  the  pre- 
vention of  the  highest  misery,  and  for  the  production  of  the 
highest  happiness  of  a  sentient  universe.  Behold  these  cano- 
pying heavens — each  world  of  this  vast  system  perhaps  the 
residence  of  spiritual  and  immortal  beings  like  our  own !  Amid 
what  amplitude  and  splendors  of  existence  a  moral  being  is 
destined  to  live  and  to  act  forever!  With  this  destination 
every  thing  comports.  You  see  powers  and  capacities  fitted 
to  this  high  end.  You  see  subordinate  objects,  ends,  motives — 
the  laws  and  modes  of  subordinate  action,  and  executive  doings, 
combined  to  give  completeness  to  the  system.  You  see  all 
worthy  of  the  infinite  attributes  of  their  author — all  stamped 
with  and  fitted  forr  never-ending  existence.  In  such  a  being 
you  see  benevolence  the  reigning  principle — governing,  guid- 
ing, employing  these  high  powers  for  these  high  ends — direct- 
ing and  consecrating  all  with  delightful  activity  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  these  results,  and  with  the  joyous  anticipation  of 
accomplishing  them  forever.  And  now  to  sway  such  a  scep- 
ter— to  reign  over  and  employ  such  powers  for  such  ends — 
thus  to  govern  and  employ  intelligence,  and  feeling,  and 
emotion,  and  will,  and  heart — the  entire  productive  energy  of 
an  immortal  spirit,  and  that  spirit  one's  self — what  other  do- 
minion, what  other  condition  of  being,  is  worthy  of  a  desire  or  a 
thought  ?  What  sublime  dignity,  what  moral  excellence,  beauty 
and  glory,  in  the  reigning  principle  itself!  What  absolute 
perfection  it  imparts  to  the  whole  nature  of  a  being  the  great- 
est of  all,  save  Him  who  made  him !  What,  compared  with 
this,  are  the  splendors  of  earthly  royalty,  even  of  the  monarch 
of  a  thousand  empires?  Compared  with  him,  this  were  the 
apocalyptic  angel,  seen  standing  in  the  sun.  Is  there  pleasure 
— is  there  happiness  in  the  possession  and  use  of  power?  What 
higher  pleasure,  what  higher  happiness  than  the  possession  and 
perfect  use  of  the  powers  of  a  moral  being,  guided  and  con- 
trolled by  perfect  love  to  their  perfect  issues  ?  Particularly, 
under  the  guidance  and  control  of  such  a  principle,  how  would 
the  intellect  awake,  in  all  its  forms  of  action,  and  in  the  vastness 
of  its  power !  How,  in  the  delightful  activity  of  its  unimpaired 
vigor,  would  it  grapple  with  themes  worthy  of  its  strength ! 
How,  as  destined  to  know  and  to  know  still  more  forever. 


EXCELLENT  RESULTS  OF  BENEVOLENCE.     43 

would  it  exult  in  its  own  expansion  and  enlargement !  How 
would  it  remove  the  clouds  and  darkness,  that  intercept  the 
knowledge  of  all  that  is  great,  and  good  and  fair,  and  devoted 
to  reasonings  and  contemplations  which  become  the  minds  of 
angels,  partake  of  their  happiness,  in  seeing  and  knowing  all 
in  the  sun-light  of  changeless  truth !  How  also,  would  the 
dominion  of  such  a  principle  extend  to  all  the  primary  active 
principles  of  our  nature !  No  dull  inactivity  would  oppress 
the  mind ;  no  reluctant  sloth  more  wearisome  than  the  effort 
it  dreads,  would  stupefy  the  powers.  Its  self-active  nature 
would  be  ever  awake  in  all  its  susceptibilities  to  objects  with- 
out and  objects  within — to  the  happiness  of  others  and  its  own 
in  their  beautiful  coincidence — to  moral  rectitude  in  its  love- 
liness, and  to  moral  pravity  in  its  turpitude — to  the  attractive 
fitness  of  all  means  to  ends  which  are  good,  and  to  the  revolt- 
ing fitness  of  all  means  to  ends  which  are  evil.  The  desire 
of  knowledge,  the  desire  of  excellence,  the  desire  of  power, 
the  desire  of  the  esteem  and  love  of  others,  the  desire  of  so- 
ciety— every  desire,  tendency  and  appetency  of  our  nature  of 
the  class  which  seem  least  capable  of  perversion,  would  be  in 
place,  and  active  to  fulfill  its  function  and  to  find  its  own 
gratification.  Under  the  reign  of  this  principle,  there  would 
be  emulation  without  ambition,  exaltation  without  pride,  self- 
approbation  without  vanity,  distinction  without  envy,  acquisi- 
tion without  avarice,  temperance  without  austerity,  economy 
without  meanness,  liberality  without  prodigality,  and  excite- 
ment without  agitation.  There  would  be  no  extremes  either 
in  deficiency  or  excess,  and  no  violence  by  conflict.  How 
too  it  would  subdue,  regulate,  and  direct  all  those  propen- 
sities, lusts,  and  passions  which  annoy,  molest  and  make 
wretched ;  preventing  internal  anarchy,  bringing  all  into 
peaceful  subjection,  imparting  order  and  harmony  in  their 
attractive  beauty,  and  employing  all  these  essential  elements 
of  our  nature,  even  those  which  have  been  counted  its  grand 
defects  and  blemishes,  only  as  the  instruments  of  our  highest 
well-being.  Instead  of  the  storms  and  tempests  of  ungoverned 
appetite  and  passion,  to  darken  and  disturb  the  serenity  within, 
the  ever-present  shekinah  would  diffuse  its  perpetual  luster  and 
influence. 

Consider  too,  its  achievements  in  difficulties  overcome  and 
deeds  performed.     Its  work  is  to  resist,  to  overcome,  to  control 


44  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

all  obstacles  and  all  enemies  to  truth,  to  virtue  and  happiness. 
How  it  corrects  prejudice  and  willful  pertinacity  of  opinion, 
with  their  false  judgments  and  errors  !  How  it  welcomes 
truth  not  only  in  its  light,  but  in  its  practical  power!  If  error 
is  death,  what  victories  are  these?  How  it  overcomes  the 
world,  vanquishing  every  form  of  temptation,  resisting  corrupt 
example,  repelling  the  seductive  attractions  of  wealth,  honor 
and  pleasure,  using  the  world  as  not  abusing  it,  and  rendering  all 
its  gifts  tributary  to  a  pilgrimage  hastening  to  a  better  country. 
In  its  onward  way,  it  is  discouraged  by  no  obstacles,  stopped 
by  no  fatigue,  put  to  flight  by  no  terrors ;  but  perpetuating  its 
own  strength  for  higher  achievements  by  its  use,  it  becomes 
stronger  and  stronger  for  its  everlasting  triumphs.  What  deeds 
of  magnanimity  it  has  performed,  in  dungeons,  on  scaffolds,  on 
the  rack,  in  the  fire,  to  which  worldly  heroism  furnishes  no 
parallel — deeds  that  need  not  the  acclamations  of  admiring 
men,  for  they  are  crowned  with  God's  approbation.  How  too, 
in  all  the  varied  forms  of  beneficence,  it  sends  forth  the  almoners 
of  its  bounty — the  ministering  spirits  of  its  love !  By  its  prac- 
tical sympathies,  by  its  supplies  of  want,  by  the  prevention  of 
evil,  by  the  removal  of  suffering  and  the  relief  of  sorrow,  by  the 
instruction  of  ignorance,  the  reformation  of  vice  and  the  restora- 
tion to  virtue,  how,  like  our  great  Exemplar,  it  feeds  the  hungry, 
heals  the  sick,  gives  sight  to  the  blind,  binds  up  the  broken- 
hearted, and  raises  the  dead  to  life !  It  is  the  spirit  of  well- 
doing on  angel-wings,  waiting  the  orders  of  the  throne,  or 
flying  on  errands  of  mercy  in  their  execution.  How  it  adorns 
the  mind  with  all  the  minor  virtues  of  the  inner  man  !  How 
it  meets  crosses  with  cheerfulness,  suffering  with  patience, 
trials  with  submission,  injuries  with  forgiveness,  wrath  with 
meekness,  persecution  with  prayer,  rendering  good  for  evil, 
and  blessing  for  cursing,  and  bringing  all,  by  these  conquests, 
into  sweet  and  peaceful  subjection,  how  gracefully  it  sways 
the  scepter!  ~No  jarring  elements  or  violent  changes  without 
interrupt  "the  soul's  calm  sunshine  and  heartfelt  joy."  In 
this  sanctuary  dwell  truth  and  uprightness,  integrity  and  jus- 
tice, love  and  gratitude,  kindness,  good-will  and  mercy.  Piety 
also  is  here,  with  its  adoring  reverence,  and  love  and  gratitude, 
with  its  steadfast  hope  in  immutable  goodness,  its  confidence 
reposing  in  everlasting  strength,  and  its  fullness  of  joy  flowing 
from  the  fountains  of  eternity.     This  is  benevolence  reigning 


EVIL    RESULTS    OF    SELFISHNESS.  45 

in'  the  heart.  How,  under  its  perfect  dominion,  would  the  soul 
be  blessed!  On  earth,  would  those  sister  seraphs,  holiness 
and  happiness,  again  dwell  in  every  heart,  and  paradise  be 
regained !  Like  the  Supreme  on  the  throne  above,  summon- 
ing the  angel  hosts  to  His  service,  it  calls  forth  the  full  and 
bright  assemblage  of  all  the  minor  virtues  and  graces  to  do  its 
will,  in  blessing  and  in  being  blessed.  This  is  the  moral  excel- 
lence of  a  moral  being  with  its  happiness — that  moral  excel- 
lence, whose  worth,  beauty,  loveliness  can  be  seen  only  in 
heaven's  light,  whose  raptures  can  be  expressed  only  in 
heaven's  song.     It  is  heaven  itself. 

Let  us  now  contemplate  the  selfish  principle  enthroned  in 
the  heart  of  a  moral  being.  We  see  every  thing  reversed. 
•LTnder  this  dominion,  we  see  the  same  exalted  powers — powers 
unparalleled  for  good  and  for  evil,  employed  for  the  worst  con- 
ceivable results  of  power.  The  high  powers  of  intellect,  of 
emotion,  of  will  and  heart,  which  qualify  for  action  amid  the 
scenes  and  grandeurs  of  eternity,  powers  and  capacities  which 
reveal  the  image,  are  stamped  with  the  immortality,  and  be- 
speak the  highest  design  of  a  creating  Deity ;  these  powers, 
with  the  productive  energies  and  unchanging  laws  of  executive 
action,  are  devoted  to  the  destruction  of  the  highest  happiness, 
and  to  the  production  of  the  highest  misery  of  a  sentient  uni- 
verse ;  these  powers  in  their  uncounteracted  nature  and  tend- 
ency— for  so  truth  contemplates  them — make  sure  their  re- 
sults. And  now,  what  is  it  to  the  agent  himself,  thus  to 
employ  such  powers  for  such  ends  ?  What  is  it,  to  establish 
such  a  dominion  over  himself?  What  a  perversion  of  facul- 
ties, what  a  defeat  of  high  destiny,  what  low  and  still  lower 
depths  of  degradation,  what  an  outrage  on  nature,  what  utter 
self-destruction  !  More  particularly,  how  under  the  influence 
of  the  selfish  principle  the  exalted  power  of  intellect  is  em- 
ployed !  This  faculty  of  a  moral  being  is  made  to  preside  over 
and  direct  all  his  other  powers.  It  gives  to  such  a  being  the 
knowledge  of  the  greatest  of  all  truths — that  to  he  happy,  he 
must  he  good  /  and  yet  in  forming  and  acting  under  the  selfish 
principle,  it  governs  him  by  the  greatest  of  all  lies — that  to  he 
happy,  he  must  he  selfish.  "As  a  man  thinketh  in  his  heart, 
so  is  he."  He  who  thinks  right,  will  feel  and  act  right ; 
he  who  thinks  wrong,  will  feel  wrong  and  act  wrong.  Every 
impure  affection,  every  corrupt  principle,  every  criminal  de- 


46  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IX    THE   ABSTRACT. 

sign,  every  wrong  and  vicious  action,  has  its  antecedent  in 
thought.  Thoughts  grow  into  desires,  desires  ripen  into 
resolves,  and  resolves  terminate  in  execution.  "Out  of  the 
heart  proceed  evil  thoughts."  What  next  ?  "  Murders,  adul- 
teries, fornication,  thefts,  false  witness,  blasphemies."  All 
begins  in  thought.  Thoughts  are  the  precursors  of  all  the 
storms  and  tempests  of  the  soul — the  floodgates  of  all  which 
desolates,  afflicts,  corrupts  and  ruins  the  immortal  mind.  Thus 
intellect,  that  high  faculty,  which  so  exalts  a  moral  being 
above  every  other,  by  giving  him  all  truth  necessary  to  the 
highest  perfection  of  being,  gives  him  for  his  practical  guid- 
ance and  control  only  falsehood  and  lies.  "With  such  things 
to  be  known,  and  with  such  intelligence  to  know  them — such 
treasures  of  wisdom  and  of  knowledge,  with  such  power  to  know 
them  by  intuition,  by  consciousness,  by  reflection,  by  memory, 
by  reason  and  judgment,  with  such  intelligence  dwelling  amid 
the  light  of  truth,  of  life,  of  blessedness,  and  yet  every  right  and 
true  conviction  is  held  in  abeyance,  and  every  practical  opera- 
tion of  thought,  of  contemplation,  of  reasoning,  gives  error, 
falsehood  and  death  !  At  the  same  time,  this  intelligence  by 
a  necessity  of  its  own  nature,  must  see  and  know  its  own  fear- 
ful perversions  and  the  fearful  issues  !  Who  shall  measure 
the  unhappiness,  the  miseries  of  such  perversions  of  such  a 
power — of  the  violence  and  outrage  done  to  this  godlike  faculty? 
Consider  now  the  influence  of  the  selfish  over  all  those  primary 
principles  of  the  soul,  which  directly  lead  to  all  subordinate 
emotions,  desires  and  affections.  And  here  its  first  effect  is 
to  resist,  counteract,  and  paralyze  that  highest  susceptibility 
of  the  mind — susceptibility  to  happiness  from  the  well-being 
of  others.  This  part  of  our  nature,  which  is  the  basis  of  all  feel- 
ing in  respect  to  right  and  wrong  doing,  of  all  the  affections, 
desires,  and  emotions  that  respect  the  true  well-being  of  others 
and  our  own,  is  held  in  abeyance,  or  rather  benumbed  into 
inaction  and  torpidity. 


LECTURE  III. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law.— 
The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded. — Third  characteristic  of  the  law  so  demanded  in  a 
perfect  Moral  Government,  viz. :  it  requires  benevolence  and  forbids  selfishness. — Relation  of 
predominant  to  subordinate  action. — Benevolence  and  selfishness  defined. — These  constitute  tho 
only  kind  of  action  possible  to  a  moral  being. — Manner  in  which  the  law  requires  and  forbids 
subordinate  action.— Benevolence  and  selfishness  the  only  morally  right  and  wrong  actions. 

Thirdly.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  requires 
benevolence  as  the  sum  of  obedience,  and  forbids  selfishness  as 
the  sum  of  disobedience  on  the  peert  of  its  subjects. 

By  this  I  mean  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government 
absolutely  and  universally  requires  benevolence  and  benevo- 
lence only,  and  that  it  absolutely  and  universally  forbids  self- 
ishness and  selfishness  only,  while  by  this  universal  require- 
ment, it  virtually  or  in  effect  requires  subordinate  action  only 
as  such  action  becomes  in  the  variable  circumstances  of  its 
subjects,  the  appropriate  expression  of  benevolence;  and  by 
this  universal  prohibition,  it  virtually  or  in  effect  forbids  sub- 
ordinate action  only  as  it  becomes  in  the  variable  circum- 
stances of  its  subjects,  the  appropriate  expression  of  selfishness. 

Before  I  proceed  to  offer  the  proof  of  this  proposition,  I  deem 
it  important  to  distinguish  the  different  kinds  of  action  on  the 
part  of  moral  beings,  which  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment may  be  supposed  to  respect. 

Premising  that  by  a  moral  being  I  mean  not  one  who  acts 
or  has  acted  morally,  but  one  who,  from  his  nature  and  condi- 
tion, is  qualified  to  act  morally,  and  is  under  a  necessity  of  so 
acting,  I  proceed  to  say,  that — 

All  the  action  which  is  predicable  of  such  a  being  when  he 
acts,  and  which  now  demands  consideration,  may  be  included 
in  two  kinds,  viz.,  that  in  which  he  electively  prefers  some 
object  or  end  as  his  supreme  or  chief  object,  and  that  action 
which  is  dictated  or  prompted  by  this  preference.*  Every 
moral  being  as  such  comes  under  the  necessity,  from  his  nature 

*  That  kind  of  action  which  takes  place  through  the  suspension  of  the  governing 
principle,  and  which  is  not  prompted  by  it,  and  which  is  occasional  and  unusual,  in 
the  present  connection  claims  no  particular  consideration. 


48  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

and  condition,  of  acting  with  his  will  and  heart  in  respect  to 
some  object  or  end,  as  his  supreme  or  chief  object  or.  end ; 
that  is,  of  electively  preferring  some  object  or  end  to  every 
other  in  competition  with  it,  as  an  object  of  preference;  or  of 
supremely  loving  some  such  object  or  end.  This  act  or  state 
of  the  mind,  as  contemplated  under  somewhat  different  aspects 
and  relations,  we  commonly  call  the  supreme  affection,  the 
prevailing  disposition,  the  governing  principle,  the  controlling 
purpose  of  the  mind.  The  true  nature  and  tendency  of  this 
state  or  act  of  the  mind  is  to  dictate  or  prompt,  to  control  or 
govern  all  other  action  of  the  being.  This  state  of  mind,  con- 
sidered as  action  cognizable  by  law,  is  too  often  lost  sight  of  by 
moralists,  as  if  moral  obligation  had  no  respect  to  the  acts  of 
the  will  and  heart' — -the  most  important  of  all  action,  because 
the  word  action  is  most  frequently  applied  to  executive  doings. 
To  avoid  this  error,  I  propose  to  distinguish  the  two  kinds 
of  action  by  one  peculiar  and  prominent  characteristic,  and 
shall  call  the  one  predominant  action,  and  the  other  subordi- 
nate action. 

Each  of  these  kinds  of  action  may  be  subdivided  into  two 
other  kinds. 

Predominant  action  consists  either  in  benevolence  or  in  self- 
ishness. These  are  the  only  predominant  acts  of  which  a 
moral  being  is  capable,  and  one  or  the  other  is  predicable  of 
every  being  of  whom  moral  character,  viz.,  morally  right  or 
morally  wrong  action,  is  predicable."  Benevolence  consists 
in  the  elective  preference  of,  or  in  electively  preferring,  the 
highest  well-being  of  all  sentient  beings,  for  its  own  sake,  to 
every  object  in  competition  with  it,  as  an  object  of  choice  or 
preference.  Selfishness  consists  in  the  elective  preference  of, 
or  in  electively  preferring,  some  inferior  good  to  the  highest 
well-being  of  all  sentient  beings,  and  is,  of  course,  a  preference 
of  this  inferior  good  to  the  prevention  of  the  highest  misery 
of  all ;  that  is,  a  preference  of  the  highest  misery  of  all  to  the 
absence  of  the  inferior  good,  as  these  objects  come  into  com- 
petition as  objects  of  choice  or  preference. 

*  In  confirmation  of  some  fundamental  principles  like  the  present,  I  shall  refer 
to  certain  passages  in  the  sacred  writings,  simply  as  expressing  the  obvious  decisions 
of  reason  and  common  sense  in  such  forms  of  statement, as  to  commend  their  truth 
at  once  to  the  mind  of  every  one,  irrespectively  of  their  divine  authority.  In  the 
present  instance,  I  refer  to  Matt.  vi.  24;  xii.  30. 


BENEVOLENCE    AND    SELFISHNESS    DEFINED.      49 

It  is  important  to  our  purpose  to  specify  some  of  the  char- 
acteristics which  are  common  to  the  two  kinds  of  predominant 
action,  and  those  wherein  they  differ. 

Each  then,  is  an  act  of  the  will  and  heart,  or  an  elective 
preference,  by  which  I  mean  that  it  includes  two  elements, 
viz.,  choice  and  affection.*  Each  is  an  intelligent  act,  or  an 
act  done  with  the  present  knowledge  or  intellectual  appre- 
hension of  the  nature  of  action, as  related  to  the  great  and  true 
end  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being.  Each  is  a  free  act, 
or  an  act  done  with  entire  exemption  from  the  influence  of 
every  cause  of  the  act,  which,  in  the  circumstances  in  which  it 
takes  place,  renders  the  act  necessary.  Each  is  a  permanent 
act,  or  an  act  which  tends  to  its  own  perpetuity,  and  is  for  the 
most  part  perpetual.  Each  is  predominant  action,  or  action 
which  tends  to  secure  all  other  action,  as  it  becomes  the  neces- 
sary means  of  accomplishing  the  end  of  the  predominant  action. 
Such  are  the  elements  in  which  the  two  elective  preferences 
called  benevolence  and  selfishness  agree. 

Wherein  do  these  kinds  of  action  differ?  Thus.  Benevo- 
lence is  action  whose  direct  end  is  the  great  end  of  all  action 
on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  and  which  is  perfectly  fitted,  in 
all  the  circumstances  of  such  a  being,  to  produce  this  end,  viz., 
the  highest  well-being  of  all  other  sentient  beings  and  of  the 
agent  himself.  Selfishness  is  action,  whose  direct  end  is  some 
end  inferior  to  the  great  end  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral 
being,  and  which  is  perfectly  fitted,  in  all  the  circumstances 
of  such  a  being,  to  defeat  this  end,  and  to  produce  the  opposite 
end,  the  highest  misery  of  all  other  sentient  beings  and  of  the 
agent  himself. 

There  is  one  end  of  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings  which, 
as  determined  by  their  nature  and  their  relations,  may  be  said 
to  be  the  great  end  of  all  action  on  their  part,  or,  as  it  is  some- 
times called,  "  the  chief  end"  of  such  beings,  viz.,  the  highest 
possible  well-being  of  each  and  of  all.     This  is  an  end,  to  the 

*  The  morally  right  act  or  state  of  the  mind  is  often  spoken  of  as  an  act  of  the 
will — an  elective  act,  an  act  of  choosing.  Vide  Dbut.  xxiv.  15-24;  Pro  v.  i.  29; 
Isa.  vii.  15;  Luke  x.  42.  The  more  prominent  element  however,  in  this  state  of 
mind  is  affection ;  and  hence  it  is  most  frequently  designated  in  some  manner  which 
presents  it  as  a  state  of  affection.  In  these  cases  however,  the  language  is  so  used 
as  to  show  that  it  is  a  supreme  affection ;  or  that  it  is  love  not  as  a  mere  constitu- 
tional emotion,  but  as  involving  an  act  of  the  will;  (i.  e.)  that  it  is  an  elective 
preference.     Matt.  x.  37;  xxii.  37;  1  John  ii.  15,  16;  Acts  xi.  23. 


50  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

promotion  of  which,  or  to  the  prevention  of  which  in  the 
promotion  of  the  opposite  end,  the  highest  misery  of  all,  all 
action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings  has,  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  a  relation  of  tendency  or  fitness.  It  is,  therefore,  em- 
phatically the  great  end  or  the  chief  end  of  all  action  on  their 
part — not,  indeed,  as  the  end  at  which  they  actually  aim,  but 
as  that  end  at  which  they  are  qualified  to  aim  and  to  promote, 
and  at  which  they  must  supremely  aim  if  they  would  promote 
or  secure  the  great  end  of  their  being.  There  is  one,  and  only 
one  kind  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  whose  direct 
end  is  the  great  end  of  all  action  on  his  part,  viz.,  benevolence, 
or  the  elective  preference  of  this  end  to  every  other  in  compe- 
tition with  it,  as  an  object  of  election  or  choice.  In  this  sense 
benevolence,  as  action  whose  direct  object  or  end  is  the  great 
end  of  all  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  may  be  said  to 
be  the  action,  and  the  only  action,  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to 
promote  or  accomplish  this  end.  There  is  one,  and  only  one 
kind  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being,  whose  direct  end 
is  some  end  inferior  to  this  great  end,  instead  of  this  great  end, 
viz.,  selfishness,  or  an  elective  preference  of  the  inferior  end  to 
this  great  end,  in  which  the  agent  virtually  and  actually  pro- 
poses to  destroy  all  other  good,  and  to  produce  the  highest 
misery  of  all  for  the  sake  of  this  direct  and  inferior  end.  In 
this  sense  selfishness  may  be  said  to  be  perfectly  fitted,  and  to 
be  the  only  action  which  is  perfectly  fitted  to  prevent  the  high- 
est well-being  of  all  and  to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  all. 

Thus  every  moral  being  who  possesses  a  moral  character,  or 
who  acts  morally  right  or  morally  wrong,  electively  prefers 
some  object  or  end  as  his  supreme  object  or  end.  In  this  state 
of  his  will  and  affections,  and  when  under  its  contolling  influ- 
ence, he  ever  aims  to  promote  or  accomplish  that  object  or 
end.  It  maintains  an  habitual  ascendency  in  the  mind,  dicta- 
ting and  controlling  his  particular  acts,  as  these  include  par- 
ticular thoughts,  affections,  desires,  dispositions,  volitions,  and 
overt  doings,  in  subservience  to  the  accomplishment  of  that 
object  or  end.  Without  this  predominant  act  or  state  of  the 
mind  there  could  be  no  consistency  in  his  conduct  as  a  moral 
being,  and  no  uniformity  of  character — nothing  which  can  be 
called  moral  character. 

Again,  there  is,  as  I  have  said,  another  kind  of  action,  viz., 
subordinate  action.     By  subordinate  action  is  meant  all  that 


SUBORDINATE    ACTION,    OF    TWO    KINDS.  51 

kind  of  action  which  is  dictated  and  controlled  by  predominant 
action,  by  the  supreme  affection,  governing  principle  or  pur- 
pose of  the  mind,  and  which  is  done  in  subservience  to,  or  to 
promote  the  end  of  the  governing  principle  or  purpose.  This 
kind  of  action  may  be  divided  into  two  particular  kinds  of 
subordinate  action.  The  one  consists  in  particular  elective 
preferences,  voluntary  affections,  dispositions  or  purposes, 
in  which  no  present  or  immediate  action  of  either  mind  or 
body  is  directly  willed.  This  may  be  called  immanent  subor- 
dinate action.  The  other  consists  in  willing  directly  some 
present  mental  or  bodily  action,  and  in  the  action  willed. 
This  may  be  called  executive  subordinate  action.  Examples  of 
the  former — justice,  honesty,  veracity,  gratitude,  humanity  or 
kindness  to  fellow-beings,  patriotism,  natural  affection  or  love 
of  kindred,  friendship,  honor,  etc. ;  and  their  opposites — all 
these,  considered  as  habitual  dispositions,  affections,  purposes, 
principles — as  mental  acts  or  states,  which  involve  acts  of  will, 
or  are  elective  preferences  of  their  particular  objects  in  which 
no  present  acts  are  directly  willed,  are  examples  of  immanent 
subordinate  action.  Examples  of  the  latter  are  the  act  of  ren- 
dering to  another  his  due,  the  act  of  speaking  truth,  the  act 
of  giving  alms,  etc.,  etc.,  and  their  opposites.  These,  con- 
sidered as  including  in  each  instance  the  act  willed  and  the 
act  of  willing  it,  are  examples  of  executive  subordinate  action. 
For  the  purpose  of  distinguishing  the  elements  of  any  action 
of  the  latter  class,  we  may  call  one  element  the  imperative 
volition,  and  the  other  the  overt  action. 

In  this  view  of  subordinate  action,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
direct  end  of  such  action,  that  is,  the  end  directly  aimed  at  by 
the  mind  in  such  action,  is  not  the  great  end  of  all  action  on 
the  part  of  a  moral  being,  nor  the  opposite  end,  and  that,  in 
this  sense,  subordinate  action  is  not  fitted  to  promote  this  end 
nor  to  defeat  it.  On  the  contrary,  the  mind,  the  agent  in  all 
subordinate  action,  directly  aims  only  at  some  limited  degree 
of  happiness  or  misery.  In  so  acting,  he  can  aim  at  the  great 
end  of  action  only  indirectly — that  is,  through  the  predominant 
action.  When  such  action  is  directly  fitted  to  produce  some 
limited  degree  of  happiness,  which  is  necessary  to  the  highest 
well-being  of  all,  then  it  is  indirectly  fitted  to  promote  this 
great  end ;  and  when  it  is  directly  fitted  to  produce  some 
limited  degree  of  happiness  which  is  inconsistent  with  this 


52  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

great  end,  or  some  limited  degree  of  misery  which  is  incon- 
sistent with  it,  then  it  is  indirectly  fitted  to  defeat  this  great 
end, and  to  promote  its  opposite. 

Having  thus  distinguished  the  different  kinds  of  action  on 
the  part  of  moral  beings,  I  now  proceed  to  show  that  the  law 
of  a  perfect  moral  government  requires  benevolence  as  the 
sum  of  obedience,  and  forbids  selfishness  as  the  sum  of  disobe- 
dience ;  in  other  words,  that  it  absolutely  requires  benevolence 
and  benevolence  only,  and  forbids  selfishness  and  selfishness 
only,  in  all  circumstances  ;  while  by  this  requirement  and 
prohibition  it  virtually  or  in  effect  requires  and  forbids  other 
action,  only  as  such  action  becomes  in  the  variable  circum- 
stances of  its  subjects,  the  appropriate  expression  of  benevo- 
lence and  selfishness.  This  will  appear  from  the  following 
considerations : 

First.  Predominant  action,  either  in  the  form  of  benevolence 
or  selfishness  is  not  only  unavoidable,  but  it  is  the  only  action  on 
the  part  of  moral  beings  which,  in  all  the  circumstances  essential 
to  their  condition,  is  possible.  The  circumstances  of  moral 
beings  are  of  two  kinds  ;  those  which  are  essential  to  their 
condition  as  moral  beings,  which  are  invariable, and  which  are 
common  to  all  their  actual  circumstances ;  and  those  which 
are  not  essential  to  their  condition  as  moral  beings,  which  are 
variable,  and  therefore  not  common  to  all  their  actual  circum- 
stances. ISTow  every  moral  being  as  such  exists  in  such  cir- 
cumstances and  sustains  such  relations, that  he  is  under  an  ab- 
solute necessity  from  his  nature  and  his  circumstances  to  per- 
form predominant  action,  either  in  the  form  of  benevolence  or 
of  selfishness.  He  must  choose  either  the  highest  well-being 
of  the  sentient  universe,  or  some  inferior  object  as  his  supreme 
object.  The  former  is  to  him  an  object  of  possible  choice.  On 
the  choice  of  it  depends  his  highest  well-being.  He  is  there- 
fore under  the  necessity  either  of  choosing  it,  or  not  choosing 
it  as  his  supreme  good.  If  he  chooses  this  object  as  his 
supreme  object,  he  is  a  benevolent  being.  If  he  does  not, 
then  he  chooses  some  inferior  object,  rather  than  this;  and  is 
a  selfish  being.  He  is  therefore  under  an  absolute  necessity 
of  performing  predominant  action,  of  becoming  in  heart — in 
principle — in  the  governing  purpose  of  the  mind,  either  a 
benevolent  or  a  selfish  being,  which  necessity  is  as  fixed  and 
unavoidable  as  are  his  nature  and  his  circumstances.     Nor  in 


PREDOMINANT   ACTION   DECIDES   CHARACTER.     53 

those  circumstances  which  are  essential  to  his  condition  as  a 
moral  being,  is  any  other  action  possible  than  predominant 
action, either  in  the  form  of  benevolence  or  of  selfishness.  All 
other  action  is  in  the  nature  of  things,  dictated  or  prompted 
by  predominant  action — is  the  consetpient  and  effect  of  pre- 
dominant action — and  therefore  utterly  impossible  without 
prior  predominant  action.  All  other  action  is  subordinate 
action;  and  all  subordinate  action  is,  in  different  respects, 
circumstantial  or  conditional  action.  The  possibility  of  such 
action  depends  on  variable  circumstances,  which  are  not  essen- 
tial to  the  condition  of  a  moral  being,  nor  common  to  all  his 
actual  circumstances.  No  moral  being  can  in  disposition, 
principle,  affection,  volition,  purpose,  become  either  just  or 
unjust,  true  or  false,  honest  or  dishonest,  or  perform  any  other 
immanent  subordinate  act  or  action,  until  he  has  become 
either  benevolent  or  selfish  ;  and  therefore  not  until  predomi- 
nant action  in  the  form  of  benevolence  or  selfishness  has  taken 
place.  The  same  thing  is  true  in  respect  to  all  executive  sub- 
ordinate action  y  for  this  also  depends  on  prior  predominant 
action.  All  subordinate  action  therefore,  since  it  depends  on 
prior  predominant  action,  is  in  this  respect  circumstantial,  as 
it  depends  on  variable  circumstances,  which  are  not  essential 
to  the  condition  of  a  moral  being.  Nor  is  this  all.  A  moral 
being,  in  one  set  of  variable  circumstances,  may  be  under  the 
necessity  of  performing  either  one  kind  of  subordinate  action 
or  its  opposite ;  for  example,  of  being  either  just  or  unjust  in 
disposition  or  purpose,  or  in  another  case,  of  acting  executively 
either  justly  or  unjustly.  In  another  set  of  variable  circum- 
stances, he  may  be  under  the  necessity  of  performing  either 
another  kind  of  subordinate  action  or  its  opposite  ;  for  exam- 
ple, of  being  in  purpose  or  will  either  true  or  false  ;  or  in 
another  case,  of  speaking  truth  or  falsehood.  Thus,  when  sub- 
ordinate action  becomes  possible  by  the  existence  of  prior 
predominant  action,  whether  such  possible  subordinate  action 
be  of  one  kind  or  of  another  kind,  depends  on  those  variable 
circumstances  which  are  not  essential  to  the  condition  of  a 
moral  being.  And  further,  there  is  no  kind  of  subordinate 
action,  which  in  any  circumstances  is  fitted  to  subserve  the 
end  of  benevolence,  which  in  some  other  circumstances  may 
not  be  fitted  to  subserve  the  end  of  selfishness,  and  be 
prompted  by  this  principle.     Thus  a  man  may  love  his  kin- 


54  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

dred,  or  his  country,  lie  may  purpose  to  be  just,  honest,  faith- 
ful and  true ;  to  give  all  his  goods  to  feed  the  poor,  and  his 
body  to  be  burned,  either  from  the  benevolent  or  the  selfish 
principle.  At  the  same  time  there  are  few  if  any  kinds  of 
subordinate  action,  which  in  all  circumstances  are  fitted  only 
to  promote  the  end  of  selfishness,  or  which  in  some  possible 
circumstances  may  not  be  fitted  to  subserve  the  end  of  benev- 
olence, and  be  performed  from  this  principle."  Thus  the 
general  purpose  to  destroy,  or  this  purpose  in  connection  with 
the  act  of  destroying  the  dwellings  of  others,  in  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances would  be  ascribed  to  the  selfish  principle  and 
pronounced  under  this  complex  conception  injustice  ;  and  yet 
the  same  act  as  immanent  subordinate  action,  in  the  form  of  a 
purpose  or  as  including  the  executive  act,  when  contemplated 
as  necessary  on  the  part  of  firemen  to  prevent  the  burning  of 
a  city,  would  be  demanded  by  benevolence,  and  may  be 
prompted  by  this  principle.  So  the  immanent  act  including 
the  executive  subordinate  act  which  respects  taking  the  life 
of  our  fellow-beings,  in  one  case  is  justly  esteemed  an  act  of 
selfishness,  and  in  another  case  an  act  demanded  by  benevo- 
lence ;  and  may  be  prompted  by  benevolence.  It  may  be  a 
question  with  some,  in  view  of  the  example  of  the  Saviour  in 
Luke  xxiv.  19-28— to  say  nothing  of  defeating  the  design  of 
an  assassin  by  stratagem  or  of  attacking  an  invading  army  by 
ambuscade,  whether  the  act  of  deceiving  so  commonly  consid- 
ered as  in  all  cases  resulting  from  the  selfish  principle,  and 
equivalent  to  lying,  may  not  in  some  cases  be  dictated  by  the 
benevolent  principle.  Without  deciding  however,  whether 
there  be  any  kind  of  subordinate  action,  which  in  all  the  vari- 
able circumstances  of  moral  beings,  can  be  dictated  only  by 
the  selfish  principle,  it  is  evident  that  all  that  action  which  I 
have  called  subordinate  action,  is  prompted  by  predominant 
action ;  and  that  such  action  is  absolutely  impossible  on  the 
part  of  moral  beings,  without  prior  predominant  action. 

Now  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  should 
require  and  forbid  action,  which  in  the  circumstances  of  the 

*  It  should  here  be  kept  in  mind,  that  justice,  veracity,  patriotism,  and  other 
specific  virtues,  which  involve  the  benevolent  principle,  and  that  injustice,  lying, 
murder,  and  other  particular  crimes  or  vices,  which  involve  the  selfish  principle, 
are  not  what  is  meant  by  subordinate  action ;  since  in  this  mode  of  conceiving  and 
speaking,  they  include  both  predominant  and  subordinate  action, 


RELATION"  OF  THE  LAW  TO  SUBORDINATE  ACTION.   55 

beings  to  whom  it  is  given,  is  utterly  impossible  on  their  part, 
is  preposterous  and  incredible.  It  is  equally  preposterous  and 
incredible,  that  the  law  of  such  a  government  should  not 
require  benevolence  and  forbid  selfishness  in  all  circumstances 
in  which  they  are  possible  on  the  part  of  subjects.  Since  then 
the  law  of  such  a  government,  absolutely  requires  and  forbids 
predominant  action,  and  predominant  action  only  in  all  the 
circumstances  of  its  subjects  which  are  essential  to  their 
moral  condition,  and  therefore  in  all  their  circumstances,  and 
since  benevolence  and  selfishness  are  the  only  kinds  of  pre- 
dominant action,  it  follows,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral 
government  absolutely  and  universally  requires  benevolence, 
and  benevolence  only,  and  forbids  selfishness  and  selfishness 
only,  on  the  part  of  its  subjects. 

This  view  of  the  subject  will  be  further  confirmed,  by  con- 
sidering the  manner  in  which  the  law  of  a  perfect  Inoral 
government  requires  and  forbids  subordinate  action.  This 
law,  as  we  have  said,  by  its  requirement  and  its  prohibition 
of  predominant  action,  virtually  or  in  effect  requires  and 
forbids  subordinate  action  only  as  such  action  becomes  in  the 
variable  circumstances  of  its  subjects,  the  appropriate  expres- 
sion of  benevolence  and  of  selfishness. 

As  we  have  seen,  predominant  action  on  the  part  of  the 
subjects  of  law,  is  possible  in  all  their  circumstances  as  moral 
beings,  while  in  some  of  their  circumstances  subordinate  action 
is  impossible.  K ow  it  is  the  nature  and  tendency  of  predomi- 
nant action  to  go  forth  into  the  appropriate  expressions  of  itself 
in  subordinate  action,  according  to  the  variable  circumstances 
of  the  subject,  in  which  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  such 
action  arise.  Hence,  to  require  predominant  action  in  the 
form  of  benevolence  absolutely  and  universally,  is  virtually 
and  in  effect,  to  require  all  its  appropriate  expressions  in  sub- 
ordinate action,  as  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  such  action 
arise  in  all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the  subject ;  and  to 
forbid  predominant  action  in  the  form  of  selfishness  absolutely 
and  universcdly,  is  virtually  and  in  effect,  to  forbid  all  its  ap- 
propriate expressions  in  subordinate  action,  as  the  possibility 
and  necessity  of  such  action  arise,  in  all  the  variable  circum- 
stances of  the  subject.*      l^or  is  there  any  other  mode  in 

*  In  those  remarks,  the  knowlodge  or  possible  knowledge  of  subordinate  action 
as  the  appropriate  expression  of  predominant  action,  on  the  part  of  the  subjects  of 


56  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

which  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  can  require  and 
forbid  subordinate  action.  To  suppose  that  it  should,  is  to 
suppose  that  it  should  go  beyond  the  obligation  of  the  subject 
in  its  requirement  and  prohibition ;  subordinate  action  being 
utterly  impossible  in  some  circumstances  of  the  subject.  The 
law  -therefore,  does  all  it  can  do  by  absolute  and  universal 
requirement,  to  secure  all  the  subordinate  action,  which  in  all 
the  variable  and  all  the  possible  circumstances  of  the  subject, 
can  become  the  appropriate  expression  of  benevolence  ;  and 
all  it  can  do  by  absolute  and  universal  prohibition,  to  prevent 
all  the  subordinate  action  which  in  all  the  variable  and  possi- 
ble circumstances  of  the  subject,  can  become  the  appropriate 
expression  of  selfishness.  In  its  absolute  and  universal  re- 
quirement of  benevolence,  it  requires  a  permanent  predomi- 
nant principle  of  action  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  subject, 
which  gives  the  best  security  which  the  nature  of  things  admits 
of,  that  all  subordinate  action  which  is  the  appropriate  expres- 
sion of  this  principle  in  all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the 
subject,  will  be  performed  ;  and  in  its  absolute  and  universal 
prohibition  of  selfishness,  it  forbids  a  principle  of  action  in  all 
the  circumstances  of  the  subject, which  gives  the  best  secu- 
rity which  the  nature  of  things  admits  of,  that  all  subordinate 
action  which  is  the  appropriate  expression  of  this  principle  in 
all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the  subject,  will  be  pre- 
vented. 

Should  it  here  be  said  that,  according  to  this  view  of  the 
law  under  consideration,  it  cannot  absolutely  and  universally 
require  and  forbid  any  subordinate  action  whatever — not  even 
thus  require  justice  or  veracity,  nor  thus  forbid  injustice  or  false- 
hood— I  answer,  that  the  law  cannot  require  and  forbid  action 
which,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  subject,  is,  from  the  nature 
of  the  case,  utterly  impossible.  It  cannot  require  justice  and 
forbid  injustice,  when  it  is  thus  impossible  that  the  subject 
should  be  either  just  or  unjust ;  and  the  subject  can  be  neither 
just  nor  unjust,  in  any  import  of  the  language,  until  he  has 
become  either  benevolent  or  selfish.  He  must  act  in  one  or  in 
the  other  of  these  forms  of  predominant  action  before  he  can 
perform  any  subordinate  act  whatever.  When  therefore,  we 
speak  without  qualification,  as  we  often  do,  and  yet  with  sufrl- 

law,  is  assumed  as  implied  in  those  circumstances,  in  which  such  action  becomes 
possible  on  their  part. 


THE    LAW    GIVES    CERTAIN    PRECEPTS.  57 

cient  precision  for  all  ordinary  purposes  of  the  law,as  requiring 
and  forbidding  certain  kinds  of  subordinate  action,  all  that  can 
be  meant  is,  that  by  requiring  and  forbidding  it  in  its  prin- 
ciple, it  requires  and  forbids  it  virtually  or  in  effect  in  all  the 
variable  circumstances  of  the  subject  in  which  such  action 
becomes  possible.  In  this  mode  the  law  requires  and  forbids 
subordinate  action,  in  the  only  conceivable  mode  of  requiring 
and  forbidding  it,  by  a  perfect  and  universal  law.  Indeed, 
were  this  mode  of  requiring  and  forbidding  subordinate  action 
not  adopted,  subordinate  action  must  be  left,  to  an  interminable 
extent,  wholly  without  requirement  and  prohibition  in  any 
respect  whatever;  the  supposition  of  particular  precepts  to 
regulate  all  subordinate  action  being  preposterous  in  the  ex- 
treme. 

It  is  readily  admitted,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment, like  the  decalogue,  may,  for  good  reasons  and  to  a 
limited  extent,  specify  in  the  form  of  particular  requirements 
and  prohibitions,  subordinate  action  to  be  done  and  not  done. 
But  it  is  maintained  that  all  such  precepts,  so  far  as  they  re- 
spect merely  subordinate  action,  are  only  formal  specifications 
or  statements  of  such  action,  which  as  the  appropriate  expres- 
sion of  benevolence  and  selfishness  in  the  variable  circum- 
stances in  which  it  becomes  possible,  becomes  in  some  sense 
binding  on  the  subject;  and  not  moral  precepts  or  laws  which 
imply  the  moral  quality  of  such  action  ;  that  all  such  precepts, 
though  useful  and  important  in  many  respects,  especially  as 
they  relate  to  action  which  is  possible  in  nearly  all  the  variable 
circumstances  of  the  subject,  are  yet  to  be  interpreted  in 
regard  to  the  universality  of  their  application,  as  all  such  lan- 
guage is,  by  the  known  limits  of  possibility  and  impossibility, 
and  by  the  known  object  and  design  of  the  precepts  them- 
selves. The  universal  form  of  the  language  of  particular  pre- 
cepts is  one  thing;  the  universal  application  of  such  precepts, 
even  in  all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the  subject,  is  another. 
This  distinction  is  recognized  in  respect  to  every  particular 
precept, so  far  as  such  relate  to  merely  subordinate  action,  in 
both  parental  and  civil  governments.  This  shows  that  such 
precepts  are  not  of  the  nature  of  absolute  and  universal  law, 
but  are  rather  highly  useful  directions,  which,  however  exten- 
sive their  application  within  the  variable  circumstances  of  the 
subject,  and  however  unqualified  the  language  in  which  they 

3* 


5S  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

are  expressed,  depend  on  the  variable  circumstances  of  the 
subject  for  their  binding  force,  and  which,  therefore,  admit  of 
possible,  though  rare  exceptions,  so  far  as  changes  in  these 
circumstances  may  require  exceptions,  in  view  of  the  great 
end  of  all  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings."  Vide  Palet, 
Moe.  and  Pol.  Phil.,  P.  VI.,  c.  4. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment absolutely  and  universally  requires  and  forbids  predomi- 
nant action,  and  only  requires  and  forbids  other  action,  vir- 
tually or  in  effect,  as  it  becomes  in  the  variable  circumstances 
of  the  subject,  the  appropriate  expression  of  predominant 
action.  It  is  equally  evident, that  benevolence  and  selfishness 
are  the  only  kinds  of  predominant  action  on  the  part  of  moral 
beings.  It  follows  therefore,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral 
government  requires  benevolence  as  the  sum  of  all  obedience, 
and  forbids  selfishness  as  the  sum  of  all  disobedience  on  the 
part  of  its  subjects. 

It  seems  greatly  to  perplex  some  moralists  to  distinguish  the 
mode  in  which,  or  the  ground  on  which,  the  law  of  a  perfect 
moral  government  requires  and  forbids  predominant  action  aa 
the  principle  of  subordinate  action,  from  the  mode  in  which, 
or  the  ground  on  which,  it  requires  and  forbids  subordinate 
action  itself.  It  seems  to  them  that  a  law  which,  in  the  man- 
ner explained,  requires  and  forbids  subordinate  action  in  the 
variable  circumstances  of  the  subject,  only  virtually  or  in  ef- 
fect, by  the  absolute  and  universal  requirement  and  prohibi- 
tion of  predominant  action,  furnishes  as  a  rule  of  action  no 
adequate  security  for  the  existence  of  one  kind,  and  for  the 
prevention  of  another  kind  of  subordinate  action,  and  so 
jeopardizes  the  interests  of  practical  morality.  To  show  how 
entirely  groundless  such  views  are,  it  is  sufficient  to  say,  that 
it  is  impossible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  the  law  in  its 
absolute  and  universal  requirement  and  prohibition,  should 
extend  beyond  the  two  kinds  of  predominant  action,  since  in 
such  a  case,  it  would  extend  beyond  the  limits  of  obligation 

*  This  view  of  the  precepts  which  respect  subordinate  action,  though  they  are 
given  in  absolute  forms  of  language,  derives  decisive  confirmation  from  the  common- 
sense  interpretation  of  such  precepts  in  Matt.  xii.  1-13,  particularly  from  the 
universal  application  of  the  principle  in  verses  7th  and  12th :  that  the  greatest  good 
is  to  be  done,  in  all  cases,  notwithstanding  the  unqualified  language  of  particular 
precepts. 


WHY  PARTICULAR  PRECEPTS,  NECESSARY.    59 

on  the  part  of  the  subject.  Besides,  if  the  requirement  of  the 
one  and  the  prohibition  of  the  other  of  the  two  great  pre- 
dominant principles  of  action,  will  not  secure  the  sufficiently 
known  and  obvious  expressions  of  the  one,  and  prevent  the 
sufficiently  known  and  obvious  expressions  of  the  other  of 
these  principles  in  appropriate  subordination,  how  would  such 
subordinate  action  be  secured  in  one  case  and  prevented  in  the 
other,  by  formally  expressed  particular  precepts?  The  subject 
who  should  obey  the  essential  requirement  and  prohibition 
of  the  law,  would  also,  while  the  principle  remains  active  and 
controlling  in  the  mind,  obey  all  its  sufficiently  known  and 
obvious  virtual  requirements  and  prohibitions  in  subordinate 
action,  as  they  become  applicable  in  all  his  variable  circum- 
stances ;*  while  if  he  should  not  obey  the  former,  there  would 
not  only  be  no  security  that  he  would  obey  the  latter,  but  an 
absolute  certainty  that  he  would  disobey  them  in  every  instance 
in  which  such  disobedience  should  be  necessary  to  accomplish 
the  end  of  his  governing  principle,  though  they  were  formally 
expressed  in  particular  enactments.  Such  enactments  could 
be  only  formal  expressions  of  the  virtual  requirements  and 
prohibitions  of  the  fundamental  law,  and  could  be  of  no  ad- 
vantage to  the  cause  of  practical  morality  in  those  cases,  in 
which  these  virtual  requirements  and  prohibitions  were  suffi- 
ciently known  without  them. 

If  these  things  are  so  in  the  cases  supposed,  i.  e.,  in  all  cases 
in  which  the  virtual  requirements  and  prohibitions  of  the 
fundamental  law  are  sufficiently  known  or  sufficiently  obvious 
for  all  practical  purposes,  it  may  be  naturally  asked,  why  are 
particular  precepts  in  the  form  of  requirement  and  prohibition 
confessedly  necessary  in  all  forms  of  moral  government,  even 
in  that  which  is  undeniably  perfect?  I  answer,  that  these 
precepts  are  necessary  in  all  cases  in  which  they  are  so,  for 
certain  purposes  peculiar  to  subordinate  action  in  the  variable 
circumstances  in  which  such  action  becomes  possible.  In  some 
cases  they  are  necessary  to  remove  unavoidable  ignorance  in 
respect  to  the  subordinate  action,  which  were  it  not  for  such 
ignorance,  would  be  virtually  required  or  forbidden  by  the 
fundamental  law.  In  some  cases  they  are  necessary  to  render 
more  manifest  the  fitness  of  the  subordinate  action  thus  vir- 

*  Not  to  do  this  is  justly  pronounced,  to  be  guilty  of  the  whole  law.  James  ii. 
10,  and  also  ii.  14-25. 


60  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

tually  required  and  forbidden,  and  thus  to  remove  doubt  and 
uncertainty,  and  to  prevent  perverted  and  false  judgments  in 
respect  to  it,  and  so  to  give  greater  security  to  the  perform- 
ance of  one  kind  of  such  action,  and  to  abstinence  from  the 
other,  than  would  otherwise  exist.  In  some  cases,  if  not  in  all, 
they  give  definiteness  to  the  kind  of  subordinate  action  which 
they  respect,  as  such  action  is  the  proof  of  obedience  and  dis- 
obedience to  the  fundamental  law.  But,  more  than  all,  such 
precepts  are  binding  to  an  extent  so  nearly  universal  in  all 
the  variable  circumstances  of  men,  and  with  exceptions  so  rare, 
that  exceptions  need  not  be  made,  or  if  made,  prove  the  rule, 
and  therefore  can  never  be  violated  without  great  caution, 
and  in  cases  of  obvious  and  undeniable  utility.  But  the  neces- 
sity of  these  particular  precepts  for  these  or  other  similar 
purposes  shows  that  they  respect  only  that  kind  of  action 
which  is  virtually  required  or  forbidden  in  the  variable  cir- 
cumstances of  the  subjects  of  law,  and  not  the  action  which 
constitutes  the  sum  of  obedience  and  the  sum  of  disobedience 
to  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government. 

It  may  be  further  said  that  particular  precepts  are  often,  not 
to  say  commonly,  promulged  in  that  absolute  and  universal 
form  of  language  which  imply  their  strictly  universal  applica- 
tion and  obligation.  In  reply  to  this,  it  were  sufficient  to  allege 
the  utter  and  obvious  impossibility  of  such  an  application  of 
this  class  of  precepts,  since  all  action  to  which  they  can  be 
applied  is  impossible,  until  the  subject  of  law  has  become  either 
benevolent  or  selfish.  If,  by  the  universal  application  of  these 
precepts,  be  meant  an  application  as  extensive  as  the  possibility 
of  subordinate  action,  this  may  be  admitted  in  respect  to  some 
kinds  of  such  action,  particularly  some  immanent  subordinate 
action;  for  example,  justice  and  injustice  as  mere  dispositions 
of  the  mind.  Still,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  such  subor- 
dinate action  may  be  prompted  either  by  benevolence  or  self- 
ishness ;  and  that,  therefore,  considered  in  itself  as  merely 
subordinate  action,  it  can  be  no  part  of  that  which  essentially 
constitutes  obedience  or  disobedience  to  the  law  of  a  perfect 
moral  government.  Thus  considered,  such  action  can  be  re- 
quired and  forbidden  by  the  law,  only  virtually  or  in  effect,  as 
circumstantial  action — action  which  becomes  the  appropriate 
expression  of  benevolence  and  of  selfishness  in  the  variable 
circumstances  of  the  subject.     As  such  action  and  such  action 


OCCASIONS  FOR  PARTICULAR  PRECEPTS.     61 

only,  can  particular  precepts  be  applicable  to  it  in  any  case 
whatever.  As  to  those  particular  precepts  which  are  designed 
to  regulate  much  other  subordinate  action,  they  are  still  more 
remote  from  having  a  universal  application;  particularly 
those  which  respect  executive  subordinate  action.  The  prin- 
ciple on  which  universal  forms  of  language  are  used  in  com- 
mon life  is  not  that  of  the  most  strictly  universal  application, 
but  that  of  an  application  so  nearly  universal,  that  the  excep- 
tions are  so  rare  and  so  obvious  that  they  require  no  specifica- 
tion, while  the  object  of  such  precepts  will  be  better  answered 
by  an  unqualified  use  of  language  than  by  the  useless  attempt 
to  specify  exceptions.  This  principle,  which  might  be  illus- 
trated and  confirmed  to  any  extent,*  is  peculiarly  applicable 
to  particular  legal  enactments,  which  respect  executive  subor- 
dinate action.  The  common-sense  application  of  it  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  such  absolute  precepts  by  the  Saviour,f  and  the 
same  familiar  application  of  it  by  Christians  generally  to  justify 
works  of  necessity  and  mercy  on  the  Sabbath,  are  decisive  on  this 
point.  A  parent  forbids  a  son,  in  the  form  of  absolute  prohi- 
bition, who  is  but  partially  recovered  from  recent  illness,  to  go 
into  the  water ;  but  unexpected  circumstances  occur,  and  the 
action  thus  absolutely  forbidden  becomes  necessary  to  save  a 
brother  from  drowning.  Who,  in  such  a  case,  would  interpret 
the  precept  to  the  letter  ?  None  would  deny  the  propriety  and 
truth  of  saying  that  the  fundamental  requirement  of  the  divine 
law  is  binding  on  all  men ;  and  yet  the  proposition  is  not  true 
to  the  letter,  since  the  obligation  implies  not  merely  the  exist- 
ence, but  the  moral  relations  of  its  subjects.  None  would  deny 
the  propriety  of  the  absolute  form  in  which  the  penalty  of  law 
is  denounced  against  the  transgressor,  and  yet,  if  the  language 
be  pressed  to  the  utmost,  the  penalty  can  never  be  remitted 
consistently  with  truth. 

In  the  use  of  all  language,  and  especially  in  the  use  of  the 
language  of  law,  there  is  an  object  to  be  attained.  Such  lan- 
guage is  therefore  to  be  interpreted  in  reference  to  that  object. 
The  object  of  language  in  the  form  of  particular  precepts  is  to 
secure  and  to  prevent  subordinate  action,  as  in  the  variable 
circumstances  of  the  subjects  of  law  it  will  in  one  case  pro- 
mote, and  in  the  other  hinder  in  some  limited  degree,   the 

*  Vide  Matt.  iii.  5;  Comp.  Heb.  ix.  27  and  xi.  5.  f  Matt.  xii.  1-13. 


62  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

general  good.  The  subordinate  action  may  be  supposed  to  be 
that  which,  in  all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the  subject  in 
which  it  becomes  possible,  will  promote  the  general  good. 
The  subordinate  opposite  action  may  be  supposed  to  be  that 
which,  in  all  the  variable  circumstances  of  the  subject  in 
which  it  becomes  possible,  will  hinder  the  general  good.  At 
the  same  time,  the  subordinate  action  which  in  some  cases  is 
fitted  to  promote  the  general  good,  will  in  other  cases  be 
fitted  to  defeat  this  end,  or  the  subordinate  action  which  in 
some  cases  is  fitted  to  defeat,  may  be  fitted  in  others  to  pro- 
mote this  end.  Be  these  things  however  as  they  may,  the  ap- 
plication of  particular  precepts  is  in  all  cases  to  be  determined 
in  view  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  the  executive  subordi- 
nate action  required  and  forbidden  in  such  precepts,  in  the 
variable  circumstances  of  the  subject  of  law. 

These  things  are  deemed  sufficient  to  show  the  truth  of  the 
unqualified  proposition,  that  he  who  is  jjcrfectly  benevolent , per- 
fectly obeys  the  law  of  a  'perfect  moral  government.  Isor  can 
this  be  denied  on  the  ground  that  one  who  is  thus  perfectly 
benevolent,  may  not  fulfill  all  the  precepts  which  respect  sub- 
ordinate action ;  for  it  is  undeniable,  that  he  will  obey  every 
such  precept. 

Once  more.  It  is  conceded,  at  least  by  all  Christian  mor- 
alists, that  the  sum  of  all  duty  on  the  part  of  moral  beings  is 
comprised  in  the  great  law  of  love  or  benevolence.  But  how 
this  can  be  true,  except  according  to  the  views  and  principles 
now  presented,  it  would  be  impossible  to  show. 

The  same  thing  will  appear,  if  we  consider — secondly, 
That  predominant  action  in  the  form  of  benevolence,  is  the 
only  morally  right  action,  and  in  the  form  of  selfishness,  is  the 
only  morally  wrong  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings. 

It  will  be  admitted,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment requires  morally  right  action  as  the  sum  of  obe- 
dience, and  forbids  morally  wrong  action  as  the  sum  of 
disobedience.  If  then  it  can  be  shown,  that  benevolence  is 
the  only  morally  right  action,  and  that  selfishness  is  the  only 
morally  wrong  action,  it  will  follow,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect 
moral  government  must  require  benevolence  as  the  sum  of 
obedience,  and  forbid  benevolence  as  the  sum  of  disobedience. 

That  benevolence  then  is  the  only  morally  right  action,  and 
that  selfishness  is  the  only  morally  wrong  action,  I  argue — 


SIGNIFICATION    OF    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  63 

1st.  From  the  established  meaning  of  the  words  right  and 
wrong  in  common  life,  and  from  the  meaning  of  the  word 
moral  as  applied  to  action. 

The  errors  and  incongruities  of  moral  philosophers,  which  so 
notoriously  mar  their  discussions,  and  which  occasion  so  much 
apparently  hopeless  controversy,  seem  to  result  chiefly  from 
overlooking  the  true  nature  of  the  moral  quality  of  action  and 
the  kind  of  action  to  which  moral  quality  exclusively  pertains. 
This  oversight  may  be  traced  to  several  causes,  primarily  it  is 
believed,  to  the  entire  want  of  scientific  precision  in  the  use  of 
the  words  right  and  wrong,  and  other  kindred  terms.  "With- 
out however,  attempting  to  unfold  these  causes,  or  to  show  the 
magnitude  of  this  error  in  scientific  speculation,  I  propose  to 
distinguish  right  action  which  is  moral,  from  right  action 
which  is  not  moral  /  and  wrong  action  which  is  moral,  from 
wrong  action  which  is  not  moral. 

For  this  purpose  I  remark,  that  among  the  most  common 
and  important  conceptions  of  the  human  mind,  are  those  of  the 
different  and  opposite  relations  of  different  things  to  some 
given  end,  either  as  fitted  to  accomplish  or  to  prevent  that 
end.  To  express  these  conceptions,  the  words  right  and  wrong 
are  of  the  most  common  and  familiar  use ;  and  when  thus 
used  in  their  general  import,  may  be  thus  defined :  the  word 
right  denotes  the  fitness  of  that  to  which  it  is  applied,  to  pro- 
duce or  accomplish  some  given  end  /  and  the  word  wrong  de- 
notes the  fitness  of  that  to  which  it  is  applied,  to  prevent  the 
same  given  end.  In  the  use  of  these  words,  some  given 
end  is  always  assumed,  in  respect  to  the  accomplishment  or 
prevention  of  which  they  are  always  applied.  Thus  assuming 
the  familiar  end  to  be  accomplished  by  a  pen,  a  clock  or  a 
watch,  we  apply  the  word  right  to  its  structure,  to  denote  its 
fitness  to  accomplish  that  end ;  and  the  word  wrong  to  denote 
its  fitness  to  defeat  or  prevent  that  end.  In  this  maimer,  one 
or  the  other  of  these  words  may  be  properly  applied  to  any 
and  to  every  thing  of  which  either  of  the  two  specified  rela- 
tions of  fitness  to  some  given  end,  can  be  predicated.  Even 
the  stroke  of  the  assassin,  as  by  its  direction  it  is  fitted  to  ac- 
complish or  to  defeat  its  end,  may  be  properly  said  to  be  right 
or  to  be  wrong.  Nor  can  either  of  these  words,  when  used 
antithetically  or  in  opposition  to  the  other,  be  properly  used 
except  to  denote  the  specified  relation  to  some  assumed  end. 


64  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

We  can  no  more  predicate  right  or  wrong,  the  one  as  opposed 
to  the  other  of  any  conceivable  thing,  except  to  the  specified 
relation  to  some  given  end,  than  we  can  predicate  red  or  blue 
of  ideas  or  other  mental  states.  When  a  thing  is  said  to  be 
right  as  opposed  to  wrong,  it  is  said  to  be  so  as  fitted  to  pro- 
duce some  given  end,  and  when  it  is  said  to  be  wrong  as  op- 
posed to  right,  it  is  said  to  be  so  as  fitted  to  prevent  that  end. 
Thus  in  the  use  of  these  words  as  opposed  in  import,  an  end  is 
always  assumed,  in  relation  to  which  a  thing  is  said  to  be  right 
or  wrong.  In  this  antithetic  use  of  the  words,  they  can  have 
no  conceivable  meaning,  unless  they  are  used  to  denote  some 
relation  to  an  end.  The  end  assumed  in  respect  to  a  particular 
thing,  as  a  pen,  a  clock  or  a  watch,  in  respect  to  which  it  is 
said  to  be  right  or  wrong,  is  the  end,  the  great  or  chief  end, 
for  which  the  class  of  things  and  of  course  each  particular 
thing  of  the  class  is  made. 

Now,  according  to  the  universal  principle  of  giving  the  same 
general  names  to  things  of  the  same  general  nature,  the  same 
general  relations  of  fitness  to  promote  or  hinder  the  end,  or  the 
great  end  of  any  thing,  are  denoted  by  the  words  right  or  wrong. 
Of  course,  the  same  general  ideas  of  fitness  to  produce  or  pre- 
vent the  end,  or  the  great  end  of  action  on  the  part  of  moral 
beings,  are  denoted  by  the  words  right  and  wrong,  when  applied 
to  such  action.  To  deny  this,  is  to  deny  a  fixed  and  universal 
principle  in  the  use  of  words.  It  is  to  deny,  in  the  language 
of  logic,  that  the  genus  is  predicable  of  the  species ;  or  that  the 
same  word  has  one  and  the  same  general  meaning  as  applied  to 
different  things  to  which  it  can  be  truly  applied  in  that  mean- 
ing. It  is  the  same  as  to  deny,  that  the  word  Hack  or  white 
has  the  same  general  meaning  when  applied  to  a  bird  and  a 
horse  of  the  same  color,  or  that  the  word  rectangular  or  trian- 
gular has  the  same  meaning  when  applied  to  different  figures 
of  the  same  general  form.  It  would  not  be  less  preposterous 
to  suppose,  that  the  words  right  and  wrong  should  be  properly 
applied  to  action  in  the  general  meaning  now  given  to  each, 
and  that  they  should  also  be  thus  applied  to  action,  in  another 
and  a  widely  different  meaning.  For  it  is  undeniable,  that  one 
kind  of  action,  as  fitted  to  promote  the  great  end  of  all  action 
on  the  part  of  moral  beings  and  to  prevent  the  opposite  end, 
is  truly  and  properly  called  right  action.  It  is  equally  unde- 
niable, that  another  kind  of  action,  as  fitted  to  prevent  the  great 


ACTION    AS    RIGHT    AND    MORALLY    RIGHT.         65 

end  of  all  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings,  and  to  promote 
the  opposite  end,  is  truly  and  properly  called  wrong  action. 
It  is  therefore  as  utterly  incredible,  that  the  word  right  or  wrong 
should  be  applied  to  action  in  another  meaning  which  excludes 
this  meaning,  or  in  any  other  generic  meaning,  as  that  the  word 
round  should  be  universally  applied  to  a  body  to  denote  its 
form,  and  yet  be  properly  applied  also  to  denote  its  color. 

Since  then  all  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings  is  either 
fitted  to  promote  the  great  end  of  action  on  their  part  and  to 
prevent  the  opposite  end,  or  fitted  to  prevent  this  great  end  of 
action  and  to  promote  its  opposite  ;  and  as  the  great  end  of  all 
action  on  the  part  of  such  beings  is  the  highest  happiness  of 
all,  it  follows,  that  the  word  right  when  applied  in  its  general 
meaning  to  such  action,  denotes  its  fitness  to  promote  the  high- 
est happiness  of  all,  and  to  prevent  the  opposite  or  highest 
misery  of  all,  and  that  the  word  wrong  when  thus  applied, 
denotes  the  fitness  of  action  to  promote  the  highest  misery  of 
all  and  to  prevent  the  opposite. 

Again ;  right  action  may  be  subdivided  into  two  particular 
kinds,  viz. :  right  action  which  is  moral  or  morally  right  action, 
and  right  action  which  is  not  moral,  or  not  morally  right  action. 
Wrong  action  may  be  subdivided  into  two  particular  kinds,  viz. : 
wrong  action  which  is  moral  or  morally  wrong  action,  and 
wrong  action  which  is  not  moral,  or  not  morally  wrong  action. 

The  word  moral  as  applied  to  action  is  a  common  predicate 
of  two  very  different  kinds  of  action.  Hence,  to  distinguish 
moral  action  from  action  not  moral,  we  have  only  to  determine 
this  common  import  of  the  word  moral  as  applied  to  two  kinds 
of  action,  or  to  right  and  wrong  action. 

The  word  morul  is  from  the  Latin  mores,  which  denotes  man- 
ners or  character ;  more  exactly,  that  permanent,  predominant 
act  of  the  will  and  heart,  which  constitutes  character  as  a  predi- 
cate of  a  moral  being.  For  philosophic  purposes  however,  it 
is  necessary  to  contemplate  this  meaning  of  the  word  moral 
more  elementarily.  With  the  explanation  already  given  of  the 
terms  now  to  be  used  in  the  definition,  I  proceed  to  say — that 
moral  action  is  the  intelligent,  free,  permanent,  predominant 
action  of  the  heart,  in  which  the  agent  elects  some  given  object 
or  end  as  his  supreme  end,  and  which  is  thus  directly  fitted  to 
promote  this  end,  and  to  prevent  its  opposite. 

That  all  action  of  which   the  several  characteristics  now 

5 


66         MORAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  ABSTRACT. 

specified  can  be  truly  predicated,  is  moral  action,  I  have  at- 
tempted to  show  in  a  previous  lecture.  I  shall,  therefore,  only 
remark  at  present,  that  the  feelings  of  self-complacency  and 
remorse  are  the  distinctive  effects  of  moral  action  experienced 
by  the  agent  in  view  of  the  nature  of  such  action,  and  that  it 
is  impossible  to  conceive  that  any  being  should  experience 
either  of  these  feelings  in  view  of  any  other  action  than  that 
now  specified,  and  that  he  should  avoid  one  or  the  other  in 
view  of  such  action.  The  being  therefore,  acts  morally  who 
acts  in  the  manner  now  specified,  whether  he  acts  or  can  act 
in  any  other  manner,  or  not ;  while  if  we  suppose  him  to  act 
in  any  other  manner  without  acting  in  this  manner,  we  cannot 
conceive  him  to  act  morally.  The  action  then  now  specified  is 
moral  action,  and  the  only  action  which  is  moral. 

From  what  has  now  been  said  respecting  the  nature  of  right 
and  wrong  action  and  of  moral  action,  it  follows,  that  the  in- 
telligent, free,  permanent,  predominant  action  of  the  will  and 
the  heart,  in  which  the  agent  electirely  prefers  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all  as  his  supreme  object  or  end,  and  which  is  thus 
fitted  to  promote  this  end  and  to  prevent  its  opposite,  the  highest 
misery  of  cdl,  is  morally  right  action,  and  the  only  morally 
right  action,  and  that  the  intelligent,  free, permanent, predomi- 
nant action  of  the  will  and  the  heart,  in  which  the  agent  elec- 
tively  prefers  some  object  or  end  inferior  to  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all  as  his  supreme  object  or  end,  and  which  is  thus 
fitted  to  prevent  this  end  and  to  promote  its  opposite,  the 
highest  misery  of  all,  is  morally  wrong  action,  and  the  only 
morally  wrong  action. 

The  same  thing  will  be  still  further  confirmed  by  consider- 
ing the  only  other  kind  of  action  on  the  part  of  a  moral  being ; 
viz.,  that  which  I  have  called  subordinate  action.  This  kind 
of  action  is  either  right  action,  which  is  not  morally  right,  or 
it  is  wrong  action,  which  is  not  morally  wrong. 

Though  a  moral  being  in  respect  to  predominant  action, 
may  be  properly  said  to  be  always  acting  either  morally  right, 
or  morally  wrong,  yet  in  much  of  what  is  called  action  on  the 
part  of  a  moral  being,  there  is  no  moral  quality.  This  is  true 
of  all  that  action,  which  may  be  distinguished  from  the  act  of 
the  will  and  the  heart,  or  predominant  action,  and  in  which  the 
agent  aims  only  at  some  limited  degree  of  happiness  or  misery, 
or  natural  good  or  evil  compared  with  the  highest  degree,  and 


SUBORDINATE    ACTION    AS    SUCH    NOT    MORAL.     07 

which  in  this  respect,  is  fitted  directly  to  produce  only  such  a 
limited  result.  There  are  two  kinds  of  such  action;  one  is 
right  action,  but  not  morally  right — the  other  is  wrong  action, 
but  not  morally  wrong. 

"When  such  action,  that  is  subordinate  action,  is  directly 
fitted  to  produce  some  limited  degree  of  natural  good  or  evil, 
which  is  necessary  to  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  and  thus 
indirectly  fitted  to  promote  this  great  end  of  all  action  on  the 
part  of  moral  beings  and  to  prevent  the  opposite,  then  it  is 
right  action  but  not  morally  right.  It  is  right  in  the  generic 
import  of  the  word  as  already  defined,  when  applied  to  action 
on  the  part  of  moral  beings.  As  indirectly  fitted,  it  is  of 
course  fitted  to  promote  the  great  end  of  all  action,  and  to 
prevent  the  opposite  ;  and  is  therefore  right  action.  But  it  is 
obvious  at  once,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  it  is  not  morally 
right  action.  It  has  no  one  of  the  essential  characteristics  of 
morally  right  action.  It  is  not  in  the  sense  explained,  either 
the  intelligent,  or  free,  or  permanent,  or  predominant  action 
of  the  will  and  heart.  Nor  is  it  the  action  in  which  the 
agent  supremely  and  directly  aims  at  the  great  end  of  all 
action,  and  which  in  this  sense  is  perfectly  fitted  to  promote 
this  end,  and  to  prevent  its  opposite.  Beside,  the  same  action 
with  the  same  relation  of  fitness  to  the  great  end  of  all  action 
and  to  prevent  its  opposite,  would  be  right  in  the  same  sense, 
whether  done  from  the  morally  right  or  from  the  morally 
wrong  principle.  To  suppose  the  right  subordinate  action  to 
be  morally  right,  is  to  suppose  that  one  may  act  morally  right, 
when  he  acts  morally  wrong  at  the  same  time. 

Again ;  when  subordinate  action  is  directly  fitted  to  pro- 
duce some  limited  degree  of  natural  good  or  evil,  which  is 
inconsistent  with  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  and  thus  indi- 
rectly fitted  to  prevent  this  great  end  of  all  action  (and  to 
promote  the  opposite),  then  it  is  wrong  action  but  not  morally 
wrong  action.  It  is  wrong  in  the  generic  import  of  the  word  ; 
for  being  indirectly  fitted,  it  is  of  course  fitted  to  prevent  the 
great  end  of  all  action,  and  to  promote  its  opposite.  It  is 
therefore  wrong  action.  But  it  is  plainly  not  morally  wrong, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  obvious  that  it  has  no  one  of  the  essential 
characteristics  of  morally  wrong  action. 

In  addition  to  these  things,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  the 
quality  of  all  subordinate  action  changes  as  the  variable  cir- 


68  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

cumstances  of  moral  beings  change ;  so  that  an  action  of  this 
kind  which  is  right  in  one  set  of  circumstances  is  wrong  in 
another  set  of  circumstances ;  and  an  action  of  this  kind, 
which  is  wrong  in  one  set  of  circumstances,  is  right  in  another. 
But  morally  right  action  is  morally  right  in  all  the  circum- 
stances of  a  moral  being ;  and  morally  wrong  action  is  morally 
wrong  in  all  the  circumstances  of  a  moral  being.  But  action, 
the  quality  of  which  as  right  and  wrong  changes  as  circum- 
stances change,  cannot  be  morally  right  nor  morally  wrong 
action.  Subordinate  action,  therefore,  though  it  may  be  right 
or  wrong,  cannot  be  either  morally  right  or  morally  wrong. 
It  thus  appears  that  no  action  except  predominant  action,  is 
or  can  be  either  morally  right  or  morally  wrong.  But  there 
is  no  predominant  action,  except  either  benevolence  or  selfish- 
ness. ISTo  action  then  is  morally  right  except  benevolence, 
and  no  action  is  morally  wTrong  except  selfishness  ;»in  other 
words,  benevolence  is  the  only  morally  right  action,  and  self- 
ishness is  the  only  morally  wrong  action.  Since  therefore,  it 
is  admitted  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  re- 
quires morally  right  action  as  the  sum  of  obedience,  and 
forbids  morally  wrong  action  as  the  sum  of  disobedience,  it 
follows,  that  the  law  of  such  a  government  must  require 
benevolence  as  the  sum  of  obedience,  and  forbid  selfishness 
as  the  sum  of  disobedience. 


LECTURE  IV. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  oflaxr. — 
The  nature  of  law  further  unfolded. — 4.  It  must  express  the  Lawgiver's  preference  of  the  action 
required,  to  its  opposite,  all  things  considered. — 5.  It  implies,  that  the  Lawgiver  can  be  satisfied 
with  obedience,  and  with  nothing  but  obedience,  on  the  part  of  the  subject.— 6.  It  expresses 
his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

These  three  propositions  may  at  first  sight  appear  to  he  so 
nearly  equivalent,  as  to  supersede  any  necessity  for  distinct 
consideration.  The  difference  "between  them  however,  and  the 
importance  of  distinguishing  them,  for  the  purpose  of  exposing 
opposite  errors, will  be  obvious  from  the  discussion. 

4.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  must  express  the 
lawgiver's  preference  of  the  action  required  to  its  opposite,  all 
things  considered. 

Some  have  maintained  it  to  be  consistent  with  the  nature  of 
such  a  law,  that  it  express  the  lawgiver's  preference  of  obedi- 
ence to  disobedience  in  themselves  considered,  while  at  the  same 
time  he  actually  prefers  disobedience  to  obedience,  in  many 
cases  at  least,  all  things  considered.  In  opposition  to  this  view, 
it  is  now  maintained,  that  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment expresses  the  lawgiver's  preference  of  obedience  to  dis- 
obedience all  things  considered,  that  is;  when  all  things  which 
depend  on  the  former  are  compared  with  all  things  which  de- 
pend or  can  be  made  to  depend  on  the  latter,  either  as  its 
own  proper  results,  or  by  the  infliction  of  punishment,  or  in 
any  other  way. 

This  view  of  the  import  of  the  word  law,  or  this  nature  of  a 
law  may  be  tested  by  an  appeal  to  common  sense.  Suppose  a 
father  to  enact  a  law,  that  his  children  shall  not  lie,  cheat,  nor 
drink  to  excess.  This  being  the  unqualified  form  of  the  law, 
suppose  him  to  add  by  way  of  explanation :  "  On  the  whole, 
or  all  things  considered,  I  prefer,  that  you  should  transgress 
rather  than  obey  the  law — that  you  should  lie,  and  cheat  and 
drink,  rather  than  tell  the  truth,  and  be  honest  and  sober" — 
would  not  common  sense  pronounce  the  so-called  law  a  con- 
temptible burlesque  and  a  mockery  ?     And  yet  such,  without 


<0  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

a  shade  of  caricature,  is  the  law  of  God  in  the  view  of  infidels, 
universalists,  and  all  who  maintain  that  sin  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good.  If  men  will  thus  go  against  com- 
mon sense,  they  must  expect  common  sense  to  go  against 
them. 

But  this  topic  demands  and  will  receive  a  more  thorough 
consideration  hereafter.  Some  further  remarks  will,  however, 
not  be  out  of  place  in  this  connection.  A  law  then,  which  is 
not  an  unqualified  expression  of  the  lawgiver's  preference  of 
the  action  required  to  its  opposite,  all  things  considered,  is  not 
a  law.  It  expresses  no  will,  no  choice,  no  preference,  and 
therefore  can  in  no  respect  be  a  command,  either  as  a  require- 
ment or  a  prohibition.  The  will  cannot  prefer  one  thing  to 
another  in  themselves  considered,  and  at  the  same  time  prefer 
the  latter  to  the  former,  all  things  considered.  The  mind  may 
involuntarily  desire  one  thing  more  than  another  in  themselves 
considered.  But  an  involuntary  desire  is  not  an  act  of  will ;  it 
is  not  an  act  of  choice,  or  an  elective  preference.  The  will  or 
mind  can  choose  between  two  objects,  and  so  prefer  one  to  the 
other  only  in  view  of  them  all  things  considered.  To  suppose 
it  to  do  both  at  the  same  time,  is  to  suppose  that  it  can  choose 
opposites  at  the  same  time,  which  is  as  absurd  as  to  suppose 
that  a  body  should  move  in  opposite  directions  at  the  same 
time.  Or,  view  this  topic  in  another  aspect.  If  the  two 
choices  or  preferences  supposed  may  coexist  in  the  same 
mind  and  should  so  exist — which  would  show  itself  in  exec- 
utive action,  or  which  of  the  two  wills  would  a  benevolent 
being  express  in  the  form  of  law  to  his  subjects?  He  wills 
or  chooses,  that  his  subjects  should  act  morally  right  rather 
than  morally  wrong,  considering  the  acts  in  themselves ;  and 
at  the  same  time,  he  wills  or  chooses,  that  they  should  act 
morally  wrong,  considering  all  things.  He  cannot  express 
with  truth  his  will  or  choice  that  they  should  act  morally 
right,  for  he  wills  or  chooses  that  they  should  act  morally 
wrong.  He  cannot  with  truth  express  his  will  or  choice  that 
they  should  act  morally  wrong,  for  he  wills  or  chooses  that 
they  should  act  morally  right.  Let  him  express  either  of  the 
supposed  wills  in  the  form  of  law,  and  he  is  convicted  of 
falsehood  by  the  existence  of  its  opposite;  which  shows  the 
supposition  of  these  two  wills  to  be  an  absurdity.  The  doc- 
trine of  two  wills  on  the  part  of  a  lawgiver,  as  now  presented, 


THE    LAWGIVER    ACCEPTS    ONLY    OBEDIENCE.       71 

is  a  simple  absurdity,  though  extensively  maintained  by  in- 
fidels, universalists,  and  by  some  of  worthier  name.*  If  his 
law  is  his  will,  it  expresses  his  preference  of  the  action  required 
to  its  opposite,  all  things  considered. 

5.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  implies,  that  the 
lawgiver  can  be  satisfied  with  obedience,  and  with  nothing  but 
obedience  on  the  part  of  subjects.  The  law  of  such  a  govern- 
ment is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  unqualified  expression  of  the  law- 
giver's preference  of  the  action  required  to  its  opposite,  all 
things  considered.  As  a  lawgiver,  so  far  as  any  thing  on  the 
part  of  subjects  is  concerned,  he  must  be  satisfied  either  with 
their  obedience  or  disobedience.  As  willing  or  preferring  the 
former  rather  than  the  latter,  he  must  be  satisfied  with  the 
former,  and  dissatisfied  with  the  latter.  To  suppose  otherwise, 
is  to  suppose  him  to  be  dissatisfied  when  his  will  is  done,  and 
satisfied  when  his  will  is  not  done  but  crossed  and  thwarted ; 
which  is  the  absurdity  of  supposing  him  dissatisfied  when  satis- 
fied, or  satisfied  when  dissatisfied. 

Again ;  the  preference  of  a  perfect  moral  governor  expressed 
in  his  law,  is  a  preference  of  the  indispensable  means  of  the 
best  end,  to  the  sure  means  of  the  worst  end.  The  former  is  as 
excellent  and  valuable — as  much  to  be  desired  as  the  end  of 
which  it  is  the  means.  The  latter  is  as  odious  and  abominable 
— as  much  to  be  abhorred  as  the  end  of  which  it  is  the  means. 
If  the  former — obedience,  does  not  take  place  on  the  part  of 
subjects,  then  the  latter  takes  place  on  their  part.  And  if  a 
perfect  moral  governor  is  not  satisfied  with  the  former,  then  he 
must  be  satisfied,  if  at  all,  with  the  latter,  i.  <?.,  he  must  be 
satisfied  with  that  which  he  regards  as  odious  and  abomin- 
able, even  with  the  means  of  the  worst  conceivable  end.  The 
absurdity  is  obvious. 

The  same  thing  may  be  viewed  in  another  light.  The  action 
required  by  his  law,  is  either  the  best  thing  which  can  be  re- 
quired of  subjects,  or  something  else  is  better,  or  something 
else  is  as  good.  If  it  is  the  best  thing,  then  a  perfect  moral 
governor  must  be  satisfied  with  it,  and  with  nothing  else  on 

*  It  is  not  here  denied,  that  a  lawgiver  may  purpose  or  will  that  the  act  opposite 
to  that  required  by  his  law,  shall  take  place,  rather  than  not  adopt  the  system,  to 
which,  so  far  as  his  power  to  prevent  it  is  concerned,  the  act  is  incidental.  This 
does  not  imply  that  he  wills  the  forbidden  act  rather  than  the  required  act,  all  things 
considered,  under  the  system. 


723  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

the  part  of  subjects ;  since  otherwise,  he  would  be  without 
benevolence,  and  of  course  without  authority.  If  something 
else  is  better  than  obedience  to  law,  then  also,  as  not  requiring 
the  best  thing  he  is  destitute  of  benevolence,  and  of  course, 
destitute  of  authority.  If  something  else  is  as  good,  then  he 
expresses  a  false  or  groundless  preference  in  his  law,  and  is  of 
course  destitute  of  the  only  character  which  can  invest  him 
with  authority. 

Again ;  if  that  which  is  required  by  the  law,  is  not  the  only 
thing  on  the  part  of  the  subject  which  will  satisfy  the  law- 
giver, then  the  question  what  will  satisfy  him  or  whether 
any  thing  will,  is  left  wholly  undetermined.  On  this  most 
momentous  of  all  questions,  all  is  uncertainty  and  doubt ;  or 
rather  deception  and  falsehood.  None  but  a  malignant  being 
could  fail  to  put  this  question  at  rest,  in  the  view  of  his  sub- 
jects. I  need  not  say,  that  in  such  a  case,  neither  law  nor 
moral  government  could  exist.  Or,  if  we  suppose  that  the 
moral  governor  can  be  satisfied  with  any  thing  but  obedience 
on  the  part  of  subjects,  then  by  his  law  he  furnishes  no  reason 
to  his  subjects,  why  they  should  obey  rather  than  disobey  his 
law.  Nothing  appears  to  show  that  he  cannot  be  satisfied 
with  something  on  their  part  which  is  not  obedience — some- 
thing which  he  does  not  claim  in  his  law;  that  he  will  not 
accept  of  a  substitute  for  obedience — some  equivalent  on  the 
part  of  subjects.  He  thus  abandons  all  claim  for  obedience, 
and  adopts  the  principle,  that  one  thing  or  another,  any  thing 
or  nothing  will  satisfy  him.  No  rule  of  action — no  law  can 
exist  in  such  a  case. 

Further ;  the  same  thing  will  be  still  more  apparent,  if  we 
advert  to  the  grounds  or  reasons  for  satisfaction  with  obedience 
on  the  part  of  the  governor,  and  to  the  grounds  or  reasons 
for  dissatisfaction  on  his  part  with  disobedience.  In  respect 
to  obedience,  the  grounds  of  satisfaction  are  two :  first,  obedi- 
ence is  the  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  the  whole 
community,  and  of  the  obedient  subject;  secondly,  another 
ground  of  satisfaction  with  the  obedient  subject  is,  that,  by  his 
obedience  he  perfectly  honors  the  law  and  fully  supports  the 
authority  of  the  moral  governor.  Nothing  on  the  part  of  the 
subject  can  amount  to  such  a  perfect  recognition  of  the  right- 
ful authority  of  him  who  reigns,  as  the  perfect  obedience  of 
the  subject.     This  gives  to  the  law  its  highest  honors,  and  to 


THE    LAW   DISSATISFIED    WITH   DISOBEDIENCE.    73 

the  authority  of  the  governor  that  homage  which  enthrones 
him  in  absolute  dominion.  Thus  in  the  two  respects  specified 
— the  entire  object  and  end — all  that  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernor can  propose  or  desire  from  his  subjects,  is  fully  accom- 
plished, and  perfect  benevolence  is  perfectly  gratified  by  their 
obedience. 

In  respect  to  disobedience,  the  grounds  of  dissatisfaction  are 
two.  One  is,  that  it  tends  to  destroy  the  highest  well-being, 
and  to  produce  the  highest  misery  of  the  community  and  of 
the  disobedient  subject.  Disobedience  to  a  perfect  law  is 
selfishness.  This  as  a  principle  of  action,  or  rather  as  itself 
action,  tends  to  the  destruction  of  the  highest  well-being  and 
the  production  of  the  highest  misery  in  others  and  in  its  sub- 
ject. Such  action  must,  of  course,  be  the  object  of  high  dis- 
satisfaction to  a  benevolent  or  perfect  moral  governor.  I  say 
nothing  here  concerning  reconciliation  with  the  transgressor 
through  an  atonement.  I  only  say,  that  with  his  character  as 
a  transgressor,  and  the  enemy  of  the  highest  well-beiug  of  all,  a 
perfect  moral  governor  must  be,  in  a  high  degree,  dissatisfied. 
The  other  ground  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  transgressor  is, 
that  by  his  act  of  transgression,  he  has  done  what  he  can  to 
destroy,  and  that  which  uncounteracted  in  its  true  tendency, 
must  destroy  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor.  Actions, 
in  familiar  phrase,  sj>eak  louder  than  words.  The  act  of  dis- 
obedience says,  in  a  manner  the  most  unequivocal,  the  law  is 
not  to  be  obeyed — the  authority  of  the  moral  governor  is  to 
be  disregarded,  and  himself  esteemed  worthy  only  of  unquali- 
fied contempt.  The  transgressor  does  what  he  can  therefore, 
to  bring  into  contempt,  and  thus  to  prostrate,  and  if  nothing 
be  done  to  counteract  the  true  tendency  of  his  act,  he  does 
what  must  effectually  prostrate  all  law  and  all  authority. 
Who  would  or  could  respect  a  king,  who  either  from  weak- 
ness, approbation,  or  policy,  should  acquiesce  in  the  open 
rebellion  of  a  single  subject,  trampling  on  his  law  and  con- 
fronting his  authority  with  undisguised  contempt  ?  Suppose 
every  subject  thus  to  defy  his  authority,  and  the  triumphant 
shout  of  rebellion  to  go  throughout  his  empire,  what  is  there 
of  law,  authority,  or  government  remaining  ?  Nothing.  And 
the  reason  is,  that  the  act  of  transgression  is  a  declaration  and 
a  proof  that  the  lawgiver,  his  law,  and  authority,  are  unwor- 
thy of  regard.  It  places  the  foot  of  rebellion  on  all  that  can 
Vol.  I.— 4 


74  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

be  called  authority,  and  all  that  is  authority  in  the  dust, 
with  the  acquiescence  of  the  moral  governor.  The  proof  is 
decisive;  the  conclusion  is  not  merely  authorized  but  required, 
either  that  he  is  incompetent  or  indisposed  to  uphold  the  best 
law,  or  both ;  and  of  course  that  he  has  no  right  to  reign,  and 
is  entitled  to  no  submission.  The  principle  is  the  same  in 
respect  to  a  single  instance  of  disobedience,  considered  as  tes- 
timony. It  gives  the  same  testimony.  It  establishes  the  same 
fact — that  so  far  as  authority  is  concerned,  there  is  none.  For 
what  is  done  once  may  be  done  again  ;  what  is  done  by  one 
may  be  done  by  all.  The  governor's  acquiescence  is  the 
result  either  of  weakness,  of  timidity,  of  indifference,  of  appro- 
bation, or  of  a  selfish  policy,  and  a  single  act  of  transgression 
acquiesced  in  by  him  proves  this.  Such  an  act  therefore,  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  case  subverts  all  authority.  We  may 
indeed  imagine  that  a  moral  governor  should  maintain  his 
place  on  his  throne  by  dint  of  power.  We  may  suppose  him 
to  express  due  disapprobation  of  all  other  transgressors  but 
one.  But  if  he  fails  to  do  this  in  respect  to  one  transgressor 
and  so  treats  him  with  favor,  under  a  merely  legal  system,  his 
authority  is  gone — subverted.  He  shows  the  partialities  of 
favoritism,  and  these  subvert  authority  if  any  thing  can.  They 
show  him  to  be  wanting  in  principle,  and  therefore  wholly 
destitute  of  that  character  which  gives  the  right  to  rule ;  they 
show  that  he  is  as  truly  the  friend  of  the  disobedient  as  of  the 
obedient — that  he  does  not  regard  obedience  to  the  best  law 
as  the  indispensable  means  of  the  best  end,  and  disobedience 
to  it  as  the  sure  means  of  the  worst  end.  Thus  disobedience, 
without  his  disapprobation,  subverts  his  authority,  and  he 
acquiesces  in  the  result.     What  right  has  he  to  reign  ? 

It  may  here  be  said,  that  under  human  governments,  acts 
of  disobedience  often  occur  without  detection,  and  that  even 
subjects  who  are  convicted  as  offenders  are  often  pardoned, 
and  yet  the  authority  of  law  is  not  subverted.  This  may  be 
admitted.  But  why  is  not  the  authority  of  law  in  these  cases 
subverted  ?  Is  it  because  the  principle  now  stated  is  not  true  ? 
Or  is  it  because  every  such  government  does  what  it  can  and 
shows  itself  determined  to  do  what  it  can,  consistently  with 
its  own  weakness  and  imperfection,  to  counteract  the  tendency 
of  transgression,  by  upholding  its  authority  in  the  punishment 
of  the  guilty  and  the  protection  of  the  innocent  ?     The  latter 


NECESSITY    FOR    PARDONING    PREROGATIVE.     75 

is  the  reason.     In  proof  of  it,  let  us  suppose  a  civil  ruler  to 
possess  knowledge  and  power  fully  adequate  to  detect  and  to 
punish  without  error  and  mistake,  every  offender  against  the 
fundamental  law  of  the  state,  could  he  refuse  to  do  it — could 
he  refuse   and  be  known  to  refuse  to  arrest  the  traitor  and 
bring  him  to  punishment,  and  yet  sustain  his  authority  in  the 
view  of  his  subjects  ?     Could   treason  be   thus   left   to  walk 
abroad  in  the  face  of  day,  untouched,  uncounteracted   in  its 
tendency,  and   the  authority  of  the  king  not  be  subverted  ? 
"What  sort  of  justice  and  what  sort  of  authority  could  belong 
to  such  a  ruler,  suffering  rebellion  thus  to  trample  on  law  ? 
lie  would  be  virtually  employing  his  power  to  protect  the 
traitor,  and  so  become  his   accomplice  in  crime.     In  respect 
to  the  pardoning  prerogative  in  human  governments,  whence 
is  it  ?     It  rests  solely  on  the  ground  of  fallibility  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.      If  we  suppose   the  infallibility  of 
omniscience,  giving  absolute  security  that  the  innocent  shall 
not  be  punished  instead  of  the  guilty,  the  pardoning  preroga- 
tive  under  civil   law  would   be,  or  ought   to  be,  unknown. 
There  could  be  no  pretense  for  it ;  for  what  sort  of  justice 
would  that  be,  which  should  punish  some  or  many  offenders 
and  not   punish  another  known  to  be  equally  guilty  ?     The 
act  of  remitting  penalty  in  respect  to  a  convict  under  a  merely 
legal  system,  must  either  rest  on  the  presumption  of  his  inno- 
cence, or  be  an  outrage  on  law.     Thus  every  human  govern- 
ment, though  necessarily  imperfect  in  the  hands  of  an  imperfect 
administrator,  distinctly  recognizes  the  principle  of  doing  all 
it  can  do  to  sustain  its  authority,  by  counteracting  the  tend- 
ency of  transgression  to  destroy  it.     By  thus  doing  all  it  can 
do  for  this  purpose,  it  shows  that  it  would  do  more  if  it  could, 
and  thus  avoid  the  very  imperfections  that  mar  its  administra- 
tion.    It  shows  that,  in  its  own  estimation,  the  transgression 
of  law  in  its  true  tendency  is  the  subversion  of  all  law  and 
of  all  authority,  by  doing   all   it   can  do   to  counteract   this 
tendency.     It  thus  recognizes,  and  therefore  fully  establishes, 
that  very  principle  of  a  perfect  moral  government  which  it  is 
supposed  to  disprove. 

If  it  should  here  be  said,  that  in  many  instances  human  gov- 
ernments do  not  do  what  they  can  nor  show  that  they  are  dis- 
posed to  do  what  they  can,  to  sustain  their  authority  in  the 
sense  now  maintained,  and  that  still  their  authority  is  recog- 


ib         MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

nized,  I  answer  that  in  this  view  of  a  human  government, 
all  that  can  be  called  authority  is  in  truth  mere  appearance. 
Language  is  used  in  these,  as  it  is  in  many  other  cases,  as  if 
that  which  it  denotes  had  an  actual  existence,  when  it  has  not. 
It  is  merely  the  language  of  appearance,  and  the  thing  when 
duly  reflected  upon,  is  seen  to  be  a  mere  quasi  authority — 
a  thing  imagined  or  supposed.  Authority  is  recognized  in 
words,  and  even  in  unreflecting  thought  and  action;  as  when 
we  speak  of  the  rising  and  setting  of  the  sun,  or  of  the  sweet- 
ness of  sugar,  or  the  coldness  of  ice,  as  properties  of  these 
things  which  resemble  our  sensations.  As  in  these  cases  so  in 
the  present  case,  by  reflection,  the  error  is  easily  and  surely 
detected  and  the  ojyposite  truth  fully  recognized.  If  in  such 
cases  rulers  and  subjects  seem  to  recognize  authority,  it  is  at 
most  only  a  recognition  of  something  for  the  reality,  which  is 
not ;  while  even  this  subserves  the  purpose  of  preventing  the 
evils  of  revolution  and  of  anarchy. 

While  the  act  of  transgression  then  in  its  true  nature  and 
tendency  subverts  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor,  I  now 
proceed  to  show  that  the  transgressor  cannot  in  any  way, 
either  by  doing  or  by  suffering  prevent  the  actual  effect.  The 
whole  force  and  influence  of  his  act  to  destroy  the  authority 
of  the  moral  governor,  may  be  said  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  the 
subject  has  violated  the  claim  for  his  obedience.  It  follows 
therefore,  that  there  is  no  way  in  which  he  can  prevent  the 
actual  subversion  of  all  authority,  except  by  satisfying  the 
unsatisfied  claim  for  obedience.  Can  he  then  by  any  thing 
which  he  can  either  do  or  suffer,  satisfy  this  claim  ?  Can  he 
annihilate  the  act  of  transgression,  or  change  it  into  an  act  of 
obedience,  or  cause  it  to  be  true,  that  he  has  not  transgressed  ? 
This  is  impossible.  Can  repentance  or  future  obedience  satisfy 
this  claim  ?  Repentance  or  future  obedience  can  at  most  only 
satisfy  the  claim  in  future.  Were  it  otherwise,  what  would 
the  law  be  ?  It  would  be  in  language  and  in  import,  not  obey, 
but  sin  and  repent,  transgress  and  reform.  This  would  be  al- 
lowing present  transgression  on  condition  of  future  obedience. 
Can  works  of  supererogation  ?  These  are  out  of  the  question, 
the  continued  demands  of  law  being  co-extensive  with  the 
powers  of  the  subject.  Can  voluntary  suffering?  But  volun- 
tary suffering  is  not  the  thing  which  the  law  claims  of  the  sub- 
ject.    The  lawgiver  threatens  to  inflict  suffering,  but  no  be- 


OBEDIENCE    ONLY    SATISFIES    THE    LAW.  77 

nevolent  lawgiver  ever  claimed  voluntary  suffering  as  the  duty 
of  a  subject.  Voluntary  suffering  then  cannot  satisfy  the 
claim.  The  law  has  but  one  claim  on  the  subject,  and  that  is, 
for  his  obedience.  The  lawgiver  proposes  nothing,  aims  at 
nothing,  desires  nothing,  except  his  obedience  and  his  happi- 
ness. How  can  misery  be  a  substitute  for  happiness  in  the 
estimate  of  a  benevolent  lawgiver?  To  suppose  this  is  to  sup- 
pose him  to  say,  "  I  am  as  willing  that  you  should  transgress 
and  be  miserable,  as  obey  and  be  happy."  Besides,  the  most 
that  the  transgressor  can  be  supposed  to  accomplish  either  by 
doing  or  suffering,  is  to  evince  his  present  regard  for  the  law. 
But  he  is  bound  to  do  or  to  suffer  whatever  can  do  this ;  it 
can  therefore,  only  satisfy  a  present  claim.  Can  punishment? 
But  punishment  is  not  the  act  of  the  transgressor,  but  of  the 
lawgiver.  It  is  not  inflicted  by  him  as  a  substitute  for  obedi- 
ence. It  is  not  an  act  of  the  lawgiver  declaring  himself  as 
well  satisfied  that  his  subjects  should  disobey  and  be  pun- 
ished, as  obey  and  be  blessed.  It  is  an  act  of  the  lawgiver 
designed,  not  to  reform  the  subject  and  bring  him  to  honor  the 
law,  not  to  retrieve  all  the  evils  of  transgression  and  so  to  be 
an  equivalent  for  the  happiness  it  has  destroyed,  but  to  pre- 
vent simply  one  of  the  evils  of  transgression,  viz.,  the  subver- 
sion of  law.  It  is  simply  the  lawgiver's  act,  upholding  his  law 
and  authority.  What  then  on  the  part  of  the  transgressor  can 
satisfy  the  unsatisfied  claim  for  his  obedience  ?  Nothing.  By 
the  act  of  transgression  he  has  proclaimed  that  the  law  is  un- 
worthy of  regard,  and  may  be  trampled  in  the  dust  by  every 
subject ;  and  this  testimony  is  decisive  of  the  fact,  it  is  prima 
facie  evidence  and  uncounteracted  by  opposing  evidence  from 
the  governor  himself,  authorizes  and  demands  the  belief,  that 
the  moral  governor  acquiesces  in  rebellion,  that  his  law  has 
ceased  as  truly  as  had  a  repeal  of  it  issued  from  his  own  lips, 
and  that  he  no  more  reigns  with  authority, than  were  he  driven 
an  insulted  and  degraded  exile  from  his  throne. 

The  conclusion  then  on  this  topic  is,  that  the  law  of  a  per- 
fect moral  governor  is  in  its  very  nature  an  unqualified  claim 
for  obedience  on  the  part  of  every  subject,  and  that  whatever 
it  may  threaten,  it  claims  of  the  subject  nothing  but  obedi- 
ence. It  knows  of  no  substitute  or  equivalent  for  disobe- 
dience on  his  part,  nor  yet  on  the  part  of  the  lawgiver  him- 
self; and  therefore  necessarily  implies,  that  the  lawgiver  can 


T8  MOEAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

be  satisfied  with  nothing  but  obedience  on  the  part  of  the 
subject. 

6.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  expresses  the  law- 
giver's highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  highest  disappro- 
bation of  disobedience. 

First.  It  expresses  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience.  By 
highest  approbation,  I  mean  not  higher  approbation  than  he 
may  feel  toward  some  other  object,  which  cannot  come  into 
competition  with  this  as  an  object  of  approbation.  A  perfect 
moral  governor  would  feel  as  high  approbation  of  the  end  of 
right  moral  action,  as  of  right  moral  action  itself.  But  by 
highest  approbation,  I  mean,  as  high  as  he  can  feel  toward  any 
object,  and  higher  than  any  which  he  can  feel  toward  any  of  all 
the  objects  which  can  come  into  competition  as  objects  of  ap- 
probation. 

The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  governor  expresses  as  we  have 
seen,  his  preference  of  the  action  required  to  its  opposite,  all 
things  considered.  This  preference  is  of  course  an  elective 
preference.  It  involves  not  only  an  act  of  will,  but  also  affec- 
tion, love,  approbation  of  its  object  as  it  is  in  its  own  nature 
and  tendency ;  and  that  degree  of  approbation  which  is  suited 
to  the  worth  and  excellence  of  the  object.  Obedience  to  the 
perfect  law  of  a  perfect  being  is  as  we  have  seen  the  indis- 
pensable means  of  the  best  end,  even  of  the  highest  happiness 
of  the  individual  subject  and  of  all  others.  As  such  a  means 
of  such  an  end,  it  is  as  excellent  and  valuable,  as  much  to  be 
loved,  desired,  approved  and  sought  as  the  end  itself.  At  the 
same  time,  these  objects — obedience  and  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  all,  can  never  come  into  competition  as  objects  of  ap- 
probation. A  perfect  moral  governor  therefore,  must  regard 
obedience  to  his  law  with  as  high  approbation  as  that  with 
which  he  can  regard  any  other  object,  even  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  all.  Such  approbation  is  necessarily  involved  in  the 
very  preference  which  he  expresses  in  his  law,  otherwise  the 
preference  expressed  in  his  law  is  not  what  it  must  be — a 
preference  of  obedience  as  it  is  in  its  true  nature  and  tend- 
ency— the  necessary  means  of  the  best  end.  Can  he  then 
feel  so  high  a  degree  of  approbation  of  any  other  object, 
which  can  come  into  competition  with  obedience  as  an  object 
of  approbation,  as  that  which  he  feels  for  obedience  ?  This  is 
impossible  and  absurd.     To  suppose  it,  is  to  suppose,  that  per- 


TIIE    LAW    EXPRESSES    APPROBATION.  79 

feet  benevolence  should  feel  as  high  approbation  or  love  for 
that  which  is  neither  the  highest  happiness  of  all  nor  the 
necessary  means  of  it,  as  it  feels  for  these  objects — which  is  to 
suppose  that  to  be  benevolence  which  is  not  benevolence. 

Again;  the  only  object,  which,  under  a  moral  government, 
can  be  conceived  to  exist  and  to  come  into  competition  with 
obedience  as  an  object  of  approbation  to. a  moral  governor, 
must  be  some  supposable  degree  of  happiness  with  exemption 
from  some  supposable  degree  of  misery  or  suffering,  in  case  of 
disobedience.  It  is  admitted  that  a  benevolent  being  approves 
of  happiness,  and  of  exemption  from  suffering  in  themselves 
considered.  But  no  happiness,  and  no  exemption  from  suffer- 
ing which  are  conceivable  in  case  of  disobedience,  or  con- 
nected with  it  or  depending  on  it,  can  be  so  highly  approved 
by  a  benevolent  ruler  as  obedience  to  a  perfect  law.  Suppose 
what  else  we  may,  so  long  as  obedience  does  not  exist,  the  ne- 
cessary means  of  the  best  end  does  not  exist,  nor  the  best  end 
itself.  Of  course  nothing  exists  or  can  exist  without  obedi- 
ence, of  which  a  benevolent  ruler  can  so  highly  approve  and 
love  as  obedience  to  his  law.  The  expression  of  his  preference 
in  his  law  therefore,  being  an  expression  of  his  approbation 
of  obedience  as  it  is,  is  an  expression  of  his  highest  appro- 
bation of  obedience. 

This  reasoning  might  be  further  enforced  by  considering 
obedience  in  its  particular  relations  as  the  means  of  the  high- 
est well-being  of  all.  Such  it  is,  not  merely  in  its  direct  ten- 
dencies to  produce  the  highest  happiness  of  the  obedient  and 
of  all  others,  but  also  in  all  its  indirect  tendencies.  Not 
however  to  specify  these,  I  only  advert  to  one  of  them  al- 
ready stated — its  tendency  to  support  the  authority  of  the 
moral  governor.  The  obedience  of  his  subjects  is  the  testi- 
mony and  the  homage  of  every  intellect  and  every  heart,  to  his 
perfect  qualification  to  reign  ;  and  pre-eminently  enthrones 
him  in  rightful  dominion.  This  is  "  the  column  of  true  ma- 
jesty" in  kings.  When  obedience  exists,  all  exists  that  a  per- 
fect moral  governor  can  propose  or  desire  in  respect  to  himself 
and  his  subjects.  And  this  he  tells  them  in  the  preference — 
the  will  given  forth  in  his  law.  "What  other  object  can  he  so 
highly  approve  ? 

Secondly.  The  law  of  a  perfect  moral  governor  expresses  his 
highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.     By  the  highest  dis- 


80  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

approbation,  I  mean  as  high  as  he  can  feel  toward  any  object, 
and  higher  than  any  which  he  can  feel  toward  any  of  all  the 
objects  which  can  come  into  competition  as  objects  of  disap- 
probation. This  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  preference  ex- 
pressed in  his  law.  This  preference  of  the  action  required  to 
its  opposite  involves  aversion,  hatred,  disapprobation  toward 
the  opposite  as  it  is  in  its  true  nature  and  tendency.  It  in- 
volves a  degree  of  disapprobation,  which  is  suited  to  the  de- 
gree of  turpitude  and  odiousness  in  disobedience.  ISTow  dis- 
obedience to  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government,  in  its  true 
nature  and  tendency,  is  the  sure  means  of  the  worst  end  even 
of  the  highest  misery  of  the  subject  and  of  all  others.  As 
such  a  means  of  such  an  end,  it  is  as  odious  as  fit  to  be  abhor- 
red and  disapproved  as  the  end  itself.  These  objects  however, 
disobedience  and  the  highest  misery  of  all,  can  never  come 
into  competition  as  objects  of  disapprobation.  A  perfect  moral 
governor  therefore,  must  regard  disobedience  with  as  high 
disapprobation  as  that  with  which  he  can  regard  the  highest 
misery  of  all.  Such  disapprobation  of  disobedience  is  involved 
in  the  very  preference  expressed  in  his  law.  For  this  prefer; 
ence  involves  aversion,  hatred,  disapprobation  of  disobedience 
as  it  is  in  its  true  nature  and  tendency,  that  is  as  the  means 
of  the  highest  misery  of  all.  Can  he  then  feel  so  high  a  de- 
gree of  disapprobation  toward  any  other  object  which  can 
come  into  competition  with  disobedience  as  an  object  of  dis- 
approbation, as  he  must  feel  toward  disobedience?  This  is 
impossible.  To  suppose  it  is  to  suppose,  that  a  being  of  per- 
fect benevolence  should  feel  as  high  disapprobation  toward 
that  which  is  neither  the  highest  misery  of  all  nor  the  means 
of  it,  as  he  feels  toward  these  objects ;  which  is  to  suppose  a 
perfectly  benevolent  being,  who  is  not  perfectly  benevolent. 

This  view  of  the  subject  is  confirmed  by  considering  the 
specific  tendency  of  disobedience  to  destroy  the  authority  of 
the  governor.  It  not  only  tends  as  a  kind  of  action  to  pro- 
duce the  highest  misery  of  all,  but  as  we  have  seen,  it  tends 
to  subvert  the  authority  of  law  and  government,  and  thus  to 
demolish  the  necessary  and  only  security  and  safeguard  against 
this  fearful  issue.  Intent  on  its  work  of  ruin,  it  storms  and 
rases  to  the  foundation  the  only  citadel  of  defense  and  protec- 
tion, that  it  may  extend  its  desolations  unhindered  and  unmo- 
lested.    It  thus  destroys  the  last  hope  and  refuge  of  benevo- 


NO    EVIL    SO    GREAT    AS    TRANSGRESSION.  81 

lence  itself;  forcing  it  to  yield  its  authority  and  its  designs  to 
the  ravages  of  fell  malignity.  What  object  so  tit  to  be  abhor- 
red ?  What  can  be  called  law,  which  does  not  express  supreme 
abhorrence  of  transgression  ?  What  lawgiver  can  be  entitled 
to  respect,  who  does  not  express  in  his  law  the  highest  disap- 
probation of  this  deed  of  death — -this  worst  of  evils  as  a  cause 
— an  evil  equaled  only  by  its  appropriate  effect,  the  absolute 
wretchedness  of  all?  Thus,  when  disobedience  exists,  all  ex- 
ists that  a  perfect  moral  governor  can  deprecate,  disapprove 
and  abhor  as  the  cause  of  evil  and  the  source  of  woe.  It  is 
hostility  and  defeat  to  his  entire  and  only  design.  It  crosses 
and  frustrates  his  only  will — his  whole  will  as  given  forth  in 
his  law.  What  other  object  can  he  so  highly  disapprove  and 
abhor  ? 

4*  6 


LECTURE  V. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  laiv. — 
The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded.— 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  involves 
sanctions.— The  relations  of  a  Moral  Governor  to  his  kingdom  more  particularly  considered. — 
Legal  sanctions  denned. — They  establish  or  ratify  the  authority  of  the  Moral  Governor.— They 
consist  in  natural  good  promised  to  obedience,  and  in  natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience. — 
They  establish  the  Moral  Governor's  authority  as  its  decisive  proof. — They  become  decisive 
proof  of  the  Moral  Governors  authority  by  manifesting  his  benevolenee  in  the  form  of  his  high- 
est approbation  of  obedience,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.— It  is  not  incredible 
that  God  in  the  Scriptures,  should  express  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  his  highest 
disapprobation  of  disobedience  to  His  law. 

In  preceding  lectures,  after  defining  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment in  general  terms,  I  entered  on  the  inquiry,  What  is  the 
law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  f  In  answer  to  this  in- 
quiry, I  attempted  to  show  that  such  a  law  is  a  decisive  rule 
of  action  to  subjects  /  that  it  must  require  "benevolence  as  the 
best  "kind  of  action,  and  forbid  selfishness  as  the  worst  kind  of 
action  conceivable  on  the  part  of  subjects  /  that  it  requires  be- 
nevolence as  the  sum  of  obedience,  and  forbids  selfishness  as  the 
sum  of  disobedience  on  t/ie  part  of  subjects ;  that  it  expresses 
the  lawgiver's  preference  of  the  action  required  to  its  opposite, 
all  things  considered;  that  it  implies  that  the  lawgiver  can  be 
satisfied  with  obedience  and  with  nothing  but  obedience  on  the 
part  of  subjects ;  that  it  expresses  the  lawgiver ys  highest  appro- 
bation of  obedience,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience 
on  the  part  of  subjects. 

Continuing  these  remarks  concerning  the  nature  of  law,  I 
proceed  to  say, 

Seventhly :  That  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government 
involves  sanctions. 

In  treating  of  this  important  and  much  controverted  part 
of  our  subject,  I  propose  to  unfold  the  nature,  the  necessity, 
and  the  equity  of  legal  sanctions  in  relation  to  the  authority 
of  the  moral  governor.  Before  however  entering  directly  on 
these  topics,  I  deem  it  important  to  consider  more  particularly 
than  I  have  done,  the  relation  which  the  moral  governor  sus- 
tains to  his  kingdom,  the  qualifications  for  the  office,  especially 
the  moral  character  which  he  must  possess  and  manifest  as 


THE  PECULIAR  RELATION  OF  THE  GOVERNOR.  83 

the  ground  of  his  authority,  and  also  the  mode  of  manifesting 
his  qualifications  to  his  subjects. 

Assuming  then  what  is  now  properly  assumed,  that  a  per- 
fect moral  government  is  the  best  means  of  the  best  end,  and 
therefore  dictated  and  demanded  by  benevolence,  I  remark — 

That  a  moral  governor  sustains  a  peculiar  relation  to  his 
kingdom — a  relation  distinguished  from  every  other  by  its 
peculiar  object  or  end,  and  also  by  its  peculiar  function. 
Every  relation  of  every  moral  being  toward  other  moral  be- 
ings which  is  dictated  and  demanded  by  benevolence,  has  its 
peculiar  object  or  end,  and  hence  also  its  peculiar  function, 
or  what  are  called  in  most  cases  its  peculiar  duties,  including 
those  acts  or  doings,  or  some  general  comprehensive  mode  of 
acting  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  peculiar  object 
or  end  of  the  relation.  Accordingly,  benevolence  in  a  moral 
governor, while  it  aims  at  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  is  also 
committed  to  another  great  object  or  end  which  is  peculiar  to 
his  relation,  viz.,  to  secure  to  the  extent  of  his  power,  right 
moral  action,  and  to  prevent  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part 
of  his  subjects,  ~by  means  peculiar  to  the  relation  of  a  moral 
governor.  I  say  that  benevolence  is  committed — pledged — in 
its  very  nature,  and  from  the  nature  of  this  relation,  to  accom- 
plish, as  far  as  possible,  this  end  by  these  means.  Under  a 
system  of  moral  government,  as  I  have  before  said,  all — all 
depends  on  action.  On  the  right  and  wrong  moral  action  of 
its  subjects  depend  its  issues  in  happiness  or  misery.  The 
weal  or  woe  of  the  moral  kingdom  depends  therefore,  on  what 
the  moral  governor  does  or  fails  to  do,  to  secure  right  and  to 
prevent  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  his  subjects.  To 
secure  right  moral  action  with  its  results  in  happiness,  and  to 
prevent  wrong  moral  action  with  its  results  in  misery,  by  the 
peculiar  influence  of  a  perfect  moral  government,  must  be  the 
grand  object  or  end,  and  compared  with  any  thing  which  can 
come  into  competition  with  it,  must  be  the  supreme  object  or 
end  of  a  perfect  moral  governor.  lie  may  care  for  and  promote 
individual  well-being,  only  so  far  as  this  shall  be  consistent 
with  securing  the  greatest  amount  possible  to  him  of  right 
moral  action,  as  the  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  his 
kingdom  by  the  peculiar  influence  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment. But  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  by  this  means, 
every  thing  which  interferes  with  it  must  be  sacrificed ;  and 


84  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

every  tiling  which  is  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  this 
end  by  this  means  must  be  done,  or  the  great  end  of  benevo- 
lence must  be  defeated.  To  accomplish  this  particular  end 
then — to  secure  the  greatest  amount  of  right  moral  action 
which  he  can  secure,  as  that  which  is  necessary  to  the  highest 
well-being  of  all,  by  that  influence  which  is  peculiar  to  his 
relation  as  a  moral  governor,  is  the  entire  function  of  his 
office.  A  moral  governor  therefore  from  the  very  nature  of 
his  relation  as  a  benevolent  being,  is  under  the  necessity  not 
merely  of  aiming  to  produce  the  highest  happiness  of  his 
kingdom,  but  of  aiming  to  produce  it  bv  securing  the  greatest 
amount  of  right  moral  action.  Nor  is  he  as  some  vainly  ima- 
gine, under  the  necessity  merely  of  aiming  to  produce  the 
highest  well-being  of  his  kingdom  by  securing  the  greatest 
amount  of  right  moral  action  which  he  can  secure ;  but  he  is 
under  the  necessity  of  aiming  to  produce  the  highest  amount 
of  right  moral  action  which  he  can  secure  by  the  peculiar  in- 
fluence of  a  -perfect  moral  government. 

What  then  is  the  peculiar  influence  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment f  It  is  we  have  already  seen,  the  single  influence  of 
authority — of  that  right  to  command  which  imposes  an  obli- 
gation to  obey.  This  is  that  peculiar  essential  influence  of  a 
perfect  moral  government,  without  which  such  a  government 
can  have  no  existence.  If  right  moral  action  can  take  place 
under  other  influences,  it  cannot  take  place  as  obedience  to  a 
moral  governor  without  the  influence  of  his  authority  on  the 
subject.  Other  influences  may  be  combined  with  this  influ- 
ence, not  to  say  must  be  combined  with  it,  from  the  very 
condition  of  all  moral  beings.  But  such  other  influences  are 
entirely  distinct  from  this  influence,  and  though  necessary  to 
its  existence,  they  are  no  part  of  it.  They  may  exist  without 
this  influence ;  but  when  this  influence  does  not  exist,  moral 
government  does  not  exist.  Eight  moral  action  clone  under 
the  direct  influence  of  natural  good  and  evil  as  merely  so 
much  motive  and  without  any  regard  to  the  will  of  another, 
is  not  done  in  submission  to  authority,  and  therefore  is  not 
obedience  to  a  moral  governor.  "Wrong  moral  action  not 
done  in  rejection  of  authority,  is  not  disobedience  to  a  moral 
governor.  The  only  influence  by  which  one  acting  simply  in 
the  relation  of  a  moral  governor  can  control,  or  attempt  to 
control  the  conduct  of  others  as  his  subjects,  is  the  single  in- 


ON    WHAT    AUTHORITY    DEPENDS.  85 

fluence  of  authority.  To  suppose  a  moral  governor  therefore 
without  authority,  is  to  suppose  a  moral  governor  without  the 
least  governing  influence,  and  is  the  absurdity  of  supposing 
one  to  possess  an  influence  which  he  does  not  possess — of  sup- 
posing a  moral  governor  who  is  not  a  moral  governor.  "When 
therefore  there  is  no  authority,  there  can  be  neither  obedience 
nor  disobedience  to  a  moral  governor — neither  a  moral  gov- 
ernment nor  a  moral  governor.  Authority  then — the  right  to 
command  which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey — is  the  pecu- 
liar, essential,  constituting  influence  of  moral  government;  so 
that  where  this  influence  exists  moral  government  exists ;  and 
where  this  influence  does  not  exist  moral  government  does 
not  exist. 

Again ;  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor — that  right  to 
command  which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey — depends  on 
his  competence  and  disposition  to  govern  in  the  best  manner; 
that  is,  on  his  knowledge  and  power  as  qualifying  him,  and 
on  his  benevolence  as  disposing  him  to  govern  in  the  best 
manner,  and  on  the  decisive  manifestations  of  these  qualifica- 
tions and  this  character  to  his  subjects. 

That  the  moral  governor's  authority  depends  on  the  knowl- 
edge and  power  which  qualify  him  to  govern  in  the  best 
manner,  and  on  the  full  manifestation  of  these  qualification? 
for  his  office,  is  too  obvious  to  be  denied.  These  qualifications 
not  manifested  to  the  conviction  of  his  subjects,  would  be  in 
respect  to  constituting  any  part  of  the  ground  of  his  authority, 
as  though  they  were  not ;  and  who  can  suppose  that  ignorance 
and  imbecility  can  give  that  right  to  command  which  imposes 
an  obligation  to  obey  ? 

The  qualifications  of  knowledge  and  power  admit  of  differ- 
ent modes  of  manifestation  in  different  cases — modes  which 
are  peculiar  to  these  attributes,  when  compared  with  that  of 
manifesting  a  perfect  moral  character.  In  that  Being  who 
possesses  omniscience  and  almighty  power,  these  attributes 
are  abundantly  manifested  by  his  works  of  creation.  Essen- 
tial however,  as  the  existence  and  the  full  manifestation  of 
these  qualifications  are  to  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor, 
it  is  in  no  respect  necessary  or  important  to  my  present  pur- 
pose to  dwell  on  either,  since  the  existence  and  the  manifes- 
tation of  them  in  a  moral  governor  in  no  respect  depend  on 
legal   sanctions.      Legal   sanctions,  whatever  may  be    their 


86  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

nature,  their  relations  or  their  necessity,  can  neither  impart 
the  requisite  attributes  of  knowledge  and  power,  nor  be  neces- 
sary to  prove  their  existence.  At  the  same  time,  if  we  sup- 
pose the  moral  governor  to  furnish  the  most  abundant  proof 
of  his  qualifications  in  respect  to  knowledge  and  power,  this 
fact  does  not  imply  that  he  possesses  the  shadow  of  authority; 
for  his  authority  depends  not  merely  on  his  knowledge  and 
power  but  also  on  his  benevolence,  and  the  full  proof  or  mani- 
festation of  it  to  his  subjects.  If  then  legal  sanctions  have 
any  influence  in  establishing  his  authority,  it  must  be  some 
influence  on,  or  in  relation  to,  the  great  question  of  his  be- 
nevolence. 

That  I  may  hereafter  exhibit  what  I  consider  just  and 
adequate  views  of  legal  sanctions,  I  now  invite  further  and 
particular  attention  to  benevolence  on  the  part  of  the  moral 
governor  and  its  manifestation  as  one  essential  ground  of  his 
authority. 

It  is  then  undeniable,  that  benevolence  is  one  thing  in  the 
character,  or  rather  that  it  is  itself  the  character  of  the  moral 
governor,  which,  in  connection  with  the  requisite  knowledge 
and  power,  constitutes  the  essential  ground  of  his  authority. 
When  it  is  once  decided  on  sufficient  evidence,  that  he  pos- 
sesses that  knowledge  and  power  which  qualify  him  to  govern 
in  the  best  manner — so  far  as  such  qualification  depends  on 
these  attributes — and  if  this  be  not  decided,  the  fact  of  his 
authority  cannot  be  established ;  then  the  fact,  and  the  only 
fact  which  remains  to  be  proved  for  the  purpose  of  fully  estab- 
lishing his  authority,  is  the  fact  of  his  perfect  moral  character 
— his  benevolence. 

In  this  fact  is  involved  another.  The  moral  governor  who 
is  truly  or  perfectly  benevolent,  must  feel  the  highest  appro- 
bation of  right  moral  action,  and  the  highest  disapprobation 
of  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  his  subjects.  These  par- 
ticular emotions  in  view  of  the  true  nature  and  tendency  of 
right  and  wrong  moral  action,  are  inseparable  from  the  nature 
of  benevolence  in  every  mind. 

Again ;  benevolence  in  the  specific  form  of  it  now  stated 
as  the  character  of  the  moral  governor,  must  from  the  very 
nature  and  design  of  his  relation,  be  supremely  concerned 
and  absolutely  committed  to  secure  so  far  as  he  is  able,  right 
moral  action  in  every  instance,  and  to  prevent  wrong  moral 


BENEVOLENCE    INVOLVES    THESE    FEELINGS.        87 

action  in  every  instance  by  the  influence  of  his  authority.  To 
accomplish  this  end  by  this  means,  is  the  great  object  of  be- 
nevolence in  a  moral  governor — the  object  by  which  this 
august  relation  is  distinguished  from  every  other  relation. 
Benevolence  on  the  part  of  a  moral  governor  acting  in  this 
single  relation,  can  be  conceived  to  aim  at  no  other  object. 
The  relation  can  be  conceived  to  involve  no  other  peculiar 
function  than  the  accomplishment  of  this  end  by  this  means. 
We  say  then,  that  the  grand,  peculiar  function  of  a  moral 
governor  is,  by  the  influence  of  his  authority,  to  aim  to  secure 
right,  and  to  prevent  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  his 
subjects.  But  if  he  who  occupies  the  throne  does  not  aim  to 
secure  right  moral  action,  wTith  the  highest  approbation  of  it 
as  the  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and  to  prevent 
wrong  moral  action,  with  the  highest  disapprobation  of  it  as 
the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all,  then  he  is  not  benevo- 
lent— he  does  not  possess  the  character  which  is  requisite  to 
his  right  to  reign — he  has  no  authority. 

Besides,  there  is  nothing  in  benevolence  itself,  on  account 
of  which  it  can  be  requisite  to  the  moral  governor's  authority, 
except  that  it  involves  these  feelings  of  highest  approbation  of 
right,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action.  Sup- 
pose benevolence  to  be  any  thing  which  it  can  be  supposed  to 
be, without  involving  the  feelings  of  highest  approbation  of 
right  and  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action,  and 
what  is  it  but  downright  selfishness,  showing  no  smile  of  favor 
for  that  which  is  the  means  of  the  highest  welfare  of  all, 
and  no  frown  of  wrath  for  that  which  is  the  means  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all  ?  What  is  it  but  selfishness  in  the  form 
of  malignity,  welcoming  and  conniving  at  crime  and  wretch- 
edness, to  subserve  some  private  interest  or  purpose  of  its 
own?  And  what  is  there  in  such  a  character,  to  give  to  its 
possessor  the  right  to  control  at  will  the  conduct  of  others  ? 
Or  soften  the  character  as  you  will,  if  it  does  not  involve  the 
feelings  of  highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  disappro- 
bation of  wrong  moral  action,  its  possessor  can  have  no  will  in 
respect  to  right  and  wrong  moral  action  in  accordance  with 
their  true  nature  and  tendency — no  preference  of  the  one  to 
the  other  as  the  one  is  the  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all, 
and  the  other  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all.  Law  as 
a  rule  of  action,  cannot  with  truth  express  such  a  will  or  pref- 


8o  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

erence.  Its  language  is  the  utterance  of  falsehood.  The  law- 
giver has  no  such  will,  no  such  preference  as  the  very  nature 
of  law  involves,  and  the  very  language  of  law  expresses. 
Whatever  then  the  thing  may  be,  by  whatever  name  it  may 
be  called — whatever  amount  of  good  it  may  impart  in  other 
relations ;  in  a  moral  governor  it  is  worthy  only  of  execration 
and  contempt.  Call  it  benevolence  if  you  will,  but  as  the  at- 
tribute of  a  moral  governor,  if  it  does  not  involve  the  high- 
est approbation  of  right,  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of 
wrong  moral  action,  it  can  give  him  no  right  to  reign — no 
authority.  Benevolence — benevolence  in  the  form  of  the 
highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  disapprobation  of 
wrong  moral  action,  is  essential  to  the  authority  of  the  moral 
governor. 

]STor  is  this  all.  The  manifestation  of  benevolence  in  the 
form  of  the  highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  disappro- 
bation of  wrong  moral  action,  is  also  essential  to  the  moral 
governor's  authority. 

The  grand  and  peculiar  object  or  end  of  a  perfect  moral 
governor,  is  to  secure  right  and  prevent  wrong  moral  action 
on  the  part  of  his  subjects,  by  the  influence  of  his  authority. 
But  his  subjects  cannot  be  reached  by  this  influence  and  act 
under  it,  or  rather  the  influence  itself  cannot  exist,  except  as  it 
results  from  a  full  manifestation  of  that  character  of  the  gov- 
ernor which  is  a  requisite  ground  of  his  authority,  even  per- 
fect benevolence  with  its  feelings  of  highest  approbation  of 
right  and  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action.  In- 
deed these  feelings  are  as  we  have  seen,  those  very  elements 
of  his  perfect  moral  character,  which  constitute  it  an  essen- 
tial ground  of  his  authority.  It  is  obvious  therefore,  that 
the  full  and  decisive  manifestation  of  these  feelings  to  the 
view  of  his  subjects,  is  as  necessary  to  his  authority  as  the  ex- 
istence of  the  feelings  themselves,  or  of  the  character  which 
involves  them.  To  suppose  Mm  to  authorize  a  doubt  in  the 
minds  of  his  subjects  of  this  character  and  these  feelings,  is  to 
suppose  him  to  authorize  a  denial  of  his  authority.  For  what 
right  to  command  can  he  possess  in  the  view  of  subjects,  while 
he  leaves  it  with  them  an  unsettled  question,  whether  he  feels 
the  highest  approbation  of  right,  and  highest  disapprobation 
of  wrong  moral  action. 

"We  may  view  this  topic  under  other  aspects.     Responsibil- 


FOR  WHAT    IS    THE    GOVERNOR    RESPONSIBLE.      89 

ity  for  actual  results  in  the  weal  and  woe  of  liis  kingdom  be- 
longs to  the  moral  governor,  so  far  as  these  results  depend  on 
his  maintaining  the  influence  of  his  authority.  His  business — . 
the  grand  function  of  his  office,  so  to  speak,  is  to  secure,  as  far 
as  may  be,  right  moral  action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all,  and  to  prevent  as  far  as  may  be,  wrong  moral 
action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all,  by  the  single 
influence  of  his  authority.  If  the  result  in  happiness  fails,  or 
if  through  wrong  moral  action  the  highest  misery  of  all  fol- 
lows, in  consequence  of  his  failure  to  sustain  and  use  the  influ- 
ence of  his  authority,  the  responsibility  is  emphatically  his 
own.  The  highest  happiness  of  all,  and  the  prevention  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all,  so  far  as  they  depend  on  the  existence 
and  influence  of  his  authority,  are  committed  to  his  keeping. 
He  is  responsible  for  these  high  interests  of  his  kingdom,  so 
far  as  they  depend  on  the  influence  of  his  authority.  His  con- 
cern is  to  maintain  this  influence  unimpaired  and  perfect,  be  the 
sacrifice  what  it  may.  Nothing  of  equal  value  can  come  in- 
to competition  with  the  maintenance  of  his  authority.  When 
it  is  once  decided  that  a  perfect  moral  government  is  the  best 
means  of  the  best  end,  then  it  is  also  decided,  that  the  main- 
tenance of  the  moral  governor's  authority  is  the  best  means  of 
the  best  end.  His  only  alternative  therefore,  is,  either  to  be- 
tray his  trust,  and  thus  to  forfeit  his  character  and  his  throne, 
or  to  manifest  those  feelings  toAvard  right  and  wrong  moral 
action,  which  are  the  essential  ground  of  his  authority.  Or 
thus,  the  moral  governor  from  the  nature  of  his  relation,  is  to 
be  looked  to  and  confided  in,  as  the  faithful  guardian  of  the 
welfare  of  his  kingdom  by  the  influence  of  his  authority.  To 
secure  to  his  kingdom  the  highest  happiness  by  this  influence, 
and  to  be  confided  in  accordingly,  is  the  sole  purpose  and  end 
of  his  high  prerogative.  Is  he  worthy,  and  does  he  show  him- 
self to  be  worthy  of  this  confidence  in  the  view  of  his  sub- 
jects? If  so,  then  he  must  manifest  those  feelings  toward 
right  and  wrong  moral  action,  which  as  a  perfect  being  he 
must  possess,  and  the  manifestation  of  which  is  essential  to  his 
authority.  How  else  can  his  subjects  confide  in  that  guardian- 
ship, which  is  to  be  extended  to  his  kingdom  only  through  the 
influence  of  his  authority?  What  confidence  can  be  reposed 
in  one,  who,  for  aught  that  appears  to  the  contrary,  is  indiffer- 
ent to  the  conduct  of  his  subjects, on  which  the  happiness  or 


90  MORAL   GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

misery  of  his  kingdom  depends,  or  who  is  or  may  prove  him- 
self to  be,  so  far  as  any  evidence  to  the  contrary  exists,  the 
friend  and  patron  of  wrong  moral  action  ?  And  yet  this  is  the 
only  just  view  of  his  character.  Failing  to  furnish  decisive 
proof  of  his  highest  approbation  of  right,  and  of  his  highest 
disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action,  he  furnishes  not  the 
shadow  of  proof,  that  he  would  express  these  feelings,  even 
should  the  expression  of  them  be  necessary  to  prevent  the 
universal  wrong-doing,  and  with  it  the  universal  and  perfect 
misery  of  his  kingdom  forevermore.  I  do  not  say,  that  the 
expression  of  these  feelings  is  necessary  to  prevent  this  result 
in  his  kingdom.  He  however,  in  the  case  supposed, can  fur- 
nish no  proof  to  the  contrary  by  what  he  does  as  a  moral 
governor.  His  own  declaration  cannot  be  proof,  for  as  yet 
his  benevolence  is  not  proved.  Of  course  his  veracity  is  not 
proved,  and  is  therefore  justly  questioned.  There  can  there- 
fore be  no  possible  proof,  in  the  view  of  his  subjects  in  the 
supposed  case,  that  the  supposed  result  would  not  follow  ;  and 
no  possible  proof  that  the  moral  governor,  foreseeing  the  re- 
sult, would  in  any  instance  express  the  specified  feelings  to- 
ward right  and  wrong  moral  action,  were  it  necessary  to  pre- 
vent the  direful  catastrophe;  no  proof, that  he  would  manifest 
the  highest  approbation  of  right  moral  action  in  a  single  in- 
stance, or  the  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action  in 
a  single  instance,  were  it  necessary  to  prevent  his  kingdom 
from  becoming  a  pandemonium  of  sin  and  misery.  He  proves 
himself  to  be  a  selfish  being;  and  there  is  not  the  shadow  of 
reason  to  conclude,  that  he  would  not  consent  to  and  so  be- 
come the  responsible  author  of,  the  unmitigated  and  endless 
woes  of  his  kingdom,  rather  than  express  the  feelings  requisite 
to  prevent  them,  through  legal  sanctions.  What  authority  or 
right  to  reign  can  such  a  being  possess  ?  Or  thus,  a  being 
who  has  the  right  to  reign  as  a  moral  governor,  is  a  benevo- 
lent being,  and  has  of  course  the  necessary  feelings  of  a  benev- 
olent being  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  the  feelings 
of  highest  approbation  of  the  one,  and  of  the  highest  disappro- 
bation of  the  other.  Having  this  character  with  its  necessary 
emotions  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  he  will  furnish 
the  requisite  manifestation  or  proof  of  this  material  fact ;  since 
otherwise  he  can  possess  no  authority  in  the  view  of  his  sub- 
jects; that  is,  cannot  use  the  necessary  means  of  the  great 


THE  LAWGIVER    MUST    SHOW  HIS  PEELINGS.        91 

end  of  benevolence,  or  of  the  highest  happiness  of  his  king- 
dom, which  benevolence  requires  him  to  use.  Benevolence 
no  more  requires  him  to  aim  at  this  end,  than  it  requires  him 
to  use  the  necessary  means  of  it — than  it  requires  him  to  mani- 
fest his  highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  disapproba- 
tion of  wrong  moral  action.  Or  thus :  to  suppose  a  perfect 
moral  governor  not  to  manifest  the  highest  approbation  of 
obedience  to  the  best  law,  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of 
disobedience  to  the  best  law,  is  a  palpable  absurdity.  It  is  to 
suppose  him  to  use  the  influence  of  his  authority,  an  influence 
which  depends  wholly  on  the  manifestation  of  these  feelings, 
and  yet  that  he  does  not  manifest  the  feelings  on  which  the  in- 
fluence thus  depends;  that  is,  it  is  to  suppose  him  to  use  an 
influence  which  can  have  no  existence  and  which  of  course  he 
does  not  use. 

Does  the  moral  governor  then  establish  and  sustain  his 
authority  ?  This  question  depends  on  another ;  does  he  fully 
manifest  his  highest  approbation  of  right,  and  highest  disap- 
probation of  wrong  moral  action;  does  he  show  that  he  re- 
gards the  one  kind  of  action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all,  and  as  such, as  valuable  as  the  end  itself,  and  the 
other  as  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all,  and  as  such,  as 
evil  as  the  end  itself?  This  is  the  grand  problem.  I  say 
then  repeating  the  question,  does  the  moral  governor  show  that 
he  regards  right  moral  action  with  supreme  approbation,  and 
wrong  moral  action  with  supreme  disapprobation  f  Does 
he  so  prove  it  as  not  to  authorize  a  doubt  of  it  ?  If  he  does 
not,  then  there  is  no  proof  of  his  benevolence  and  therefore 
no  proof  of  his  authority.  There  is  proof  to  the  contrary. 
Failing  as  the  responsible  guardian  of  the  welfare  of  his  king- 
dom fully  to  manifest  these  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong 
moral  action — the  highest  approbation  of  the  one  as  the  means 
of  the  highest  welfare  of  all,  and  the  highest  disapprobation 
of  the  other  as  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all — he  de- 
cisively evinces  the  opposite  character,  and  can  make  no  claim 
or  pretense  to  authority. 

I  remark  once  more,  that  the  requisite  manifestation  and 
proof  of  the  moral  governor's  benevolence,  in  the  form  of  his 
highest  approbation  of  right,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of 
wrong  moral  action,  and  in  this  way  the  requisite  proof  of  his 
authority,  must  depend  not  merely  on  what  he  does  in  other 


02  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

relations^  hut  also  on  what  he  does  in  this  relation.  From  in- 
adequate views  of  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor  and  the 
peculiar  function  of  his  office,  it  seems  not  to  be  an  uncommon 
opinion,  that  he  may  by  acts  and  doings  in  other  relations, 
fully  establish  his  character  for  benevolence ;  that,  from  his 
character  thus  established,  may  be  inferred  his  appropriate 
feelings  toward  right  and  WTong  moral  action;  and  that  in 
this  way  his  authority  or  right  to  rule,  so  far  as  it  depends  on 
this  character  and  these  feelings,  may  also  be  fully  established. 

On  this  fundamental  point  it  is  readily  conceded,  that  to 
the  establishment  of  his  authority  as  a  moral  governor,  his 
character  as  manifested  in  all  his  other  relations  must  be  unim- 
peached  and  unimpeachable.  It  is  indispensable  to  this  pur- 
pose, that  his  acts  and  his  doings  in  all  his  other  relations, 
should  not  only  be  free  from  every  thing  which  wrould  evince 
the  selfish  principle,  but  consist  in  or  include  all  the  positive 
acts  of  beneficence  which  are  demanded  by  his  other  relations. 
Otherwise  he  would  furnish  decisive  proof  against  his  benevo- 
lence, and  of  course  against  his  authority.  But  it  is  now 
maintained,  that  these  things — even  the  most  decisive  proofs 
of  benevolence  possible  in  his  other  relations  merely — cannot 
prove  his  benevolence,  and  so  establish  his  authority  as  a 
moral  governor.  They  may  furnish  a  degree  of  presumptive 
evidence — nay,  the  best  evidence  supposable  in  the  case — of 
that  character  which  entitles  him  to  assume  the  relation  of  a 
moral  governor.  But  no  matter  what  proofs  of  his  benevo- 
lence he  may  furnish  in  his  other  relations,  they  are  not  suffi- 
cient proofs  of  his  benevolence,  if  in  this  relation  he  does  not 
perform  that  appropriate  function  of  his  office  which  benevo- 
lence requires  him  to  perform.  To  what  purpose  is  it,  that  a 
being  furnishes  every  possible  proof  of  his  benevolence  in 
some  or  in  many  relations,  if  in  another  relation  he  utterly 
fails  to  perform  the  duties  or  functions  wmich  in  this  relation 
benevolence  requires  him  to  perform  ?  All  his  conduct  in 
other  relations  be  it  ever  so  unexceptionable,  may  he  the  dic- 
tate of  the  selfish  principle ;  while  his  failure  to  perform  the 
duties  or  functions  of  this  relation,  is  decisive  j>roof  that  it  is 
the  dictate  of  the  selfish  principle. 

Now  the  moral  governor  sustains  a  peculiar  relation — a 
relation  widely  different  from  every  other,  and  involving  a 
peculiar  responsibility  and  a  peculiar  function.     He  is   the 


BENEVOLENCE    MUST    SHOW    ITS    FEELINGS.        93 

responsible  guardian  of  a  kingdom's  welfare,  as  its  weal  or 
woe  depends  on  what  lie  does, to  bring  his  subjects  under  the 
influence  of  his  authority.  The  grand  and  peculiar  function 
of  his  relation  or  office  is  to  bring  this  influence  to  bear  on 
his  subjects,  that  by  it  he  may  secure  right  and  prevent  wrong 
moral  action,  the  one  being  the  means  of  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all,  and  the  other  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of 
all.  The  question  of  his  benevolence  therefore,  depends  not 
merely  on  what  he  does  or  has  done  in  other  relations,  but 
also  on  what  he  does  in  this  relation.  Does  he  as  the  moral 
governor,  perform  the  peculiar  function  of  his  office  ? — does 
he  create  the  influence  of  his  authority  by  what  he  does  in 
this  relation?  If  not — if  he  does  not  bring  his  subjects  under 
this  influence,  so  that  they  in  acting  must  either  submit  to  it 
or  resist  it,  then  he  is  recreant  to  the  grand  and  only  function 
of  his  office,  and  betrays  the  trust  which  he  pretends  to  as- 
sume. He  thus  shows  himself  not  to  be  benevolent,  and  of 
course  to  possess  no  authority.  Benevolence  therefore,  re- 
quires him  to  manifest  his  benevolence  by  what  he  does  in 
the  relation  of  a  moral  governor,  and  in  this  way  to  establish 
his  authority. 

Ivor  is  this  all.  Benevolence  requires  him  also  to  manifest 
in  his  relation  as  a  moral  governor,  his  benevolence  in  that 
form  which  is  peculiar  and  appropriate  to  this  relation,  viz., 
in  its  necessary  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action 
on  the  part  of  subjects.  The  happiness  or  misery  of  his  king- 
dom depends  on  his  showing  himself  to  feel  toward  right  and 
wrong  moral  action, as  a  benevolent  being  must  feel.     If  he 

CD  J  CD 

does  not  show  these  feelings,  he  shows  himself  not  to  be  be- 
nevolent. As  we  have  seen,  all  that  there  is  in  the  nature  of 
benevolence  which  qualifies  him  to  rule  and  can  give  him  the 
right  to  rule,  is, that  it  involves  these  feelings  and  will  mani- 
fest them,  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  great  end  of  benevo- 
lence. If  benevolence  has  any  peculiar  feelings  toward  hap- 
piness and  misery,  it  must  have  peculiar  feelings  toward  right 
moral  action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  and 
toward  wrong  moral  action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  mis- 
ery of  all.  If  benevolence  requires  the  moral  governor  to 
make  a  full  and  decisive  manifestation  of  his  feelings  toward 
the  highest  happiness  of  all  and  the  highest  misery  of  all,  then 
it  requires  him  also  to  manifest  not  less  decisively  its  peculiar 


94  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

feelings  toward  right  moral  action,  as  the  means  of  the  high- 
est happiness  of  all,  and  toward  wrong  moral  action  as  the 
means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all.  But  if  he  does  not  mani- 
fest his  benevolence  in  its  peculiar  and  necessary  feelings 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  by  what  he  does  in  his 
relation  as  a  moral  governor,  he  cannot  manifest  it  at  all ;  and 
the  proof  from  this  is  decisive,  that  he  is  not  benevolent,  and 
can  have  no  right  to  rule ;  nay  more,  that  he  is  not  willing  to 
use  the  best  and  only  proper  means  of  securing  the  highest 
happiness  of  all  and  preventing  the  highest  misery  of  all,  and 
therefore  is  a  selfish  being  and  in  moral  character,  nothing 
better  than  a  fiend. 

Thus  plain  is  it,  that  a  moral  governor  is  under  an  absolute 
necessity  of  maintaining  his  authority  in  the  view  of  his  sub- 
jects, if  he  maintains  it  at  all,  by  what  he  does  in  the  relation 
of  a  moral  governor ;  in  other  words,  by  manifesting  in  this 
relation  his  benevolence,  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approba- 
tion of  right  moral  action,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of 
wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  his  subjects.  If  he  would 
use  the  peculiar  and  essential  influence  of  a  perfect  moral 
government,  the  influence  of  authority — if  he  would  establish 
his  right  to  reign,  he  must  appear  before  his  kingdom  as  the 
unchangeable  friend  and  patron  of  right  moral  action,  and  the 
uncompromising  enemy  and  avenger  of  wrong  moral  action, 
showing  that  he  loves  the  one  as  he  loves  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  his  kingdom,  and  that  he  hates  the  other  as  he  hates 
the  highest  misery  of  his  kingdom.  He  must  appear  in  all 
the  excellence  and  loveliness  and  majesty  of  this  character, 
without  a  cloud  or  a  spot  to  obscure  its  splendor.  The  glory  of 
his  rightful  dominion  must  be  as  the  sun  shining  in  his  strength. 

In  view  of  what  has  now  been  said  concerning  the  relation 
of  the  moral  governor  to  his  kingdom,  his  qualifications  for 
the  office,  and  especially  concerning  the  moral  character 
which  he  must  possess  and  manifest  as  the  ground  of  his 
authority,  I  now  proceed  to  the  direct  consideration  of  legal 
sanctions.  My  object  is,  to  ascertain  their  nature,  to  show 
their  necessity  to  the  existence  of  law  and  moral  government, 
and  to  unfold  their  equity  in  respect  to  the  degrees  of  natural 
good  and  evil  which  are  requisite  to  their  design.  For  the 
purpose  of  presenting  what  I  deem  just  and  adequate  views 
of  the  subject,  I  propose  to  define,  in  somewhat  general  terms, 


LEGAL    SANCTIONS    DEFINED.  95 

the  phrase  legal  sanctions,  or  sanctions  of  law,  and  to  explain 
and  defend  the  several  parts  of  the  definition. 

Legal  sanctions  then — by  which  I  mean  the  sanctions  of  the 
law  of  a  perfect  moral  government — consist  in  that  natural 
good  promised  to  obedience,  and  in  that  natural  evil  threatened 
to  disobedience  by  the  moral  governor,  which  establish  or  ratify 
his  authority  as  the  decisive  or  necessary  proof  of  it,  by  mani- 
festing his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approbation 
of  obedience  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience, 
and  which  for  this  purpose  include  the  highest  possible  degree 
of  natural  good  in  each  case  of  obedience,  and  the  highest  pos- 
sible degree  of  natural  evil  in  each  case  of  disobedience. 

This  definition  may  be  fully  comprised  in  the  following  par- 
ticular propositions : 

1st.  Legal  sanctions  establish  or  ratify  the  authority  of  the 
moral  governor. 

2d.  They  consist  in  natural  good  promised  to  obedience, 
and  in  natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience,  by  the  moral 
governor. 

3d.  They  establish  or  ratify  the  moral  governor's  authority, 
as  the  decisive  proof  of  it. 

4th.  They  become  the  decisive  proof  of  his  authority,  by 
manifesting  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  appro- 
bation of  obedience,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobe- 
dience. 

5th.  They  are  the  necessary  proof  of  his  authority,  as  being 
the  necessary  manifestations  and  proof  of  his  benevolence,  in 
the  necessary  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience, 
and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

6th.  They  include  the  highest  possible  degree  of  natural 
good  in  each  case  of  obedience,  and  the  highest  possible  de- 
gree of  natural  evil  in  each  case  of  disobedience. 

These  several  particular  propositions  I  propose  to  explain 
and  to  vindicate. 

1st,  Legal  sanctions  establish  or  ratify  the  authority  of  the 
moral  governor.  If  legal  sanctions  are  tilings  of  any  signifi- 
cance, they  sustain  this  particular  relation  to  law — they  estab- 
lish or  ratify  it  as  an  authoritative  rule  of  action  to  subjects. 
To  speak  of  law  as  an  authoritative  rule  of  action,  is  only  to 
say, that  it  is  a  rule  of  action  given  by  one  who  has  authority 
or  that  right  to  command  which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey. 


96  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

That  which  gives  to  the  law  of  a  moral  government  its 
binding  force,  or  which  constitutes  its  whole  influence  or  char- 
acter as  a  decisive  rule  of  action,  considered  as  the  will  of  one 
which  ought  to  be  obeyed  because  it  is  his  will,  is  the  author- 
ity of  the  lawgiver  or  moral  governor.  Whether  we  speak  of 
legal  sanctions  as  establishing  the  authority  of  law,  or  estab 
lishing  law  as  an  authoritative  rule  of  action,  all  that  we  can 
mean  is,  not  that  they  constitute  but  determine  or  establish 
the  fact,  that  it  is  the  law  of  one  who  has  the  right  to  com- 
mand— who  has  authority.  The  authority  of  law  therefore — 
its  binding  force  or  influence  upon  the  subject,  if  established 
at  all,  must  be  established  by  establishing  the  authority  of 
him  whose  law  it  is — by  showing  that  he  has  that  right  to  com- 
mand which  imposes  an  obligation  to  obey.  This  being  done, 
all  is  done  which  can  give  force  to  law,  or  invest  it  in  the 
view  of  subjects,  with  that  characteristic  which  constitutes  it 
an  authoritative  and  decisive  rule  of  action  to  them.  Nothing 
can  be,  nothing  can  need  to  be  established  or  sanctioned,  for 
the  purpose  of  giving  to  law  all  the  binding  force  which  law 
can  have,  except,  that  he  who  assumes  the  right  to  rule  actu- 
ally possesses  and  shows  himself  to  possess  the  right.  The 
peculiar  influence  of  legal  sanctions  then, is  to  establish  or  rat- 
ify, in  the  view  of  his  subjects  the  authority  of  the  moral 
governor. 

2d.  Legal  sanctions  consist  in  natural  good  promised  to  obe- 
dience, and  in  natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience  by  the 
moral  governor.  By  this  I  mean,  that  in  respect  to  the  matter 
of  them,  they  consist  exclusively  in  such  natural  good  and  evil. 
Whatever  natural  good  and  evil  are  as  sanctions,  and  what- 
ever else  may  be  necessary  to  their  being  sanctions  of  law, 
they  are  the  only  things  which  are  or  can  be  sanctions  of  law. 
All  men  concur  in  calling  natural  good  and  natural  evil  an- 
nexed to  law  in  the  manner  now  specified,  legal  sanctions. 
Nor  can  this  language  be  applied  to  any  thing  else,  with  the 
least  propriety  or  truth.  Other  things  which  are  not  legal 
sanctions  may  be  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor, 
that  he  may  establish  his  authority  by  natural  good  and  nat- 
ural evil  as  legal  sanctions.  Other  things  may  be  necessary  to 
this  purpose,  because  the  want  of  them  would  be  proof  against 
his  authority,  and  thus  prevent  the  promised  good  and  threat- 
ened evil  from  sanctioning  his  authority,  however  adapted  in 


LEGAL   SANCTIONS,  NATURAL  GOOD  AND   EVIL.    97 

themselves  to  the  purpose.  The  impossibility  that  the  moral 
governor  should  establish  or  sustain  his  authority  by  other 
means  than  by  annexing  natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as 
sanctions,  I  shall  attempt  to  show  hereafter.  lie  cannot  do 
this  as  we  have  already  seen,  merely  by  furnishing  the  requi- 
site evidence  of  his  qualifications  to  reign  in  respect  to  knowl- 
edge and  power.  If  in  addition  to  this  wTe  suppose,  that  by 
giving  the  best  rule  of  action,  and  by  a  blameless  and  kind  de- 
portment in  all  other  relations  than  that  of  a  moral  governor, 
he  does  what  he  can  without  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal 
sanctions,  to  establish  and  sustain  his  authority,  still  none  of 
these  things  nor  all  of  them  combined  can  be  legal  sanctions ; 
in  other  words,  they  cannot  sanction  his  authority.  Indeed 
this  supposition  is  wholly  inadmissible,  for  all  these  things 
may  be  done,  and  be  justly  believed  to  be  done  by  a  selfish 
being  who  of  course  can  possess  no  authority.  His  authority 
could  not  be  established  by  these  things.  When  all  this  is 
done,  more  must  be  done,  or  there  can  be  no  legal  sanctions. 
The  best  evidence  of  his  authority  must  be  furnished  of  which 
the  nature  of  the  case  admits.  But  such  evidence  cannot  be 
furnished  without  the  promise  to  obedience  of  a  proper  de- 
gree of  natural  good,  and  the  threatening  to  disobedience  of 
a  proper  degree  of  natural  evil.  This  is  the  evidence  and  the 
only  evidence,  which  wdien  any  tiling  else  supposable  has  been 
done,  determines — settles  the  question  of  his  authority  beyond 
reasonable  doubt.  The  sanctioning  influence  then,  whatever 
it  is,  pertains  exclusively  to  natural  good  promised  to  obe- 
dience as  a  reward,  and  natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience 
as  a  penalty.  What  is  true  in  the  nature  of  things  however, 
may  more  fully  appear  hereafter.  I  now  appeal  to  the  uni- 
versal conceptions  of  mankind,  as  evinced  by  the  only  author- 
ized use  of  language.  On  this  ground  I  claim,  that  neither 
the  act  of  prescribing  the  best  rule  of  action  nor  a  blameless 
and  kind  deportment,  nor  both  combined,  nor  any  thing  else 
except  natural  good  as  the  reward  of  obedience,  and  natural 
evil  as  the  penalty  of  disobedience,  can  with  the  least  propriety 
or  truth  be  called  legal  sanctions.  The  authority  of  the  moral 
governor  then,  cannot  be  either  wholly  or  partially  sanctioned 
by  other  things  than  natural  good  as  a  legal  reward,  and  nat- 
ural evil  as  a  legal  penalty.  If  his  authority  is  not  fully  and 
exclusively  sanctioned  by  these,  it  is  not  sanctioned  at  all. 
Vol.  I.— 5  1 


98  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

Legal  sanctions  then  in  the  matter  of  them,  consist  exclusively 
in  natural  good  promised  by  the  moral  governor  to  obedience, 
and  in  natural  evil  threatened  to  disobedience. 

3d.  Legal  sanctions,  or  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanc- 
tions, establish  or  ratify  the  moral  governor's  authority  as  the 
decisive  proof  of  it.  The  word  sanction  denotes  a  particular  kind 
of  evidence  or  proof,  viz.,  that  which  is  the  decisive  and  neces- 
sary proof  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  sanction.  I  shall  now 
speak  of  it  only  as  decisive  proof,  proposing  to  consider  its 
necessity  hereafter.  In  some  cases  of  moral  evidence  it  is 
justly  deemed  too  weak  to  authorize  belief,  at  least  for  practi- 
cal purposes.  This  may  be  owing  to  its  intrinsic  insufficiency, 
or  to  its  being  opposed  to  contrary  evidence  of  the  same  kind. 
In  some  cases  of  opposing  evidence  of  this  kind,  we  speak  of 
the  balance  of  evidence  or  probability  as  in  favor  of  what  we 
believe.  In  some  such  cases  of  belief,  the  degree  of  our  assent 
or  the  strength  of  our  conviction,  is  not  such  as  to  exclude  all 
doubt,  or  is  at  least  less  than  it  would  be, were  there  no  op- 
posing evidence.  What  we  believe  is  not  fully  or  decisively 
established — there  is  not  that  ground  for  unqualified  belief 
which  there  would  be,  were  the  evidence  wholly  un counter- 
acted by  evidence  on  the  other  side.  By  decisive  proof  I  mean, 
not  merely  a  slight  balance  of  probability,  nor  merely  what 
may  be  called  sufficient  proof;  but  I  mean  that  which  implies 
the  absence  of  all  opposing  evidence  or  of  all  ground  for  doubt 
or  hesitation,  and  which  in  its  own  nature,  there  being  no 
opposing  evidence,  fully  confirms  and  in  this  sense  establishes 
or  ratifies  that  of  which  it  is  the  proof. 

Now  to  every  one  tolerably  acquainted  with  the  use  of  lan- 
guage, it  must  be  obvious,  that  nothing  can  be  truly  and  prop- 
erly called  a  sanction,  except  under  the  idea  of  it  as  a  proof; 
nor  unless  it  implies,  in  the  circumstances  or  case  in  which  it 
is  a  sanction,  the  absence  of  all  opposing  evidence  or  proof, 
nor  unless  it  is  conceived  to  be  a  decisive  proof,  a  proof  which 
in  its  nature  so  establishes  or  ratifies  that  of  which  it  is  the 
sanction,  as  to  remove  all  reasonable  doubt.  To  illustrate  by 
an  example.  The  sanction  of  a  treaty  with  this  country,  is  the 
consent  of  the  President  and  Senate.  This  consent  is  not  only 
a  proof  of  the  reality  or  validity  of  a  treaty,  but  a  proof  which 
implies  the  absence  of  all  opposing  evidence  or  proof,  and 
which  in  its  own  nature  establishes  or  ratifies,  to  the  exclu- 


LEGAL  SANCTIONS,  A  PROOF  OF  AUTHORITY.   99 

sion  of  all  doubt,  the  reality  or  validity  of  the  instrument  or 
writing  called  a  treaty.  It  is  under  this  view  of  it  as  essential 
to  a  sanction,  that  such  consent  is  called  a  sanction. 

In  accordance  with  this  view  of  the  nature  of  a  sanction  in 
one  respect,  I  maintain  that  legal  sanctions  are  the  decisive 
proof  oi  the  authority  of  a  moral  governor.  Or  thus  I  main- 
tain, that  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  are  that  kind 
of  evidence  or  proof  of  the  moral  governor's  authority,  which 
implies  the  absence  of  all  opposing  evidence,  and  which  being 
in  its  own  nature  the  best  evidence  of  which  the  nature  of  the 
case  admits,  establishes  or  ratifies  his  authority  beyond  all 
reasonable  doubt  or  hesitation.  I  do  not  say  that  natural 
good  and  evil,  be  the  degree  of  them  what  it  may,  are  legal 
sanctions  in  a  case  in  which  there  is  evidence  from  any  other 
source  against  the  moral  governor's  authority.  On  the  con- 
trary I  maintain,  that  they  cannot  be  legal  sanctions,  except 
in  a  case  in  which  there  is  no  such  opposing  evidence,  and  that 
therefore,  as  legal  sanctions,  they  imply  the  absence  of  all  evi- 
dence against  the  moral  governor's  authority.  It  is  under  this 
idea  or  notion  of  them  as  legal  sanctions  that  they  exclude  all 
doubt  of  his  authority,  while  in  their  own  nature  and  tendency 
when  thus  uncounteracted  by  opposing  evidence,  they  establish 
or  ratify  his  authority.  With  this  explanation  in  view,  I  now 
ask,  what  can  be  more  obvious  in  the  use  of  language,  than 
that  natural  good  and  evil  considered  as  legal  sanctions,  are 
universally  conceived  of  as  the  decisive  proof  of  the  law- 
giver's authority  ?  If  as  legal  sanctions  they  prove  nothing, 
then  they  sanction  nothing ;  and  how  then,  or  in  what  possi- 
ble meaning  can  they  be  called  sanctions?  If  as  sanctions 
they  prove  or  establish  any  thing,  it  must  be  as  we  have  seen, 
the  authority  of  the  moral  governor.  And  how  can  they 
establish  or  ratify  this,  that  is,  confirm  it  beyond  all  reason- 
able doubt,  except  as  implying  the  absence  of  all  opposing 
evidence,  and  as  being  in  their  own  nature  decisive  proof 'of 
his  authority? 

Ith.  Legal  sanctions  or  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanc- 
tions, oecome  decisive pr oof  of  the  moral  governor's  authority,  by 
manifesting  his  benevolence  in  the  form  qf  his  highest  approba- 
tion of  obedience  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 
Our  object  is  now  to  show  how  or  in  ivhat  manner  natural  good 
and  evil  become  decisive  proof  of  the  moral  governor's  author- 


100       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

ity.  This  cannot  be,  as  we  have  before  shown,  by  proving  his 
qualifications  for  the  office  in  respect  to  knowledge  and  power. 
These  qualifications  and  the  requisite  proof  of  them  must  be 
presupposed.  Nor  can  it  be,  except  in  a  case  in  which  there 
is  opposing  or  counteracting  evidence  of  any  kind  whatever. 
For  what  we  claim  and  all  that  we  claim  is,  that  natural  good 
and  evil  are  legal  sanctions,  by  being  such  in  their  true  nature 
and  tendency,  as  to  be  decisive  proof  of  his  authority,  when  in 
their  influence  as  evidence, they  are  uncounteracted  by  oppos- 
ing evidence.  In  this  case,  we  say  that  they  become  decisive 
proof  of  his  authority,  by  manifesting  his  benevolence  in  the 
form  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  of  his  highest 
disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

While  natural  good  and  evil  constitute  the  matter  of  legal 
sanctions,  they  do  not,  considered  simply  as  natural  good  and 
evil,  become  or  constitute  legal  sanctions.  Natural  good  prof- 
fered or  conferred,  and  natural  evil  threatened  or  inflicted, 
may  sustain  very  different  relations ;  and  it  is  in  respect  to 
these  different  relations,  that  we  conceive  and  speak  of  them 
as  very  different  things.  Natural  good  under  one  relation  we 
call  payment,  and  under  another  hire,  wages  and  the  like.  We 
call  it  reward  also,  as  conceived  of  under  very  different  rela- 
tions. The  word  reward  is  often  applied  to  the  consequence 
of  wickedness.  Natural  evil  under  one  relation — that  is,  when 
inflicted  with  the  design  of  reforming  an  offender,  we  call  chas- 
tisement, discipline,  and  sometimes  punishment;  while  evil 
inflicted  with  no  such  design  is  also  often  called  punishment. 
What  then,  is  the  precise  nature  of  a  legal  reward  and  of  a 
legal  penalty  or  punishment  f  What  is  the  peculiar  relation 
of  natural  good  and  evil  as  sanctions  of  law  f  And  here,  ac- 
cording to  what  has  been  already  said,  it  is  obvious,  that  to  be- 
come sanctions  of  law,  they  must  sustain  some  relation  to  law ; 
and  not  only  so,  but  in  this  particular  relation  to  law,  they 
must  tend  to  secure  or  render  effectual,  by  establishing  or  rati- 
fying the  peculiar  and  appropriate  influence  of  law,  which  as 
we  have  seen,  is  its  authority  or  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver. 
Here  then  we  have  a  sure  criterion  by  which  to  determine 
what  causes  natural  good  promised  to  obedience,  and  natural 
evil  threatened  to  disobedience  to  be  legal  sanctions;  viz.,  that 
they  tend  to  secure  and  render  effectual  the  peculiar  influence 
of  law — the  authority  of  the  lawgiver  or  moral  governor — by 


LEGAL  SANCTIONS  MANIFEST  BENEVOLENCE.   101 

establishing  or  ratifying  this  authority.  What  we  now  claim 
is,  that  they  have  this  tendency  as  decisive  proof  of  his  author- 
ity, by  manifesting  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and 
his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

It  will  not  be  denied,  that  natural  good  promised  as  the  re- 
ward of  obedience,  is  a  decisive  manifestation  of  approbation 
of  obedience,  by  him  who  promises  it ;  nor,  that  natural  evil 
threatened  as  the  penalty  of  disobedience,  is  a  decisive  mani- 
festation of  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  by  him  .who 
threatens  it.  The  promise  and  the  threatening  would  be  all 
which  the  case  would  admit  of,  prior  to  any  acts  of  obedience 
or  disobedience.  If  now  we  suppose  the  fulfillment  of  the 
promise  in  every  case  of  obedience,  and  the  execution  of  the 
threatening  in  every  case  of  disobedience,  the  most  impressive 
manifestation  of  the  feelings  specified  is  made  which  is  con- 
ceivable. And  yet  the  promise  of  reward,  and  the  threaten- 
ing of  penalty  prior  to  all  acts  of  obedience  and  of  disobedi- 
ence, being  all  the  evidence  of  which  the  nature  of  the  case 
admits,  are  as  truly  decisive  proof 'of  the  feelings  specified,  as 
would  be  the  actual  conferring  of  the  reward  in  the  case  of 
obedience,  and  the  actual  inflicting  of  the  penalty  in  the  case 
of  disobedience.  In  either  case,  the  feeling  of  approbation  of 
obedience,  and  the  feeling  of  disapprobation  of  disobedience 
would  be  fully  and  decisively  proved  to  be  real. 

Nor  is  this  all.  The  degree  of  natural  good  promised  or 
conferred  as  the  reward,  and  the  degree  of  natural  evil  threat- 
ened or  inflicted  as  the  penalty,  would  be,  in  all  just  estima- 
tion, the  criteria  and  measure  of  the  degree  of  the  feelings  of 
which  they  would  be  the  manifestations.  When  therefore, 
the  natural  good  conferred  in  such  a  case  on  the  obedient 
subject  is  such  in  degree  as  to  manifest  on  the  part  of  him 
who  confers  it,  the  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  the 
natural  evil  inflicted  on  the  disobedient  subject,  manifests  on 
the  part  of  him  who  inflicts  it  the  highest  disapprobation  of 
disobedience,  then  supposing  no  counteracting  evidence,  the 
authority  of  the  moral  governor  is  established  or  ratified.  He 
thus  manifests  the  feelings  which  are  essential  to  his  character 
as  a  perfect  moral  governor.  He  thus  decisively  proves  the 
fact,  and  the  only  fact  which  needs  to  be  proved  in  the  case, 
viz.,  that  he  possesses  that  moral  character  which  invests  him 
with  the  right  to  govern — that  is,  with  authority.     Having 


102       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

already  evinced,  by  their  proper  evidence,  Ills  qualifications  in 
respect  to  knowledge  and  power  for  his  responsible  office,  and 
having  furnished  by  his  deportment,  his  acts  and  doings,  no 
evidence  against  his  perfect  moral  character,  he  now  proves 
what  only  remains  to  be  proved — that  he  has  the  feelings  and 
the  character,  and  will  act  the  part,  of  a  benevolent  moral 
governor.  By  thus  showing  through  the  medium  of  natural 
good  and  evil,  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  his 
highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  he  shows  that  he  re- 
gards obedience  to  the  best  law  as  it  is,  the  best  kind  of 
action,  and  disobedience  to  the  best  law  as  the  worst  kind  of 
action — the  one,  as  that  which,  in  its  true  nature  and  tendency, 
is  the  means  of  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and  the  other  as 
that  which  in  its  true  nature  and  tendency  is  the  means  of  the 
highest  misery  of  all.  These  are  the  feelings  and  the  only 
feelings  of  benevolence  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action. 
This  decisive  manifestation  of  them  through  the  requisite  de- 
gree of  natural  good  as  a  reward,  and  the  requisite  degree  of 
natural  evil  as  a  penalty,  is  therefore  decisive  proof  of  benev- 
olence, and  of  course,  decisive  proof  of  authority.  Indeed, 
suppose  what  other  mode  of  manifesting  these  feelings  and 
this  character  we  may,  if  any  such  mode  were  supposable, 
how  feeble  and  unimpressive  it  must  be,  compared  with  that 
which  would  be  made  through  that  degree  of  natural  good  as 
a  reward,  and  of  natural  evil  as  a  penalty,  which  should  be 
the  expression  of  these  feelings  1  How  would  any  other  evince 
that  weakness  of  heart  which  would  provoke  contempt, when 
compared  with  the  power  and  majesty  of  emotions  which,  for 
the  sake  of  the  highest  universal  good,  express  themselves  in 
such  results  of  happiness  to  the  obedient,  and  of  misery  to  the 
disobedient ! 

Thus  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  become  de- 
cisive proof  of  the  moral  governor's  authority,  by  manifesting 
his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of 
obedience,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 
They  reveal  his  moral  character,  holding  forth,  in  defiance  of 
doubt,  his  perfect  benevolence,  in  its  essential  emotions  of  love 
of  right  and  abhorrence  of  wrong  moral  action.  They  show 
the  full  strength  of  his  will,  fixed  on  securing  so  far  as  may 
be,  the  best  means  of  the  best  end,  and  on  preventing  so  far 
as  may  be,  the  sure  means  of  the  worst  end.     Thus  they  bring 


SCRIPTURAL   SANCTION,    NOT    STRANGE.         103 

out,  in  full  and  vivid  manifestation,  the  glories  of  Him  who 
occupies  the  throne.  Removing  all  ground  of  doubt  in  re- 
spect to  that  character  which  gives  him  the  right  to  command, 
they  tend  to  secure  the  full  force  and  efficacy  of  his  authority 
in  the  confidential  homage  and  unqualified  submission  of  his 
subjects,  and,  with  these,  the  perfect  blessedness  of  his  king- 
dom. 

EE MAKE. 

It  is  not  to  be  thought  strange  or  incredible,  that  the  sanc- 
tions of  the  law  of  God,  as  these  are  presented  in  the  Scrip- 
tures, should  express  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and 
his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.  Without  here 
affirming  that  such  sanctions  are  necessary  to  establish  his 
authority  as  the  perfect  moral  governor  of  his  moral  kingdom, 
I  now  ask,  who  can  show  that  they  are  not  necessary  for  this 
purpose  ?  Who  can  show  that  the  legal  sanctions,  which  as 
wre  have  seen,  would  fully  establish  his  authority,  are  not 
necessary  to  establish  it  ?  If  this  cannot  be  shown,  then  let 
it  not  be  thought  incredible  that  such  sanctions  are  annexed 
to  the  law  of  that  Being  who  reigns  over  the  moral  universe. 
The  incredibility  of  this  is  further  diminished,  if  we  reflect 
that  a  system  of  moral  government  which  includes  these  sanc- 
tions, includes  the  highest  degree  of  influence  to  secure  right 
and  to  prevent  wrong  moral  action, which  can  be  conceived  to 
be  essential  to  a  moral  government.  Suppose  what  other  sys- 
tem of  moral  government  we  may,  it  cannot  involve  much  of 
the  influence  to  secure  right  and  prevent  wrong  moral  action 
which  this  system  involves.  If  any  other  system  would  in- 
volve decisive  proof  of  the  perfect  qualifications  of  the  moral 
governor  in  respect  to  knowledge  and  power,  of  the  excellence 
of  his  law  as  a  rule  of  action,  and  of  his  absolute  perfection 
in  moral  character,  so  does  this.  But  besides  all  this,  and 
more  than  all  this,  the  system  nowr  maintained  presents  mo- 
tives in  natural  good  and  evil  which  admit  of  no  parallel,  and 
which  bind  the  will  to  right  moral  action,  not  indeed  by 
physical  force,  but  by  the  most  imperious  necessity  by  which 
it  can  be  bound — the  necessity  of  right  moral  action  to  secure 
perfect  happiness,  and  to  avoid  perfect  misery  forever.  And 
more  still.  In  proof  .that  the  action  required  ought  to  be 
done,  and  that  its  opposite  ought  not  to  be  done,  it  reveals 


104       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

through  these  sanctions,  the  will  of  an  infinitely  perfect  being, 
unveiling  his  infinite  benevolence  in  its  highest  approbation 
of  obedience,  and  its  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 
Thus  there  is  no  truth  and  no  evidence  of  truth,  which  can 
be  employed  to  secure  right  moral  action,  and  which  can  be 
supposed  to  be  essential  to  a  perfect  moral  government,  which 
the  system  now  maintained  does  not  employ,  and  employ  in 
the  most  impressive  manner.  There  is  no  such  truth  in  re- 
spect to  God,  and  the  creatures  of  God  formed  in  his  image, 
which  is  fitted  to  secure  the  great  end  of  their  being,  which 
is  not  made  known  in  its  full  power  to  impress  and  control. 
Pre-eminently  by  this  system  is  God  revealed  —  God,  the 
depths  of  whose  wisdom  none  can  fathom — God,  the  thunder 
of  whose  power  who  can  understand — God,  in  the  enrapturing 
glories  of  his  goodness,  smiling  his  approbation  of  right  moral 
action,  and  recoiling  from  wrong  moral  action  in  wrathful 
abhorrence!  What  majesty  and  awful  love!  More  cannot 
be  conceived.  The  universe  of  truth,  of  evidence,  of  motive, 
is  exhausted  to  give  every  essential  perfection  which  can  be 
conceived  to  this  system  of  moral  government,  and  to  bind  the 
will  of  moral  beings  to  secure  their  own  perfection  in  char- 
acter and  in  happiness.  Who  then  shall  count  it  strange,  that 
God  should  place  his  moral  creation  under  such  an  influence  ? 
Who  knows — who  can  prove — that  this  degree  of  influence  is 
not  necessary  to  the  best  results  in  happiness,  and  therefore 
demanded  by  infinite  goodness  ?  Who  knows — who  can  prove 
— that  the  highest  blessedness  of  the  moral  universe — not  to 
add  also,  the  prevention  of  the  perfect  misery  of  all — does  not 
require  this  manifestation  of  God  through  the  medium  of 
legal  sanctions,  that  all  may  see  and  know-  what  a  friend  he  is 
to  right  moral  action,  and  what  an  enemy  he  is  to  wrong  moral 
action  ?  Who  knows — who  can  prove — that  the  Book,  which 
declares  that  an  infinitely  perfect  Being  employs  such  an  influ- 
ence for  such  a  purpose,  declares  a  falsehood  ? 


LECTURE  VI. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law. — 
The  nature  of  such  a  law  further  unfolded.— 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  involves 
sanctions,  (continued.)— 5th.  Legal  sanctions  the  necessary  proof  of  the  Moral  Governor's 
authority,  as  the  necessary  manifestations  and  proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  appro- 
bation of  obedience,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. — This  shown  by  proving 
(1,)  that  legal  sanctions  are  in  some  respect  necessary  as  the  proof  of  the  Moral  Governor's 
authority;  (2,)  that  they  are  necessary  for  this  purpose,  as  the  necessary  proofs  of  his  benevo- 
lence; and  (3,)  that  they  are  necessary  proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest 
approbation  of  obedience  and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. — The  (1)  and  (2)  of 
these  arguments  are  treated  in  this  lecture. — (1.)  Legal  Sanctions  are  necessary  in  some 
respect  as  proof  of  the  Moral  Governor's  authority. — Argued  from  the  import  of  the  phrase  legal 
sanctions;  from  the  nature  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government;  from  the  nature  of  a  law 
or  rule  of  action  without  sanctions;  from  the  fact  that  conformity  and  nonconformity  to  a  rule 
without  sanctions  would  subvert  the  Moral  Governor's  authority. — (2.)  They  are  necessary  as 
proofs  of  the  Governor's  authority,  as  they  are  the  necessary  proofs  of  his  benevolence. — 
Keason  given  why  attempts  to  prove  the  benevolence  of  God  from  the  light  of  nature  are  so 
unsuccessful. 

In  the  last  lecture  I  proposed  to  show,  that  legal  sanctions, 
or  the  sanctions  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government,  con- 
sist in  that  natural  good  promised  to  obedience,  and  in  that  nat- 
ural evil  threatened  to  disobedience  by  the  moral  governor,  ivhich 
establish  or  ratify  his  authority  as  the  decisive  and  necessary 
proof  of  it,  by  manifesting  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his 
highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  his  highest  disappro- 
bation of  disobedience,  and  which  include  the  highest  pos- 
sible degree  of  natural  good  in  each  case  of  obedience,  and 
the  highest  possible  degree  of  natural  evil  in  each  case  of  dis- 
obedience. 

This  proposition  was  divided  into  several  particular  propo- 
sitions ;  the  four  following  of  which  I  explained,  and  endeav- 
ored to  support,  viz. : 

1st.  That  legal  sanctions  establish  or  ratify  the  authority  of 
the  moral  governor. 

2d.  That  they  consist  in  the  matter  of  them,  exclusively  in 
natural  good  promised  to  obedience,  and  in  natural  evil  threat- 
ened to  disobedience  by  the  moral  governor. 

3d.  That  they  establish  or  ratify  the  moral  governor's  author- 
ity as  the  decisive  proof  of  it. 

•1th.  That  they  become  the  decisive  proof  of  it, by  manifest- 
5* 


106       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

ing  Ills  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of 
obedience,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

I  now  propose  in  this  and  the  following  lectures  to  show 
the  necessity  of  legal  sanctions,  and  for  this  purpose,  to  explain 
and  prove  the  fifth  of  the  particular  propositions  before  stated, 
viz. : 

5th.  That  legal  sanctions  are  the  necessary  proof  of  the 
moral  governor's  authority,  as  the  necessary  manifestations  and 
proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of  his  highest  approba- 
tion of  obedience,  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedi- 
ence. 

This  proposition  I  shall  attempt  to  establish  by  showing — 

(1.)  That  legal  sanctions  are  in  some  respect  or  under  some 
relation,  necessary  as  the  proof  of  the  moral  governor's  author- 
ity. 

(2.)  That  they  are  necessary  for  this  purpose,  as  the  neces- 
sary manifestations  or  proofs  of  his  benevolence,  and — 

(3.)  That  they  are  necessary  for  this  purpose,  as  the  neces- 
sary manifestations  or  proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  form  of 
his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  of  his  highest  disap- 
probation of  disobedience. 

(1.)  Legal  sanctions  are  necessary  in  some  respect  or  tinder 
some  relation,  as  the  proof  of  the  moral  governor's  authority. 

This  will  appeal1 — 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  import  of  the  phrase,  legal  sanc- 
tions. I  have  already  remarked,  that  the  word  sanction  de- 
notes a  particular  kind  of  evidence  or  proof,  viz.,  that  which  is 
the  decisive  and  necessary  proof  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  sanc- 
tion. I  have  attempted  to  show  that  it  denotes  a  decisive 
proof — that  is,  a  proof  which  implies  the  absence  of  all  oppos- 
ing proof  or  evidence,  and  fully  establishes  or  ratifies  that  of 
which  it  is  the  sanction.  I  now  propose  to  show,  that  it  de- 
notes a  necessary  proof  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  sanction.  By 
this  I  mean,  that  it  is  that, without  which  there  is  not  only  no 
proof  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  sanction,  but  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. On  this  point,  I  appeal  to  the  example  already  referred 
to.  Without  the  consent  of  the  President  and  Senate,  there  is 
and  can  be  not  only  no  proof  of  the  reality  or  validity  of  a 
treaty  between  this  nation  and  another,  but  there  is  decisive 
proof  to  the  contrary.  We  may  suppose  the  evidence  of  the 
fact  in  other  respects  to  be  what  it  may,  still  without  the  con- 


SANCTIONS    AS    PROOF    OP    AUTHORITY.  107 

sent  specified,  no  instrument  purporting  to  be  such  a  treaty 
can  possess  the  least  validity.     On  the  contrary,  the  want  of 
such  consent  is  decisive  proof  of  its  validity.     Thus  plain  is  it, 
that  the  word  sanction  denotes  that  which  is  the  necessary 
proof  of  that  of  which  it  is  the  sanction — necessary  as  being 
that  without  which  there  can  be  no  proof  of  the  fact  or  truth 
to  be  proved  in  the  case,  but  must  be  proof  to  the  contrary. 
Since  then  the  genus,  as  logicians  speak,  is  always  included  in 
the  species,  it  follows, that  legal  sanctions,  in  the  universal  con- 
ceptions of  men,  are  the  necessary  proof  of  that  of  which  they 
are  the  sanctions.     In  the  second  place,  the  same  thing  is 
evident  from  the  nature  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment.    It  is  essential  to  the  nature  of  such  a  law,  that  it  be, 
and  that  it  be  fully  proved  to  be,  an  expression  of  the  law- 
giver's preference  of  obedience  to  disobedience,  of  his  satisfac- 
tion with  obedience  and  with  nothing  but  obedience  on  the 
part  of  the  subject,  and  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience, 
and  of  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.     But  no 
possible  proof  without  legal  sanctions  can  be  furnished,  that  it 
is  an  expression  of  such  feelings.     The  moral  governor  may 
furnish  all  possible  evidence  of  kind  or  benevolent  feelings  in 
all  his  other  relations,  he  may  prescribe  the  best  rule  of  action 
in  this  relation,  and  all  this  may  be  prompted  by  other  feel- 
ings than  those  of  true  benevolence ;  may  be  prompted  by  the 
feelings  and  purposes  of  a  purely  selfish  mind.     There  can  be 
nothing  in  the  case  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  he  is  not  ac- 
tuated by  purely  selfish  designs ;  nor  that  he  has  the  feelings 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  which  his  law  in  words 
expresses,    tlather,  there  is  decisive  proof  to  the  contrary.    As 
a  perfect  moral  governor,  he  is  as  we  have  seen,  under  the  ne- 
cessity of  manifesting  these  feelings  ;  and  as  a  benevolent  being 
will  manifest  them.     He  cannot  be  a  benevolent  moral  gover- 
nor without  having  these  feelings,  nor  without  making  a  full 
and  decisive  manifestation  of  them.      Not  to  manifest  them 
therefore,  is  proof  decisive  that  they  do  not  exist.     Nor  is  this 
all.      This  manifestation  of  these  feelings  toward  right  and 
wrong  moral  action  must  be  made,  as  we  have  also  seen,  if 
made  at  all,  by  what  he  does  in  the  relation  of  a  moral  gov- 
ernor.    But  he  can  do  nothing  in  this  relation,  except  give  the 
best  rule  of  action,  annex  sanctions  to  the  rule,  and  execute 
them  as  occasion  shall  occur  in  the  conduct  of  subjects.    Merely 


108       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

to  give  the  best  rule  of  action  will  not  make  the  requisite  mani- 
festation. This  act  alone  is  entirely  consistent  with  selfish 
designs  on  his  part.  It  is  not  the  best  evidence  of  the  feelings 
of  benevolence  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  of  which 
the  nature  of  the  case  admits,  and  therefore  not  all  the  evidence 
which  the  case  requires.  It  is  only  when  the  proof  from  legal 
sanctions  is  added  that  the  evidence  becomes  all  that  the  nature 
of  the  case  admits  of  and  requires,  and  is  therefore  decisive.  I 
am  not  now  saying  that  legal  sanctions  will  fully  prove  the 
lawgiver's  preference  of  obedience  to  disobedience.  Nor  am  I 
now  saying  any  thing  of  the  mode  in  which  natural  good  and 
evil  in  the  form  of  sanctions  become  the  proof  of  the  expression 
of  such  a  preference.  I  am  only  saying,  that  without  legal 
sanctions  there  can  be  no  proof  of  such  a  preference  on  the 
part  of  the  moral  governor,  that  whatever  else  may  be  neces- 
sary, natural  good  and  evil  as  sanctions  are  necessary  to  evince 
the  reality  of  those  feelings  which  the  language  of  law  ex- 
presses, and  that  the  want  of  such  sanctions  is  full  proof  that 
such  feelings  on  the  part  of  the  lawgiver  do  not  exist ;  and  of 
course  that  what  is  called  law  in  such  a  case,  if  any  thing  can 
be  so  called,  is  not  law ;  and  therefore  there  is  no  lawgiver 
having  authority. 

We  may  view  this  topic  in  another  light.  The  law  of  a  per- 
fect moral  government  is  an  authoritative  rule  of  action.  Can 
then  a  rule  of  action  without  natural  good  and  evil  as  the 
sanctions  of  its  authority,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  of  the 
lawgiver's  authority,  be  regarded  as  an  authoritative  rule  of 
action  ?  Is  it  in  this  sense  a  law  ?  Plainly  to  pronmlge  such 
a  rule  in  the  form  of  a  command — to  give  it  forth  in  the  man- 
ner of  one  having  the  right  to  rule,  claiming  for  it  the  majesty 
of  law, and  for  himself  the  unqualified  homage  of  his  subjects, 
would  be  a  burlesque  on  all  legislation.  Can  a  moral  governor 
claim  the  submission  of  the  will  of  every  subject  to  his  will, 
and  furnish  no  evidence  that  he  will  reward  obedience  and 
punish  disobedience ;  or  rather  furnish  decisive  proof  that  he 
will  do  neither !  Do  you  call  this  a  law — an  authoritative  rule 
of  action?  No  misnomer  can  be  more  palpable — none  more 
ridiculous.  Is  this  performing  the  high  function  of  his  office '{ 
Is  such  a  rule  of  action  the  only  means  which  one  standing 
before  his  kingdom  as  its  rightful  sovereign,  and  the  supreme 
guardian  of  its  welfare,  must  use  to  promote  and  protect  the 


LAW  WITHOUT  SANCTIONS,  NO  AUTHORITY.   109 

highest  happiness  of  all?  Such  a  rule  would  not  only  leave 
this  great  end,  which  he  is  bound  to  protect,  unprotected,  and 
show  that  it  is  wholly  uncared  for  by  him  who  is  responsible 
for  its  protection,  but  it  would  be  an  invitation  to  wrong 
doing  from  the  throne  itself.  For  not  to  promise  to  reward 
obedience,  and  not  to  threaten  to  punish  disobedience,  is  not 
only  a  pledge  not  to  reward  the  one  and  not  to  punish  the 
other,  but  virtually  to  threaten  to  punish  obedience,  and  to 
promise  to  reward  disobedience ;  since  not  to  reward  is  in  a 
degree  to  punish  obedience,  and  not  to  punish  is  in  a  degree 
to  reward  disobedience.  Such  a  rule  of  action  therefore,  in- 
stead of  having  the  nature  and  tendency  of  law,  instead  of 
being  adapted  to  secure  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  would 
tend  to  secure  the  highest  misery  of  all.  Who  does  not  know 
this  ?  Who  would  be  governed,  influenced  at  all,  by  a  law 
without  sanctions  as  an  authoritative  rule  of  action?  Who 
would  be  concerned  about  doing  or  not  doing  the  will  of 
another,  from  whom  to  say  the  least,  obedience  has  nothing  to 
hope,  and  disobedience  nothing  to  fear?  He  gives  no  secur- 
ity, furnishes  no  evidence  that  the  obedient  shall  be  protected 
and  blessed  and  the  disobedient  be  punished — none  that  lie 
will  not  reverse  the  treatment  of  the  two  classes,  should  his 
sinister  and  selfish  designs  demand  it,  or  rather,  he  furnishes 
good  reason  to  believe  that  he  will  reverse  it.  Who  then  could 
respect  his  character  or  his  will,  and  regard  him  as  entitled  to 
exercise  the  prerogative  of  absolute  dominion,  who  confide  in 
him  as  the  friend  and  protector  of  a  kingdom's  happiness,  who 
submit  to  his  will  as  law  ?  He  may  in  words,  express  kind 
wishes,  and  in  form  propound  the  best  rule  of  action.  He  may 
show  kindness  in  every  other  relation.  But  as  a  moral  gover- 
nor he  shows  none  to  his  kingdom.  He  is  recreant  to  the  high 
function  of  his  office.  He  betrays  his  trust  as  the  guardian  of 
universal  happiness.  He  sinks  the  power  and  majesty  of  law 
into  the  weakness  of  ineffective  wishes,  and  justly  incurs  the 
scorn  and  contempt  due  to  unmasked  hypocrisy.  He  thus  de- 
feats the  great  and  sole  end  of  moral  government,  and  tempts 
his  subjects  to  war  on  each  other  and  himself,  without  the 
shadow  of  restraint  from  law  and  authority. 

Again ;  a  rule  of  action  without  sanctions,  viewed  in  the 
most  favorable  aspect,  is  justly  considered  as  mere  advice. 
But  advice  be  the  form  of  it  what  it  may,  is  not  law.     The 


110       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

difference  between  them  demands  consideration.  Advice  be 
it  ever  so  wise  and  good,  is  a  mere  declaration  of  wliat  is  best 
to  be  done.  It  implies  no  will  or  preference  on  the  part  of  the 
adviser  of  that  which  is  advised  to  its  opposite.  It  wonld  still 
be  advice,  though  attended  with  a  preference  of  the  opposite 
doing,  and  though  prompted  solely  by  sinister  designs.  Law 
is  the  most  unequivocal  expression  of  the  unqualified,  absolute 
will  or  preference  of  the  lawgiver,  that  what  is  commanded 
should  be  done.  Compliance  with  the  one  is  discretionary  on 
the  part  of  him  to  whom  it  is  given.  He  has  the  right  un- 
questionable and  perfect,  to  rejudge  the  decision  of  the  giver, 
and  is  responsible  to  none  for  his  individual  judgment  in  the 
case.  He  violates  no  right  of  another  merely  by  rejecting  the 
counsel  which  is  given.  Compliance  with  the  other  admits 
not  of  a  question,  even  in  thought.  Law  decides — settles  the 
question  of  what  ought  and  ought  not  to  be  done,  by  supersed- 
ing the  right  of  all  further  inquiry.  Its  violation  is  the  viola- 
tion of  a  right  the  most  sacred  and  inviolable  of  all  rights — 
the  right  to  control  that,  on  which  the  highest  happiness  of 
each  and  of  all  depends.  Advice  whether  complied  with  or 
not,  involves  in  respect  to  him  to  whom  it  is  given,  not  the 
least  good  or  evil  wdiich  depends  on  the  will  of  him  who  gives 
it.  Law  enforces  compliance  by  results  in  good  and  evil  to 
the  subject  which  depend  on  the  will  of  the  lawgiver,  and 
wmich,  while  as  motives  to  right  reason,  they  must  be  decisive 
and  final  for  obedience,  reveal  the  perfect  character  and  per- 
fect wTill  of  him  from  whom  it  emanates.  Advice  carries  with 
it  no  binding  influence  from  the  character  or  will  of  him  who 
gives  it, to  the  will  of  him  to  whom  it  is  given.  Law,  instead 
of  leaving  compliance  with  its  claim  to  the  mere  option,  to 
the  uninfluenced  will  of  the  subject,  binds  his  will  to  compli- 
ance— not  indeed  by  physical  force  or  necessity,  but  by  that 
obligation  which  is  imposed  by  the  right  to  command,  the 
strongest  influence  by  which  the  will  can  be  bound.  This,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  the  grand,  peculiar,  essential  influence  of  law 
— the  influence  of  authority.  But  to  prescribe  a  rule  of  action 
without  sanctions,  as  the  law  of  a  moral  government,  is  to  give 
mere  advice,  which  can  possess  no  authority.  It  is  to  divest 
law  of  its  peculiar  and  essential  nature  and  influence,  and  to 
degrade  it  to  a  level  with  the  counsels  of  imbecility,  by  com- 
mitting the  question  of  what  ought  and  ought  not  to  be  done 


"WITHOUT    SANCTIONS    LAWGIVER   UNFIT.  Ill 

to  the  judgment  and  will  of  an  equal.  It  is  for  the  moral  gov- 
ernor to  disclaim,  in  the  most  formal  manner,  all  authority 
or  right  to  rule.  It  is  an  open  avowal  that  he  has  not  the 
character  which  entitles  him  to  exercise  the  prerogative  of 
dominion — that  he  is  a  governor  who  neither  has  nor  can 
have  the  least  governing  influence.  Surely  a  rule  of  action, 
a  law  without  sanctions,  involving  such  a  palpable  dereliction 
of  all  claim  or  pretense  to  rightful  authority,  cannot  be  an 
authoritative  rule  of  action — cannot  be  the  law  of  a  perfect 
moral  government. 

In  the  third  place,  a  law  or  rule  of  action  without  sanctions, 
is  a  decisive  proof  that  the  lawgiver,  either  by  imbecility  or 
by  selfishness,  or  by  both,  is  utterly  disqualified  to  rule.  As 
a  proof  on  the  question  of  his  qualification  to  rule,  it  is  al- 
together equivalent  to  refusing  to  reward  obedience,  and  to 
punish  disobedience,  when  they  exist.  In  such  a  case,  the 
moral  governor  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  both  competent  and 
disposed  to  execute  legal  sanctions,  for  then  he  would  execute 
them.  He  must  then,  either  be  both  incompetent  and  indis- 
posed to  execute  them — in  which  case  he  would  be  disqualified 
to  rule  in  every  essential  respect — or,  he  must  be  incompetent 
and  yet  disposed,  or  competent  and  indisposed,  to  execute 
them.  Now,  he  is  either  able  to  confer  a  reward  on  the  obedi- 
ent, in  the  form  of  protection  and  favor,  or  he  is  not.  If  he  is 
not  able  to  confer  a  reward,  then  he  is  the  subject  of  an  imbe- 
cility which  is  an  utter  disqualification  for  office.  If  he  is 
able  to  confer  a  reward  then,  by  conferring  none,  he  manifests 
no  approbation  of  obedience, when  the  public  good  demands 
that  he  should,  and  when,  were  he  truly  benevolent  he  would 
manifest  it  by  rewarding  the  obedient.  He  stands  before  his 
kingdom  therefore,  convicted  of  indifference,  or  aversion  to 
obedience — to  the  very  thing  on  which  the  highest  happiness 
of  his  kingdom  depends.  He  thus  shows  himself  to  be,  not  a 
benevolent  but  a  selfish  being,  and  of  course  to  be  utterly 
disqualified  to  govern.  Again ;  he  is  either  able  to  inflict  a 
penalty  on  the  disobedient,  or  he  is  not.  If  he  is  not,  then  he 
is  disqualified  to  govern  by  his  imbecility.  If  he  is  able,  then 
by  inflicting  no  penalty  for  disobedience,  he  manifests  no  dis- 
approbation of  disobedience,  when  the  public  good  demands 
that  he  should,  and  when  were  he  truly  benevolent,  he  would 
manifest  it  by  the  infliction  of  penalty.     He  stands  before  his 


112       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

kingdom  therefore,  convicted  of  indifference  to,  or  approbation 
of  disobedience,  the  very  thing  which  tends  to  produce  the 
highest  misery  of  his  kingdom.  He  thus  shows  himself  the 
unconcerned  spectator  of  disobedience  on  the  part  of  his  sub- 
jects, or  rather  the  open  patron  of  disobedience,  and  the  open 
enemy  of  the  public  good.  He  occupies  the  place  of  the  only 
guardian  of  the  public  good,  as  this  depends  on  his  mani- 
festing his  highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  disap- 
probation of  wrong  moral  action.  Indifference  to  either  is 
unmasked  enmity  to  the  public  good.  His  disqualification  to 
rule  on  either  supposition,  is  decisively  proved.  He  gives  a 
law  without  sanctions,  and  the  fact  must  be  traced  either  to 
incompetence  or  indisposition  to  execute  sanctions,  or  to  both. 
In  either  case,  he  is  proved  to  be  disqualified  to  govern.  Legal 
sanctions  then,  are  in  some  respect  necessary,  as  proof  of  the 
moral  governor's  authority  or  right  to  rule. 

In  the  fourth  place,  conformity  and  non-conformity  to  a  law 
or  rule  of  action  without  sanctions,  alike  disprove  and  subvert 
the  moral  governor's  authority.  Conformity  to  the  rule  in 
such  a  case  would  exist  without  a  reward,  and  non-conformity 
without  a  penalty.  Conformity  to  the  rule  takes  place,  in  a 
case  in  which  there  is  no  proof  of  the  governor's  authority. 
The  subject  therefore,  does  not  act  in  conforming  to  the  rule, 
from  respect  to  his  authority,  or  under  the  influence  of  his 
authority.  He  conforms  to  the  rule  for  some  other  reason, 
and  under  some  other  influence.  The  fact  is  undeniable  and 
notorious.  It  cannot  be  otherwise.  The  act  of  conformity  is 
not  only  no  recognition  of  the  moral  governor's  authority,  but 
as  done,  and  known  to  be  clone  exclusively  under  another  in- 
fluence,^ is  a  distinct  declaration,  testimony,  or  proof  on  the 
part  of  the  subject,  that  the  moral  governor  has  no  authority. 
He  acts  just  as  he  would  act,  for  aught  that  appears  to  the 
contrary,  were  no  rule  of  action  prescribed.  He  thus  disclaims 
all  right  in  the  author  of  the  rule  to  govern  him,  and  gives  an 
open  and  decided  testimony  against  his  authority.  Nor  is  this 
all.  The  moral  governor,  by  conferring  no  reward,  acquiesces 
in  this  disregard  of  his  authority ;  for  did  he  promise  and  con- 
fer a  reward,  there  would  be  no  proof  from  the  supposed  act 
of  conformity  that  it  was  not  rendered  from  respect  to  his 
authority,  but  the  contrary.  Indeed,  it  would  be  impossible 
in  such  a  case  that  the  subject  should  conform  to  the  rule  and 


WITHOUT  SANCTIONS,  AUTHORITY  SUBVERTED.    113 

not  be  influenced  by  his  authority.  The  moral  governor 
therefore,  by  conferring  no  reward,  acquiesces  in  the  subject's 
disregard  of  his  authority,  and  so  confirms  the  testimony  or 
proof  from  the  act  of  the  subject.  Tims  the  act  of  conforming 
to  the  rule,  contemplated  as  an  unrewarded  act,  augments  the 
proof,  and  shows,  beyond  all  dotibt  or  denial,  that  the  author 
of  the  rule  has  no  right  to  reign. 

The  same  thing  will  appear,  still  more  strikingly,  from  non- 
conformity to  a  rule  of  action  without  a  penalty.  The  act  of 
non-conformity  or  transgression  is,  in  its  true  nature,  an  open 
proclamation  by  the  transgressor,  that  the  character  of  the 
governor  does  not  entitle  him  to  the  submission  claimed  in  his 
law.  And  the  proof  in  this  form  of  testimon}^  or  declaration 
is  decisive,  provided  the  governor  himself  does  not  counteract 
it  by  opposing  proof  in  the  execution  of  penalty.  What  force 
or  influence  can  there  be  or  ought  there  to  be,  in  the  mere 
dictum,  of  one — call  it  law  if  you  will ;  what  force  or  influence 
is  there  or  ought  there  to  be,  in  an  expression  of  his  will  as 
his  will,  when  there  is  nothing  in  his  doings  and  nothing  in 
his  character  to  give  it  the  least  weight,  or  to  entitle  it  to  the 
least  respect  ?  Now  it  is  in  exactly  such  a  case  that  the  sup- 
posed act  of  transgression,  or  as  we  may  suppose,  a  universal 
revolt,  occurs.  What  is  it  as  an  act, and  what  is  it  as  a  testi- 
mony? As  an  act,  it  is  one  of  open  defiance  of  the  moral 
governor — of  absolute  contempt  of  his  want  of  qualification 
to  govern,  and  a  decisive  triumph  of  self-will  over  incompe- 
tence and  usurpation.  As  a  testimony,  under  what  aspect  does 
it  present  the  supposed  lawgiver  except  that  of  an  utter  dis- 
qualification to  rule — as  had  infancy  itself  ascended  the  throne 
and  given  forth  the  law  ?  The  law  and  the  lawgiver  would  be, 
and  ought  to  be,  despised.  Rebellion  would  place  its  foot  on 
liis  authority,  and  in  a  shout  of  triumph,  seal  its  prostration. 
Nor  is  this  all.  The  moral  governor  by  inflicting  no  penalty, 
acquiesces  in  this  contempt  of  himself  and  of  his  authori ij. 
He  refuses  to  counteract  the  testimony  furnished  by  the  act 
of  transgression  to  the  fact  that  he  has  no  right  to  reign.  lie 
thus  confirms  the  proof  furnished  by  the  act  of  transgression  ; 
and  so,  the  act  as  unpunished,  utterly  subverts  his  authority. 
Who  does  not  know  all  this  ?  Who  does  not  know,  that  rebel- 
lion unpunished  legalizes  rebellion — that  it  hides  from  every 
eye  the  reality  of  a  perfect  moral  governor,  and  covers  with 

8 


114       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

infamy  him  who  pretends  to  exercise  his  prerogative ;  that  it 
annihilates  all  possible  evidence  of  his  authority,  and  puts  all 
authority  in  the  dust  ?  The  proclamation  of  the  rebel  is,  that 
the  mandate  from  the  throne  is  unworthy  of  regard,  and  the 
moral  governor  by  his  quiescent  good  wishes,  confirms  the 
proclamation,  and  authorizes  rebellion  throughout  his  empire. 

(2.)  Legal  sanctions  are  necessary  to  establish  the  authority 
of  the  moral  governor,  as  the  necessary  manifestations  or  proof 
of  his  benevolence.  If  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor  is  any 
thing,  it  is  a  relation  distinguished  from  every  other  by  its 
peculiar  function.  This  peculiar  function  as  we  have  seen,  is 
to  create  and  establish  the  influence  of  his  authority,  that  by 
this  influence,  he  may  secure  obedience  to  his  will  as  the 
means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all,  and  prevent  disobedience 
to  his  will  as  the  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all.  The  in- 
fluence of  his  authority  depends  on  his  moral  character,  on  his 
benevolence,  and  on  the  decisive  manifestation  or  proof  of  his 
benevolence.  He  can  as  we  have  seen,  possess  no  authority 
in  the  view  of  his  subjects,  unless  it  is  made  evident  to  them 
that  he  is  a  benevolent  being,  and  feels  toward  right  and 
wrong  moral  action  on  their  part  as  a  benevolent  being  must 
feel. 

The  question  then  is,  can  he  furnish  the  requisite  proof  of 
his  benevolence,  and  of  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  and  in  this  way  estab- 
lish his  authority,  or  right  to  rule,  without  annexing  sanctions 
to  his  law  ? 

Here  it  is  readily  admitted,  that  other  things  beside  legal 
sanctions  are  or  may  be  necessary,  that  the  moral  governor 
may  establish  his  authority  by  legal  sanctions.  Supposing 
him  to  evince  by  the  proper  proofs,  his  qualifications  in  re- 
spect to  knowledge  and  power,  it  may  still  be  necessary  to  the 
purpose  under  consideration,  that  his  deportment  in  all  his 
other  relations  beside  that  of  moral  governor,  should  be  free 
from  all  acts  of  unkindness  or  injustice — from  every  thing 
which  would  decisively  evince  the  selfish  principle ;  and  also, 
that  it  should  be  characterized  by  all  those  positive  acts  of 
beneficence  which  are  demanded  by  his  other  relations ;  since 
otherwise  he  would  furnish  decisive  evidence  against  his  be- 
nevolence, and  so  against  his  authority.  It  may  be  necessary 
for  the  same  purpose,  that  he  should  prescribe  the  best  rule 


THINGS    NECESSARY    BESIDES    SANCTIONS.       115 

of  action.  His  blameless  and  kind  deportment  in  his  other 
relations  may  furnish  beforehand  a  degree  of  presumptive 
evidence  of  the  character  which  entitles  him  to  assume  the 
relation  of  a  moral  governor.  These  things,  provided  the  re- 
quisite sanctions  are  annexed  to  his  law,  may  be  said  to  furnish 
additional  evidence  of  his  authority;  because  his  benevolence 
and  with  it  his  authority,  being  in  this  case  established  by  the 
requisite  sanctions,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  what  may 
proceed  from  benevolence  does  proceed  from  benevolence. 
But  it  is  now  maintained,  that  none  of  these  things, nor  all  of 
them  together,  nor  any  thing  else,  can  without  legal  sanctions, 
prove  his  benevolence,  and  so  establish  his  authority.  The 
question  of  his  benevolence,  as  we  have  before  shown,  de- 
pends, not  on  what  he  does  or  has  done  in  his  other  relations, 
but  on  what  he  does  in  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor.  If 
he  would  establish  his  right  to  rule,  he  must  act  benevolently 
in  this  relation  as  well  as  in  other  relations.  Benevolence  im- 
poses on  him  a  momentous  function  which  is  peculiar  to  this 
relation,  the  fulfillment  of  which  is  absolutely  indispensable  as 
the  proof  of  his  benevolence.  Whatever  his  conduct  in  his 
other  relations  may  have  been  or  now  is,  if  he  fails  to  fulfill 
the  peculiar  and  momentous  function  of  his  present  relation, 
this  failure  is  decisive  proof  that  he  is  not  a  benevolent  but  a 
selfish  being.  Benevolence  therefore,  requires  him  to  mani- 
fest his  benevolence  by  what  he  does  in  his  relation  as  a  moral 
governor.  It  requires  him  to  fulfill  the  peculiar  function  of 
his  office,  which  is,  to  create  and  establish  the  influence  of  his 
authority,by  manifesting  in  his  present  relation  his  benevo- 
lence in  its  necessary  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong  moral 
action.  If  he  would  create  and  establish  the  influence  of  his 
authority,  he  must  act  the  part  of  benevolence  in  his  present 
relation;  and  if  he  would  act  the  part  of  benevolence  in  his 
present  relation,  he  must  manifest  the  necessary  feelings  of 
benevolence  toward  the  best  and  the  worst  kind  of  action  on 
the  part  of  his  subjects,  by  what  he  does  in  his  present  rela- 
tion. All  that  there  is  in  the  nature  of  benevolence  which 
gives  him  the  right  to  rule,  or  on  which  this  right  does  or  can 
depend  in  the  view  of  his  subjects,  is,  that  it  necessarily  in- 
volves certain  peculiar  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong  moral 
action,  and  that  it  does  and  will  make  a  full  manifestation  of 
them  in  the  moral  governor,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the 


110        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

one  kind  of  action  as  the  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of 
all,  and  of  preventing  the  other  as  the  means  of  the  highest 
misery  of  all.  If  then  the  moral  governor  does  not  in  his 
relation  as  a  moral  governor,  make  a  full  and  decisive  mani- 
festation of  these  feelings  of  benevolence,  he  cannot  prove  his 
benevolence,  cannot  fulfill  the  grand  and  peculiar  function  of 
his  office,  and  of  course  cannot  establish  his  authority. 

To  recur  then  to  the  question  now  before  us ;  can  the  moral 
governor  in  his  present  relation  manifest  in  any  way,  the  ne- 
cessary feelings  of  benevolence  toward  right  and  wrong  moral 
action,  and  so  establish  his  authority  without  legal  sanctions? 

Can  he  do  this  by  mere  professions  of  the  supposed  feelings? 
Such  professions  may  be  made  by  the  most  insincere  and  false 
pretender  to  benevolence,  or  rather,  would  be  made  in  most 
cases,  by  the  veriest  usurper  and  tyrant.  Who  that  ever 
claimed  the  right  of  dominion  over  others,  did  not  profess  to 
aim  at  the  general  good,  and  to  require  submission  to  his  will 
only  to  promote  this  high  end  ?  I  clo  not  say  that  such  profes- 
sions are  necessarily  inconsistent  with  benevolence ;  but  I  say, 
that  in  themselves  they  are  utterly  insufficient  as  proof  of  benev- 
olence :  while  the  want  of  all  proof  from  every  other  source, 
would,  notwithstanding  such  professions,  be  decisive  proof  to 
the  contrary.  Mere  professions  of  a  principle  of  action  in 
cases  in  which  if  it  exist,  it  will  show  itself  in  action,  and  in 
which  it  does  not  thus  show  itself,  are  ever  and  justly  regarded 
as  insincere  and  false.  To  say  in  such  a  case  to  a  sufferer, 
(depart  in  peace,  be  warmed,  be  fillecl,)and  yet  to  give  noth- 
ing, is  proof  decisive  of  the  want  of  the  benevolent  principle. 
So  in  the  case  before  us.  If  there  are  acts  which  the  moral 
governor  may  perform  which  would  fully  prove  his  benevo- 
lence, and  which  therefore  he  would  perform  were  he  truly 
benevolent,  then  no  possible  reason  can  be  conceived  for  his 
failure  to  show  himself  benevolent  by  the  requisite  acts,  except 
that  he  does  not  possess  the  character.  Who  would  concede 
the  right  to  govern  to  such  a  mere  pretender  to  benevolence  ? 

Again ;  there  are  strictly  speaking  but  three  acts  which  a 
being  in  the  capacity  or  relation  of  a  perfect  moral  governor 
can  perform,  viz.,  the  act  of  prescribing  the  best  rule  of  action ; 
the  act  of  annexing  the  requisite  sanctions  to  the  rule;  and  the 
act  of  executing  these  sanctions  in  cases  of  obedience  and  dis- 
obedience.    These  acts  may  be  viewed  as  comprising  all  that 


NOT    ENOUGH,    TO    PRESCRIBE    RULES.  117 

lie  does  or  can  do  in  performing  the  function  of  this  high  rela- 
tion. In  assuming  this  relation,  he  cannot  reward  obedience 
nor  punish  disobedience ;  for  neither  obedience  nor  disobedi- 
ence can  exist.  The  question  then  now  before  us  is  reduced  to 
this:  can  he  manifest  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action  by  merely  prescribing 
the  best  rule  of  action.  We  have  already  said  enough  to  show 
that  such  a  rule  of  action  without  sanctions,not  only  could  not 
be  an  authoritative  rule  of  action,  but  could  not  possess  other 
essential  characteristics  of  the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment ;  that  it  would  be  the  mere  advice  of  imbecility ;  that  it 
could  not  be  regarded  as  the  truthful  expression  of  any  benev- 
olent feeling  whatever  on  the  part  of  him  who  should  give  it, 
but  would  amount  to  an  open,  palpable  disclaimer  of  all  author- 
ity. I  do  not  say, that  the  act  of  giving  the  best  rule  of  action 
is  not  necessary,  that  the  moral  governor  may  by  legal  sanc- 
tions manifest  or  prove  his  benevolence.  But  I  affirm,  that 
the  act  itself  without  legal  sanctions, is  not  proof  of  his  benev- 
olence, lie  does  nothing  in  this  case  which  a  perfectly  selfish 
being  may  not  be  believed  to  do.  He  does  nothing  to  show 
that  he  feels  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  as  a  benev- 
olent being  must  feel ;  nothing  to  show  that  he  truly  prefers 
the  best  kind  of  action  to  the  worst,  or  the  highest  happiness 
of  all  to  the  highest  misery  of  all ;  nothing  to  show  that  he  will 
befriend  and  bless  the  obedient  rather  than  the  disobedient,  or 
that  he  will  not  confer  good  on  the  latter,  and  inflict  evil  on 
the  former  to  the  extent  of  his  power.  He  commits  himself  in 
no  respect  as  the  friend  and  patron  of  right  moral  action,  nor  as 
the  enemy  and  avenger  of  wronj?  moral  action.  lie  refuses  to 
do  it  when  benevolence  recpiires  him  to  do  it,  and  when  were 
he  a  benevolent  being,  he  would  do  it.  lie  therefore  proves 
himself  not  to  be  benevolent. 

Again  ;  if  the  manifestation  of  these  feelings  of  the  moral 
governor  be  made  at  all,  it  must  be  made  by  some  act  or  acts, 
which  are  the  appropriate  and  significant  expressions  of  them, 
by  some  act  or  acts  which  shall  be  justly  and  universally  re- 
garded as  such  expressions  of  them.  We  have  already  seen, 
that  by  promising  natural  good  to  obedience, and  threatening 
natural  evil  to  disobedience  in  some  supposable  degrees,  the 
moral  governor  in  a  case  in  which  there  is  no  evidence  to  the 
contrary,  would  decisively  and  in  the  most  impressive  man- 


118        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

ner  conceivable,  express  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  and  so  establish  his 
authority.  Such  sanctions  as  we  have  spoken  of,  would  be  de- 
cisive evidence  of  these  feelings,  because  they  furnish  the  best 
evidence  of  them  of  which  the  nature  of  the  case  admits.  I 
now  say,  that  legal  sanctions  are  the  necessary  evidence  of 
these  feelings  on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor.  What  then 
is — what  can  be,  truly  or  justly  regarded  as  the  decisive,  un- 
ambiguous expression  of  his  feelings  of  approbation  of  obedi- 
ence and  his  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  except  either, 
when  giving  his  law,  the  promise  to  reward  obedience  and  the 
threatening  to  punish  disobedience ;  or  the  actual  conferring 
of  a  reward  for  obedience  when  it  exists,  and  the  actual  inflict- 
ing of  a  penalty  for  disobedience  when  it  exists.  In  giving  his 
law,  he  cannot  reward  obedience  nor  punish  disobedience,  for 
there  can  be  no  obedience  to  be  rewarded  nor  disobedience  to 
be  punished.  If  then  he  does  not  promise  to  reward  the  one, 
and  threaten  to  punish  the  other,  he  does  nothing  and  can  do 
nothing,  to  manifest  the  necessary  feelings  toward  the  two 
kinds  of  action,  nothing  to  show  that  it  is  not  a  matter  of  per- 
fect indifference  to  him  whether  his  subjects  obey  or  disobey 
his  law.  By  annexing  no  sanctions  to  his  law,  he  furnishes 
decisive  proof  that  he  wills  no  consequences  in  good  or  evil, 
no  results  in  happiness  or  misery  to  his  subjects  as  obedient  or 
disobedient,  and  of  course, that  he  is  not  willing  to  use  the  least 
influence  in  the  form  of  motive,  nor  any  influence  arising  from 
the  expression  of  his  approbation  or  disapprobation  clearly  and 
fully  made,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  right  and  preventing 
wrong  moral  action,  and  thus  securing  the  highest  happiness 
of  all, and  preventing  the  highest  misery  of  all.  As  a  moral 
governor  then,  in  such  a  case  he  can  manifest  no  feelings,  and 
of  course  no  character,  which  entitles  him  to  the  least  respect- 
ful consideration  from  his  subjects.  Whatever  may  be  his 
claims  or  his  professions  or  both,  there  can  be  no  influence 
from  his  character  to  secure  the  one  kind  of  moral  action  nor 
to  prevent  the  other — none  from  his  official  prerogative  or 
right  to  rule — none  which  would  not  result  from  the  character 
of  any  other,  even  the  most  selfish  being,  who  should  make  the 
same  claims  and  the  same  professions — none  in  a  word,  to 
secure  obedience  and  prevent  disobedience  to  his  will,  because 
it  is  the  will  and  proved  to  be  the  will  of  a  perfect  being. 


LEGAL  SANCTIONS  PROOFS  OF  BENE YOLENCE.  119 

Were  obedience  to  exist,  lie  would  make  no  manifestation  of 
such  a  will  by  conferring  a  reward.  Were  disobedience  to  ex- 
ist, he  would  manifest  no  such  will  by  inflicting  a  legal  pen- 
alty. What  then,  shall  be  said  of  his  moral  character?  Where 
in  the  view  of  his  subjects  is  the  proof  of  his  benevolence  ? 
What  becomes  of  the  peculiar  function  of  his  office  ?  lie  ut- 
terly refuses  to  do  the  very  things,  which  his  high  relation 
as  a  moral  governor,  benevolence  requires  him  to  do,  viz.,  to 
manifest  his  benevolence  as  a  practical  principle  in  its  neces- 
sary forms  of  approbation  of  right  and  disapprobation  of  wrong 
moral  action.  lie  utterly  neglects  to  establish  his  right  to 
rule.  He  refuses  to  bring  that  influence  to  bear  on  his  sub- 
jects, which  is  indispensable  to  secure  the  highest  happiness 
of  all,  and  to  prevent  the  highest  misery  of  all — the  influence 
of  his  authority.  Instead  therefore,  of  manifesting  his  benev- 
olence in  its  appropriate  and  necessary  expressions,  and  so 
performing  the  peculiar  function  of  his  office  by  bringing  this 
highest  and  best  influence  to  control  the  moral  conduct  of  his 
subjects,  he  betrays  a  character  which  entitles  him  only  to  exe 
cration,as  a  false  and  faithless  protector  of  his  kingdom's  wel- 
fare. Legal  sanctions  then  are  necessary  to  evince  the  benevo- 
lence of  a  moral  governor,  and  so  to  establish  his  authority. 

Further ;  the  same  thing  will  appear  if  we  examine  some  of 
the  particular  ways  or  modes  in  which  it  may  be  supposed 
that  a  moral  governor  may  evince  his  benevolence,  and  so 
establish  his  authority  without  legal  sanctions. —  Vide  Lect. 
VII.,  p.  128.  It  may  be  said  or  supposed,that  a  greater  amount 
of  obedience  to  the  best  rule  of  action  might  or  would  be  se- 
cured, and  with  it  a  greater  amount  of  happiness  without  legal 
sanctions  than  with  them,  and  that  in  this  way  the  benevolence 
of  the  moral  governor  and  his  consequent  right  to  rule  may  be 
fully  established.  I  answer,  that  by  obedience  in  this  case 
cannot  be  meant  conformity  to  the  rule  involving  submission 
to  authority ;  for  according  to  the  supposition,  the  so-called 
obedience  must  exist  as  the  proof  of  the  governor's  benev- 
olence, and  in  this  way  as  the  proof  of  his  authority.  There 
can  therefore  be  no  manifestation  of  his  character  as  the  ground 
of  his  authority  prior  to  the  supposed  obedience,  and  of  course 
no  obedience  involving  submission  to  his  authority.  On  the 
contrary,  he  who  should  give  the  supposed  rule  of  action, 
would  as  we  have  seen,  instead  of  manifesting  the  character, 


120        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

the  manifestation  of  which  is  requisite  to  his  authority,  mani- 
fest the  opposite  character,  and  so  disprove  and  subvert  his 
authority.  By  obedience  then  in  the  present  case,  must  be 
meant  mere  conformity  to  the  rule  of  action,  or  right  moral 
action  performed  solely  under  the  influence  of  the  perceived 
nature  and  tendencies  of  moral  action,  with  out  involving  the 
least  submission  to,  or  respect  for,  authority.  But  to  say  that 
there  might  be  a  greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  without 
than  with  legal  sanctions',  is  saying  nothing  to  the  purpose, 
since  it  may  as  well  be  said  that  there  might  not  be.  To  say 
either,  is  merely  to  assert  a  natural  possibility  of  things — a 
possibility  which  must  always  be  admitted  in  cases  of  moral 
reasoning.  The  question  is  one  of  probability.  And  the  prob- 
ability of  a  greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  is  greater, 
other  things  being  the  same,  under  a  greater  degree  of  in- 
fluence to  secure  it,  than  under  a  less  degree  of  such  influ- 
ence ;  while  the  degree  of  this  influence  is  greater  with  legal 
sanctions  than  without  them.  Besides,  our  object  in  the  pres- 
ent inquiry  is  not  to  determine  the  comparative  excellence  of 
different  systems  of  influence.  It  is,  to  ascertain  what  is  the 
nature  of  a  perfect  moral  government  under  the  general  or 
universal  admission,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  administered  by 
an  infinitely  perfect  being  over  his  moral  creation,  and  that 
whatever  else  it  is,  it  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  right  moral  action  and  of  happiness.  "We  have  said 
enough  already,  to  show  that  without  legal  sanctions  there 
cannot  be  a  perfect  moral  government.  To  say  then,  that  a 
greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  might  be  secured  without 
legal  sanctions  than  with  them,  is  to  say  that  such  a  result 
might  be  secured  without  a  perfect  moral  government ;  that 
is,  that  the  result  might  be  secured  without  the  necessary 
means  of  securing  it ;  which  is  absurd.  Thus  if  we  view  the 
present  question  as  one  of  mere  probability,  all  the  probability 
in  the  case  is,  that  there  would  be  a  greater  amount  of  right 
moral  action  with  legal  sanctions  than  without  them ;  while 
the  fact  that  there  would  be,  is  fully  admitted  in  the  concession 
that  a  perfect  moral  government  is  necessary  to  the  greatest 
amount  of  right  moral  action.  But  there  is  yet  another  view 
of  this  important  topic  which  demands  consideration.  If  then 
it  be  conceded  that  a  greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  and 
of  happiness  would  take  place  under  the  supposed  system,  and 


NO    PROOF    POSSIBLE    WITHOUT    SANCTIONS.     121 

that  its  adoption  would  therefore  be  demanded  by  benevo- 
lence, still  the  benevolence  of  the  being  who  should  adopt  it, 
could  never  be  proved.  It  has  already  been  shown,  that 
neither  his  deportment  prior  to  his  assuming  the  relation  of  a 
moral  governor,  nor  the  act  of  prescribing  the  best  rule  of 
action,  could  be  regarded  as  proof  of  his  benevolence.  Nor 
could  the  least  degree  of  proof  on  this  point  be  furnished  by 
any  degree  of  right  moral  action  and  of  happiness  snpposable 
in  the  case.  As  I  have  already  said,  right  moral  action  in 
such  a  case,  must  be  performed  solely  under  the  influence  of 
the  perceived  nature  and  tendencies  of  moral  action.  It  can- 
not therefore  be  performed  out  of  respect  for  the  character  of 
the  lawgiver,  and  of  course  can  furnish  no  testimony  or  proof 
of  its  excellence.  There  can  be  no  connection  between  the 
right  mural  action  and  the  character  of  the  lawgiver.  The 
former  therefore  can  furnish  no  proof  of  the  excellence  of  the 
latter.  The  amount  of  happiness  consequent  on  such  action 
can  in  no  degree  depend  on  the  will  of  the  lawgiver ;  for  to 
suppose  this,  would  be  to  suppose  a  legal  reward  in  a  case  in 
which  there  is  no  legal  reward.  No  possible  proof  then  exists 
or  can  exist  in  the  case  supposed,  that  he  who  assumes  the  re- 
lation of  a  moral  governor, feels  toward  right  and  wrong  moral 
action,  as  a  benevolent  being  must  feel.  Were  he  a  perfectly 
selfish  being,  it  is  altogether  credible  that  he  should  do  all  that 
he  is  supposed  to  do.  Nor  is  this  all.  But  by  failing  to  show 
in  his  relation  of  a  moral  governor,  the  feelings  of  a  benevolent 
being  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,- he  proves  himself 
to  be  a  selfish/being.  If  then  he  is,  according  to  the  present 
supposition  a  benevolent  being,  he  is  benevolent  in  a  case  in 
which  his  benevolence  cannot  be  proved,  in  which  he  acts 
contrary  to  the  plainest  dictates  of  benevolence,  and  in  which 
therefore,  according  to  the  laws  of  evidence,  he  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  selfish  being.  In  such  a  case,  there  could  of 
course  be  no  authority  ;  nothing  which  could  be  called  a 
moral  government.  I  do  not  say  that  a  benevolent  being 
would  not  adopt  the  supposed  system,  if  the  greatest  good 
required  its  adoption ;  nor  that  it  would  riot  be  one  kind  of  a 
moral  system.  But  1  say  that  it  would  not  be  a  jjerfect  moral 
government.  Its  influence  would  be  simply  that  of  the  per- 
ceived nature  and  tendencies  of  moral  action ;  and  nothing 
more  and  nothing  less  than  were  there  no  lawgiver  supposed 
Vol.  I.— 6  " 


122       MOEAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

in  the  case.  There  could  not  be  the  shadow  of  that  influence 
which  results  from  the  law,  the  authority  and  the  character  of  a 
perfect  moral  governor.  He  who  should  assume  the  supposed 
relation  without  annexing  sanctions  to  his  law,  would  have, 
and  would  be  entitled  to  have,  no  more  and  no  other  influence 
over  the  conduct  of  his  subjects,  than  any  individual  among 
them  who  should  propound  the  same  rule  of  action.  The  great 
object  and  end  of  the  relation  is  to  secure  the  highest  well- 
being  of  all,  and  to  prevent  the  highest  misery  of  all,  by  secur- 
ing right  and  preventing  wrong  moral  action ;  and  the  great 
and  peculiar  function  of  the  relation  is,  to  secure  right  moral 
action, and  to  prevent  wrong  moral  action  by  the  influence  of 
his  authority — an  influence  which  depends  on  the  manifesta- 
tion of  that  approbation  of  the  one  kind  of  action, and  of  that 
disapprobation  of  the  other,  which  a  benevolent  being  must 
feel.  But  without  legal  sanctions  he  manifests  no  such  feel- 
ings, and  thus  proves  himself  to  be  a  selfish  being  and  desti- 
tute of  all  authority. 

Again ;  it  may  be  said,  that  a  moral  governor  by  promising 
a  reward  to  obedience,  though  he  threatens  no  penalty  to  dis- 
obedience, would  prove  his  benevolence  and  so  establish  his 
authority.  I  answer,  that  the  thing  supposed  is  impossible. 
For  how  could  the  promise  of  a  reward  to  obedience  prove  the 
benevolence  of  the  lawgiver,  while  he  left  disobedience  to  go 
unpunished  ?  How  could  he  show  himself  to  feel  as  a  benev- 
olent being  must  feel  toward  right  moral  action,  without  also 
showing  himself  to  feel  as  a  benevolent  being  must  feel  toward 
wrong  moral  action  ?  All  the  proof  of  such  feeling  toward 
right  moral  action  furnished  by  the  reward,  would  be  wholly 
counteracted  by  manifesting  no  appropriate  feeling  toward 
wrong  moral  action ;  or  rather,  to  manifest  no  disapprobation 
of  wrong  moral  action,  would  be  to  show  indifference  or  appro- 
bation in  respect  to  it ;  and  no  being  who  feels  either  indiffer- 
ence to  or  approbation  of  wrong  moral  action,  can  feel  as  a 
benevolent  being  must  feel  toward  either  right  or  wrong 
moral  action.  But  not  to  dwell  longer  on  this  topic.  Make 
what  supposition  you  will,  if  the  moral  governor  confers  no 
reward  for  obedience, he  expresses  no  approbation  of  the  only 
means  of  the  best  end,  but  rather  disapprobation ;  and  if  he 
inflicts  no  penalty  for  disobedience, he  expresses  no  disappro- 
bation of  the  means  of  the  worst  end,  but  rather  approbation. 


THE   GOVERNOR   SELFISH  WITHOUT   SANCTIONS.   123 

In  the  one  case,  lie  virtually  punishes  obedience  by  withhold- 
ing a  reward  ;  in  the  other,  he  virtually  rewards  disobedience 
by  withholding  penalty.  Suppose  then  what  else  we  may,  if, 
in  the  capacity  of  moral  governor,  he  does  not  annex  sanctions 
to  his  law,  and  if  he  does  not  reward  obedience  and  punish 
disobedience,  his  conduct  must  be  traced  to  the  selfish  prin- 
ciple in  some  form.  It  may  be  selfishness  in  the  form  of 
caprice,  despotic  humor,  favoritism,  a  spirit  of  self-aggrandize- 
ment, the  love  of  applause,  or  of  a  weak,  indulgent  tenderness 
which  sacrifices  public  good  to  individual  happiness.  But  it 
is  selfishness  still,  and  not  benevolence ;  for  benevolence  in  a 
moral  governor  must  feel,  and  must  express,  approbation  of 
obedience  and  disapprobation  of  disobedience  to  the  best  law. 
Xot  to  express  these  feelings,  is  not  to  show  the  necessary  and 
due  regard  to  the  only  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all, 
and  the  necessary  and  due  abhorrence  of  the  sure  means  of 
the  highest  misery  of  all.  Not  to  do  it,  is  to  establish  the  fact 
that  the  moral  governor  is  not  himself  governed  by  the  prin- 
ciple of  perfect  and  immutable  rectitude.  Whom  he  will 
reward,  and  whom  he  will  punish,  however  it  may  be  supposed 
to  be  decided  by  other  considerations,  is  not  determined  by 
the  perfection  of  his  character.  So  far  as  this  basis  for  confi- 
dence is  concerned,  the  good  have  as  much  to  fear  as  the  bad, 
and  the  bad  as  much  to  hope  for  as  the  good.  Perfection  in 
character  is  wanting  in  him  who  occupies  the  throne.  Obedi- 
ence, as  submission  to  authority — as  that  confidential  homage 
and  unqualified  and  joyous  compliance  in  which  the  will  of 
the  subject  goes  along  with  the  will  of  a  perfect  ruler  of  all, 
is  impossible.  There  is  no  such  ruler.  The  act  of  obedience, 
and  the  act  of  disobedience,  alike  in  their  true  tendency  and 
influence, disclaim  and  prostrate  his  authority,  and  the  moral 
governor,  doing  nothing  to  counteract  the  effect,  legalizes  re- 
bellion from  one  end  of  his  dominions  to  the  other. 


REMARK. 

"We  see  why  the  attempts  to  prove  the  benevolence  of  God 
from  the  light  of  nature  have  been  so  often,  not  to  say  uni- 
formly, unsuccessful.  The  fact  I  think  will  not  be  denied, 
that  the  arguments  of  the  soundest  theism  on  this  most  inter- 
esting and  momentous  question  have  been,  and  still  are,  in  the 


124        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

view  of  many  of  the  most  acute  and  ingenuous  minds,  marred 
by  manifest  imperfection  and  weakness.  Even  many  Christian 
divines  confidently  maintain  that  the  moral  perfection  of  God 
cannot  be  proved  from  the  light  of  nature.  My  present  design 
is  not  to  trace  minutely  the  defects  of  the  arguments  now  re- 
ferred to,  but  rather  to  present  what  I  deem  a  fundamental 
defect  common  to  them  all,  and  which  fully  accounts  for  their 
inconclusive  and  unsatisfactory  character,  viz.,  that  in  these 
arguments  the  most  important  relation  of  God  to  his  moral 
creation  has  been  wholly  overlooked  in  its  true  and  proper  bear- 
ing on  the  conclusion.  And  here  let  me  not  be  misunderstood. 
I  do  not  say  that  this  important  relation  of  God  has  been  de- 
nied. It  has  been  fully  believed  by  every  sound  theist.  But 
I  affirm  that,  in  the  best  conducted  arguments  on  the  subject 
with  which  I  am  acquainted,  that  no  such  account  has  been 
made  of  the  relation  of  God  as  the  moral  governor  of  men  as 
the  exigency  of  the  argument  demands.  If  what  has  been 
said  in  the  present  lecture  be  just,  the  question,  whether  a 
being  who  assumes  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor  is  benevo- 
lent, depends  on  another,  viz.,  whether  the  sanctions  of  his  law 
manifest  his  benevolence  in  its  necessary  approbation  of  right, 
and  necessary  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action.  But  in 
what  treatise  or  work  in  natural  theology  has  the  argument 
for  the  divine  benevolence  been  made  to  depend  on  the  rela- 
tion of  God  to  men  as  their  moral  governor — on  the  nature, 
principles  and  facts  of  this  relation,  and  particularly  on  the 
sanctions  annexed  to  his  law?  On  the  contrary,  is  not  the 
uniform  method  of  discussing  the  great  question  of  God's 
moral  character  from  the  light  of  nature,  after  having  proved 
his  existence  as  Creator,  and  his  natural  attributes,  to  proceed 
directly  to  the  proof  of  his  moral  attributes — that  is,  to  the 
proof  of  his  benevolence — without  the  least  attempt  to  unfold 
the  nature  of  his  high  relation  to  his  creatures  as  their  perfect 
moral  governor  ?  But  if  God  sustains  this  relation  to  men — 
and  surely  no  sound  theist  will  deny  it — then  manifestly  it  is 
the  great,  the  paramount  relation  which  he  sustains  to  them — 
a  relation  to  which  every  other  must  be  subservient,  even 
that  of  their  Creator,  and  that  of  the  providential  Disposer 
of  all  events  in  respect  to  them.  This  relation  of  God  to  his 
creatures  must  therefore  control  and  modify  all  the  manifesta- 
tions of  himself  to  them,  and  especially  the  manifestations  of 


GOD'S   BENEVOLENCE,    HOW    PROVED.  125 

his  moral  character.  How  can  we  judge  of  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  any  being  except  from  his  works,  his  acts,  and  his  do- 
ings, their  nature,  design,  tendencies  and  results?  And  how 
can  we  judge  of  these  without  understanding  and  contempla- 
ting: the  relation  which  the  being  sustains  to  other  beings 
whom  his  acts  and  doings  respect  ?  Suppose  you  were  to  wit- 
ness a  parent  inflicting  chastisement  upon  his  child  in  some  of 
its  necessary  and  severer  forms,  and  yet  were  so  ignorant  of 
the  parental  relation  as  not  to  be  able  to  comprehend,  or  so 
thoughtless  as  not  to  consider,  the  design  of  parental  discipline; 
or  suppose  you  were  to  see  a  surgeon  amputating  the  limb  of 
a  patient,  without  a  suspicion  or  a  thought  of  the  necessity  of 
the  operation  to  save  the  life  of  the  latter;  or  to  see  the  exe- 
cutioner of  public  justice  inflicting  the  penalty  of  the  law 
upon  the  murderer,  wholly  ignorant  or  making  no  account  of 
the  design  of  such  infliction — how,  in  either  case,  could  you 
regard  the  evil  suffered  as  the  dictate  and  proof  of  benevolence, 
or  as  other  than  the  decisive  proof  of  the  opposite  principle  ? 
So, if  God  is  acting  in  the  relation  of  a  perfect  moral  governor 
of  his  moral  creation,  and  if  all  his  acts  and  doings  are  con- 
trolled and  modified  by  this  relation,  to  what  purpose,  without 
appealing  to  this  relation  and  to  his  acts  and  doings  as  dictated 
and  modified  by  it,  shall  we  attempt  to  prove  his  benevolence, 
or  to  judge  for  ourselves,  or  to  lead  others  to  judge  of  Ids 
moral  character?  On  this  supposition  no  wonder  that  all 
such  attempts  are  vain.  If  we  wo  aid  vindicate  the  ways  of 
God  to  man,  we  must  understand,  and  lead  others  to  under- 
stand, his  relation  to  man  as  a  moral  governor.  To  represent 
him  as  merely  the  Creator  of  men,  and  the  providential  Dis- 
poser of  their  allotments,  and  in  these  relations  aiming  only 
to  produce  the  happiness  and  to  prevent  the  misery  of  his 
creatures  irrespective  of  their  moral  conduct,  when  he  is  act- 
ing in  the  paramount  relation  of  their  lawgiver,  and  adhering 
to  every  principle  of  strictest  equity  in  his  administration,  is 
to  pour  darkness  on  all  his  works  and  ways,  and  therefore  on 
his  moral  character;  while  to  contemplate  him  in  his  true  re- 
lation— the  high  and  august  relation  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernor— would  light  up  all  the  dark  paths  of  his  providence, 
and  cause  all  his  goodness  to  pass  before  us. 

That  God  is  in  fact  administering  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment over  this  world,  will  be  readily  conceded  by  every  be- 


126       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

liever  in  divine  revelation.  It  is  true  indeed  that  there  is  no 
ground  for  the  pretense  that  he  carries  this  system  of  govern- 
ment out  to  its  full  issues  in  the  present  life.  Still  it  must  be 
admitted  by  all  who  receive  the  Christian  revelation,  that  God 
in  his  providence  over  men  in  this  world,  in  no  respect  departs 
from  or  violates  a  single  principle  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment; but  that  on  the  contrary,  he  so  adheres  to  every  such 
principle  in  his  administration,  that  its  perfection  can  in  no 
respect  be  impeached  or  denied.  Why  then  is  it  incredible 
that  his  providence,  were  it  rightly  read  in  the  lessons  which 
it  gives  us,  should  show  us  that  he  is  administering  a  perfect 
moral  government  over  this  world,  if  not  in  the  form  of  a 
strictly  legal  economy  with  some  delay  of  its  just  retributions 
not  inconsistent  with  its  nature,  at  least  in  what,  as  we  think, 
is  far  more  probable — in  the  form  of  an  economy  of  grace  ? 
If  the  word  of  God  reveals  him  to  us  as  our  moral  governor, 
exercising  his  rightful  dominion  through  grace,  why  should  it 
be  thought  strange  that  his  works  and  ways  of  providence, 
well  considered,  should  present  him  in  the  same  exalted  and 
glorious  relation  ?  Or  rather,  how  can  it  be  supposed  to  be 
otherwise  ?  Can  it  be  supposed,  that  in  his  works  and  ways 
of  providence  he  contradicts  the  testimony  concerning  himself 
given  in  his  word  ?  Does  his  written  revelation  exhibit  him 
to  our  faith  in  one  relation,  and  his  acts  and  doings  in  another  ? 
Is  it  credible,  that  his  works  when  duly  considered,  should 
make  no  decisive  manifestation  of  the  character  and  the  rela- 
tion which  he  sustains  to  his  intelligent  creation?  What  shall 
be  concluded,  if  his  works  furnish  no  confirmation  of  his  dec- 
larations ?  What  is  this  but  contradicting  in  his  word  what 
he  is  doing  in  his  providence?  If  the  book  of  revelation 
reveals  God  administering  over  men  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment blended  with  an  economy  of  grace,  the  book  of  nature 
— the  book  that  tells  us  what  he  is  oy  what  he  does — if  rightly 
read,  must  show  him  as  the  righteous  Sovereign,  and  las  the 
Eewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek  Him. 


LECTURE  VII. 

V.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law. — 
The  nature  of  the  law  further  unfolded. — 7.  The  law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government  involves 
sanctions. — 5th.  The  necessity  of  legal  sanctions  shown. — (3,)  because  they  are  the  necessary 
proofs  of  his  benevolence  in  the  forms  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience  and  highest  dis- 
approbation of  disobedience. — This  is  argued;  first,  from  the  insufficiency  of  another  mode  of 
proving  Ins  benevolence ;  second,  from  the  nature  of  legal  sanctions  as  already  explained  ;  third, 
from  the  view  of  the  sanctions  of  the  supreme  law  of  the  state. — Remarks:  1.  Christianity  is 
not  a  selfish  system  of  religion ;  2.  What  it  is  to  make  light  of  the  divine  threatenings ;  3. 
They  who  deny  the  view  now  given  of  the  sanctions  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government,  cannot 
prove  the  benevolence  of  God. 

In  treating  of  the  necessity  of  legal  sanctions  in  the  preced- 
ing lecture,  I  attempted  to  show,  (1.)  That  they  are  necessary, 
in  some  respect  or  under  some  relation,  as  the  proof  of  the 
moral  governor's  authority;  and  (2.)  That  they  are  necessary 
for  this  purpose,  as  being  the  requisite  proof  of  his  benevo- 
lence. 

I  now  proceed  to  show,  as  I  proposed — 

(3.)  That  legal  sanctions  are  necessary  for  this  purpose,  as 
the  required  manifestations  or  proofs  of  his  benevolence  in 
the  form  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  of  his 
highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  moral  governor  is  under  the 
necessity  of  establishing  by  decisive  proof,  his  authority,  or 
right  to  reign ;  that  he  cannot  do  this  without  proving  his 
benevolence,  and  that  he  cannot  prove  his  benevolence  and  so 
establish  his  authority,  by  any  thing  which  he  can  do  in  his 
other  relations,  nor  by  any  thing  which  he  can  do  in  this  rela- 
tion, without  annexing  natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as  its 
sanctions.  "What  I  now  propose  to  show  is,  that  he  cannot 
prove  his  benevolence, without  annexing  sanctions  to  his  law 
which  shall  manifest  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and 
his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience;  in  other  words,  that 
natural  good  and  evil  cannot  become  legal  sanctions — that  is, 
cannot  manifest  the  benevolence,  and  so  establish  the  authority 
of  the  moral  governor,  in  any  other  ivay  or  mode,  except  by 
manifesting  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  his  high- 
est disapprobation  of  disobedience. 


128       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

I  argue  the  truth  of  this  proposition, 

In  the  first  place,  from  the  insufficiency  of  certain  particular 
ways  or  modes  in  which  natural  good  and  evil  are,  or  have 
been  supposed  to  become  legal  sanctions,  other  than  that  now 
specified.  Here  I  propose  to  examine  such  other  modes  than 
the  one  now  specified,  some  one  of  which  so  far  as  I  know,  has 
been  considered  the  proper  mode.  If  natural  good  and  evil  can- 
not become  legal  sanctions  in  any  of  these  modes,  it  is  fairly 
inferred  that  they  cannot  in  any  other  than  that  now  maintain- 
ed.    I  remark  then, 

That  natural  good  promised  or  conferred  as  the  mere  dictate 
of  individual  kindness,  cannot  possess  the  nature  of  a  legal 
reward;  and  that  natural  evil,  threatened  or  inflicted  as  the 
mere  dictate  of  individual  unkindness,  cannot  possess  the 
nature  of  a  legal  penalty.  In  such  a  case,  the  lawgiver  in 
annexing  the  supposed  sanctions  to  his  law,  and  also  in  their 
execution,  can  have  no  benevolent  regard  for  the  public  good, 
and  of  course  no  such  regard  for  the  establishment  of  his  own 
authority  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  public  good.  His 
whole  object  in  conferring  the  natural  good,  and  in  inflicting 
the  natural  evil  supposed,  terminates  in  the  happiness  and 
unhappiness  of  individuals  as  such,  and  in  his  own  selfish  grati- 
fication. This  implies  an  utter  disregard  of  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  all,  and  of  the  necessary  means  of  this  end.  It  shows 
him  to  be  utterly  regardless  of  the  function  of  his  high  relation, 
and  recreant  to  his  high  trust.  Whatever  other  tendencies 
then  his  acts  may  be  supposed  to  have,  or  whatever  results 
they  may  be  supposed  to  produce,  they  can  have  no  tendency 
to  establish  his  authority,  and  to  secure  by  means  of  it  the 
highest  well-being  of  his  kingdom.  On  the  contrary,  the  sup- 
posed acts  must  be — the  one  in  the  form  of  favoritism  or  in- 
dulgent tenderness,  and  the  other  in  that  of  resentment  or 
revenge,  the  dictate  of  unqualified  selfishness,  and  must  there- 
fore decisively  disprove  his  authority. 

Nor  do  natural  good  and  evil  employed  merely  as  moral 
discipline,  constitute  legal  sanctions.  It  is  altogether  credible, 
that  a  being  perfectly  benevolent  should,  prior  to  assuming  the 
relation  of  the  moral  governor  of  other  beings,  confer  on  them 
much  natural  good,  and  inflict  some  natural  evil,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  better  results,  when  they  come  to  act  under 
his  moral  government,  than  he  could  otherwise  secure.     Such 


PUNISHMENT    NOT    CHASTISEMENT.  129 

natural  good  and  evil  however,  cannot  constitute  legal  sanc- 
tions. It  is  also  credible,  if  we  suppose  a  legal  economy  to  be 
connected,  as  it  may  be,  with  an  economy  of  grace,  that  natu- 
ral good  and  evil  should  be  employed  to  reform  the  transgres- 
sors of  law.  Such  natural  good  and  evil  however,  being  merely 
disciplinary  in  their  design  and  tendency,  cannot  constitute 
lejml  sanctions.  I  admit  indeed  that  natural  evil  inflicted  for 
the  purpose  of  reclaiming  an  offender,  is  often  called  punish- 
ment in  the-  popular  use  of  the  word.  Hence  such  natural 
evil  is  often  mistaken  for  penal  evil,  or  for  the  penalty  of  the 
law.  Such  natural  evil,  as  distinguished  from  legal  penalty, 
is  properly  called  chastisement.  It  implies  not  less  than  the 
legal  penalty,  that  the  subject  is  an  offender,  since  otherwise 
its  infliction  for  the  purpose  of  reformation  would  be  obviously 
absurd.  It  differs  however  essentially,  under  a  perfect  moral 
government,  from  the  legal  penalty.  Chastisement  aims  ex- 
clusively at  the  reformation  of  the  subject;  legal  penalty  not 
at  all.  Chastisement  is  inflicted  in  love;  legal  penalty,  in 
wrath.  Chastisement,  in  its  design  and  tendency,  is  a  blessing 
to  its  subject;  legal  penalty,  an  unmitigated  curse.  Chastise- 
ment has  a  special  respect  to  the  individual's  benefit ;  legal 
penalty  respects  the  good  of  the  public.  Hence  chastisement 
cannot,  under  a  perfect  moral  government,  be  the  penalty  of 
the  law,  it  being  a  ridiculous  anomaly  to  threaten  a  transgres- 
sor of  law  with  the  means  of  his  reformation  and  of  his  deliv- 
erance from  the  legal  penalty;  in  other  words,  to  threaten  a 
real,  and  to  him  the  greatest  blessing,  as  a  legal  penalty. 

Nor  is  the-' conferring  of  a  legal  reward  by  the  moral  gov- 
ernor, the  payment  of  a  debt,  in  the  sense  of  that  which  is  due 
for  something  received,  which  is  not  clue.  The  lawgiver  re- 
ceives nothing  in  the  obedience  of  his  subjects  but  what  is  his 
due.  Obedience  is  a  matter  of  obligation  on  their  part,  and 
of  rightful  demand  on  his ;  and  surely  he  does  not  reward  them 
for  paying  their  own  debt.  By  this  I  do  not  mean  that  the 
reward  is  not  that  which  is  due,  at  least  on  account  of  the 
relation  which  conferring  it  has  to  the  public  good,  as  one 
means  of  increasing  the  public  good,  and  that  it  may  not  in 
this  sense  be  properly  said  that  the  reward  is  reckoned  of  debt 
Kara  to  o(pi?.7][ia.  This  however  cannot  imply  that  the  service 
claimed  or  rendered  is  not  due  to  the  lawgiver,  and  that  the 
reward  establishes  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver  simply  by 
6*  9 


130       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

satisfying  the  claim  of  the  obedient  subject.  Indeed,  the  act 
of  satisfying  the  claim  of  the  subject,  be  the  ground  of  it  what 
it  may,  may  be  prompted  by  selfishness  as  well  as  by  benevo- 
lence, and  can  therefore  furnish  no  proof  of  benevolence,  and 
none  of  authority  on  the  part  of  the  lawgiver.  Besides,  on  the 
supposition  opposed,  the  lawgiver's  authority  could  not  be 
established, until  obedience  should  exist  and  the  reward  be  con- 
ferred. Of  course,  in  the  supposed  act  of  obedience  there  could 
be  no  recognition  of  authority.  In  short,  if  the  "promise  and 
the  conferring  of  a  reward  for  obedience  has  no  relation  except 
to  satisfy  a  claim  of  the  subject,  then  it  has  no  relation  to  the 
public  good.  It  does  not  imply  the  least  degree  of  approbation 
of  obedience  as  the  means  of  the  public  good,  and  instead  of 
being  proof  of  the  lawgiver's  benevolence,  and  so  of  his  author- 
ity, it  is  proof  to  the  contrary. 

~Noy  is  the  endurance  of  natural  evil  as  a  legal  penalty  the 
payment  of  a  debt  on  the  part  of  the  transgressor,  by  which 
he  satisfies  the  claim  of  the  lawgiver,  and  thus  establishes  his 
authority.  For  what  has  the  subject  received  for  which  he 
owes  suffering  as  an  equivalent  ?  Plainly,  he  cannot,  in  this 
sense,  be  said  to  owe  suffering  as  a  debt.*  lie  has  neither 
done  nor  failed  to  do  any  thing  for  which  suffering  on  his  part 
can  be  rendering  an  equivalent.  The  language  of  a  benevo- 
lent lawgiver  is  not,  "  I  will  be  as  well  pleased  and  satisfied 
with  disobedience  and  the  endurance  of  its  penalty,  as  with 
perfect  obedience."  Legal  penalty  is  not  a  thing  claimed  by 
the  lawgiver  and  rendered  by  the  traSgressor,  but  a  tiling 
threatened  and  inflicted  by  the  lawgiver,  and  endured  by  the 
transgressor.  Considered  simply  as  so  much  suffering  endured, 
it  can  have  no  tendency  to  manifest  the  benevolence  of  the 
lawgiver.  Kor  can  it  have  such  tendency  except  it  be  consid- 
ered as  suffering  inflicted  by  the  act  of  the  lawgiver,  and  as 
such,  becoming  an  expression  of  the  emotion  which  benevo- 
lence must  feel  toward  transgression.  Voluntary  submission 
to  it  on  the  part  of  the  subject,  is  in  no  respect  necessary  to  it 
as  a  legal  penalty.  Its  infliction  is  the  act  of  the  moral  gov- 
ernor, and  in  no  respect  the  act  of  the  transgressor,  by  which 


*  Sin,  as  an  act  of  withholding  obedience  which  is  due,  may  be  called  a  debt,  as 
in  Matt.  vi. :  12 ;  not  however  as  something  due  which  can  be  paid  by  suffering  the 
legal  penalty,  nor  by  any  thing  else. 


SANCTION    PRIMARILY    NOT    MOTIVES.  131 

lie  may  satisfy  any  demand  made  on  him  by  the  lawgiver,  and 
thus  establish  his  authority. 

Nor  do  natural  good  and  evil  become  legal  sanctions,  as 
being  so  much  motive  to  secure  right  and  prevent  wrong 
moral  action.  By  this  I  do  not  mean,  that  natural  good  and 
evil  as  the  matter  of  legal  sanctions,  must  not  have  the  influ- 
ence of  motives  on  the  minds  of  subjects,  that  they  may  answer 
the  end  of  legal  sanctions.  Nor  do  I  mean  that  the  direct  in- 
fluence of  natural  good  and  evil  as  motives,  is  at  all  incon- 
sistent with  that  peculiar  influence  which  we  call  moral  gov- 
ernment, so  that  the  two  influences  may  not  coexist.  But  I 
mean,  that  the  influence  of  natural  good  and  evil  as  such,  or  as 
so  much  motive  merely,  does  not  constitute  them  legal  sanc- 
tions. In  such  influence  merely,  there  is  no  influence  of 
authority.  The  former  may  exist  without  the  latter.  If  we 
suppose  the  subject  to  be  under  the  influence  of  natural  good 
and  evil,  as  so  much  motive  merely,  he  is  not  under  the  influ- 
ence of  authority,  and  therefore  not  under  the  influence  of 
moral  government.  If  we  suppose  him  to  conform  to  the  rule 
of  action  under  the  former  influence  merely,  the  act  would  not 
be  done  because  the  moral  governor  commands  it,  but  done 
simply  to  obtain  natural  good  and  to  avoid  natural  evil ;  and 
of  course  done  without  the  least  regard  to  the  will  or  character 
of  him  who  prescribes  the  rule.  Now  the  object  of  a  perfect 
moral  governor  is  not  merely  to  secure  right  moral  action,  but 
to  secure  it  in  a  given  way  by  a  peculiar  influence — the  influ- 
ence of  his  authority  ;  to  secure  it,  I  do  not  say  exclusively,  but 
really  by  this  influence.  It  is  to  bring  his  subject  to  act  from 
a  respect  to  his  will,  as  the  will  of  a  perfect  being.  Otherwise 
the  act  of  conformity  to  the  rule  would  not  be  an  act  of  obedi- 
ence, as  involving  any  recognition  of  his  right  to  rule.  Even 
supposing  the  act  to  be  morally  right — an  act  done  in  view  of 
the  true  nature  and  tendency  of  moral  action,  still  if  done  from 
this  influence  merely,  it  would  no  more  involve  any  regard  for 
the  character  of  the  lawgiver,  as  that  which  gives  him  the  right 
to  rule,  than  were  the  subject  hired  to  perform  the  act  by  a 
fellow  subject,  Natural  good  and  evil  then,  influencing  the 
subject  as  merely  so  much  motive,  are  not  legal  sanctions. 

Nor  do  natural  good  and  evil  become  legal  sanctions, on  the 
ground  that  it  is  right  or  just  to  reward  obedience  and  to 
punish  disobedience,  irrespective  of  the  tendency  of  so  doing 


132       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

to  produce  happiness  and  to  prevent  misery.  The  contrary 
opinion  is  maintained  by  some  at  least  in  respect  to  penalty. 
It  is  said  that  it  is  right  to  pnnish  the  transgressor  of  law  irre- 
spective of  the  general  good — that  it  is  ill-desert,  and  not  the 
good  of  society,  which  is  the  ground  of  his  just  liability  to 
punishment — that  sin  or  transgression  is  an  evil  in  itself  and 
deserves  punishment  for  its  own  sake,  and  without  respect 
to  its  tendency  to  evil.  Now  in  such  statements  as  these, 
it  is  obvious  that  distinctions  are  made  without  a  difference. 
It  is  readily  admitted,  then,  that  it  is  right  to  punish  the  trans- 
gressor of  law ;  that  it  is  ill-desert,  which  is  the  ground  of  his 
just  liability  to  punishment,  and  that  sin  or  transgression  is  an 
evil  in  itself.  But  it  is  denied  that  these  things  are  true,  or  can 
be  conceived  to  be  true,  irrespective  of  the  relation  of  punish- 
ment to  some  good  end,  or  to  the  public  good.  The  real  and  only 
question  in  the  case  then  is,  would  it  be  right  or  just  to  punish 
the  transgressor  of  law,  if  no  good  end  could  be  promoted  by 
his  punishment?  Or  thus,  would  it  be  right  or  just  to  inflict 
suffering  in  a  case  in  which  not  the  least  good  in  kind  or  degree 
could  result,  either  to  the  sufferer  or  to  any  other  being  from 
its  infliction  ?  To  say  that  it  would  be,  is  to  say  that  it  would 
be  right  or  just  to  inflict  suffering  purely  for  its  own  sake. 
Could  a  being  of  perfect  benevolence  do  this  ?  Could  any 
feeling  short  of  unqualified  malice  prompt  it  ?  "Would  such  an 
act  sustain  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor  ?  But  it  will 
be  said  that  there  is  inherent  ill-desert  in  the  trangression  of  a 
perfect  law,  and  that  on  this  account  it  is  right  or  just  to  inflict 
punishment  on  the  transgressor.  But  the  ill-desert  of  trans- 
gression is  either  its  relation  to  the  law  as  tending  to  destroy 
its  authority  or  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver  and  so  to  destroy 
the  public  good  which  depends  on  the  authority  of  law,  or  it  is 
not.  If  it  is,  and  if  punishment  is  justly  inflicted  on  this  ac- 
count and  as  the  means  of  sustaining  this  authority,  then  it 
is  inflicted  in  respect  to  a  good  end,  even  for  the  public  good. 
If  it  is  not,  then  plainly  the  transgression  of  law  sustains  no  re- 
lation to  law,  on  account  of  which  it  is  right  or  just  to  punish 
it.  It  leaves  the  authority  of  the  law  or  of  the  lawgiver  unim- 
paired and  in  full  force.  It  has  done,  and"  can  do  no  injury  to 
the  law  or  to  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver.  There  is  no  evil 
to  be  prevented  or  to  be  redressed  by  punishment,  no  good  to 
be  accomplished  in  respect  to  the  law.     Why  then  punish  the 


PUNISHMENT    FOR    THE    PUBLIC    GOOD.  133 

transgressor?  Is  it  said  that  the  ill-desert  of  transgression  is 
not  its  relation  to  law  as  tending  to  destroy  its  authority,  but 
its  inherent  moral  turpitude  considered  simply  as  wrong  moral 
action  ?  Be  it  so ;  but  how  can  this  be  a  good  reason  for  in- 
flicting suffering  on  the  transgressor  merely  for  its  own  sake,  or 
when  no  good  end  can  be  answered  by  its  infliction?  Is  it  said 
that  it  is  fit,  or  proper,  or  right,  or  what  ought  to  be  done,  and 
that  we  instinctively  feel  it  to  be  so  ?  But  why  is  it  ?  Right 
to  inflict  suffering  purely  for  the  sake  of  inflicting  it !  Who 
are  the  beings  that  instinctively  feel  this  to  be  right,  and  in 
what  world  do  they  dwell  ?  Of  such  a  species  of  beings  we 
have  no  knowledge,  and  with  them  if  they  exist,  we  utterly 
disclaim  all  fraternity.  Is  it  then  said  that  transgression  is  evil 
in  itself,  and  that  on  this  account  and  for  its  own  sake,  it  de- 
serves punishment?  This  is  only  saying  in  another  form  the 
same  thing.  What  then  is  the  meaning  of  the  language? 
There  are,  generally  speaking,  two  things,  and  only  two,  each 
of  which  may  be  properly  said  to  be  evil  in  itself.  The  one  is 
suffering,  including  unhappiness  and  misery,  and  the  other  is 
the  direct  means  of  suffering.  Each  is  truly  and  properly  said 
to  be  evil  in  itself  in  distinction  from  being  evil  as  the  indi- 
rect means  of  suffering.  That  suffering,  i.  e.  unhappiness,  pain, 
or  misery,  is  evil  in  itself  will  not  be  denied.  So  that  which 
is  the  direct  means  of  suffering  or  of  unhappiness,  is  properly 
said  to  be  evil  in  itself  though  it  be  also  the  indirect  means  of 
it.  Thus  it  is  properly  said,  that  ignorance  or  infamy  is  evil  in 
itself.  But  neither  of  these  things  is  evil  in  itself  in  the  same 
sense  in  which  unhappiness  or  suffering  is.  The  transgression 
of  a  perfect  law,  sin,  wrong  moral  action,  is  also  evil  in  itself, 
not  as  being  itself  suffering,  but  as  being  in  its  own  nature  and 
true  tendency,^  direct  means  of  suffering.  This  is  all  that 
can  be  properly  meant  by  calling  transgression  or  sin  evil  in 
itself.  Not  being  identical  with  suffering  or  unhappiness,  it 
can  be  conceived  to  be  evil,on\y  as  being  in  its  own  nature  the 
direct  means  of  suffering.  But  how  can  this  fact  be  a  good 
and  sufficient  reason  for  inflicting  suffering  on  the  transgressor 
by  a  moral  governor,  when  no  good  can  result  from  the  inflic- 
tion ?  It  would  be  only  to  increase  evil  for  evil's  sake.  And 
we  say  again,  that  nothing  short  of  unqualified  malice  could 
inflict  suffering  in  such  a  case.  Or  rather,  we  affirm  that  the 
most  unqualified  malice  could  not  do  it.     The  supposed  act  is 


134       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

impossible  in  the  nature  of  tilings.  No  being  can  find  a  motive 
to  inflict  suffering  on  others  any  more  than  on  himself,  when  no 
good  in  his  view  either  to  himself,  or  to  them,  or  to  others,  is 
connected  with  or  depends  on  the  act.  The  supposition  in- 
volves the  absurdity  of  choosing  to  act  without  a  motive  or  a 
reason — the  absurdity  of  an  event  without  a  reason.  The  sup- 
posed act  bids  defiance  to  even  infernal  malice.  But  it  has 
been  said,  if  the  justice  of  punishment  is  founded  in  the  utility 
of  punishment,  then  it  will  follow,  that  if  the  public  good  would 
be  best  promoted  by  punishing  the  innocent  instead  of  the  trans- 
gressor, it  would  be  right  and  just  to  punish  the  innocent,  which 
is  revolting  to  every  sentiment  of  our  moral  nature.  It  is  read- 
ily admitted,  that  to  punish  the  innocent  instead  of  the  guilty, 
would,  as  things  are  in  their  essential  nature  and  relations,  be 
abhorrent  to  every  true  sentiment  of  right  and  equity.  But 
here  two  questions  arise ;  why  is  it  thus,  and  how  would  it  be, 
were  the  nature  and  relations  of  things  changed  in  the  manner 
supposed?  Why  is  it  thus?  Is  it  not  because  the  truth  is 
clearly  seen  and  strongly  felt  by  every  mind,  that  the  author- 
ity of  law,  and  with  it  the  public  good  depend  on  and  require 
the  punishment  of  the  transgressor,  and  forbid  the  punishment 
of  the  obedient  subject?  Does  not  every  one  know,  even  the 
culprit  at  the  bar,  as  well  as  the  judge  on  the  bench,  that  to 
assert,  that  a  due  regard  to  the  authority  of  law  and  with  it  to 
the  public  good  require  the  punishment  of  the  transgressor,  is 
the  same  thing  as  to  assert  that  justice  requires  his  punish- 
ment ?  And  now,  if  we  suppose  the  essential  nature  of  things 
to  be  so  changed,  that  the  authority  of  law  and  the  public  good 
as  depending  on  it, would  be  destroyed,  and  absolute  and  uni- 
versal misery  follow,  unless  the  innocent  were  to  be  punished, 
would  it  not  be  right  to  make  innocence,  now  become  the  true 
and  necessary  cause  of  such  fearful  results,  the  ground  of  pun- 
ishment? Could  a  benevolent  moral  governor  voluntarily  be- 
come the  author  of  such  utter  ruin  and  wretchedness,by  suffer- 
ing the  innocent  to  escape  punishment  ?  Plainly  on  the  sup- 
position now  made,  the  nature  of  things  would  be  so  changed, 
that  innocence,  obedience  to  law,  would  possess  the  same  nature, 
aud  sustain  the  same  relations  as  the  ground  of  punishment, 
which  disobedience  now  sustains  ;  and  if  our  moral  nature  ap- 
prove of  the  punishment  of  the  latter,  it  must  in  the  case 
supposed,  approve  of  the  punishment  of  the  former.     If  it  is 


SANCTIONS    FROM    JUST    BENEYOLENCE.  135 

dow  right  or  just  to  punish  the  disobedient,  it  would  then  be 
so  to  punish  the  obedient — to  punish  for  a  thing  having  the 
same  relative  nature,  though  it  should  have  another  name.  To 
deny  it,  is  to  make  a  supposition  to  be  reasoned  on,  and  then 
to  disregard  and  overlook  it  in  the  reasoning.  It  is  like  sup- 
posing the  nature  of  things  to  be  so  changed  that  two  and  two 
should  be  five,  and  then  to  deny  that  on  this  supposition  two 
and  tw^o  would  be  five,  or  that  twice  two  and  two  would  be 
ten.  Those  philosophers  then,  who  maintain  the  justice  of 
punishment,  irrespective  of  its  relations  to  the  public  good  or 
to  any  good — and  the  same  thing  is  true  mutatis  mutandis — 
in  respect  to  the  justice  of  reward,  evidently  fail  to  analyze 
their  own  necessary  ideas  or  conceptions  of  things.  If  the 
question  be  put,  why  is  it  right  to  punish  transgression,  they 
have  no  answer  to  give,  but  that  it  is  right,  or  that  it  is  right 
because  it  is  right,  or  some  equivalent  answer  equally  trivial 
and  irrelevant.  If  pressed  further  on  the  point,  they  tell  us, 
that  the  idea  of  moral  rectitude  or  rightness  is  a  simple  idea — 
an  idea  incapable  of  analysis  and  definition,  and  that  the  ques- 
tion is  wholly  unauthorized,  why  is  an  action  morally  right,  or 
what  is  that  in  which  its  moral  rectitude  consists.  This  has 
already  been  considered. 

Nor  do  natural  good  and  evil  become  legal  sanctions,  con- 
sidered as  the  dictate  of  justice  as  distinguished  from  benevo- 
lence; or,  as  annexed  to  law,  apart  from  their  subserviency  to 
public  good.  This  view  of  the  subject,  which  is  not  perhaps 
essentially  different  from  that  just  considered,  instead  of  repre- 
senting benevolence  as  the  primary  attribute,  and  justice  as 
one  particular  form  of  benevolence,  represents  them  "  as  dis- 
tinct and  primary  characteristics"  or  attributes  of  a  perfect 
moral  governor.*  Its  advocates  are  obviously  led  to  adopt  it, 
from  an  inadequate  and  false  conception  of  the  nature  of  be- 
nevolence, as  the  comprehensive  moral  perfection  of  a  perfect 
ruler.  By  benevolence,  they  obviously  mean  that  species  of 
sentimental  kindness  wdiich  seeks  the  welfare  of  others  as  indi- 
viduals, without  regard  to  the  highest  well-being  of  the  whole. 
Such  kindness  is  not  the  benevolence  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernor. It  not  only  does  not  involve  or  imply  the  attribute  of 
justice,  but  would  be  palpably  inconsistent  with  it.     Benevo- 

*  Chalmers'  Natural  Theology,  Vol.  II.,  c.  vi. 


136       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

lence,  as  the  attribute  of  a  perfect  moral  governor,  is  the 
supreme  love  of  the  highest  happiness  of  his  kingdom,  or  an 
elective  preference  of  this  object  to  every  other  that  can  come 
into  competition  with  it  as  an  object  of  preference.  It  becomes 
therefore,  from  its  very  nature  in  relation  to  the  promotion  of 
the  highest  happiness,  a  disposition  or  purpose  to  promote  it, 
by  every  means  necessary  for  its  promotion.  One  of  these  is, 
the  establishment  and  support  of  the  authority  of  a  perfect 
law,  or  of  the  lawgiver's  authority,  by  legal  sanctions.  Benev- 
olence dictates  and  demands  this,  and  in  its  very  nature  neces- 
sarily leads  to  a  full  and  fixed  determination  or  purpose  to 
secure  and  employ  this  means  of  the  general  good,  or  highest 
well-being  of  all ;  and  as  such  a  purpose  is  what  we  mean,  and 
all  that  can  be  meant,  by  justice  as  the  attribute  of  a  perfect 
moral  governor — call  it  by  what  name  we  will — righteousness, 
holiness,  justice — it  is  a  disposition  or  purpose,  prompted  by 
benevolence,  to  uphold  the  authority  of  the  law,  or  of  the  law- 
giver, by  legal  sanctions  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  general 
good.  It  is  therefore  one  particular  form  or  modification  of 
benevolence,  or  a  particular  disposition  or  purpose,  prompted 
by  benevolence.  Indeed,  all  we  c  all  moral  attributes  in  a  per- 
fect moral  being,  except  benevolence,  are  only  forms  or  modifica- 
tions of  benevolence  in  more  particular  dispositions  or  purposes. 
Thus  veracity  is  a  particular  disposition  or  purpose,  prompted 
by  his  benevolence,  to  speak  truth ;  pity,  or  compassion,  is  a 
particular  disposition  or  purpose  prompted  by  benevolence,  to 
relieve  suffering;  mercy,  as  an  attribute  of  a  moral  ruler,  is  a 
particular  disposition  or  purpose,  prompted  by  benevolence,  to 
show  favor  to  the  guilty.  Justice  also,  as  the  attribute  of  a 
moral  ruler,  is  a  particular  disposition  or  purpose  prompted 
by  benevolence,  to  establish  and  maintain  the  authority  of  law 
by  legal  sanctions,  which,  under  a  merely  legal  system,  is  in 
all  cases  indispensable  to  the  general  good.  It  is  true  that 
general  benevolence  dictates  and  requires  other  things  also,  for 
other  things  are  necessary  to  the  general  good.  But  it  de- 
mands the  support  of  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor  as 
one  necessary,  absolutely  indispensable  means  of  this  end. 
Thus  viewed  as  a  benevolent  disposition  to  uphold  his  author- 
ity^ the  indispensable  means  of  the  general  good,  it  consti- 
tutes, or  rather  assumes  the  particular  form,  which  we  call 
justice,  as  an  attribute  of  a  moral  governor.    Hence  benevo- 


BENEVOLENCE    AND    JUSTICE    COINCIDE.  137 

lence,  as  the  attribute  of  a  perfect  moral  governor,  never  re- 
quires any  thing  which  is  inconsistent  with  what  justice  in  a 
perfect  moral  governor  dictates  and  demands ;  for  the  support 
of  the  authority  of  law  is  always  as  truly  exacted  by  benevo- 
lence as  by  justice.  Kor  does  justice  ever  require  any  thing 
inconsistent  with  benevolence ;  for  the  support  of  the  authority 
of  law  by  the  requisite  means  of  its  support,  is  what  justice 
demands,  and  this  is  always  necessary  to  the  general  good,  and 
therefore  always  dictated  and  demanded  by  benevolence.  Be- 
nevolence, no  less  than  justice  requires,  under  a  perfect  moral 
government  viewed  as  a  merely  legal  system,  the  sacrifice  of 
individual  happiness  in  the  case  of  the  transgressor;  so  that 
justice  in  seeking  his  punishment,  never  claims  what  benevo- 
lence forbids.  What  justice  demands  in  such  a  case,  benevo- 
lence also  demands.  So  if  benevolence  dictates  and  demands 
an  atonement,  which  shall  fully  support  the  authority  of  law  in 
the  pardon  of  the  transgressor,  it  claims  nothing  which  justice 
as  the  attribute  of  a  moral  governor  forbids.*  The  entire  claim 
of  justice  is  met,  provided  the  authority  of  law  be  supported 
in  case  of  transgression,  whether  this  be  done  by  the  execution 
of  penalty  or  by  an  atonement.  There  is  therefore  no  antago- 
nism here — no  clashing  of  different  attributes  in  the  moral 
governor — no  violence  done  to  benevolence,  in  answering  the 
inflexible  demand  of  justice;  and  none  to  the  inflexible  demand 
of  justice,  by  conforming  to  any  conceivable  demand  of  benev- 
olence. Justice,  and  all  the  particular  moral  attributes  of  a 
perfect  moral  governor,  may  be  distinguished  not  only  from 
each  other,  but  also  from  his  benevolence.  But  while  each 
particular  attribute,  so  to  speak,  acts  in  subservience  to  benev- 
olence, all  act  in  perfect  harmony.  Benevolence  is  the  central 
sun  which  gives  direction,  and  power,  and  results,  to  the  whole 
constellation  of  the  particular  moral  attributes  of  a  perfect 
moral  governor.  If  compassion  demands  relief  for  the  suffer- 
ing, or  if  mercy  dictates  favor  to  the  guilty,  so  does  benevo- 
lence. If  justice  require  legal  sanctions,  as  it  does  under  a 
merely  legal  system,  benevolence  also  demands  them  as  the 
necessary  means  of  supporting  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver, 
and  as  such,  of  promoting  the  general  good. 

Such  are  some  of  the  ways  or  modes — -and  I  know  of  no 

*  Vide  Appendix  on  Justice,  Vol.  II.,  p.  000. 


138        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

other — iii  which  it  lias  been  supposed  that  natural  good  and 
evil  can  become  legal  sanctions,  instead  of  that  which  is  now 
maintained  to  be  the  only  mode.  It  is  obvious  however  that 
the j  cannot  become  legal  sanctions  in  any  of  these  modes. 
If  this  be  so,  it  is  a  fair  conclusion  that  they  can  become 
legal  sanctions  in  no  other  than  that  now  maintained;  that 
is,  except  as  manifestations  of  the  moral  governor's  highest 
approbation  of  obedience,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  dis- 
obedience. 

I  argue  the  same  thing — 

In  the  second  place,  from  what  has  been  already  shown 
respecting  the  nature  of  legal  sanctions.  We  have  seen  that 
the  moral  governor  can  establish  his  authority  only  by  natural 
good  and  evil  annexed  to  his  law  as  sanctions.  Whatever  else 
may  be  necessary  for  this  purpose  besides  natural  good  and 
evil  as  legal  sanctions,  the  establishing  or  sanctioning  influence 
is  exclusively  from  natural  good  as  the  reward  of  obedience, 
and  from  natural  evil  as  the  penalty  of  disobedience.  But  he 
cannot  establish  his  authority,  as  we  have  shown,  without 
manifesting  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  his  high- 
est disapprobation  of  disobedience,  and  of  course  cannot  estab- 
lish his  authority  by  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions, 
except  as  they  manifest  these  feelings.  Since  then,  natural 
good  and  evil  are  necessary  as  legal  sanctions;  since  they  can 
become  such  only  as  manifestations  of  the  moral  governor's 
approval  or  disapproval,  it  follows,  that  they  are  necessary  as 
legal  sanctions,  solely  because  they  are  requisite  for  the  pur- 
pose of  such  a  manifestation. 

Or  thus :  it  has  been  shown  that  the  moral  governor  cannot 
establish  his  authority  without  manifesting  his  benevolence ; 
that  he  cannot  do  this  by  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanc- 
tions, unless  they  manifest  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action ;  and  that  these  are  the 
highest  approbation  of  the  one,  and  the  highest  disapprobation 
of  the  other.  As  then  the  moral  governor  cannot  establish  his 
authority  by  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  unless 
they  manifest  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  his 
highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  it  follows,  that  they  are 
required  as  legal  sanctions,  solely  because  they  are  necessary 
for  the  purpose  of  such  a  manifestation. 

What  has  now  been  said  will  be  more  fully  confirmed  by 


SANCTIONS   MUST    MANIFEST    THE    LAWGIVER.   139 

viewing  the  subject  under  some  other  aspects,  and  in  some 
other  connections.     I  proceed  then  to  remark — 

In  the  third  place,  that  it  is  utterly  unsupposable  and  in- 
conceivable, that  natural  good  and  evil  should  become  legal 
sanctions  in  any  other  mode,  than  as  expressions  or  manifesta- 
tions of  the  moral  governor's  highest  approbation  of  obedience, 
and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

Every  one  knows, that  promising  natural  good  to  obedience, 
in  the  form  of  law,  and  conferring  it  when  obedience  is  ren- 
dered, is  the  appropriate  and  most  significant  possible  expres- 
sion of  approbation  of  obedience ;  and  that  the  threatening  of 
natural  evil  to  disobedience,  in  the  form  of  law,  and  inflicting 
it  when  disobedience  occurs,  is  the  appropriate  and  most  sig- 
nificant expression  of  disapprobation  of  disobedience.  The 
degree  of  approbation  in  the  one  case,  and  of  disapprobation  in 
the  other,  are  justly  estimated  and  measured  by  the  degree  of 
natural  good  promised  or  conferred  in  the  one  case,  and  of 
natural  evil  threatened  or  inflicted  in  the  other.  JSTow,  when 
these  things  are  so — when,  as  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  other 
conceivable  reason  that  a  perfect  moral  governor  should  annex 
natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as  legal  sanctions ;  or  rather, 
when  to  annex  them  for  any  other  conceivable  reason  or  pur- 
pose, would  disprove  his  moral  perfection  and  subvert  his 
authority,  what  good  or  sufficient  reason  could  he  have  for 
annexing  natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as  legal  sanctions, 
and  to  do  this  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  his  authority, 
except  that  they  are  necessary  for  this  purpose,  and  because 
they  are  the  only  significant  and  true,  and  therefore  necessary, 
expressions  of  his  approval  of  obedience  and  disapproval  of 
the  opposite. 

Again ;  if  natural  good  and  evil  can  become  legal  sanctions 
in  any  other  mode  than  by  expressing  the  moral  governor's 
highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and  highest  disapprobation 
of  disobedience,  it  must  be  either  by  not  manifesting  any  degree 
of  these  feelings,  or  by  manifesting  some  less  degree  of  them 
than  the  highest.  Can  he  then  establish  his  authority  by  nat- 
ural good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  without  manifesting 
through  them  some  degree  of  the  feelings  specified  ?  This  is 
plainly  impossible.  For  they  can  be  proof  of  nothing  on  the 
part  of  a  moral  governor  on  which  his  authority  depends,  un- 
less they  manifest  on  his  part  some  degree  of  approbation  of 


140       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

obedience,  and  some  degree  of  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 
As  the  appropriate  and  significant  signs  of  these  feelings,  they 
necessarily  express  them.  Even  if  they  are  considered  as 
merely  so  mnch  motive  or  inducement  employed  by  him  to 
secure  obedience  and  to  prevent  disobedience,  they  necessarily 
imply  a  preference  on  his  part  for  some  reason  or  another — 
either  a  selfish  or  a  benevolent  preference — of  obedience  to  dis- 
obedience, and  of  course  some  kind  and  degree  of  approbation 
of  the  one,  and  of  disapprobation  of  the  other.  It  is  true  in- 
deed, that  if  they  express  these  feelings  in  their  selfish  form, 
they  become  proof  against  his  authority.  But  it  is  also  true, 
that  if  they  are  not  regarded  as  expressions  of  these  feelings  in 
any  form,  they  can  imply  no  preference  of  one  kind  of  action 
to  the  other,  and  therefore  can  prove  nothing  in  respect  to  the 
will,  can  establish  nothing  in  respect  to  the  feelings  and  char- 
acter of  the  moral  governor  which  can  have  the  least  bearing 
on  the  question  of  his  authority,  any  more  than  were  they  the 
effects  of  an  impersonal  cause  or  physical  agent.  If  then  nat- 
ural good  and  evil  annexed  to  law  as  sanctions,  do  not  manifest 
some  approbation  of  obedience, and  some  disapprobation  of  dis- 
obedience on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor,  they  can  prove 
nothing  which  can  have  the  remotest  connection  with  estab- 
lishing his  authority — nothing  in  respect  to  the  purpose  for 
which  they  are  annexed  to  law.  They  can  sanction  nothing — 
they  can  prove  nothing  which  can  give  him  the  right  to  reign, 
and  therefore  cannot  be  legal  sanctions. 

Again;  it  has  been  already  shown  that  the  moral  governor 
can  make  no  decisive  expression,  and  therefore  can  furnish  no 
decisive  proof  of  his  benevolence,  except  by  natural  good  and 
evil  as  legal  sanctions ;  nor  by  these,  except  as  they  express  his 
approbation  of  obedience,  and  his  disapprobation  of  disobedi- 
ence. If  therefore  he  does  not  make  such  manifestation,  he 
furnishes  no  proof  of  his  benevolence,  and  of  course  none  of  his 
authority.  On  the  contrary,  his  failure  to  manifest  these  feel- 
ings by  this  means,  decisively  proves  that  he  is  not  a  benevo- 
lent but  a  selfish  being,  and  utterly  disproves  his  authority. 
Who  would  concede  to  another  the  right  to  govern — the  right 
to  impose  his  will  as  an  authoritative  rule  of  action,  who 
should  refuse  to  furnish  the  least  proof  of  his  approbation  of 
right,  and  his  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action,  and  who 
should  thus  furnish  decisive  proof  of  that  selfishness  which,  to 


SANCTIONS  EXPRESS   HIS  STRONGEST  FEELINGS.  14.1 

subserve  its  purposes,  is  as  ready  to  befriend  and  patronize 
wrong  as  right  moral  action — to  sacrifice  as  to  promote  the 
highest  happiness  of  his  kingdom?  Plainly  the  moral  governor 
cannot  establish  his  authority  by  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal 
sanctions,  without  manifesting  through  them  some  degree  of 
approbation  of  right,  and  some  degree  of  disapprobation  of 
wrong  moral  action. 

To  recur  now  to  the  other  side  of  the  alternatives ;  can  the 
moral  governor  establish  his  authority  by  annexing  to  his  law 
natural  good  and  evil  as  sanctions,  which  manifest  a  less  degree 
of  the  feelings  specified  than  the  highest  ?  I  answer ;  that  to 
suppose  that  he  can,  is  to  suppose  what  is  absurd  and  impossi- 
ble. We  have  already  seen  that  the  moral  governor,  by  annex- 
ing that  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as  sanctions 
which  would  fully  express  the  highest  degree  of  the  feelings 
specified,  would  thus  manifest  the  true  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  and  thus  decisively 
establish  his  authority.  But  it  is  obvious,  that  natural  good 
and  evil  in  this  case  would  become  proof  of  his  benevolence 
solely  by  expressing  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience,  and 
his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience.  It  is  equally  plain, 
that  no  less  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  would  express 
these  feelings.  To  suppose  therefore,  that  any  less  degree  of 
natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions  than  is  necessary 
should  manifest  them,  is  absurd.  To  suppose  that  the  mani- 
festation of  any  other  feelings  either  in  kind  or  degree,  than  the 
true  and  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence, should  prove  benev- 
olence, is  equally  absurd.  The  benevolence  then  of  the  moral 
governor,  and  of  course  his  authority,  cannot  be  proved  by  any 
degree  of  legal  sanctions  less  than  that  which  shall  manifest  his 
benevolence  in  the  form  of  its  highest  approbation  of  obedience, 
and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience. 

Again ;  the  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  annexed  by  the 
moral  governor  as  sanctions  to  his  law,  is  the  measure  and  cri- 
terion of  his  approbation  of  obedience,  and  disapprobation  of 
disobedience.  It  is  undeniable,  that  by  some  given  degree  of 
natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  he  may  express  the 
highest  degree  of  these  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong  moral 
action,  and  that  by  the  lowest  possible  degree  of  natural  good 
and  evil  as  legal  sanctions,  he  would  express  less  approbation 
of  right  and  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action,  than  the 


142        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

highest, and  of  course  less  of  these  feelings  toward  these  objects 
than  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence.  But  we  may  as 
well  suppose  that  the  expression  of  the  least  possible  degree  of 
these  feelings  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  is  an  ex- 
pression of  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevolence,  as  to  suppose 
that  any  expression  of  these  feelings  short  of  the  highest,  is  an 
expression  of  such  feelings.  But  I  need  not  say  how  preposter- 
ous would  be  the  attempt  of  a  moral  governor  to  prove  his 
benevolence  and  so  to  establish  his  authority, by  expressing  the 
least  possible  degree  of  approbation  of  that  kind  of  action, 
which  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  highest  happiness  of  all, 
and  the  least  possible  degree  of  disapprobation  of  that  kind  of 
action,  which  is  the  sure  means  of  the  highest  misery  of  all. 
If  then  he  annexes  to  his  law  a  less  degree  of  natural  good  and 
evil, than  that  which  is  requisite  to  express  his  highest  appro- 
bation of  obedience,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedi- 
ence, he  furnishes  no  proof  of  the  necessary  feelings  of  benevo- 
lence, and  of  course  no  proof  of  his  authority.  On  the  contrary, 
he  expresses  a  lower  degree  of  approbation  of  obedience  and  of 
disapprobation  of  disobedience,  than  he  as  a  benevolent  being 
must  feel,  that  is,  he  expresses  that  degree  of  approbation  of 
right,  and  that  degree  of  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action, 
which  none  but  a  selfish  being  can  feel.  The  moral  governor 
cannot  establish  or  prove  his  authority,  or  rather  he  cannot 
avoid  disproving  it,  without  annexing  as  sanctions  to  his  law, 
that  degree  of  natural  good  and  of  natural  evil  which  expresses 
his  highest  approbation  of  right,  and  his  highest  disapprobation 
of  wrong  moral  action. 

I  remark  yet  again,  that  natural  good  and  evil,  which  ex- 
press a  less  degree  of  approbation  of  obedience,  and  a  less  de- 
gree of  disapprobation  of  disobedience  than  the  highest,  can- 
not become  legal  sanctions  by  combining  their  influence  with 
other  influences,  to  establish  the  moral  governor's  authority. 
The  contrary  may  be  supposed.  The  supposition  however  is 
manifestly  absurd,  since  there  could  be  no  legal  sanctions  in 
the  case.  Allowing  what  is  indeed  impossible,  that  benevo- 
lence of  the  moral  governor  may  be  proved,  and  that  his 
authority  may  be  fully  or  partially  established  by  other  evi- 
dence than  that  furnished  by  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal 
sanctions,  still  neither  this  other  evidence  nor  its  sources  can 
be  legal  sanctions ;  for  nothing  can  be  legal  sanctions  except 


LESS    GOOD    AND    EVIL    INSUFFICIENT.  143 

natural  good  and  evil.  Nor  in  the  case  supposed  can  they  be 
such,  since  they  do  not  by  their  own  peculiar  and  exclusive  in- 
fluence establish  the  moral  governor's  authority.  Nor  is  this 
all.  The  natural  good  and  evil  in  the  case  supposed,  cannot 
have  the  least  tendency  or  influence  whatever  to  establish  his 
authority.  Not  expressing  his  highest  approbation  of  obedi- 
ence and  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  they  furnish  not  the 
slightest  evidence  of  these  feelings,  nor  of  course  of  the  charac- 
ter, which  is  requisite  to  authority.  They  may  be  evidence  of 
some  kind  or  degree  of  approbation  of  right  and  of  disapproba- 
tion of  wrong  moral  action,  but  in  no  such  degree  as  a  per- 
fectly benevolent  being  must  feel.  Whatever  evidence  of 
authority  therefore  may  be  supposed  to  be  furnished  by  other 
sources,  none  can  be  furnished  by  the  natural  good  and  evil 
now  supposed.  On  the  contrary,  these  being  expressions ,  are 
also  a  proof 'of  a  less  degree  of  approbation  of 'right  and  of  dis- 
approbation of  wrong  moral  action  than  the  highest,  and  are 
therefore  evidence  that  the  moral  governor  is  not  a  benevo- 
lent but  a  selfish  being,  and  can  possess  no  authority.  No 
other  evidence  then  can  establish  the  authority  of  the  moral 
governor,  except  that  which  is  furnished  by  natural  good  and 
evil  as  legal  sanctions  manifesting  his  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action.  No  matter  what  evi- 
dence or  proof  of  benevolence  he  may  be  supposed  to  furnish 
in  his  other  relations,  it  is  altogether  neutralized  and  set  aside 
by  his  failure  to  annex  as  sanctions  to  his  law,  that  degree  of 
natural  good  and  evil  which  fully  expresses  his  highest  aj3pro- 
bation  of  right  and  his  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  mora, 
action. 

If  it  should  here  be  said — and  I  know  of  nothing  more  plaus- 
ible on  the  question  at  issue  (  Vide  Lectuke  VI.) — that  a  greater 
amount  of  right  moral  action,  and  with  it  also  of  happiness, 
might  be  secured  by  a  less  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  as 
legal  sanctions  than  that  now  maintained,  and  that  hence  benev- 
olence would  require  that  a  less  degree  of  such  good  and  evil 
be  annexed  to  the  law  as  sanctions;  I  answer,  in  the  first  place, 
that  while  the  natural  possibility  of  the  supposed  consequence 
must  be  admitted  in  a  system  including  moral  beings,  the  moral 
governor  when  assuming  this  relation  in  the  promulgation  of 
his  law,  can  furnish  no  proof  to  his  subjects,  that  a  greater 
amount  of  right  action  and  of  happiness  would  be  secured  by 


144:       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

the  supposed  less  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  as  legal  sanc- 
tions. It  may  be  otherwise,  and  to  suppose  that  it  would  not 
be,  is  to  make  the  supposition,  when  all  the  evidence  in  the 
case, and  the  best  evidence  the  nature  of  the  case  admits  of,  is 
against  its  truth.  It  is  supposing  that  a  greater  amount  of 
right  moral  action  would  be  secured  by  a  less  degree  of  influ- 
ence fitted  to  secure  it,  than  by  a  greater  degree  of  such  influ- 
ence. The  only  rational  conclusion  in  the  case  then  is,  that  a 
greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  and  of  happiness  would 
be  secured  by  the  degree  of  legal  sanctions  now  maintained, 
than  by  any  less  degree.  I  answer,  in  the  second  place,  that 
there  could  be  no  evidence  or  proof  of  the  benevolence  of  the 
moral  governor,  but  there  would  be  decisive  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. Nothing  can  be  supposed  to  exist  in  the  case, of  the  na- 
ture of  evidence  to  this  main  fact,  except  the  mere  declaration 
of  a  being  whose  benevolence  and  of  course  his  veracity  are 
to  be  decided  by  what  he  does  as  a  moral  governor,  and  this 
too  when  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  is  against  the  truth  of  his 
declaration.  His  mere  declaration  therefore  in  respect  to  the 
greater  amount  of  right  moral  action  and  of  happiness,  cannot 
be  received  as  evidence  of  the  fact  nor  of  his  benevolence.  In 
the  third  place,  in  the  act  of  assuming  this  relation  of  a  moral 
governor,  he  comes  under  its  high  and  peculiar  responsibility. 
He  must  now  in  the  very  act  of  assuming  this  relation,  and  in 
claiming  the  homage  of  his  subjects,  either  show  himself  re- 
creant to  this  high  responsibility,  and  thus  decisively  disprove 
his  right  to  rule,  that  is  his  authority ;  or  he  must  fulfill  the 
grand  function  of  his  office  by  proving  his  right  to  rule,  that  is, 
establish  his  authority  by  the  necessary  means  of  doing  so.  He 
cannot  establish  or  prove  his  authority  without  furnishing  de- 
cisive proof  of  his  benevolence  ;  and  this  he  cannot  do  without 
annexing  that  degree  of  natural  good  and  evil  to  his  law  as  its 
sanction,  which  shall  express  the  feelings  of  benevolence.  On 
the  contrary,  without  annexing  such  sanctions  to  his  law,  he 
shows  himself  selfish  and  recreant  to  his  high  and  peculiar 
responsibilities  as  a  moral  governor,  disproves  his  benevolence, 
and  in  consequence  subverts  his  authority. 

Nor  can  this  decisive  proof  against  his  authority  be  set  aside 
or  weakened  by  any  supposable  results  in  the  conduct  of  his 
subjects.  Let  us  suppose  a  law  without  such  sanctions  as  I  ad- 
vocate, and  this  law  or  rule  of  action  to  be  followed  with  per- 


SANCTIONS    NECESSARY.  145 

feet  conformity  on  the  part  of  those  to  whom  it  is  given,  except 
in  one  single  instance.  In  this  case  there  could  be  no  proof 
that  a  law  with  such  sanctions  as  I  advocate  in  its  stead, would 
not  be  followed  by  perfect  conformity  without  even  one  excep- 
tion. Of  course, there  could  be  no  proof  that  the  lawgiver,  in 
giving  the  law  without  such  sanctions,  acts  benevolently.  On 
the  contrary,  the  proof  as  above  stated,  that  he  does  not  act 
benevolently,  remains  unimpaired  and  decisive.  lie  makes  no 
strong  expression  of  the  feelings  of  a  benevolent  being  toward 
right  and  wrong  moral  action,  which  he  must  do,  or  disprove 
his  benevolence  and  therefore  his  authority.  Let  us  now  sup- 
pose the  same  law  to  be  given,  and  to  be  followed  with  perfect 
conformity  on  the  part  of  subjects, without  even  a  solitary  ex- 
ception. This  would  furnish  no  proof  that  the  supposed  law 
would  be  followed  by  the  supposed  result,  even  for  an  hour  or 
a  moment  beyond  the  time  in  which  it  actually  exists,  nor  that 
a  law  with  the  sanctions  which  I  advocate,  would  not  be  fol- 
lowed with  the  supposed  perfect  obedience  forever.  There  can 
of  course  be  no  proof  that  the  lawgiver,  in  the  case  supposed, 
has  annexed  those  sanctions  to  his  law  which  benevolence  re- 
quires him  to  do.  Nor  is  this  all.  There  can  be  no  proof  that 
he  would  annex  such  sanctions  to  his  law  as  I  advocate,  did  he 
know  that  the  greatest  good  required  it,  By  annexing  there- 
fore the  supposed  limited  sanctions  to  his  law,  he  not  only  does 
not  prove  his  benevolence,  but  he  never  can  prove  it.  He  can 
furnish  no  evidence  that  he  has  any  other  feelings  toward  right 
and  wron<>:  moral  action  than  those  of  a  selfish  beino-.  The 
proof  then  of  his  benevolence,  depends  not  on  any  present 
amount  of  right  moral  action  on  the  part  of  subjects,  under  a 
law  without  the  sanctions  which  I  advocate ;  nor  on  any  con- 
jectures or  supposed  possibility  respecting  what  would  be  the 
amount  of  such  action  under  such  a  law.  It  depends  not  on 
what  he  declares  respecting  the  result  on  right  moral  action, 
but  on  what  he  does  in  the  time,  and  in  the  act  of  assuming  the 
relation  of  one  having  a  ri^ht  to  govern.  The  law  must  come 
forth  from  the  throne,  bearing  the  testimonial  of  such  authority 
in  its  nature  and  form.  It  must  be  in  itself,  i.  e.  in  its  sanctions,  a 
decisive  testimonial  of  the  feelings  and  the  character  of  the  law- 
giver. Instead  of  waiting  for  the  conduct  of  subjects  to  create 
its  authority  by  their  conformity  to  its  demands,  or  leaving 
them  to  conjecture  its  authority,  which  implies  that  it  has  no 
Vol.  I.— 7  10 


MO        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

authority,  it  must  bear  unqualified  and  decisive  proof  of  this  in 
its  very  promulgation.  As  an  expression  of  the  feelings  of  per- 
fect benevolence  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action  by  the 
moral  governor,  that  is,  of  his  highest  approbation  of  the  one, 
and  of  his  highest  disapprobation  of  the  other,  its  very  an- 
nouncement must  invest  it  with  authority.  It  must  thus  show 
what  the  moral  governor  is  in  his  character,  by  showing  what 
his  feelings  are  toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  and  as 
depending  on  these,  toward  the  weal  and  woe  of  his  kingdom. 
Why  ?  Because,  in  this  way,  and  in  this  way  only,  can  the 
question  of  his  authority  be  settled,  when  it  should  and  must 
be,  viz.,  when  he  gives  the  law.  Because,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
this  way  the  best  evidence  which  the  nature  of  the  case  admits 
of  would  be  furnished,  because  such  evidence  is  imperiously 
demanded — because  if  he  has  the  character  which  invests  him 
with  authority,  it  will  be  furnished,  and  because  therefore  if  it 
is  not  furnished,  it  is  decisive  proof  that  he  does  not  possess  the 
character.  Make  what  other  supposition  you  will  concerning 
his  declarations  or  his  doings,  it  is  nothing  better,  and  can  be 
regarded  by  his  subjects  as  nothing  better  than  the  barefaced 
hypocrisy  of  saying  to  a  sufferer,  '  Be  warmed,  be  filled,  and 
giving  nothing.'  He  can  easily  settle  the  question  of  his  char- 
acter and  his  authority — he  can  at  once  place  it  beyond  all 
reasonable  doubt;  he  can  thus  bring  that  highest,  best  influence 
on  the  minds  of  his  subjects,  an  influence  as  desirable  as  the 
highest  happiness, and  the  prevention  of  the  highest  misery  of 
his  kingdom.  If  he  expects  confidence  in  his  character  or 
homage  to  his  authority,  why  does  he  not  show  that  he  has  the 
feelings  toward  the  conduct  of  his  subjects  and  the  welfare  of 
his  kingdom, which  alone  can  entitle  him  to  their  confidence, 
and  their  homage,  and  enthrone  him  in  rightful  dominion. 
Plainly  if  he  does  not  do  it — if  he  does  not  annex  those  sanc- 
tions to  his  law  which  express  the  feelings  of  benevolence 
toward  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  feelings  which  as  a 
benevolent  being  he  must  not  only  have  but  must  express,  then 
he  authorizes  the  belief  that  he  is  selfish  and  not  benevolent, 
and  in  consequence  disproves  his  authority.  And  it  will  not 
be  pretended,  that  presenting  himself  to  his  kingdom  in  char- 
acter nothing  better  than  an  infinite  fiend,  that  he  uses  that 
degree  of  influence  to  secure  right  moral  action,  which  will 
secure  the  greatest  amount  of  such  action  which  can  be  se- 


THE   AUTHORITY    OF    THE    CIVIL  LAW.  147 

cured,  or  that  lie  can  secure  the  least  degree  of  it, by  that  influ- 
ence which  is  essential  to  secure  to  the  greatest  amount  of  it, 
the  influence  of  authority.  Natural  good  and  evil  then,  which 
as  legal  sanctions  express  the  moral  governor's  highest  appro- 
bation of  right,  and  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral 
action,  are  necessary  to  prove  his  benevolence,  and  so  to  estab- 
lish his  authority. 

In  the  third  place,  I  remark,  that  the  view  now  given  of  the 
nature  of  legal  sanctions, is  substantially  that  which  all  men  en- 
tertain of  the  supreme  law  of  the  state,  so  far  as  they  regard  its 
authority.  I  say, so  far  as  they  regard  its  authority,  meaning 
so  far  as  they  regard  the  law  of  the  state  as  established  and 
administered  by  disinterested  love  of  country.  Such  indeed 
is  the  evidence  of  selfishness,  even  on  the  part  of  civil  rulers, 
as  distinguished  from  true  patriotism,  that  in  our  utmost 
respect  for  civil  government,  we  regard  it  as  having  a  quasi 
authority  rather  than  a  real  authority,  and  find  ourselves  under 
the  necessity  of  imagining  the  latter,  and  acting  as  if  we  be- 
lieved it,  rather  than  actually  believing  it.  Whether  this  be 
an  imaginary  or  real  regard  for  the  authority  of  the  law,  I  in- 
clude it  under  the  language  which  I  use,  and  contemplate  it  as 
real.  By  that  law  of  the  state,  which  I  call  supreme,  I  mean 
that  which  is  essential  to  the  government  of  the  state  as  a  moral 
government,  and  obedience  to  which  is  the  test  of  loyalty.  The 
■reward  of  obedience  to  this  law,  in  language  which  admits  of 
some  qualification  in  extreme  cases,*  but  needs  none  for  our 
present  purpose,  is  the  protection  of  life,  liberty  and  property. 
The  penalty  of  this  law  is  death. 

If  now  we  contemplate  the  nature  of  this  reward,  and  the 
condition  on  which  it  is  conferred,  we  cannot  fail  to  see  its 
peculiar  characteristic  as  a  legal  sanction.  In  its  nature,  it  is 
obviously  the  highest  good  which  a  civil  government  can  con- 
fer as  a  common  blessing  on  its  obedient  subjects.  It  is  con- 
ferred solely  on  condition  of  the  subject's  obedience  to  the 
supreme  law  of  the  state.     It  is  therefore  a  plain  and  unequiv- 

*  I  say  admits  of  qualification,  etc.,  because  no  man  has,  as  some  modern  fanat- 
ical moralists  and  politicians  maintain,  an  absolute  right  to  either  life,  or  liberty,  or 
property,  i.  e.,  in  all  cases  or  circumstances.  When  the  public  good  demands  the 
sacrifice  of  either  or  of  all  these  blessings,  whether  on  account  of  crime  or  for  the 
defense  of  the  state,  or  for  the  greatest  public  good  in  any  way,  the  surrender  must 
be  made.     The  state  has  a  right  to  it,  and  the  subject  has  no  opposing  right. 


148        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

ocal  expression — a  direct  and  decisive  proof  of  the  moral  gov- 
ernor's highest  approbation  of  obedience  to  this  law.  No 
subject  can  fail  to  regard  it  in  this  light,  who  reflects  at  all  on 
its  design;  nor  can  he  regard  it  in  this  light, without  regarding 
it  as  a  decisive  manifestation  of  that  character  of  the  lawgiver, 
which  alone  becomes  him  as  the  guardian  of  a  nation's  welfare, 
and  which  alone  gives  him  a  right  to  rule.  The  subject  doubt- 
less will  regard  the  reward  as  so  much  natural  good,  and  as  such, 
a  motive  to  conform  to  the  demand  of  the  law.  But  as  an  obe- 
dient subject,  as  under  and  submitting  to  authority,  he  must  re- 
gard the  reward  as  something  more  than  simply  so  much  nat- 
ural good  as  a  motive.  He  must  regard  it  as  that  which  by 
manifesting  the  lawgiver's  design  to  secure  the  highest  welfare 
of  the  state,  gives  majesty  to  his  law,  and  inspires  reverence 
for  his  authority.  Otherwise  all  we  call  the  majesty  of  law  or 
the  authority  of  civil  government,  is  reduced  to  the  contempt- 
ible conceit  of  a  mere  contract  or  stipulation  of  so  much  hire 
for  a  certain  amount  of  service.  To  call  such  a  contract  gov- 
ernment or  law,  or  to  speak  of  its  authority,  is  to  talk  of  what 
has  no  existence.  Yiewed  as  a  legal  sanction  then,  reward  is 
something  more  than  so  much  natural  good  as  a  motive  to  ful- 
fill the  claim  of  law.  It  manifests  the  moral  governor's  highest 
approbation  of  that  on  the  part  of  the  subject  which  ought  to 
be  most  highly  approved,  viz.,  his  obedience,  and  carries  to  every 
mind  the  conviction  of  that  character  of  the  governor  which 
gives  him  a  right  to  rule,  and  thus  establishes  his  authority. 

The  same  thing  is  true  in  respect  to  the  penalty  of  the  civil 
law,  viz.,  it  is  designed  to  establish  the  authority  of  the  gov- 
ernor. This,  as  I  maintain,  it  does,  and  is  designed  to  do,  as  a 
direct  and  decisive  expression  and  proof  of  his  highest  disap- 
probation of  disobedience  to  the  supreme  law  of  the  state.  The 
penalty  of  this  law,  as  I  have  said,  is  death.  Here  it  were 
highly  desirable,  did  our  limits  allow,  to  distinguish  this  pen- 
alty of  the  supreme  law  of  the  state  from  those  punishments  or 
penalties  as  they  are  often  called,  which  are  annexed  to  various 
particular  and  subsidiary  legislative  enactments,  as  merely  so 
much  good  or  evil  in  the  form  of  motive  to  prevent  transgres- 
sion. This  distinction  I  have  attempted  to  trace  in  an  appendix 
to  this  lecture.*     I  will  only  say  here,  that  it  is  evident  that 

*  Appe^tdix  I. 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    THE   CIVIL    LAW.  110 

tills  class  of  punishments  are  not  legal  sanctions  ;  inasmuch  as 
the  subject  who  incurs  them, is  virtually  treated  as  an  obedient 
subject,  that  is,  he  is  virtually  rewarded  as  such  by  being  pro- 
tected, with  some  qualification  greater  or  less,  in  his  life,  lib- 
erty and  property.  The  offenses  for  which  this  class  of  punish- 
ments is  inflicted,  do  not,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  involve  a 
principle  of  hostility  to  the  state.  But  the  penalty  of  death — 
the  penalty  of  the  supreme  law  of  the  state,  is  inflicted  only  for 
such  crimes  as  treason  or  murder — crimes, which  in  the  eye  of 
the  law,  do  involve  a  spirit  of  war  on  the  happiness  and  exist- 
ence of  the  state ;  and  which  therefore  require  the  expression 
of  the  highest  disapprobation  of  him  who  is  the  guardian  of  the 
state.  If  now  we  consider  this  penalty  in  its  adaptation  and 
fitness  to  this  end,  wre  shall  see  that  there  can  be  no  ground  to 
doubt  that  it  is  designed  to  answer  this  end.  And  here  it  may 
be  safely  assumed  that  there  can  be  no  hesitation  on  this  point, 
except  this  one,  that  death  without  torture  is  not,  in  the  strictest 
accuracy  of  speech,  the  highest  degree  of  natural  evil  winch  the 
governor  can  inflict  for  disobedience.  Hence  it  may  perhaps 
be  inferred  by  some, that  it  is  not  designed  as  a  direct  and  deci- 
sive expression  of  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience ; 
but  only  as  so  much  natural  evil  to  deter  from  disobedience  in 
the  form  of  motive. 

Admitting  then,  that  in  the  strictest  use  of  language  (and 
who  makes  such  a  use  of  it  in  common  life  ?)  death  without  tor- 
ture, is  not  the  highest  degree  of  natural  evil  which  is  possible 
in  the  case,  there  are  three  suppositions  to  be  made  and  consid- 
ered. One  is,  that  on  this  account  death  is  not  according  to 
the  true  mode  of  judging,  viewed  either  by  the  governor  or  his 
subjects  as  an  expression  and  proof  of  his  disapprobation,  or 
that  it  is  not  designed  to  be  such  by  the  governor, nor  to  be  so 
regarded  by  his  subjects.  From  this  supposition,  it  follows 
that  there  is  nothing  in  civil  government,  either  as  viewed  by 
the  governor  or  his  subjects,-  which  answers  to  the  idea  of 
authority.  There  is  no  evidence  from  the  penalty,  and  there- 
fore none  from  any  source,  that  he  has  the  least  degree  of  dis- 
approbation of  obedience,  and  therefore  no  evidence  that  he  has 
a  right  to  rule.  On  the  contrary, there  is  decisive  proof  that  he 
has  not  this  right.  Civil  government  of  course  is  not  in  the 
lowest  sense  a  moral  government.  In  its  highest  perfection,  it 
involves  not  an  iota  of  that  influence  which  is  called  authority. 


150        MOEAL    GOVERNMENT    IN"    THE    ABSTRACT. 

Another  supposition  is,  that  the  governor  and  his  subjects  ac- 
cording to  the  true  mode  of  judging — and  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  it  can  be  otherwise — regard  the  penalty  of  death  as  ex- 
pressing some  degree  of  disapprobation  of  disobedience  to  the 
supreme  law  of  the  state,  but  not  the  highest  degree.  On  this 
supposition  there  can  be  no  ground  of  confidence  in  his  charac- 
ter as  a  civil  ruler ;  and  of  course  no  recognition  of  his  author- 
ity. As  the  head  of  an  empire,  that  he  may  secure  the  confi- 
dence of  his  subjects,  and  command  their  submission  to  his 
authority  as  the  rightful  guardian  of  all,  he  is  under  a  necessity 
of  annexing  a  penal  sanction  of  peculiar  severity  to  the  supreme 
law  of  the  state.  lie  is  obliged  to  show  that  he  will  sacrifice 
the  life  of  any  subject,who  like  the  traitor  or  the  murderer, shall 
war  on  the  welfare  and  existence  of  the  state,  rather  than  sacri- 
fice the  state  itself.  To  test  the  truth  of  this  remark,  let  it  be 
supposed  that  he  refuses  to  execute  the  traitor  or  the  murderer, 
because  he  is  his  friend,  or  his  favorite,  or  even  his  son ;  and 
would  not  an  enlightened  and  just  public  sentiment  frown  him 
into  infamy  and  contempt,  as  unworthy  of  his  place  and  as  hav- 
ing no  right  to  rule  ?  And  why  ?  Is  it  that  as  the  only  guar- 
dian of  the  state,  he  does  not  express  some  degree  of  disappro- 
bation of  a  deed  so  hostile  to  the  state  which  is  less  than  the 
highest  degree  ?  Or  is  it,  that  in  their  estimation  he  does  not 
express  the  highest  disapprobation  of  the  crime  by  the  inflic- 
tion of  death  as  the  requisite  penalty  ?  Plainly  the  latter,  for 
without  this  view  of  the  penal  sanction,  there  could  be  no  proof 
that  the  moral  governor  regarded  the  welfare  of  the  state  as  the 
supreme  good ;  that  he  would  not  sacrifice  it  to  any  inferior  ob- 
ject or  end.  Whether  the  penalty  of  death  can  be  justly  re- 
garded as  the  expression  and  proof  of  his  highest  disapproba- 
tion or  not,  it  is  undeniable  that  it  must  be  so  regarded,  or 
there  can  be  no  ground  of  confidence  in  his  character  as  the 
ruler  and  protector  of  the  state,  and  of  course  no  recognition  of 
his  authority.  A  third  supposition  then  is  not  merely  that  it  is 
so  regarded,  but  that  it  is  justly  so  regarded ;  in  other  words, 
that  according  to  the  true  mode  of  judging  in  the  case,  both 
the  governor  and  his  subjects  regard  the  penalty  of  death  as  a 
direct  and  decisive  expression  and  proof  of  his  highest  disap- 
probation of  disobedience  to  the  supreme  law  of  the  state,  and 
as  such  a  legal  sanction.  But  here  the  question  arises,  how 
can  death  without  torture  be  justly  regarded  as  such  an  ex- 


DEATH,    THE    SUPREME    EYIL.  151 

prcssion?  I  answer,  that  in  the  common  conceptions  of  all 
men,  death  is  the  supreme  evil  to  man.  It  is,  as  it  were,  con- 
stantly in  common  speech,  and  of  course  in  the  common  con- 
ceptions of  the  human  mind,  distinguished  as  the  greatest  of 
evils  to  man, considered  as  a  being  of  earth  and  time.  As  such 
it  is  signalized  in  all  human  thought,  familiarized  as  the  evil 
most  to  be  dreaded,  and  even  personified  as  the  king  of  terrors. 
The  idea  of  it, is  of  so  great  an  evil — it  so  absorbs  thought  and 
feeling  by  its  own  magnitude,  that  the  ordinary  suffering  which 
is  an  attendant  circumstance, is  unthought  of  as  enhancing  it. 
If  we  dread  its  approach,  if  we  adopt  means  to  escape  it  our- 
selves or  to  prevent  it  in  others,  it  is  death  as  death  that  we 
think  of,  and  not  the  sufferings  it  may  bring  with  it.  Or  if  we 
suppose  a  degree  of  suffering  to  be  connected  with  it,  it  would 
be  apt  to  attract  and  engross  thought  and  feeling,  and  so  to 
divert  the  dread  of  the  greater  evil  to  the  less ;  and  it  is  easier,  as 
everyone  knows,  to  harden  the  mind  against  bodily  suffering 
than  against  death, when  the  mind  conceives  the  latter  as  an 
evil  in  its  true  magnitude.  Nor  can  it  be  reasonably  doubted, 
that  the  threatening  of  death — of  death  simply — death  as  the 
supreme  evil  in  the  habitual  thought  and  feeling  of  the  human 
mind,  is  fitted  to  make  a  stronger  impression  than  the  threaten- 
ing of  any  other  evil.  Different  effects  might  to  some  extent 
be  produced  on  different  minds  by  the  supposed  difference  of 
penalty.  But  I  now  speak  of  the  most  general  effect,  and  the 
thought  and  the  fear  of  death  are  ever  present  to  every  mind 
in  their  practical  and  controlling  power.  Now  it  is  of  this 
universal  habitual  thought  and  fear  of  death,  that  the  moral 
governor  in  presenting  the  penalty  of  his  law  avails  himself. 
He  conforms  to  this  universal  and  familiar  conception  of  the 
human  mind ;  and  when  he  would  impress  most  effectually 
every  subject  with  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience 
to  his  supreme  law,  he  makes  that  which  in  their  constant  and 
familiar  conceptions  is  signalized  as  the  supreme  evil  —the  great- 
est of  all  evils — the  expression  and  the  proof  of  his  disapproba- 
tion. What  so  natural,  what  so  fitted  to  his  design?  They  know 
how  the  lan^ua^e  ouo-ht  to  be  understood.  He  knows  how  it 
will  be  understood.  He  knows  their  conceptions  of  the  evil, 
and  is  sure  of  the  judgment  which  they  will  form  of  the  degree 
of  his  disapprobation  of  disobedience, when  thus  measured  by 
death  as  the  penalty  of  his  law.     He  thus  shows  himself  the 


152        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

benevolent  protector  of  the  welfare  of  the  state,  by  showing 
himself  in  their  just  estimation  the  mortal  enemy  of  rebellion 
against  it.  In  the  most  natural,  obvious  and  impressive  man- 
ner, even  in  the  only  possible  way,  he  manifests  the  highest 
disapprobation  of  disobedience  to  his  supreme  law ;  and  so 
also  the  feelings  and  the  character  on  which  his  authority  de- 
pends. 

Thus  I  have  attempted  to  show,  that  the  view  now  main- 
tained of  the  nature  of  legal  sanctions  in  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment, is  substantially  that  which  mankind  generally  entertain 
of  the  sanctions  of  the  supreme  law  of  the  state.  If  indeed  we 
find,  in  the  wisest  and  best  administration  of  human  govern- 
ment, some  occasional  departures  from,  or  even  violations  of 
the  principles  contended  for,  still  we  also  find  the  most  distinct 
recognition  of  the  principles  themselves.  Every  such  departure 
or  violation  is  so  obviously  the  result  of  the  comparative  in- 
feriority of  the  interests  to  be  protected,  and  the  necessary  im- 
perfection of  a  human  administration,  not  to  say  of  its  corrup- 
tion, as  clearly  to  show,that  they  cannot  mar  the  moral  admin- 
istration of  a  Being  infinitely  perfect.  Here  no  departure  from 
the  principles  of  eternal  truth  and  righteousness  can  arise  from 
weakness  or  error,  from  indifference  or  aversion  to  the  end  to 
be  accomplished.  The  magnitude  of  the  interests  concerned, 
the  value  of  the  law  as  the  indispensable  means  of  securing  these 
interests,  the  ill-desert  of  transgression  as  the  destruction  of  this 
law,  the  relation  and  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver,  are  to  be 
estimated,  not  by  the  standard  of  earth  and  time,  but  by  that 
of  eternity.  And  if  what  has  now  been  said  in  respect  to  the 
sanctions  of  the  law  of  the  state  be  true,  what  can  truth,  and 
wisdom,  and  goodness  demand  in  the  government  of  a  king- 
dom, where  every  act  of  every  subject  is  virtually  the  perfect 
and  endless  happiness  or  misery  of  all,  but  a  full  and  unquali- 
fied manifestation  of  the  benevolence  of  Him  that  sitteth  on  the 
throne,  in  his  highest  approbation  of  right  and  disapprobation 
of  wrong  moral  action  ?  What  other  influence  can  command 
respect  and  reverence,  or  be  fitted  to  secure  confidential  and 
cheerful  submission  to  his  will,  except  that  which  emanates 
from  the  sanctions  of  his  law,  revealing  that  character  which 
alone  becomes  the  friend  and  guardian  of  universal  happiness 
— an  influence  from  the  manifestation  of  himself,  clothing  him 
with  majesty  as  with  a  garment? 


CHRISTIANITY  NOT    A    SELFISH  SYSTEM.  153 

I  shall  conclude  this  lecture  with  three  remarks : 
1.  Christianity  is  not  a  selfish  system  of  religion.  Infidels 
have  often  said,  that  Christianity,  inasmuch  as  it  aims  to  influ- 
ence men  by  rewards  and  punishments,  is  a  selfish,  mean,  and 
mercenary  system.  And  I  am  sorry  to  say,  that  many  of  the 
friends  and  advocates  of  Christianity  have  furnished  too  much 
occasion  fur  this  reproach.  It  has  often  been  said  in  the 
pulpit,  that  man  cannot  act  under  the  influence  of  the  divine 
threatenings  without  acting  in  a  selfish  maimer ;  and  yet  of- 
tener,  how  this  can  be  otherwise  has  been  deemed  an  unsolvable 
problem.  The  question  more  fully  stated,  is  this :  how  can 
the  promised  good  and  the  threatened  evil  involved  in  these 
sanctions  be  presented  to  the  mind  of  man,  without  directly  ap- 
pealing to  his  selfishness  ;  or,  how  can  man  act  in  view  of  these 
motives  without  acting  in  a  selfish  manner  ? 

I  answer,  that  according  to  the  view  now  given  of  legal  sanc- 
tions as  involving  natural  good  and  evil,  they  appeal  not  to 
human  selfishness  at  all,  but  only  to  self-love,  or  to  the  consti- 
tutional susceptibility  of  the  mind  to  happiness  and  misery. 
They  do  not  appeal  to  selfishness,  because  that  would  be  to 
offer  a  less  good  than  the  greatest.  But  these  sanctions  proffer 
the  highest  good  of  which  man  is  capable — the  happiness  of 
being  good  and  doing  good.  And  to  choose  this  is  to  be  dis- 
interestedly benevolent.  It  is  voluntarily  renouncing  every 
good  which  can  come  into  competition  with  the  public  weal, 
and  therefore  truly  virtuous.  And  further :  the  direct  influ- 
ence of  these  sanctions  on  the  mind,  as  natural  good  and  evil, 
wholly  terminates  in  awakening  constitutional  desires  to  se- 
cure the  one  and  avoid  the  other.  Such  desires  are  not  volun- 
tary states  of  the  mind,  not  acts  of  the  will,  and  therefore  not 
selfishness,  which  is  an  act  of  will.  They  are  simply  constitu- 
tional feelings,  inseparable  from  the  nature  of  man  as  a  sentient 
being,  without  which  man  could  become  neither  benevolent  nor 
selfish,  but  must  be  as  insensible  as  a  stone  or  a  clod.  By  these 
susceptibilities,  with  their  resulting  states  of  desire,  he  is  quali- 
fied, in  one  respect,  to  become  either  benevolent  or  selfish,  and 
can  therefore  become  selfish  only  by  his  own  fault,  only  by  the 
perversion  of  the  influence,  which  is  designed  to  secure  the 
opposite  result,  benevolence.  Nor  is  this  all.  For,  while  the 
reward  and  the  penalty  are  designed  and  fitted  to  awaken 
strong  constitutional  emotion,  the  design  by  no  means  termi- 


154       MOKAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

nates  in  this.  They  are  designed  to  be  subservient  to  an- 
other and  a  higher  purpose — to  show  God  to  the  mind,  and 
to  do  it  in  the  most  impressive  maimer  conceivable  ;  to  rouse 
thought  and  sensibility  and  emotion  to  behold  God  in  his 
supreme  approbation  of  obedience  and  supreme  disapproba- 
tion of  disobedience;  to  see  and  know  this  fact  as  one  in 
which  the  mind  has  a  direct  personal  concern.  The  design  is 
to  show,  in  such  a  manner  that  the  mind  shall  not  fail  to  see 
God  in  the  glory  of  his  holiness — with  the  full  strength  of  his 
infinite  will  fixed  on  securing  right  and  preventing  wrong  moral 
action.  Such  is  the  object  presented  through  the  medium  of 
these  sanctions.  And  is  it  selfislmess,for  man  thus  seeing  clearly 
and  exactly  what  God  is,  to  love  him  ?  Is  there  any  influence 
more  directly  sanctifying  in  its  tendency,  more  fitted  to  make 
holy  than  that  which  is  furnished  by  this  vision  of  the  perfect 
God  ?  And  is  it  mean  or  mercenary  for  man  to  yield  himself  to 
do  the  will  of  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  and  thus  in  heart, 
in  will  and  character,  to  become  like  God  himself? 

2.  In  the  view  which  has  now  been  given  of  legal  sanctions, 
we  may  see  what  it  is  to  make  light  of  the  divine  threaten- 
ings.  I  here  speak  hypothetically.  If  God  is  administering 
a  perfect  moral  government  over  men,  then  in  view  of  the 
sanctions  of  such  a  government,  what  is  it  to  make  light  of 
them?  "What  are  they?  Manifestations  of  God,  peculiarly 
bright,  glorious,  and  awful.  They  are  manifestations  of  God 
in  that  character,  under  that  high  relation  to  man,  which  is 
more  desirable,  more  exalted,  more  worthy  of  Himself,  and  more 
useful  to  man,  than  any  the  human  mind  can  conceive.  If  a 
perfect  God  is  not  also  the  perfect  moral  governor  of  his  moral 
creation,  what  is  he  ?  I  am  not  now  saying  that  he  is.  But  if 
he  is  not,  I  ask  you  what  he  is  ?  Have  you  decided,  can  you 
decide  surely  and  beyond  all  doubt,  what  that  relation  is  which 
God  sustains  to  moral  beings  if  not  that  of  their  moral  gover- 
nor ?  Do  not,  then,  make  light  of  what  are  and  what  must  be — 
if  he  is  their  moral  governor — the  sanctions  of  his  law.  Prove 
Christianity  to  be  false  if  you  can.  But  do  you  know,  can  you 
prove,  that  God  is  not  administering  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment over  his  moral  creation  ?  This  is  at  least  a  possible  truth. 
There  may  be  such  a  God,  such  a  government,  such  sanctions. 
And  it  is  any  thing  but  philosophy,  reason,  or  magnanimity  to 
trifle  with  such  possible  reality  as  this.     Say  if  you  must,  that 


DEISTS   CANNOT    PROVE    GOD'S    BENEVOLENCE.    155 

you  do  not  believe  that  proof  is  wanting ;  but  do  not  ridicule, 
do  not  despise  and  make  light  of  it,  lest  haply  you  make  light 
of  God  in  the  brightest  splendors  of  his  glory. 

3.  Those  who  deny  the  view  iioav  given  of  the  sanctions  of  a 
perfect  moral  government  cannot  prove  the  benevolence  of 
God.  Deists,  universalists,  all  those  who  deny  either  the  fact 
or  the  nature  of  God's  perfect  moral  government,  profess  to  be- 
lieve that  God  is  perfectly  benevolent.  This  belief,  to  man  in  his 
weakness  and  consequent  dependence  on  his  Maker,  it  would 
seem  must  be  quite  welcome,  not  to  say  natural.  It  is  the  only 
source  of  light  in  this  dark  world ;  the  only  refuge  from  terror. 
What  an  amount  of  misery  must  result  from  the  thought  of  a 
tyrant  in  the  heavens,  and  of  the  cruelties  to  which  his  creation 
must  be  exposed.  Ignorant  as  men  may  be  of  goodness,  and 
little  as  they  may  esteem  or  desire  it  for  themselves,  all  know 
how  to  appreciate  it  when  compared  with  the  opposite  charac- 
ter, as  that  of  the  Being  who  holds  in  his  hands  their  destiny. 
Hence,  even  with  those  who  entertain  inadequate  and  false 
views  of  its  nature  and  its  necessary  doings,  it  is  a  fond  and 
favorite  belief  that  God  is  good. 

But  it  is  a  momentous  question,  can  they,  on  their ^incijjle-s, 
show  any  ground  for  this  belief;  can  they  prove  that  God  is 
good  ?  I  answer,  not  unless  they  can  show  that  he  is  adminis- 
tering a  perfect  moral  government  over  men.  If  this  can  be 
proved,  if  it  can  be  seen  from  the  light  of  nature  that  he  is 
administering  a  perfect  moral  government  over  men  involv- 
ing on  his  part  the  highest  approbation  of  right  and  the 
highest  disapprobation  of  Avrong  moral  action ;  if  it  can  be 
shown  that  he  has  so  hegun  the  administration  of  his  moral 
government  in  this  world,  that  he  can,  and  that  he  furnishes 
sufficient  evidence  that  he  will  finish  it  in  another ;  that  he  is 
carrying  forward  such  a  system  in  respect  to  each  individual  of 
our  race  as  rapidly  as  its  perfection  demands,  and  this  with  a 
singleness  of  purpose  to  complete  what  he  has  begun,  and  with 
a  benignity  of  execution  which  foretells  results  worthy  of  in- 
finite goodness,  especially  if  it  can  be  proved  that  he  is  admin- 
istering such  a  government  under  an  economy  of  grace,  then 
indeed  it  may  not  be  difficult  to  prove  his  perfect  benevolence. 
Then  Ave  may  be  able  to  show  that  he  has  adopted  the  best 
conceivable  system,  that  moral  evil  is  incidental  in  respect  to 
divine  prevention  to  this  best  system  ;  that  natural  evil  is  the 


156       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good ;  and  that  the  system  it- 
self, with  its  issues  here  and  hereafter,  is  as  decisive  a  proof  of 
the  goodness  of  its  author,  as  had  no  evil  but  the  perfect  and 
universal  happiness  of  his  creation  been  the  actual  result.  But 
if  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  be  shown  that  God  is  admin- 
istering a  perfect  moral  government,  involving  the  mani- 
festation of  his  highest  approbation  of  right,  and  his  highest 
disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action,  then  his  benevolence  or 
moral  perfection  cannot  be  proved.  Yet  more  is  true.  If  the 
proof  of  benevolence  is  wanting  in  respect  to  a  being  who  has 
been  acting  for  thousands  of  years  in  the  view  of  his  intelligent 
and  dependent  creatures,  the  want  of  such  evidence  is  itself 
proof  of  the  opposite  character. 

If  you  say,that  aside  from  the  fact  that  God  is  administering 
a  perfect  moral  government  over  men, there  is  abundant  proof 
of  his  benevolence,  I  ask, what  is  it  and  what  are  your  premises  ? 
You  must  know  or  prove  something  to  be  true  of  God, that  you 
may  frame  an  argument.  If  God  then  is  not  a  perfect  moral 
governor  of  men, what  is  he?  What  relation  or  relations  does 
he  sustain  toward  his  dependent  creatures,  and  what  are  his 
designs  and  purposes  concerning  them  ?  If  you  cannot  decide 
these  questions,  then  you  know  and  can  decide  nothing  to  your 
purpose.  On  the  question  of  his  moral  character  you  have  no 
data,  no  premises ;  and  you  must  either  believe  nothing  respect- 
ing it,  or  believe  that  he  is  a  selfish  or  malignant  being,  or  that 
he  is  good  without  evidence,  and  merely  because  you  wish  to 
believe  it. 

What  then  is  the  proof  that  God  is  benevolent,  on  the  sup- 
position that  he  is  not  a  perfect  moral  governor  ?  Is  it  said, 
that  as  a  being  of  infinite  natural  perfection,  he  must  be  also  a 
being  of  infinite  benevolence  ?  I  answer,  not  so,  not  of  neces- 
sity, for  he  is  a  free  moral  agent ;  nor  yet  of  certainty,  for  other 
moral  beings  are  wholly  selfish,  and  yet  are  not  so  through  the 
imperfection  of  their  natural  powers.  I  admit  indeed,  that  the 
natural  perfections  of  God  furnish  a  presumption  of  his  moral 
perfection,  even  sufficient  proof  of  it, if  it  can  be  shown  to  be 
uncounteracted  by  opposing  evidence.  But  it  is  a  kind  of  evi- 
dence which  in  its  nature  admits  of  opposing  evidence,  and  may 
be  wholly  neutralized  and  set  aside  by  his  acts  and  his  doings, 
by  his  treatment  of  his  creatures.  His  natural  perfections  then, 
in  view  of  the  existing  evil  under  his  government,  furnish  no 


CAN   GOD   BE    BENEVOLENT   AND   ALLOW   EVIL?    157 

proof,  nothing  like  proof,  of  his  benevolence,  until  the  existence 
of  evil  be  accounted  for  consistently  with  his  benevolence.  If 
a  father,  in  all  that  he  lias  done  for  his  dependent  offspring 
from  birth  to  manhood,  has  furnished  no  proof  of  affection  and 
kindness  toward  them  by  his  conduct,  to  what  purpose  should 
we  appeal  to  his  intellectual  and  physical  superiority,  or  even 
to  the  fact  that  he  is  their  father?  The  evidence  from  his  do- 
ings, from  the  utter  want  of  benevolent  action,  would  be 
decisive  against  his  benevolence.  Do  you  then  appeal  to  the 
doings  of  God,  and  claim  that  he  proves  himself  to  be  good  by 
imparting  more  happiness  than  misery  to  his  creatures,  and 
thus  rendering  their  existence  far  preferable  to  non-existence  ? 
This  fact,  though  it  may  be  necessary  to  the  proof,  is  not  itself 
proof  of  the  goodness  of  the  Creator.  Beings  who  are  not  benev- 
olent but  are  wholly  selfish,  often  produce  more  happiness  than 
misery.  Why  then  does  not  an  omnipotent  Creator  impart  per- 
fect and  unmingled  happiness  to  his  sentient  creation ;  why, 
under  his  government,  is  there  misery  at  all  ?  Do  you  say, 
that  nothing  is  contrived  to  produce  misery,  that  every  design 
and  adaptation  is  to  produce  good,  that  "  teeth  are  made  to  eat 
and  not  to  ache."  This  is  not  true  in  such  a  respect  as  your 
argument  requires.  Teeth  are  made  to  ache.  lie  who  made 
them, knew  that  they  would  ache,  and  for  some  reason  or  other 
intended  that  they  should  ache.  And  the  question  is,  why  not 
make  teeth  which  would  not  ache  ?  Is  there  any  pretense  that 
God  has  produced  all  the  natural  good  he  can,  so  far  as  mere 
power  is  concerned  ?  Do  you  then  say,  that  the  fact  that  crea- 
tures are  not  perfectly  happy,is  not  owing  to  the  want  of  power 
in  God,  but  to  some  limitation  in  the  nature  of  things  ;  that  the 
'system  by  which  alone  the  greatest  good  possible  to  the  Crea- 
tor can  be  produced  involves,  in  respect  to  his  prevention,  evil 
in  the  nature  of  things?  What  evil?  You  cannot  say  all  the 
natural  evil  which  exists.  Do  you  then  say  moral  evil,  and  as  a 
necessary  and  useful  consequence,  natural  evil  ?  Be  it  so.  But 
then,  what  is  that  system  which  thus.necessarily  in  the  nature  of 
things  involves  moral  evil  ?  Plainly  a  moral  system,  a  moral 
government ;  and  if  it  be  proof  of  a  perfect  God,  then  it  must 
be  a  perfect  moral  government.  But  now  you  arc  on  our 
ground.  You  are  reasoning  from  the  fact  that  God  is  admin- 
istering a  perfect  moral  government  over  men.  And  thus  you 
are  compelled  to  reason,  if  you  would  find  the  shadow  of  proof 


158        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

that  God  is  benevolent,  or  rather  if  you  would  set  aside  the 
most  decisive  proof  that  he  is  not  benevolent.  And  now  if 
you  mean  to  reason  in  proof  of  the  divine  benevolence  on  this 
ground,  then  do  not  forget  it.  God,  you  believe,  is  adminis- 
tering a  perfect  moral  government  over  men.  If  you  do  not, 
and  say  that  there  is  some  other  mode  of  proving  his  benev- 
olence than  on  the  ground  that  he  is  administering  a  perfect 
moral  government  over  men,  then  tell  us  what  it  is.  This  is 
one  of  the  great  points  in  the  argument  for  God's  benevolence. 
It  is  not  to  be  passed  over  lightly,  to  be  conceded  for  the  mo- 
ment, to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  conclusion 
and  then  forgotten  as  the  most  momentous  relation  of  God  to 
his  moral  creation.  If  God  is  not  the  perfect  moral  governor 
of  men,  we  want  to  know  what  he  is,  what  are  his  relations, 
designs,  and  doings  toward  the  children  of  men ;  we  want  to 
know  what  his  character  is ;  we  want  to  know  whether  there  is 
nothing  on  the  throne  of  the  universe  but  omnipotent  selfish- 
ness or  infinite  malignity ;  we  want  to  know,  in  a  word,  what 
the  God  of  the  infidel  is. 

He  is  not  to  have  the  benefit  to  his  argument  and  his  system 
of  the  belief  in  a  benevolent  God,  unless  he  can  prove  that  in 
truth  there  is  such  a  God.  This  he  cannot  do  without  admitting: 
the  fact — which,  as  I  maintain,  is  fatal  to  his  infidelity — the  truth 
that  God  is  administering  a  perfect  moral  government  overmen. 
He  is  shut  up  to  this  alternative.  He  must  admit  either  that 
God  feels  the  highest  approbation  of  right  and  the  highest  dis- 
approbation of  wrong  moral  action,  or  that  he  does  not ;  that 
God  reigns  over  us  in  the  glory  of  a  perfect  moral  dominion, 
or  that  the  Being  who  holds  all  destiny  in  his  hands  is  a  being 
of  unqualified  selfishness,  or  even  of  infinite  malignity.  From 
this  dilemma  there  is  no  escape. 

And  now  I  request  those  infidels,  universalists — all  who  deny 
that  God  feels  the  highest  approbation  of  right  and  highest  dis- 
approbation of  wrong  moral  action,  and  as  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernor will  express  these  feelings — to  look  carefully  at  this  point. 
You  believe  in  the  perfect  benevolence  of  God.  But  is  your 
faith  rational  according  to  your  own  principles ;  has  it  the 
least  foundation  or  warrant  unless  God  is  the  perfect  moral 
governor  ?  You  believe  in  God's  perfect  benevolence.  Why  ? 
Have  you  examined  the  foundations  of  your  faith  ?  Have 
you  seen,  that  if  you  believe  in  God's  benevolence,  you  must 


THE    DEIST'S    IDEA    OF    GOB.  159 

believe  in  God's  perfect  moral  government  over  yourself  and 
»all  men?  Have  yon  looked  at  the  monstrons  incongruity  in  a 
God  perfectly  benevolent,  and  yet  not  feeling  the  highest  ap- 
probation of  right,  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong 
moral  action?  Or  rather,  for  you  will  allow  me  to  ask  the 
question,  is  not  this  aspect  of  God  unwelcome  and  repulsive, 
and  excluded  from  your  faith  for  the  sake  of  what  seems  to 
you  the  more  attractive  and  lovely  view  of  a  being  who  is 
good  without  being  just,  and  virtually  indifferent  to  the  best 
thing  as  the  means  of  happiness,  and  to  the  worst  thing  as  the 
means  of  misery,  right  and  wrong  moral  action?  If  so,  see 
where  you  stand.  As  a  rational  being  you  are  bound  to  be- 
lieve in  an  infinite  God  who  is  virtually  indifferent  to  that  ac- 
tion in  his  creatures,  which  will  secure  their  highest  happiness 
or  misery — indifferent  to  the  weal  and  woe,  the  life  and  death  of 
his  own  creation — a  being  who  has  no  rectitude  of  principle, 
and  who,  for  aught  that  appears,  will  sacrifice  to  self-will,  to 
favoritism,  to  selfishness  in  some  form,  every  interest  of  every 
creature  whose  character  can  excite  no  love,  awaken  no  hope, 
inspire  no  confidence — whose  heart  is  unmoved  by  pity,  un- 
touched by  woe — a  being,  the  bare  thought  of  whom  is  enough 
to  fill  the  soul  with  consternation  and  dismay.  If  there  is 
any  thing  in  reason,  such  is — such  must  be  the  God  of  the  in- 
fidel. And  if  the  aspect  of  the  God  of  Christianity  is  unwel- 
come and  repulsive,  what  is  that  of  the  God  of  infidelity?  The 
character  of  the  former  to  a  wise  and  good  man  (I  know  I 
speak  with  the  approbation  of  every  man's  conscience)  is 
ground  only  for  hosannas  of  rapture — that  of  the  latter  would 
make  all  things  tremble  but  the  dark  throne  on  which  he  him- 
self sitteth. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

Y.  A  perfect  Moral  Government  involves  the  exercise  of  authority  through  the  medium  of  law. 
— The  nature  of  the  law  further  unfolded. — Seventhly.  The  Law  of  a  perfect  Moral  Government 
involves  the  requisite  sanctions  of  the  Moral  Governor's  authority. — 6th.  Legal  sanctions  in- 
clude the  highest  possible  degree  of  natural  good,  &c,  and  the  highest  possible  degree  of  evil. — 
Objections. — Punishment  ought  to  terminate  with  sin;  if  all  should  disobey,  all  ought  not  to 
be  punished;  incredible  and  impossible  that  God  should  adopt  a  moral  system  with  such 
liabilities. — Conclusion. 

I  now  proceed  to  show  as  I  proposed — 

6  tli.  That  the  legal  sanctions  of  a  perfect  moral  government 
include  the  highest  degree  of  nattered  good  possible  in  each  case 
of  obedience,  and  the  highest  degree  of  natural  evil  possible  in 
each  case  of  disobedience. 

The  doctrine  lias  often  been  maintained)  that  natural  good 
and  evil  in  their  highest  degree,  annexed  to  the  best  law  as  its 
reward  and  penalty,  become  legal  sanctions  by  operating  sim- 
ply as  motives  (or  inducements)  to  secure  the  greatest  amount  of 
obedience.  "We  have  seen  however, that  natural  good  and  evil 
employed  merely  in  the  way  of  motives,  cannot  become  legal 
sanctions.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  natural  good  and  evil 
employed  as  legal  sanctions,  have  beside  their  sanctioning  in- 
fluence and  as  necessary  to  it,  another,  even  the  influence  of 
motives.  This  with  the  sanctioning  influence,  or  with  that 
which  establishes  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor,  may  be 
necessary  to  secure  the  greatest  amount  of  obedience.  If  we 
could  suppose  a  system  designed  to  secure  the  greatest  amount 
of  right  moral  action  by  the  mere  influence  of  natural  good 
and  evil  as  motives,  and  to  the  exclusion  of  the  peculiar  influ- 
ence of  moral  government — the  influence  of  authority — then  we 
could  not  say,  that  the  highest  possible  degrees  of  natural  good 
and  evil  would  not  be  necessary  to  the  end  proposed.  Be  this 
however  as  it  may,  the  present  argument  for  the  highest  de- 
grees of  natural  good  and  evil  is  not  placed  on  this  basis.  It 
rests  solely  on  the  ground  that  such  degrees  of  natural  good 
and  evil  are  necessary  for  another  purpose,  that  of  sanctioning 
or  establishing  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor. 


THE    NATURE    OF    LEGAL    REWARD.  161 

This  argument,  in  view  of  what  has  been  already  said,  may 
be  thus  briefly  presented.  Natural  good  and  evil  are  necessary 
as  legal  sanctions  to  the  law  of  a  perfect  mural  government ; 
they  are  necessary  as  legal  sanctions,  for  in  their  relation  they 
establish  and  sustain  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor;  they 
are  so  as  being  the  necessary  manifestations  of  his  benevolence 
in  the  particular  forms  of  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience 
and  disapprobation  of  disobedience.  This  degree  of  approval 
and  disapproval  can  be  manifested  only  by  the  highest  possible 
degree  of  natural  good  as  the  reward  of  obedience  and  of  nat- 
ural evil  as  the  penalty  of  disobedience.  It  follows  therefore, 
that  the  highest  possible  degree  of  natural  good  as  a  legal  re- 
ward, and  of  natural  evil  as  a  legal  penalty  are  necessary  to 
establish  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor. 

This  argument  contains  two  premises  in  addition  to  others 
already  considered,  which,  obvious  as  they  are,  may  need  a 
more  particular  consideration. 

I  remark  then — 

In  the  first  place,  that  the  legal  reward  must,  for  the  purpose 
specified,  consist  of  the  highest  possible  degree  of  happiness  to 
the  obedient  subject.  + 

I  now  speak  of  that  degree  of  reward  which  pertains  to  a 
perfect  system  of  moral  government — a  system  in  which  the 
highest  happiness  of  each  individual  is  consistent  with  that  of 
the  whole.  Some  indeed  maintain  the  impossibility  of  such  a 
system,  affirming  that  the  sin  and  misery  of  a  part  are  the  ne- 
cessary means  of  the  greatest  good  of  the  whole.  To  this  I  here 
briefly  reply,  that  the  assumption  of  a  system  in  which  the 
highest  good  of  each  shall  be  consistent  with  that  of  the  whole 
as  an  impossibility,  is  wholly  gratuitous  and  unauthorized,  since 
the  supposition  of  such  a  system  cannot  be  shown  to  involve 
any  contradiction  or  absurdity.  And  further,  if  such  a  system 
of  moral  government  is  impossible,  then  a  perfect  system  of 
moral  government  is  impossible ;  indeed,  any  thing  which  can 
be  called  a  moral  government  is  impossible  ;  for  sin  being  ac- 
cording to  the  supposition,  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good,  there  can  be  no  sincerity,  truth,  or  benevolence,  and  of 
course  no  authority  in  a  lawgiver  who  should  forbid  it.  And 
lastly,  the  supposed  perfect  system  is  possible,  nothing  being 
more  absolutely  certain,  than  that  every  moral  agent  and  there- 
fore every  subject  of  a  moral  government  can  be  morally  per- 
il 


162       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

feet,  and  that  the  moral  perfection  of  each  and  of  all  in  its  true 
tendency,  would  secure  the  perfect  happiness  of  each  and  of  all. 
If  then  in  such  a  system  the  moral  governor  does  not  secure 
the  highest  happiness  of  the  obedient  subject  which  he  can  se- 
cure, he  does  not  choose  to  make  the  subject  thus  happy  ;  and 
as  the  highest  happiness  of  each  obedient  subject  is  consistent 
with  and  necessary  to  the  highest  happiness  of  the  whole,  he 
neither  chooses  the  highest  happiness  of  the  individual,  nor  of 
the  whole.  He  is  therefore  not  benevolent,  and  has  no  right  to 
give  law  to  a  moral  kingdom.  The  same  thing  on  the  present 
supposition  may  be  shown  in  other  forms.  !Not  choosing  to 
make  the  obedient  subject  happy  in  the  highest  possible  degree, 
the  moral  governor  does  not  express  the  highest  approbation  of 
obedience,  and  therefore  does  not  feel  it.  lie  therefore  proves 
that  he  is  not  benevolent,  and  of  course  subverts  his  authority 
or  right  to  command.  Or  thus,  according  to  what  has  been 
already  shown,  the  decisive  expression  of  the  moral  governor's 
highest  approbation  of  obedience,  is  indispensable  as  a  proof 
of  such  approbation,  while  not  to  make  such  an  expression 
gives  equal  evidence  of  the  want  of  such  approbation — proof 
<*of  the  want  of  benevolence — of  the  opposite  principle,  and  of 
course  of  the  want  of  all  authority  or  right  to  rule.  But  the 
only  conceivable  mode  of  proving  his  highest  approbation  of 
obedience,  is  by  conferring  on  the  obedient  subject  on  account 
of  his  obedience  the  highest  possible  degree  of  happiness. 
Otherwise  he  can  furnish  no  proof  that  he  does  not  feel,  and 
would  not  express  higher  approbation  of  disobedience  than  of 
obedience.  If  then  he  does  not  confer  on  the  obedient  subject 
the  highest  possible  degree  of  happiness  as  a  legal  reward,  he 
does  not  regard  obedience  as  he  ought,  or  as  a  perfect  being 
must  regard  it.  He  shows  himself  to  be  destitute  of  benev- 
olence, and  therefore  without  authority. 

Again ;  if  the  moral  governor  does  not  confer  the  highest  pos- 
sible happiness  on  the  obedient  as  a  reward,  there  can  be  no 
proof  that  he  would  do  it,  were  it  necessary  to  prevent  the 
universal  disobedience,  and  with  it  the  universal  and  perfect 
misery  of  his  kingdom.  Xor  is  the  supposition  of  such  a  ne- 
cessity unauthorized.  There  can  be  no  proof  that  it  does  net 
exist.  The  declaration  of  the  moral  governor  to  the  contrary 
cannot  be  received  as  evidence ;  for  there  is  no  proof  of  his 
benevolence,  and  of  course  none  of  his  veracity.     Such  a  re- 


DEGREES    AND    CONTINUANCE    OF    REWARD.       163 

ward  may  be  necessary  to  prevent  such  a  fearful  issue.  But 
since  the  moral  governor  refuses  according  to  the  present  sup- 
position, to  annex  such  a  reward  to  his  law,  when  as  we  have 
seen  it  is  dictated  by  benevolence  and  demanded  by  the  highest 
happiness  of  his  kingdom,  it  follows, that  there  can  be  no  proof 
that  he  would  confer  such  a  reward  were  it  necessary  to  prevent 
the  universal  disobedience,  and  with  it  the  universal  and  per- 
fect misery  of  his  kingdom.  As  he  does  not  confer  the  reward 
which  is  demanded  by  benevolence  in  the  one  case,  there  can 
be  no  reason  to  conclude  that  he  would  in  the  other.  What 
confidence  can  be  reposed  in  such  a  being — what  authority  can 
he  possess? — He,  a  being  of  whose  benevolence  there  is  not  the 
slightest  evidence — of  whose  selfishness  the  proof  is  decisive, 
and  who  may,  as  all  are  bound  to  believe,  consent  to  and  actu- 
ally prefer  the  universal  and  perfect  wretchedness  of  his  king- 
dom, rather  than  confer  the  highest  happiness  which  he  can 
confer  on  perfectly  obedient  subjects. 

Should  it  here  be  saidvthat  the  highest  possible  degree  of 
happiness  as  a  legal  reward,  is  inconsistent  with  different  de- 
grees of  reward  according  to  the  merit  of  different  subjects,  I 
answer,  that  the  capacity  of  happiness  in  different  subjects 
would  differ  according  to  their  character.  If  we  suppose  va- 
rious degrees  of  merit  in  subjects  who  are  perfectly  obedient, 
we  must  suppose  different  degrees  of  capacity  for  happiness. 
Should  each  therefore  receive  as  a  reward  the  highest  possible 
amount  of  happiness,  that  is,  the  highest  of  which  he  is  cap- 
able, degrees  of  reward  would  exist,  differing  according  to  the 
degrees  of  merit. 

In  respect  to  the  duration  of  reward,  I  remark,  that  from  the 
very  nature  of  law,  it  follows, that  reward  must  continue  while 
obedience  continues,  and  cease  when  obedience  ceases.  That  it 
must  do  so,  is  obvious  from  what  has  been  already  shown.  To 
suppose  reward  to  be  withheld  from  a  subject  who  continues  obe- 
dient, is  to  suppose  no  approbation,  but  disapprobation  of  obedi- 
ence on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor,  and  of  course  the  want 
of  authority.  That  the  reward  must  cease  when  obedience 
ceases — every  expression  of  approbation  of  the  conduct  of  the 
subject  on  the  part  of  the  governor  is  equally  obvious.  The 
demand  of  the  law  is,  that  the  subject  render  ceaseless  obedi- 
ence, and  the  subject  is  bound  to  render  it.  When  therefore 
he  ceases  to  obey,  he  ceases  to  satisfy  the  claim  of  law — ceases 


164       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

to  fulfill  his  obligation — ceases  to  be  an  obedient  subject.  All 
ground  of  approbation  by  the  moral  governor  ceases,  and  it 
is  impossible  that  he  should  regard  and  treat  the  subject  as 
obedient,  without  regarding  and  treating  him  as  he  is  not; 
without  regarding  the  non-fulfillment  of  the  claim  of  law,  as 
obedience  to  it.  The  governor  can  therefore  never  confer  a  re- 
ward on  the  disobedient  subject, without  approving  of  his  fail- 
ure to  satisfy  the  claim  of  law.  If  we  suppose  the  disobedient 
subject  to  reform,  this  cannot  so  change  his  relation  to  law  as 
to  cause  him  to  stand  right  in  law,  or  to  become  the  fit  object 
of  favor  and  reward  from  the  moral  governor.  He  has  not 
satisfied  the  claim  of  law,  but  violated  it.  He  never  can  satisfy 
it.  The  lawgiver  therefore  must  cease  to  express  all  approba- 
tion of  the  subject  by  ceasing  forever  to  reward,  or  he  must 
reward  in  view  of  his  unsatisfied  claim  for  obedience;  that  is, 
he  must  pass  by,  overlook,  and  virtually  approve  and  reward 
transgression,  and  thus  subvert  his  authority. 

We  may  view  this  topic  in  another  light.  The  disobedient 
subject  destroys  all  law  and  all  authority.  His  act  in  its  true 
nature  and  tendency  destroys  all  good  and  produces  all  evil. 
His  ill-desert  is  not  so  diminished  by  subsequent  reformation, as 
not  to  require  that  degree  of  penalty  which  is  necessary  to  ex- 
press the  moral  governor's  highest  disapprobation  of  such  an 
act.  The  deed  has  been  done  which  creates  the  necessity  for 
such  an  infliction  of  evil.  Without  it,  no  adequate  expression 
can  be  made  of  the  moral  governor's  feelings  toward  the  act, 
nor  of  his  benevolence.  But  the  principle  now  stated  will 
be  still  more  obvious, when  we  consider  the  degree  of  penal 
evil  which  is  necessary  to  establish  and  sustain  the  moral  gov- 
ernor's authority. 

I  remark,  then— 

In  the  second  place,  that  the  legal  penalty  must  consist 
of  the  highest  possible  degree  of  misery  to  the  disobedient  sub- 
ject. 

Were  the  moral  governor  to  inflict  a  less  degree  of  suffering 
as  a  legal  penalty  than  the  highest  possible  in  the  case,  nothing 
would  or  could  appear  to  show  that  he  would  not  inflict  greater 
suffering  for  something  else,  even  for  some  act  of  obedience,  than 
he  inflicts  for  disobedience.  Why  else,  when  every  object  and 
end  for  expressing  disapprobation  at  all,  imperiously  demands 
the  expression  of  the  highest  disapprobation,  when  as  we  have 


THE    LEGAL    PENALTY.  165 

seen, nothing  can  justify  him  in  inflicting  natural  evil  as  a  pen- 
alty, except  the  necessity  of  so  doing  to  establish  his  authority 
by  showing  his  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  or  that 
there  is  nothing  which  he  so  much  abhors  as  this  supreme  evil, 
why  does  he  not  show  it  ?  Were  he  to  make  the  transgressor 
this  enemy  of  all  good,  this  author  of  universal  and  absolute 
misery,  in  the  highest  degree  miserable,  that  would  put  at 
rest  the  question  of  his  own  supreme  abhorrence  of  transgres- 
sion. None  could  doubt  that  he  is  a  being  of  perfect  benevo- 
lence, and  has  the  necessary  feelings  of  such  a  being  toward 
wrong  moral  action.  If  this  be  not  done,  then  he  can  furnish 
no  proof  that  such  is  his  character.  He  furnishes  decisive 
proof  to  the  contrary.  The  appropriate  necessary  expression 
of  his  highest  abhorrence  of  rebellion  is  not  made.  Whatever 
may  be  the  reason  for  refusing  to  do  it,  it  is  an  insufficient 
reason.  He  furnishes  not  the  shadow  of  evidence  that  lie  acts 
upon  the  principle  of  immutable  rectitude  of  benevolence.  He 
does  not  show  that  he  has  that  supreme  abhorrence  of  rebel- 
lion which  a  benevolent  being  must  have,  and  as  a  perfect 
governor  must  show  himself  to  have.  There  is  no  evidence 
that  he  does  not  inflict  suffering,  regardless  of  every  good  and 
sufficient  reason  for  inflicting  it — regardless  of  every  principle 
of  rectitude,  and  therefore  as  a  matter  of  caprice  or  despotic 
humor,  at  least  as  the  dictate  of  the  selfish  principle.  There  is 
proof  rather  that  he  is  actuated  by  the  selfish  principle.  Xot 
acting  in  the  relation  of  a  moral  governor,  as  a  benevolent  being 
must  act,  he  proves  himself  to  be  a  selfish  being.  Why  then, 
if  disposed,  will  he  not  inflict  greater  suffering  on  the  obedient 
than  he  inflicts  on  the  disobedient !  What  confidence  can  be 
placed  in  the  character  of  such  a  being  ?  What  authority  or 
right  to  reign  can  he  possess  ? 

Again;  the  moral  governor,  by  not  inflicting  the  highest 
possible  suffering  on  the  transgressor,  shows  that  he  esteems 
the  transgression  of  Ids  law  a  less  evil  than  the  infliction  of 
such  a  penalty.  Transgression,  if  unpunished  in  one  instance, 
utterly  destroys  the  authority  of  law — destroys  the  highest 
happiness  of  all  of  which  the  authority  of  the  law  is  the  neces- 
sary means,  and  produces  all  the  misery,  of  the  prevention  of 
which  the  authority  of  law  is  the  necessary  means.  When 
transgression  occurs,  the  alternative  on  the  part  of  the  moral 
governor  is,  either  to  consent  to  the  destruction  of  his  authority 


166        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

with  these  fearful  results,  or  to  sustain  it,  by  expressing  his 
highest  disapprobation  of  transgression  in  the  infliction  on  the 
transgressor  of  the  highest  degree  of  suffering.  Such  being 
the  alternative,  he  shows,  by  refusing  to  inflict  the  supposed 
penalty,  that  he  prefers  a  far  greater  evil  to  a  less.  JNo  matter 
what  the  reason  or  motive  may  be,  none  can  be  supposed  for 
not  inflicting  the  requisite  penalty,  which  will  not  bring  upon 
him  the  imputation  of  preferring  the  destruction  of  his  author- 
ity, and  the  production  of  all  the  misery,  the  prevention  of 
which  depends  on  its  support,  to  the  infliction  of  that  penalty 
on  the  transgressor  which  is  requisite  to  maintain  his  authority, 
and  to  prevent  the  evil  resulting  from  it*  subversion.  By  re- 
fusing to  inflict  this  penalty,  he  shows  that  he  esteems  such  a 
deed,  with  its  ruin  and  its  miseries,  a  less  evil  than  the  inflic- 
tion of  the  highest  degree  of  suffering  on  the  author  of  the 
deed.  By  the  infliction  of  such  a  penalty,  its  evil  tendency 
would  be  counteracted  and  its  results  prevented ;  and  yet 
the  moral  governor  refuses  to  inflict  it.  He  becomes  there- 
fore the  voluntary  responsible  author  of  all  this  evil.  Who 
would  or  could  confide  in  his  character,  or  submit  to  his  au- 
thority I 

Once  more ;  if  the  moral  governor  does  not  inflict  the  high- 
est possible  suffering  on  the  transgressor,  there  can  be  no  evi- 
dence or  proof  that  he  would  inflict  such  a  penalty,  if  it  were 
necessary  to  secure  the  obedience  and  perfect  happiness  of  all, 
and  to  prevent  the  disobedience  and  perfect  misery  of  all  for- 
ever. I  do  not  say,  as  some  have  said,  that  this  penalty  is 
necessary  to  the  result  now  specified.  But  I  affirm  that  there 
can  be  no  proof  that  there  is  not.  The  moral  governor's  decla- 
ration would  be  no  proof  on  this  point,  for  as  yet  his  character 
for  benevolence  and  veracity  is  not  established.  There  can 
therefore  be  no  possible  evidence  or  proof  in  the  view  of  his 
subjects,  that  the  supposed  penalty  is  not  necessary  to  secure 
the  obedience  and  perfect  happiness  of  all,  and  to  prevent  their 
disobedience  and  perfect  misery  forevermore;  and  therefore, 
none  that  the  moral  governor,  with  the  knowledge  of  this 
necessity,  would  inflict  the  penalty — no  proof  that  he  would 
punish  a  single  individual,  were  it  necessary  on  the  one  hand 
to  make  his  kingdom  a  paradise  of  holiness  and  joy,  and  on 
the  other,  to  prevent  it  from  becoming  a  pandemonium  of  sin 
and  misery;  no  proof  that  he  does  not  prefer  the  destruction 


TIIE    LEGAL    PENALTY   ETERNAL.  167 

of  the  perfect  happiness  and  the  production  of  the  perfect  mis- 
ery of  all,  rather  than  inflict  the  same  evil  on  one  who  is  the 
author  of  the  direful  result ;  no  proof  that  the  least  security — 
the  least  barrier  against  sin,  exists  in  the  character  of  the  moral 
governor;  that  holiness  and  its  joys  will  not  utterly  cease  to 
exist,  and  sin  and  its  woes  reign  without  restraint  and  without 
mitigation ;  the  universe  become  an  unqualified  hell,  and  the 
moral  governor  stand  revealed  in  his  true  character,  a  selfish, 
malignant  being,  the  accessory  of  the  transgressor,  the  patron 
of  sin,  the  responsible  author  of  the  eternal  misery  of  all. 
Such,  according  to  the  evidence  in  the  case,  and  in  the  view 
of  his  subjects,  would  be  the  character  of  a  moral  governor 
who  should  refuse  to  inflict  the  highest  degree  of  suffering,  as 
the  penalty  of  transgressing  the  best  law. 

It  can  hardly  be  necessary  to  say,  that  according  to  the  view 
now  given  of  legal  penalty,  the  suffering  of  the  transgressor, 
if  it  be  possible,  must  be  unmingled  and  eternal.  The  only 
supposable  case  in  which  an  Omnipotent  moral  governor  can- 
not inflict  unmingled  suffering,  is  that  of  a  penitent,  reformed 
transgressor.  The  natural  possibility  that  a  transgressor,  under 
a  system  of  mere  law,  should  reform  or  return  to  duty,  and 
the  impossibility  of  rendering  such  a  one  perfectly  miserable, 
or  as  miserable  as  he  might  be  rendered  without  reforming, 
may  be  admitted.  On  the  supposition  however  of  the  refor- 
mation of  a  transgressor,  he  would  still  be  capable  of  suffering 
in  some  degree;  and  the  highest  degree  of  suffering  possible  in 
his  case,  would  fully  evince  the  moral  governor's  highest  dis- 
approbation of  his  transgression.  It  would,  as  such  an  expres- 
sion, fully  establish  his  authority,  and  would  be  necessary  for 
this  purpose.  In  the  case  of  the  impenitent  transgressor, 
unmingled  suffering  would  be  possible,  and  is  therefore  the 
degree  of  suffering  which,  in  his  case,  is  requisite  to  sustain  the 
moral  governor's  authority.  Its  eternal  duration  is  possible, 
and  therefore  in  all  cases  it  must  be  eternal,  that  it  may  answer 
the  end  of  a  legal  penalty  in  a  perfect  moral  government. 

Some  objections  to  the  view  of  legal  sanctions,  which  has  now 
been  given,  demand  consideration. 

Objection  1.  It  is  said,  that  on  the  principle,  that  reward  is 
to  be  continued  only  while  obedience  continues,  it  follows,  that 
punishment  is  to  be  continued  only  while  disobedience  con- 
tinues; in  other  words,  that  the  repentance  or  reformation  of 


168       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

the  transgressor  is  a  just  ground  of  forgiveness  and  favor  from 
the  moral  governor.* 

This  objection  derives  all  its  plausibility  from  a  false  view 
of  the  essential  claim  of  law.  It  supposes  that  law  does  not 
in  its  very  nature  claim  uninterrupted  obedience,  or  that  pres- 
ent conformity  to  law,  however  frequently  it  may  have  been 
interrupted  by  transgression,  is  still  obedience,  and  as  such 
justly  entitled  to  the  reward.  If  this  be  so,  then  all  that  the 
law  claims  is  to  transgress  and  reform.  The  claim  of  the  law 
is  satisfied  by  transgression  and  reformation.  To  transgress 
and  reform,  is  obedience  to  law  by  satisfying  the  claim  of  the 
law.  To  transgress  and  reform  is  therefore  all  that  the  law 
does,  or  can  justly  demand  of  its  subjects.  Without  affirming 
that  the  lawgiver  in  such  a  case  would  prove  himself  to  be  as 
well  pleased  with  transgression  as  with  reformation  on  the  part 
of  the  subject,  it  is  plain,  that  he  shows  himself  to  be  as 
well  pleased  with  transgression  and  reformation  as  with  unin- 
terrupted obedience.  This  is  too  absurd  to  be  maintained  by 
any.  But  why  is  it,  that  when  obedience  ceases,  reward  must 
also  cease,  and  punishment  begin,  never  to  cease  ?  It  is  be- 
cause the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government  requires,  and  to 
deserve  the  name  of  law  must  require,  the  uninterrupted  obe- 
dience of  the  subject,  and  because  the  lawgiver  can  sustain  his 
authority  by  the  sanction  of  reward,  only  by  rendering  reward 
to  that  which  satisfies  the  claim  of  law.  In  rewarding  for 
uninterrupted  obedience,  he  rewards  on  the  only  possible  ground 
of  a  just  legal  reward — that  the  claim  for  uninterrupted  obedi- 
ence is  satisfied  by  the  subject.  In  this  way  only  can  the 
reward  become  an  expression  of  his  highest  approbation  of 
that  which  satisfies  his  claim  on  the  subject,  and  thus  support 
his  authority.  If  obedience  be  interrupted  by  an  act  of  diso- 
bedience, the  claim  of  the  lawgiver  is  not  satisfied  by  the 
subject,  and  never  can  be.  Of  course  the  only  ground  of  con- 
ferring a  reward,  by  which  the  lawgiver  can  accomplish  the 


*  Many  advocates  of  the  doctrine  of  endless  punishment  unwarily  admit,  that 
punishment  is  to  be  continued  only  while  disobedience  continues,  by  vindicating 
the  justice  of  such  punishment  on  the  ground  of  continued  sin.  They  thus  concede, 
that  without  continued  sin,  eternal  punishment  would  be  unjust.  I  only  say  here, 
that  this  is  not  vindicating  the  doctrine  of  revelation,  which  declares,  that  "  cursed 
is  every  one  that  continueth  not  in  all  things  written  in  the  book  of  the  £tw,  to  do 
them." 


OBJECTIONS    CONSIDERED.  1G9 

end  of  a  legal  reward,  does  not  exist,  and  never  can  exist.  He 
can  express  no  approbation  of  the  subject  by  a  reward  confer- 
red on  tlie  ground  of  liis  satisfied  claim.  If  lie  express  appro- 
bation at  all,  it  must  be  in  view  of  liis  claim,  as  unsatisfied  and 
violated  by  the  subject  who  is  rewarded.  By  such  an  act,  he 
relinquishes  his  claim  for  uninterrupted  obedience, —  allows 
transgression,  which,  in  one  instance,  is  the  destruction  of  all 
good,  lie  shows  himself  satisfied  with,  and  approving  trans- 
gression, by  becoming  the  friend  and  patron  of  the  transgressor. 
The  reason  then  is  obvious, why  uninterrupted  reward,  accord- 
ing to  the  very  nature  of  law,  is  exclusively  connected  with 
Uninterrupted  obedience,  viz.,  the  claim,  and  only  claim  of  law 
on  the  subject,  is  satisfied  by  such  obedience,  and  can  be  satis- 
fied by  nothing  else.  The  reason  is  equally  obvious, why  unin- 
terrupted punishment  is  connected  with  interrupted  obedience, 
and  not  exclusively  with  uninterrupted  transgression — viz.,  the 
claim,  and  only  claim  of  law  on  the  subject,  is  not  satisfied  by 
transgressing  and  repenting,  but  is  as  truly  unsatisfied  and 
violated  as  by  continued  transgression. 

Again;  it  is  objected,  obedience  during  a  limited  period, 
does  not  deserve  a  future  endless  reward,  while  disobedience  in 
one  instance  does  deserve  an  endless  punishment.  The  good 
and  ill-desert  of  conduct  in  a  subject  of  moral  government  are 
to  be  determined  by,  or  rather  they  are  themselves  the  relations 
of  his  conduct  to  the  support  and  the  subversion  of  the  moral 
governor's  authority.  The  obedience  of  the  subject  supports 
the  moral  governor's  authority  so  long,  and  only  so  long  as  it 
is  rendered.  It  does  not  extend  its  influence  in  this  respect 
through  all  futurity,  and  thus  give  eternal  support  to  the  law- 
giver's authority.  The  subject  while  obedient,  fulfills  only  a 
present  obligation,  and  satisfies  a  present  claim.  He  therefore 
does  nothing, and  can  do  nothing  which  can  have  any  influence 
to  sustain  the  lawgiver's  authority  beyond  the  present  effect  of 
his  present  obedience.  Whether  he  will  support  this  authority 
in  future, depends  on  his  future  obedience.  Having  then  given 
no  support  by  his  obedience  to  the  authority  of  the  lawgiver 
for  the  future,  he  can  deserve  no  reward  for  so  doing.  The 
sole  reason  for  conferring  upon  him  a  reward  for  his  obedience 
is,  that  his  obedience  supports  the  lawgiver's  authority,  while  it 
is  rendered.  If  then  his  obedience  ceases,  so  does  its  influence 
in  this  respect  and  with  it  every  reason  for  a  reward,  and  of 
Vol.  I.— 8 


170       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    TIIE    ABSTRACT. 

course  all  desert  of  reward.  But  this  is  not  all.  The  subject, 
by  ceasing  to  obey  becomes  disobedient ;  and  by  this  one  act, 
if  its  influence  be  uncounteracted  by  the  execution  of  penalty, 
he  destroys  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor  forever.  He 
can  in  no  way  prevent  the  effect,  either  by  doing  or  by  suf- 
fering. He  is  as  ill-deserving  as  were  the  effect  to  follow,  as 
had  he  laid  the  authority  of  the  moral  governor  in  ruin  forever- 
more,  and  must  himself  remain  as  ill-deserving  forever.  His 
ill-desert  can  neither  be  diminished,  canceled,  nor  annihilated. 
The  relation  of  transgression  to  law,  its  tendency  to  destroy  its 
authority  and  to  subvert  moral  government  is  eternal.  It  is 
true, the  moral  governor,  by  the  execution  of  the  legal  penal ty, 
can  counteract  this  tendency,  can  prevent  the  actual  effect,  can 
uphold  his  own  authority.  He  can  do  this  however,  not  by  an- 
nihilating the  transgression  of  his  law,  nor  its  tendency  to  de- 
stroy his  authority,  but  only  by  punishment  as  his  continued 
act,  expressing  his  continued  supreme  disapprobation  of  the 
transgressor.  The  punishment  cannot  change  at  all  the  nature 
and  tendency  of  the  transgression.  It  simply  in  the  manner 
already  explained,  counteracts  this  tendency  of  transgression, 
and  thus  holds  back  the  effect  which  would  follow  the  moment 
in  which  punishment  should  cease.  The  sole  reason  for  inflict- 
ing the  penalty  of  law  is  not  diminished  nor  removed  by  its 
infliction  for  any  limited  period.  Of  course  the  ill-desert  of 
transgression  is  not  lessened  nor  removed  by  such  an  inflic- 
tion.  The  entire  influence  of  the  penalty  is  to  uphold  the 
moral  governor's  authority,  as  a  continued  expression  and 
proof  of  his  highest  disapprobation  of  transgression.  As  the 
tendency  of  transgression  to  destroy  his  authority  is  eternal, 
the  expression  of  his  highest  disapprobation  of  transgression  in 
the  form  of  legal  penalty  must  be  eternal. 

Let  us  look  still  further  at  the  doctrine  under  consideration. 
The  principle  on  which  the  doctrine  rests  is,  that  equity  or  jus- 
tice demands  that  the  penitent  reformed  transgressor  of  law  be 
forgiven  and  rewarded.  It  is  to  no  purpose  to  say, that  the  act 
of  forgiving  the  penitent  transgressor  is  an  act  of  sovereignty 
on  the  part  of  the  lawgiver;  for  it  cannot  be  vindicated  as  such 
under  a  merely  legal  dispensation,  unless  it  be  consistent  with 
benevolence  in  the  form  of  general  justice  ;  and  if  it  be  consist- 
ent witl i  general  justice  under  such  a  dispensation,  that  the 
subject  of  law  be  exempted  from  the  penalty  of  law,  then  it 


REPENTANCE    NOT    ENTITLED    TO    PARDON.        171 

must  be  inconsistent  with  general  justice  either  to  threaten  to 
punish, or  actually  to  punish  him  for  transgression.  Of  course 
justice  forbids  his  punishment,  that  is,  demands  his  exemption 
from  the  legal  penalty.  His  exemption  therefore  is  not  by 
sovereignty. 

In  respect  to  this  principle,  I  remark,  that  it  is  a  groundless 
and  unauthorized  assumption.  Who  will  pretend  that  he  either 
knows  or  can  prove,  that  the  great  ends  of  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment  and  of  infinite  benevolence  can  be  secured  by  such  a 
principle?  Who  can  know  or  prove,  that  were  the  moral  gov- 
ernor to  act  on  this  principle  in  a  single  instance,  it  would  not 
defeat  every  design  of  infinite  goodness,  and  fill  the  universe 
with  unniingled  and  unending  woe? 

The  principle  derives  no  support  from  the  practice  of  human 
governments.  Whatever  may  be  the  ground  of  pardon  in  these 
cases,  it  is  not  the  principle  of  equity  or  justice.  When  has  the 
principle  been  recognized  and  proclaimed  in  the  family,  that 
murderers  of  fathers  and  murderers  of  mothers,  or  in  the  state, 
that  traitors,  conspirators,  men  reeking  with  crime  and  blood, 
are  justly  entitled  to  pardon  and  reward  on  condition  of  repent- 
ance? On  this  principle,  the  vilest  malefactor  cannot  be  justly 
jnmished,  until  it  is  first  ascertained  that  he  is  not  a  penitent ; 
for  being  so,  he  has  an  equitable  claim  to  pardon  and  reward. 
Why  then  in  the  name  of  all  that  is  sacred  in  human  rights, is 
not  this  principle  of  equity  recognized  and  acted  upon  ?  Why 
is  not  a  court  of  equity  established  to  vindicate  these  rights  of 
injured  innocence? 

On  this  principle  a  lawgiver  has  no  right  to  punish  transgres- 
sion of  law  at  all,  but  only  to  punish  impenitence  after  trans- 
gression.    It  is  not  rebellion,  but  solely  the  want  of  repentance. 

So  also  the  transgressor  of  law  cannot  be  justly  punished  for 
transgression  which  only  deserves  punishment.  And  if  he  can- 
not be  justly  punished  for  transgression,  he  cannot  be  justly 
punished  for  that  which  only  deserves  punishment ;  cannot 
be  justly  punished  for  that  for  which  alone  he  can  be  justly 
punished. 

On  the  same  principle  repentance  itself  is  impossible.  There 
can  be  no  repentance  where  there  is  no  guilt  or  ill-desert.  But 
if  there  is  no  ill-desert  except  in  the  want  of  repentance,  then 
there  is  nothing  in  transgression  which  can  be  repented  of.  The 
transgressor  has  no  reason  to  repent  of  any  thing  whatever,  or 


172       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

at  most  of  a  transgression  which  furnishes  no  ground  or  reason 
for  repentance.  Is  it  said,  that  by  repentance,  the  transgressor 
acknowledges  that  it  would  be  just  to  punish  him  for  his  trans- 
gression? Then  plainly  justice  does  not  require  that  he  go  un- 
punished, i.  e.,  that  he  be  pardoned  for  his  repentance.  Besides, 
if  it  is  just  to  punish,  benevolence  or  the  general  good  requires 
punishment.  How  then  can  justice,  benevolence,  or  the  general 
good  require  his  punishment,  and  also  his  exemption  from  pun- 
ishment ? 

On  this  principle,  there  is  nothing  in  transgression  or  sin, 
neither  guilt  nor  ill-desert  to  be  forgiven  ;  nothing  except  im- 
penitence after  transgression.  But  there  can  be  no  impeni- 
tence ;  for  impenitence  implies  previous  sin,  guilt  or  ill-desert. 
So  that  there  can  be  nothing  to  be  forgiven,  neither  sin  nor  im- 
penitence. Forgiveness  therefore  is  impossible  and  inconceiv- 
able. There  can  be  no  grace  in  forgiveness ;  for  grace  is  favor 
or  kindness  to  the  guilty,  and  there  is  no  guilt  in  transgression, 
nor  yet  in  impenitence.  There  can  be  no  influence  to  deter  from 
transgression  in  law  nor  authority ;  nor  in  anv  thing  else  an  in- 
nuence  to  prevent  any  thing  but  impenitence  and  this  can  have 
no  existence.  Repentance  for  sin  cannot  be  a  duty,  for  sin  or 
transgression  involves  nothing  to  be  repented  of.  There  can  be 
no  reason  on  the  part  of  the  moral  governor  for  prohibiting  sin ; 
nor  for  displeasure,  should  every  subject  transgress  his  perfect 
law ;  for  the  only  evil  in  the  case  is  impenitence  after  trans- 
gression, which  impenitence  itself  is  impossible.  Nor  can  the 
moral  governor  with  the  least  reason  or  propriety  require  obe- 
dience to  his  law ;  for  as  there  is  nothing  morally  wrong  in 
transgression,  there  can  be  nothing  morally  right  in  obedience. 
In  short,  the  principle  that  justice  requires  the  forgiveness  of 
sin  on  condition  of  repentance,  subverts  all  moral  distinctions, 
and  every  relation  between  the  moral  governor  and  his  sub- 
jects. 

This  subject  may  be  presented  in  other  lights.  Let  it  be 
supposed  that  a  penitent  transgressor  is  forgiven  and  restored 
to  favor.  The  natural  and  authorized  conclusion  on  the  part  of 
any  and  every  other  subject  is,  that  if  he  transgresses  and  repents, 
he  also  shall  be  forgiven  and  restored  to  favor.  What  then  is 
there  in  the  legal  penalty  to  prevent  transgression  ?  Nothing. 
Its  sole  influence  is,  as  so  much  natural  evil,  to  deter  from 
impenitence  after  transgression;  for  the  moral  governor  has 


NO    PUNISHMENT    FOR    IMPENITENCE.  173 

authorized  the  conclusion,  that,  by  repentance,  the  penalty  shall 
he  avoided.  What  the  moral  governor  then  aims  at,  by  an  abso- 
lute prohibition  in  the  form  of  law  with  the  absolute  threatening 
of  the  penal  evil,  is  not  to  invent  sin,  but  only  to  prevent  its 
continuance.  For  aught  that  appears,  he  is  as  well  satisfied 
with  transgression  and  repentance,  as  with  uninterrupted  and 
perfect  obedience.  Is  such  a  ruler  entitled  to  respect ;  has  he 
a  right  to  reign  ?  Or  thus  :  what  is  there  in  the  law  to  prevent 
on  the  part  of  every  subject,  a  continued  series  of  alternate 
acts  of  transgression  and  repentance  ?  Nothing.  As  the  law 
threatens  to  punish,  not  transgression,  but  only  impenitence 
after  transgression,  and  as  transgression  according  to  the  sup- 
position is  followed  by  repentance,  there  can  be  no  place  for 
punishment.  Let  it  then  be  supposed,  that  acts  of  transgres- 
sion and  of  repentance  occur  in  a  series  at  such  intervals  as  you 
please  to  imagine,  and  what  shall  be  said  of  the  government 
and  the  character  of  the  lawgiver  ?  Can  he  be  entitled  to  re- 
spect, or  possess  the  least  authority,  or  the  lowest  possible 
qualification  to  rule?  In  such  a  case,  how  could  it  appear  that 
the  governor  would  annex  an  endless  penalty  to  transgression, 
if  he  knew  that  it  would  prevent  all  transgression?  And  if 
this  could  not  be  known,  how  could  it  appear  that  he  would 
annex  such  a  penalty,  though  he  knew  it  to  be  necessary  to 
prevent  universal  and  endless  transgression  without  repentance, 
and  with  the  complete  and  endless  misery  of  his  kingdom  ? 

Without  however  dwelling  longer  on  the  absurdities  of  this 
jxrinciple,  there  is  one  incontrovertible  fact  which  must  exempt 
this  part  of  the  subject  from  all  difficulty  and  doubt,  viz.,  that 
sin  or  transgression  on  its  first  existence,  is  the  fit  object  of  the 
highest  disapprobation,  and  therefore  requires  the  highest  de- 
gree of  penal  evil.  Sin,  or  the  transgression  of  law,  is  a  prin- 
ciple of  action  in  a  moral  being,  and  in  its  essential  nature,  is 
at  its  first  existence  one  and  the  same  thing  which  it  is  in  its 
continuance.  It  is  true,  that  by  continuance,  in  certain  circum- 
stances, its  strength  as  a  principle  of  action  may  be  increased, 
and  also  its  ill-desert.  In  some  circumstances,  this  is  undeniably 
true.  Under  the  reclaiming  influences  which  they  resist,  evil 
men  wax  worse  and  worse.  Placed  under  such  influences,  they 
are  under  the  necessity  of  forming  the  selfish  principle  de  novo 
with  greater  or  less  frequency,  and  thus  greatly  increase  the 
strength  of  the  selfish  principle — their  wickedness  and  guilt. 


1 74      MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE   ABSTRACT. 

By  continuance,  it  may  also  extend  its  actual  desolations,  and 
reveal  to  us  more  clearly  its  fell  malignity ;  and  thus  its  intrin- 
sic turpitude  and  ill-desert  may  be  iudged  by  us  to  be  greater 
than  in  its  beginning.  But  the  question  now  is,not  whether  it 
becomes  deserving  of  penalty  by  increasing  in  strength,  or  by 
developing  its  malignant  tendency  to  our  observation  in  actual 
results.  But  the  question  is,  whether  sin  becomes  ill-deserving 
or  deserving  of  penalty  by  mere  continuance;  or  whether  it 
would  cease  to  be  ill-deserving  by  being  repented  of?  I  an- 
swer, that  the  mere  continuance  of  the  same  principle  both 
in  kind  and  degree,  neither  gives  it  its  ill-desert  nor  increases 
it  one  iota.  Sin  continued,  differs  not  from  sin  begun,  except 
in  the  mere  circumstance  of  continuance,  which  can  in  no  re- 
spect change  the  nature  of  sin  or  increase  its  ill-desert.  Sin, 
when  it  first  exists,  is  and  must  be,  in  its  nature,  tendency, 
and  every  essential  relation  of  sin,  all  that  it  ever  is  or  ever  can 
be.  In  its  true  nature  and  tendency,  and  in  the  lowest  degree 
of  strength  in  which  it  can  exist  in  the  mind,  and  whether  it 
produce  its  appropriate  results  or  not,  it  prostrates  law,  author- 
ity, and  moral  government — it  destroys  all  happiness  and  pro- 
duces all  misery.  It  does  not  therefore  become  the  fit  object 
of  the  highest  disapprobation  by  its  continuance,  nor  by  the 
impenitence  of  the  transgressor,  nor  yet  by  any  thing  connected 
with  or  dependent  on  its  continuance.  It  is  so  in  its  essential 
nature.  As  such  an  object,  as  demanding  the  expression  of 
the  moral  governor's  highest  disapprobation  in  penal  evil,  it  is, 
when  it  first  exists,  all  that  in  its  nature  which  it  ever  can  be. 
The  transgressor  in  his  first  act  of  transgression,strikes  the  death 
blow  at  all  good,  and  puts  his  hand  to  the  production  of  com- 
plete and  universal  misery.  Then  it  is  that  the  deed  is  com- 
mitted— done  in  heart — requiring  no  continuance,  no  repetition, 
no  overt  acts,  no  results  in  woe,  to  give  it  its  full  measure  of 
ill-desert  as  the  transgression  of  law.  Were  the  full  results  of 
one  sin  instantly  to  follow  its  commission — the  destruction  of 
all  good,  and  of  all  the  means  of  good,  with  woe  unmingled, 
complete,  universal,  and,  without  the  execution  of  the  supposed 
penalty,  eternal,  who  would  not  see  in  these  results  the  nature 
and  ill-desert  of  sin,  without  supposing  its  continuance — would 
not  see  that  its  nature  and  ill-desert  could  not  be  changed  by 
repentance,  when  its  work  was  done  \  Suppose  now,  that  the 
execution  of  the  supposed  penalty  in  comparatively  a  few  in- 


NO   PUNISHMENT   FOR  IMPENITENCE.  175 

stances  would  retrieve  the  evil,  and  cause  a  universe  of  joy, 
bespeaking  the  benevolence  of  its  author,  and  lasting  as  eter- 
nity, to  rise  on  these  ruins,  would  not  the  execution  of  the 
penalty  be  demanded  by  benevolence;  would  not  every  voice 
of  reason  and  of  conscience  respond,  'The  judgment  is  righteous 
altogether  V  But  if  the  supposed  execution  of  the  penalty 
would  be  demanded  to  retrieve  the  evil,  why  is  it  not  required 
to  prevent  it  ?  We  say  that  it  is,  as  truly  as  a  perfect  moral 
government  is  demanded  by  the  highest  good  which  an  infinite 
Being  can  produce.  Sin  then,  as  sin,  does  not  derive  its  ill- 
desert  in  the  lowest  degree  from  impenitence,  nor  can  its  ill- 
desert  be  lessened  by  repentance.  Being  what  it  is  in  its 
essential  nature,  and  viewed  as  a  principle  of  action  irrespect- 
ively of  any  increased  strength  of  any  actual  results  in  evil, 
either  natural  or  moral,  and  continuing  but  for  a  moment,  it  is 
the  lit  object  of  the  highest  disapprobation,  and  demands  the 
highest  degree  of  natural  evil  as  its  penalty. 

Objection  2.  It  may  be  said,  that  as  punishment  can  be  jus- 
tified only  on  the  principle  that  the  greatest  good  requires  it, 
it  would  follow,  that  if  all  the  subjects  of  a  moral  government 
should  rebel,  benevolence  would  forbid  their  endless  punish- 
ment. If  it  be  admitted,  that  in  the  case  supposed,  benevolence 
would  forbid  eternal  punishment,  it  does  not  follow  that  it 
would  forbid  it  in  any  actually  existing  case,  nor  in  any  case 
in  which  a  benevolent  being  can  be  supposed  to  adopt  a  perfect 
moral  government.  ISor,  to  apply  the  objection  to  this  world, 
and  supposing  all  to  be  in  a  state  of  disobedience,  does  it  follow, 
that  benevolence  might  not  inflict  eternal  punishment  on  all. 
It  cannot  be  shown  that  the  moral  governor  might  not  punish 
rebellion  to  whatever  extent  it  may  be  supposed  to  exist  in  this 
world,  and  yet,  by  creating  other  worlds,  produce  on  the  whole 
an  amount  of  creature  happiness  equal  to  that  which  would 
exist  without  the  supposed  punishment.  The  possibility  of  his 
so  doing  seems  to  be  distinctly  recognized  in  the  Scriptures ; 
and  the  admission  of  it  is  also  important,  if  we  would  duly 
appreciate  the  mercy  of  God  in  the  work  of  redemption. 
"Think  not,"  said  John  the  Baptist,  to  the  unbelieving  Jews, 
"  to  say  within  yourselves,  we  have  Abraham  to  our  father ; 
for  I  say  unto  you,  God  is  able  of  these  stones  to  raise  up  chil- 
dren unto  Abraham."  As  if  he  had  said,  God  can  destroy  you 
forever,  and  yet  glorify  himself  by  creating  and  blessing  other 


176       MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

beings.  This  is  possible  truth,  and  as  such, it  fully  overthrows 
the  present  objection, as  applied  to  the  endless  punishment  of 
every  human  being.  Such  a  punishment  of  the  race  may  be 
consistent  with  God's  benevolence.  If  it  here  be  asked,  why 
then  did  not  God  actually  adopt  this  course?  I  answer,  not 
because  as  a  benevolent  being  he  was  under  the  necessity  of 
adopting  another — not  because  he  could  not  secure  as  much  (I 
do  not  say  he  could  secure  more)  creature  happiness,  by  the 
punishment  of  this  world  and  the  creation  of  another,  as  by 
the  redemption  of  this ;  but  because,  viewing  this  world  as 
actually  created — for  it  must  be  so,  if  we  suppose  it  to  de- 
serve punishment — it  may  be  true  that  he  could  himself  find 
more  happiness  in  blessing  with  redemption  creatures  already 
existent,  than  by  creating  others  to  be  the  subjects  of  an  equal 
degree  of  happiness.  lie  would  thus  derive  the  decisive  mo- 
tive to  redemption  from  himself,  and  not  from  a  greater  amount 
of  creature  happiness.  In  this  view  of  the  subject,  with  what 
emphasis  does  he  say,  "!Not  for  your  sakes  do  I  this,  but  for 
my  own  great  name's  sake."  How  rich  is  such  mercy  com- 
pared with  that  which  benevolence,  as  is  supposed,  requires 
him  to  show  to  guilty  beings  !  The  Christian  must  admit  that 
it  is,  and  the  infidel  that  it  may  be,  consistent  with  God's  per- 
fect benevolence  to  punish  a  revolted  world  with  everlasting 
destruction. 

More  can  be  said  on  this  point,  Whether  benevolence  re- 
quires the  eternal  punishment  of  the  transgressors  of  law  in 
any  actual  case  or  not,  it  is  undeniable,  that  there  cannot  be 
a  perfect  moral  government  without  it  as  the  penalty  of  trans- 
gression. According  to  the  principles  already  presented,  every 
subject  in  this  case,  would  be  authorized  and  required  to  be- 
lieve, by  decisive  evidence,  that  the  moral  governor  does  not 
regard  the  transgression  of  his  law  with  the  highest  disappro- 
bation. He  does  not  punish  on  this  princij^le,  but  plainly 
shows  that  he  esteems  it  of  less  consequence  that  his  law  is 
transgressed, than  that  that  penalty  be  inflicted  on  the  trans- 
gressor, which  is  requisite  to  sustain  his  own  authority  as  a 
perfect  moral  governor.  He  would  that  the  rebel  should  be 
made  less  than  completely  and  eternally  miserable,  rather  than 
secure  and  employ  the  necessary  means  of  the  highest  happi- 
ness of  all  for  eternity ;  yea,  rather  than  furnish  so  far  as  any 
evidence  to  the  contrary  is  concerned,  the  necessary  means  of 


EXTREME   PENALTY  NOT    IMPOSSIBLE.  1  V< 

preventing  the  absolute  misery  of  all  for  eternity.  lie  shows 
that  he  does  not  regard  obedience  to  his  law  as  the  supreme 
good,  and  disobedience  to  his  law  as  the  supreme  evil.  He 
shows  himself  too  kind,  too  indulgent  to  the  rebel,  to  make 
him  as  miserable  as  the  support  of  his  own  authority  and  the 
highest  happiness  of  his  kingdom  demand.  In  a  word,  he 
shows  himself  to  be  truly  a  selfish  and  malignant  being.  And 
what  is  law,  authority,  or  moral  government  in  such  a  case,  but 
a  pretense  and  a  mockery  ?  To  talk  of  a  perfect  moral  govern- 
ment then,  in  a  case  in  which  benevolence  will  not  allow  the 
authority  of  the  governor  to  be  sustained  by  an  endless  penalty, 
is  only  to  say,  that  a  perfect  moral  government  in  such  a  case, 
is  impossible;  that  benevolence  itself  forbids  the  necessary 
means  of  the  highest  happiness. 

Objection  3.  It  is  said,  that  it  is  incredible  and  impossible 
that  benevolence  should  adopt  a  moral  government  with  a 
legal  penalty  consisting  in  the  highest  degree  of  natural  evil. 
I  answer,  that  to  assume  the  impossiblity  and  incredibility  that 
benevolence  should  adopt  such  a  system,  is  wholly  gratuitous 
and  unauthorized.  It  cannot  be  shown,  nor  can  it  be  rendered  in 
the  lowest  degree  probable,  that  such  a  system  of  moral  govern- 
ment is  not  the  necessary  means  of  the  best  end  which  an  in- 
finitely perfect  Being  can  accomplish.  The  supposition  that  it 
is,  involves  no  contradiction  or  absurdity.  It  may  not  only  be 
true,  that  such  a  system  is  the  necessary  means  of  such  an  end, 
but  that  the  end  is  so  great  that  the  supposed  penalty  in  its 
actual  execution,  is  in  the  comparison  insignificant,  an  evil 
scarcely  to  be  accounted  of.  Great  as  the  evil  may  be  to  the 
individual  sufferers,  it  is  to  be  estimated  not  simply  as  related 
to  them,  but  as  related  to  the  great  end  of  the  system — the 
end  which  an  infinite  being  can  accomplish  only  by  means  of 
it.  This  principle  is  familiar  to  every  mind,  and  constantly  re- 
cognized by  right  reason  as  indubitable.  Why  are  the  crimes 
of  murder  and  treason  punished  with  death,  and  this  too  con- 
sidered only  as  fatal  to  certain  great  interests  of  time  ?  Is  not 
death  a  most  fearful  evil  to  man,  viewed  as  a  being  of  time 
only  ?  Why  then  is  it  made  the  penalty  of  some  single  acts  of 
transgression?  Because  the  interests  which  one  such  act  de- 
stroys, the  great  ends  of  human  society  can  be  secured  by  no 
other  means.  Do  you  say,  that  the  unminglecl  and  endless 
misery  of  a  being  is  an  evil  so  immeasurably  great,  that  it  is 
8*  12 


178        MORAL  .GOVERNMENT    IN    TIIE    ABSTRACT. 

incredible  that  there  should  he  any  necessity  for  it  as  the 
means  of  good  ?  But  remember  and  admit,  that  the  failure  of 
the  end  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  secure,  may  be  an  immeas- 
urably greater  evil.  If  you  refuse  to  admit  this,  you  are  not  a 
fair  reasoner.  If  you  do  admit  it,  then  why  should  it  be 
thought  incredible,  that  the  penalty  of  the  law  should  be  the 
unmingled  and  endless  suffering  of  the  transgressor  ?  If  the 
limited  and  comparatively  inferior  interests  or  end  of  an 
earthly  kingdom,  demand  for  their  security  the  penalty  of 
death,  why  may  not  the  penalty  under  consideration  be  justly 
inflicted  on  him  who  would  destroy  the  interests  and  defeat 
the  end  of  an  eternal  kingdom.  "Why  may  not  an  infinite 
Being  propose  an  end,  the  accomplishment  of  which  shall  re- 
quire the  infliction  of  the  highest  degree  of  natural  evil  on 
those  who  would  otherwise  defeat  that  end,  who  would  even  fill 
his  creation  with  unmingled  and  endless  woe  ?  The  sum  total 
of  penal  evil  actually  inflicted  under  this  system  may  be  ten 
thousand  times  less  compared  with  the  actual  good  of  which  it 
is  the  necessary  means,  than  the  penal  evil  in  any  kingdom, 
state,  or  even  family  on  earth  compared  with  the  good  which 
results  from  it. 

On  this  subject,  if  we  would  not  be  led  by  feeling  instead  of 
reason,  we  must  think  of  the  end — the  happiness  to  be  pro- 
duced— the  misery  to  be  prevented — the  end  worthy  of  an  in- 
finitely perfect  Being,  and  which  shall  be  a  full  expression  and 
manifestation  of  his  infinite  attributes — the  end  which  such  a 
Being  will  and  must  accomplish!  And  who  shall  prescribe 
limits  to  this,  and  undertake  to  tell  how  much  evil  may  be  jus- 
tifiably incurred  in  its  accomplishment  ?  But  it  will  probably 
be  said,  that  infinite  power  can  dispense  with  the  supposed 
penalty,  and  that  thus  its  necessity  is  wholly  superseded.  I 
answer,  that  a  perfect  moral  government  is  the  necessary  means 
of  the  end  proposed ;  and  that  no  degree  of  power  can  dispense 
with  such  a  system,  nor  with  any  thing  necessary  to  its  perfec- 
tion. Perfect  benevolence  must  adopt  the  system.  Power  can 
in  no  respect  interfere  with  or  change  its  nature.  Omnipotence 
is  here  under  a  restriction  from  the  nature  of  things,  the  gov- 
ernment of  free  moral  agents.  The  power  of  an  infinite  Being 
is  as  truly  restricted  by  the  nature  of  the  subject  as  the  power 
of  man  ?  What  can  power  do  ?  It  cannot  secure  as  its  proxi- 
mate effect  right,  nor  can  it  prevent  wrong  moral  action.     It 


ETERNAL    PUNISHMENT    CREDIBLE.  179 

cannot  destroy  the  power  of  moral  beings  to  act  morally  wrong 
without  destroying  their  nature.  In  the  language  of  Dr.  Dwight, 
"  Men  are  beings  possessed  of  the  full  power  to  originate  any 
and  every  moral  action."*  With  this  view  of  the  nature  of 
men  as  moral  beings,  it  is  absurd  to  talk  of  God's  producing  in 
them  either  rig] it  or  wrong  moral  action  by  dint  of  power;  as 
really  so  as  to  talk  of  producing  thought  and  volition  by  a 
machine,  or  breaking  rocks  with  arguments,  or  governing  the 
winds  by  motives.  I  am  not  saying  that  God  cannot  by  influ- 
ences consistent  with  the  nature  of  moral  agency  in  men,  in 
many  instances,  prevent  wrong  and  secure  right  moral  action. 
But  I  affirm,  that  in  view  of  the  nature  of  moral  agency,  it  is 
impossible  to  prove  that  God  could  prevent  sin  in  the  best 
moral  system.  Moral  agents  can  act  morally  wrong  under 
every  possible  influence  from  God.  To  suppose  him  to  pre- 
vent all  wrong  moral  action  on  their  part  in  all  cases,  may,  for 
aught  that  can  be  shown  to  the  contrary,  be  supposing  him  to 
do  what  in  certain  cases  he  cannot  do,  that  is,  that  he  can  do 
in  certain  cases,  what  he  cannot  do.      Vide  Matt.  xiii.  24. 

The  system  of  a  perfect  moral  government  now  maintained  is 
possible,  is  credible,  though  moral  evil  and  its  eternal  punish- 
ment in  some  cases  be  a  foreseen  and  actual  consequent.  It 
may  be  true  that  it  is  the  best — the  necessary  and  only  means 
of  the  best  end  which  an  infinite  Being  can  accomplish.  It 
may  have  in  his  estimation  more  value  than  all  the  worlds  and 
beings  which  he  has  created;  the  end  which  he  can  accomplish 
only  by  a  perfect  moral  government  may  be  so  great  and  good, 
that  compared  with  it,  the  eternal  destruction  of  such  a  world 
as  this,  nay,  of  thousands  of  such  worlds,  would  be  only  as  an 
infinitesimal  compared  with  infinitude.  It  may  at  least  be  true 
that  it  were  better,  that  heaven  and  earth,  the  created  universe, 
should  pass  away,  than  that  one  jot  or  tittle  should  pass  from 
the  law. 

Do  you  say  that  this  is  telling  what  may  be,  that  it  is  going 
off  into  the  unknown  regions  of  possibilities  ?  I  know  it.  But 
that  is  where  your  objection  goes,  and  we  must  follow.     You 

*  The  same  writer  also  says,  "My  actions  are  intuitively  seen  by  me  not  to  be  the 
effects  of  an  extraneous  cause,  or  of  something  beside  myself."  "The  changes 
passing  in  my  own  mind  are  produced  bj^my  own  active  powers."  "We  are  agents 
possessing  active  powers  by  which  we  can  originate  changes."  "  Man  chooses 
while  possessed  of  a  power  to  choose  otherwise." — Theology.  Sermons,  24,  21. 


180        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

say  it  is  impossible  that  God  should  adopt  such  a  system  as  I 
have  described.  I  show  you  that  you  cannot  prove  it,  and 
have  therefore  no  right  to  say  it.  Confess  the  possibility  of 
such  a  system,  and  so  take  back  your  objection  and  I  am  satis- 
fied.    My  argument  will  then  remain  in  unimpaired  force. 

I  have  thus  in  several  lectures  attempted  to  show  what  a 
perfect  moral  government  is,  dwelling  more  particularly  and 
fully  on  the  nature  of  its  legal  sanctions.  In  conclusion,  I  pro- 
pose to  make  a  few  brief  reflections  on  the  subject  and  the 
manner  in  which  it  has  been  treated. 

You  must  have  seen  that  the  principles  which  I  have  at- 
tempted to  sustain  by  reason  are  those  which  belong  to  the 
Christian  system.  If  my  endeavor  has  been  successful,  I  have 
furnished  on  the  authority  of  reason  a  full  vindication  of  these 
great  principles  of  Christianity,  and  have  thus  in  effect  re- 
futed every  objection  to  Christianity  which  is  derived  from 
these  principles.     More  particularly — 

If  the  view  now  given  of  the  nature  of  moral  government  be 
correct,  and  if  it  be  conceded  that  God  is  the  perfect  moral 
governor  of  his  moral  creation,  then  a  strong  not  to  say  the 
strongest  objection  of  the  infidel  against  Christianity  is  re- 
moved, viz.,  that  its  law,  or  rather  the  law  on  which  this  sys- 
tem rests, involves  such  a  fearful  penalty.  Most  infidel  writers, 
Paine  not  excepted,  have  conceded  and  applauded  the  excel- 
lence of  the  Christian  morality — they  have  praised  the  law 
of  Christianity,  but  have  denounced  its  penalty.  In  view  of 
what  has  been  said  in  these  lectures,  I  ask,  what  excellence 
would  pertain  to  this  law  without  its  penalty?  "Would  it  pro- 
pose or  require  the  best  kind  of  action,  and  so  far  as  its  excel- 
lence as  a  rule  of  action  should  be  understood,  furnish  strong 
motives  to  obedience?  Be  it  so.  But  it  would  not  be  a  law — 
the  law  of  a  perfect  moral  government ;  for  it  could  possess  no 
authority.  It  could  not  with  propriety  be  called  a  rule  of 
action.  It  would  be  advice  merely ;  leaving  the  question  of 
conformity  to  the  discretion  of  those  to  whom  it  is  given,  fully 
authorizing  them  to  do  their  own  will  without  the  least  respect 
to  that  of  God.  Yea,  promulged  in  the  form  of  law,  it  would 
subvert  all  authority  in  God,  disprove  his  goodness,  and  justify 
abhorrence  of  his  character  and  contempt  for  his  government. 
It  would  reveal  not  even  such  a  God  as  guilt  makes  welcome,  but 
a  being  who  would  fill  the  moral  creation  with  terror.     And 


TIIE    GOD    OF    INFIDELITY.  181 

would  such   a  law  be  excellent?     What  if  it  proposed  right 
action,  while  it  revealed  such  a  being  on  the  throne  of  the  uni- 
verse, while  itself  was  known  to  be — nut  the  law  of  truth,  not 
the  will  of  perfect  benevolence,  but  a  lie  of  infinite  malignity ! 
Call  this  a  rule  of  action,  law,  authority,  moral  government ! 
It  were  but  the  pretense,  the  mockery  of  it  in  the  hands  of  an 
omnipotent  fiend — the  very  patronage  of  iniquity,  sanctioning 
its  unrestrained  perpetration,  and  exemplifying  its  horrors  in 
the  unmingled  and  unending  miseries  of  the  universe.    Why  is 
it  that  men  cannot  see  here,  what  they  see  and  know  every- 
where  else  ?     Who  does  not  see  and  feel  the  power  of  law 
when  administered  by  that  supreme   regard  to  the  general 
good,  which  never  wavers,  never  flinches,  but  carries  it  out  in 
the  full  measure  of  its  penal  inflictions,  whoever  may  be  the 
transgressor?      Were  this   the   principle  of  our  civil    rulers, 
were  it  fully  understood  and  known  that  law  was  in  the  hands 
of  such  a  principle,  what  might  and  majesty  it  would  possess ! 
What  would  become  of  the  crimes  that  stalk  so  openly  and 
shamelessly  before  our  eyes?     And  if  you  want  an  illustration 
of  the  imbecility  of  law  contemned  and  fit  only  to  be  con- 
temned, look  at  the  too  frequent  use  of  the  pardoning  preroga- 
tive by  the  executive  of  our  states,  and  at  the  riots,  bloodshed, 
and  murders  perpetrated  in  anticipation  of  such  clemency.     If 
an  armed  mob  in  a  great  city,  infuriate  to  desperation,  can  so 
impressively  tell  us  what  a  law  without  a  penalty  is,  why  can 
we  not  learn,  that  a  law  from  God  without  a  penalty  reveal- 
ing the  feelings  and  the  character  of  a  perfect  Being,  would 
be  no  law,  Worse  than  no  law,  a  calamity  and  a  curse  to  his 
moral  creation  ?     Let  us  then  judge  of  the  law  of  God  as  it  is  ; 
judge  of  it  with  those  sanctions  which  reveal  a  perfect  God; 
judge  of  it  in  its  true  tendency,  as  the  only  law  which  is  fitted 
to  bring — as  actually  bringing  the  will  of  every  moral  creature 
of  God  into  subjection  to  his  will — then  shall  we  see  that  the 
law  of  the  Lord  is  perfect,  that  were  God  to  give  a  law  to 
moral  beings  without  a  penalty  revealing  his  holiness,  nay,  his 
full  abhorrence  of  sin,  it  would  veil  in  darkness  his  brightest 
glories — would  be  the  most  fearful  act  of  infinite  malignity. 

And  here,  I  venture  to  say,  that  the  main  principle  in  the 
reasonings  of  infidels  is  subverted,  and  their  stronghold  is  broken 
down.  Who  does  not  know, that  the  most  plausible  and  the 
most  successful  assaults  on  Christianity  derive  their  force  from 


182        MORAL    GOVERNMENT    IN    THE    ABSTRACT. 

the  fearful,  and  as  it  is  represented,  the  incredible  nature  of  its 
sanctions  ?  How  much  has  been  said  and  written  on  the  sub- 
ject, to  throw  Christianity  beyond  the  boundary  of  human  cred- 
ibility!  as  if  the  supreme  Lawgiver  of  the  universe  had  nothing 
to  do  in  his  administration,  but  to  caress  the  foundlings  of  his 
love,  and  to  scatter  blessings  among  them  whether  obedient  or 
disobedient !  How  often  are  appeals  made  to  all  that  is  revolt- 
ing in  the  cruelty  of  a  tyrant;  how  often  is  this  contrasted  with 
all  that  is  touching  in  the  tenderness  of  a  mother;  as  if  the 
governor  of  the  moral  universe  must  be  either  a  Xero  or  a 
woman !  Surely  a  mother's  tenderness,  lovely  as  it  is,  does 
not  exactly  qualify  her  to  rule  a  pandemonium !  To  resort  to 
such  appeals  in  argument  then,is  not  reasoning.  To  him  who 
knows  enough  to  reason  at  all  on  the  subject,  there  is  a  majesty 
in  law,  there  is  certainly  a  majesty  in  God's  dominion  which 
looks  down  with  contempt  on  such  expedients  to  degrade  it. 

But  so  it  is.  Thousands  allow  themselves  to  be  misled  by 
feeling,  and  to  overlook  without  a  thought,  the  magnitude  of 
those  interests,  which  for  their  protection  employ,  and  will 
forever  employ,  the  attributes  of  the  Infinite  Being.  Indeed, 
if  there  be  any  case  in  which  there  can  be  no  hope  of  a  true 
verdict,  it  is  when  the  question  arises,  what  is  the  just  penalty 
of  transgressing  the  divine  law,  when  the  transgressor  is  the 
judge?  We  may  safely  say,  that  there  is  no  subject  within 
the  limits  of  human  inquiry ,  on  which  the  human  mind  is  more 
liable  to  be  unduly  swayed  by  interest  and  feeling,  nor  one  on 
which  such  influence  is  less  apt  to  be  suspected.  Argument  in 
moral  science  depends  much  for  its  apparent  force  and  conclu- 
siveness, on  the  impression  which  it  makes  on  the  mind.  In- 
difference to  truth  and  error  here,  is  in  fact  out  of  the  question. 
In  the  present  instance,  our  reasoning,  instead  of  meeting  sen- 
sibilities to  welcome  and  receive  its  influence,  has  first  to  en- 
counter the  strongest  tide  of  opposite  emotion ;  and  so  feeble 
is  its  power  to  impress,  that  its  failure  to  convince  is  ascribed 
almost  of  course  to  its  intrinsic  weakness  and  insufficiency. 
Though  the  argument  should  be  absolutely  conclusive,  and 
should  utterly  baffle  every  attempt  to  detect  its  weakness,  it 
would  not  be  strange  should  it  leave  the  mind  unconvinced, 
and  be  itself  rejected  as  sophistry  too  ingenious  to  be  detected. 
Kor  would  it  be  any  more  surprising,  should  harshness  of  tem- 
per, or  at  least  the  want  of  the  more  tender  feelings  of  our 


TIIE    FEELINGS    SHOULD    NOT    DECIDE.  183 

nature,  be  imputed  to  the  author  of  an  argument  which  sup- 
ports so  revolting  a  conclusion. 

All  this  however  is  unphilosophical.  Reproach  not  the  ad- 
vocates of  Christianity  for  severity  of  temper,  in  maintaining 
what  may  seem  to  you,  gloomy  or  even  terrific  views  of  God's 
moral  government.  How  easy  is  it  to  recriminate  with  at  least 
equal  plausibility!  For  what  is  more  terrific  than  the  God  of 
Infidelity?  On  your  scheme, all  is  uncertainty,  darkness,  terror. 
On  ours  only,  is  there  light  and  hope  even  in  well-doing.  Hell 
itself  giveth  both,  for  it  upholds  the  empire  of  righteousness. 

This  is  a  subject  then,  which,  above  all  others,  calls  on  us  to 
protect  the  understanding  from  all  the  vagaries  of  the  imag- 
ination and  all  the  feelings  of  the  heart.  Here  if  anywhere, 
should  the  mind  be  disciplined  to  the  use  of  simple  intellect, 
and  be  prepared  to  follow  the  light  of  evidence,  to  give  up 
every  thing  to  the  supremacy  of  argument,  to  adopt  conclu- 
sions however  unwelcome,  and  to  make  sacrifices  however 
painful,  the  moment  truth  demands  them.  For  truth,  be  it 
said  to  her  eternal  honor,  never  can  require  a  sacrifice  which 
our  highest  good  does  not  also  demand. 


END   OF   SECTION   I. 


THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD. 


SECTION  II. 

THE  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  GOD 

AS  KNOWN 

BY  THE  LIGHT  OF  NATURE. 

LECTURE     I. 

Thesis  to  be  established  in  three  leading  propositions. — First,  God  administers  a  Moral  Govern- 
ment in  some  sense ;  for,  1,  men  are  moral  beings ;  2,  God  has  given  them  a  law. — Shown  from 
the  manifestation  of  the  tendencies  of  action  to  good  and  evil. — No  opposing  evidence. — Perver- 
sion of  a  design  does  not  disprove  the  reality  of  the  design;  nor  the  fact  that  such  perversion 
was  foreseen ;  nor  that  the  perversion  is  universal. — The  perversion  observed  may  be  temporary. 
— Tendency  to  wrong,  not  greater  than  to  right  action. — Cause  of  the  certainty  but  not  of  the 
necessity  of  such  perversion.— The  only  proper  method  of  reasoning.— Conclusion. 

My  object  in  several  lectures  on  the  subject  proposed,  is  to 
establish  the  proposition,  that — 

God  is  administering  a  perfect  moral  government  over 

MEN. 

For  this  purpose  I  propose : 

I.  To  show  that  God  is  administering  a  moral  government 
over  men  in  some  proper  import  of  the  language. 

II.  To  prove  the  equity  of  his  administration  ;   and — 

III.  To  prove  his  rightful  authority. 

In  proving  the  first  of  these  propositions,  we  shall  show  that 
God  is  administering  a  moral  in  distinction  from  a  providential 
government.  In  proving  the  second,  i.  <?.,  the  equity  of  his  ad- 
ministration, we  shall  show  that  he  has  given  to  men  the  best 
law ;  that  he  strictly  adheres  to  the  principles  of  equity  in  its 
administration,  and  will  sustain  its  perfect  authority. 

In  proving  the  third,  i.  e.,  his  rightful  authority,  we  shall 


GOD    A    MORAL    GOVERNOR.  185 

show  his  benevolence  or  absolute  moral  perfection.  And  when 
these  things  are  shown,  the  perfection  of  his  moral  government 
is  proved. 

In  the  present  lecture,  I  enter  on  the  proof  of  the  first  of 
these  propositions,  viz. : 

I.  God  is  administering  a  moral  government  over  men  in 
some  proper  import  of  the  phrase. 

I  have  already  defined  moral  government  to  be  the  influence 
of  authority  on  moral  beings,  exercised  by  a  moral  governor, 
through  the  medium  of  law.  To  support  the  proposition  now 
before  us,  it  is  necessary  only  to  show  that  men  are  moral  beings, 
that  God  has  given  them  a  lata,  and  that  he  enforces  conformity 
to  his  law  by  the  influence  of  authority. 

1.  Men  are  moral  beings;  that  is,  they  possess  the  powers  of 
moral  action,  and  are  placed  in  the  circumstances  requisite  for 
their  exercise.  The  fact  that  men  are  moral  agents,  I  shall  here 
take  for  granted ;  having  given  what  I  deem  sufficient  proof  of 
it  in  other  lectures,  and  also  because  I  suppose  it  will  not  be 
denied. 

2.  God  has  given  to  men  a  law,  which  is  a  decisive  expres- 
sion of  a  moral  governor's  preference  of  some  action  to  its  op- 
posite. 

That  God  has  given  a  law  to  men,  I  argue,  from  the  fact  that 
he  has  made  them  moral  beings;  in  other  words,  from  their 
constitution  and  the  circumstances  of  their  existence. 

Whatever  may  be  the  design  of  our  constitution, and  the  cir- 
cumstances of  our  being,  of  that  design  God  is  the  author. 
What  I  claim  then  is,  that  God  in  creating  men  moral  beings, 
and  placing  them  in  circumstances  requisite  to  moral  action, 
clearly  manifests  his  will  or  jjveference,  that  men  should  act 
morally  right  rather  than  morally  wrong.  The  proof  of  this 
position  rests  on  this  obvious  and  undeniable  principle,  that 
the  clear  manifestation  of  adaptation  or  tendency  to  an  end  in 
the  structure  or  nature  of  any  thing  which  is  made,  is  decisive 
proof  that  this  end  was  designed  by  the  maker,  provided  there 
is  no  opposing  evidence. 

I  will  now  state  as  briefly  as  may  be,  the  argument  from 
man's  constitution  and  condition  as  a  moral  being,  and  then 
show  that  there  is  no  opposing  evidence. 

It  is  then  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things  that  God  should 
create  a  moral  being,  without  placing -him  under  a  stronger 


186     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

motive — a  far  higher  inducing  influence  to  the  performance  of 
right,than  to  the  performance  of  wrong  moral  action.  "Whether 
a  moral  agent  be  created  or  not,  depends  on  the  will  of  God. 
But  that  right  moral  action  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
highest  happiness  of  a  moral  agent,  is  eternal  truth — truth 
which  no  more  depends  on  the  will  of  God,  than  the  equality 
of  all  straight  lines  from  the  center  to  the  circumference  of  a  cir- 
cle. Right  moral  action  is  benevolent ;  wrong  moral  action  is 
selfish.  According  therefore  to  the  essential  and  immutable  na- 
ture of  things,  right  moral  action,be  the  limited  temporary  self- 
sacrifice  it  may  involve  what  it  may,  tends  to  secure  the  highest 
happiness  of  the  agent,  as  well  as  that  of  others ;  and  wrong 
moral  action,  afford  what  limited  temporary  enjoyment  it  may, 
tends  to  secure  the  highest  misery  of  the  agent  and  of  others. 
These  ideas  enter  into  our  necessary  conceptions  of  right  and 
wrong  moral  action  as  their  essential  elements.  As  we  cannot 
conceive  of  matter  without  solidity  and  extension,  no  more  can 
we  conceive  of  right  and  wrong  moral  action, without  conceiv- 
ing of  the  one  as  tending  to  secure  the  highest  happiness,  and 
of  the  other,  the  highest  misery  of  a  moral  being. 

There  is  another  philosophy,  which  maintains  that  the  highest 
happiness  of  the  individual  may  come  into  competition,  and  so 
be  inconsistent  with,  the  highest  happiness  of  the  whole,  and 
that  therefore  the  individual  may  be  bound  to  sacrifice  his 
own  to  the  general  good.  This  philosophy,  endorsed  as  it  is 
by  great  names,  I  regard  as  absurd  and  self-contradictory, 
though  admitting  that  a  moral  being  may  be  under  obligation 
to  sacrifice  much  and  even  all  of  what  may  be  called  his  own 
happiness,  for  the  sake  of  the  general  good.  But  there  are  two 
facts  here  which  must  not  be  forgotten.  The  one  is, that  there 
must  be  some  motive  to  this  voluntary  sacrifice  of  his  own 
happiness,  for  there  can  no  more  be  choice  without  a  motive 
than  an  effect  without  a  cause,  and  there  can  no  more  be  mo- 
tive except  in  the  form  of  good  or  happiness  to  the  agent,  than 
there  can  be  motive  which  is  not  motive.  To  suppose  a  being 
then  voluntarily  to  sacrifice  absolutely  all  his  own  happiness 
for  the  sake  of  the  general  good,  is  to  suppose  him  to  act  with- 
out a  motive,  that  is,  to  act  with  a  motive  and  without  a  mo- 
tive at  the  same  time,  which  is  a  contradiction  and  an  ab- 
surdity. 

The  other  fact  will  explain  the  mystery.     This  is,  that  what- 


THE  PERFECT  HAPPINESS  OF  THE  GOOD.    187 

ever  degree  of  tlic  agent's  own  happiness  may  come  into  com- 
petition with  the  general  good,  and  which  for  this  reason  he 
may  he  bound  to  sacrifice  for  it,  still  his  own  happiness,  in  one 
respect — even  his  own  highest  happiness — can  never  come  into 
competition  with  general  good.  This  is  the  happiness  of  being 
good  and  doing  good /  the  happiness  of  promoting  the  general 
good,  which  lie  can  never  he  required  to  sacrifice.  This  is  not 
only  his  own  highest  happiness,  but  it  will  ever  be  great  in  pro- 
portion to  the  sacrifice.  Kay  more ;  just  and  adequate  views 
of  the  nature  of  a  moral  being,  and  the  true  tendencies  of  action 
on  his  part,  show  that  if  perfectly  benevolcnt,he  must  be  per- 
fectly blessed.  To  such  a  being,  under  every  loss  of  happiness 
possible  to  him,  there  are  fountains  remaining,  adequate  to  fill 
every  capacity  of  happiness,  even  the  fountains  opened  amid 
the  throne  of  God  and  the  Lamb.  Or  in  the  language  of  phi- 
losophy, such  is  the  nature  of  a  moral  being, that  perfection  in 
character  is  perfection  in  blessedness.  This  is  the  fact  which 
gives  such  peculiar  grandeur  and  glory  to  a  moral  agent. 
Moral  agency  in  its  very  nature,  involves  a  power  so  to  oc- 
cupy the  mind,  so  to  bless  the  moral  being  with  the  right 
object  of  affection,  that  any  loss  or  sacrifice  of  good  which  is 
possible  in  the  case  shall  be  accounted  as  nothing.  Paul  un- 
derstood this, when  he  spoke  of  "  suffering  the  loss  of  all  things, 
and  counting  them  as  dung  that  he  might  win  Christ,"  "  as 
having  nothing  and  yet  possessing  all  things." 

Such  then  is  the  nature  of  man  as  a  moral  being,  that  his  per- 
fection in  happiness  depends  on  the  use  he  makes  of  his  powers ; 
in  other  words,  on  his  moral  character.  And  if  it  be  not  true 
from  the  very  nature  which  God  has  given  him  as  a  moral 
being,  that  one  kind  of  moral  action  will  secure  his  perfection 
in  happiness,  and  another  produce  his  perfect  misery,  then  is 
the  eternal  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  action  an- 
nihiliated.  I  claim  then,  that  the  obvious  and  undeniable 
facts  in  the  nature  and  condition  of  man  as  a  moral  being — 
supposing  no  evidence  to  the  contrary — are  the  most  deci- 
sive manifestations  and  proofs  that  the  will  of  God  is,  that 
man  should  always  act  morally  right  rather  than  morally 
wrong. 

Indeed  it  is  inconceivable,  on  the  supposition  of  no  opposing 
evidence,  that  there  should  be  any  single  source  of  proof  so  decis- 
ive as  this,  any  so  fitted  to  place  the  fact  of  the  divine  preference 


188     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

of  right  to  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  man, beyond  all 
denial  and  doubt.  If  the  design  of  the  Maker  can  be  discovered 
from  that  which  is  made,  if  the  structure  and  position  of  an 
eye  or  a  tooth  show  this,  then  do  the  nature  and  condition  of 
man  as  a  moral  being,  show  that  he  is  made  to  act  morally 
right  rather  than  morally  wrong.  It  is  then — on  the  supposi- 
tion of  no  opposing  evidence — the  will  of  our  Maker,  it  is  the 
law  of  God,  that  man  should  always  act  in  the  exercise  of  the 
great  principle  of  love  or  benevolence. 

Our  argument  is  thus  far  hypothetical.  I  proceed  now  to 
inquire — is  there  any  opposing  evidence  to  set  aside  or  weaken 
that  which  has  been  adduced  ?  All  that  can  be  offered  is  fur- 
nished in  the  fact  of  the  universal  perversion  of  moral  agency 
on  the  part  of  man. 

All  that  can  be  necessary  here  is  to  ascertain  and  apply  the 
correct  principle  of  judging  in  such  a  case.  I  maintain  it  to 
be  this — that  the  perversion  of  a  design  clearly  manifested  in 
the  structure  and  condition  of  a  thing,  which  perversion  can  he 
easily  accounted  for  consistently  with  the  reality  of  the  design, 
is  no  evidence  against  its  reality. 

To  test  the  correctness  of  this  principle,  let  us  suppose  a 
watchmaker  to  have  made  a  number  of  watches  of  exquisite 
workmanship,  foreseeing  that  in  the  wisest  and  best  disposal  of 
them  he  can  make,  they  will  be  so  perverted  or  misused  as  to 
defeat  temporarily  the  end  to  which  they  are  so  perfectly 
adapted.  Let  it  be  further  supposed,  that  by  giving  the  re- 
quisite information  and  direction,he  shows  a  most  decided  pref- 
erence of  the  right  to  the  wrong  use  of  them,  and  with  ample 
skill  and  power  to  repair  the  machinery,  and  thus  in  a  great 
degree  to  redress  the  foreseen  evil,  he  actually  adopts  a  course 
of  measures  which  insures  such  a  result.^  I  ask, is  the  supposed 
perversion  in  such  a  case  to  be  traced  to  the  will  of  the  watch- 
maker ?  Is  it  not  rather  manifest,that  the  supposed  perversion 
is  a  direct  contravention  of  his  preference  ?  Do  not  the  perfect 
structure  of  the  watches,  and  his  directions  respecting  them, 
furnish  indisputable  proof  that  in  every  instance  he  prefers  the 
right  to  the  wrong  use  of  them  ? 

On  precisely  the  same  principle  of  reasoning,  I  claim  that 
the  perversion  of  moral  agency  on  the  part  of  man,  does  not 
furnish  the  least  opposing  evidence  to  that  given  by  his  con- 
stitution and  condition,  that  God  prefers  right  moral  action  to 


GOD    PREFERS    RIGHT    TO    WRONG    ACTION.      189 

wrong.  I  shall  hereafter  attempt  to  show,  by  the  best  kind  of 
moral  evidence,  that  he  will  in  fact  repair  in  a  great  degree  the 
evil  done,  having  actually  adopted  a  course  of  measures  per- 
fectly fitted  to  such  an  end.  All  however  that  my  present 
purpose  requires  is,  to  say  that  these  things  may  be  true.  This 
cannot  be  controverted.  It  is  possible  that  the  greatest  good 
required  exactly  the  present  system,  but  not  the  perversion  of 
moral  agency  in  a  single  instance,  under  the  present  system — 
it  may  be  true,tha,t  it  is  impossible  that  God  should  adopt  the 
best  moral  system  and  prevent  the  perversion  of  moral  agency 
in  any  greater  degree  than  he  does  prevent  it ;  it  may  be  better, 
that  moral  agency  should  in  every  instance  be  rightly  used 
rather  than  perverted  under  the  present  system  ;  and  of  course 
it  may  be  true  that  the  Creator,  notwithstanding  the  actual 
perversion  of  moral  agency,  prefers  that  every  human  being 
should  act  morally  right  rather  than  morally  wrong. 

If  it  be  said  that  God  might  so  have  increased  the  tend- 
encies to  right  action  as  to  have  prevented  moral  evil,  either 
wholly  or  partially,  I  answer ;  this  cannot  be  proved  as  I  have 
already  shown,  and  is  therefore  entitled  to  no  consideration. 
Besides,  to  have  altered  the  system  in  one  iota,  might  have 
been  to  change  it  for  the  worse,  and  produced  more  sin  than 
it  would  have  prevented.  The  fact  then  that  God  did  not  in- 
crease the  tendencies  to  right  action,  is  no  proof  that  he  does 
not  in  every  instance  prefer  right  to  wrong  action  under  the 
system  as  it  is. 

Is  it  further  said  that  the  omniscient  Creator  foresaw  the 
universal  perversion  of  the  moral  agency,  and  therefore  must 
have  intended  or  purposed  its  actual  existence  ?  This  is  readily 
admitted,  admitted  as  the  only  truth  which  can  form  a  basis 
for  confidence,  submission  and  joy,  in  view  of  such  an  amount 
of  evil  as  exists  under  the  divine  government.  But  I  have 
said  the  perversion  of  moral  agency  may  be  in  respect  to  di- 
vine prevention, incidental  to  the  best  system.  God  then  may 
have  purposed  the  existence  of  the  evil,  rather  than  not  adopt 
the  best  system  to  which  the  evil  may  be  thus  incidental.  But 
this  fact  would  give  no  shadow  of  proof  that  he  does  not  prefer 
right  to  wrong  moral  action  under  this  system. 

Is  it  still  further  said,  that  all  this  would  be  quite  credible, 
were  moral  agency  perverted  only  by  an  individual  moral 
agent,  but  not  so  in  view  of  its  universal  perversion  by  a 


190     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

world  ?  I  answer,  that  the  perversion  of  moral  agency  h y  a 
single  world  may  sustain  the  same  relation  to  ,its  non-perver- 
sion in  other  worlds,  which  its  perversion  by  a  single  individ- 
ual would  sustain  to  its  non-perversion  by  all  other  individ- 
uals, even  the  relation  of  an  infinitesimal  to  infinitude.  Of 
course  this  perversion  by  a  world  affords  no  more  proof  that 
the  Creator  does  not  prefer  right  to  wrong  moral  action  in 
every  instance,  than  would  its  perversion  by  a  single  indi- 
vidual. 

But  not  to  rest  the  argument  on  the  hypothesis  of  other 
worlds.  It  is  sufficient  for  my  present  purpose  to  say,  that 
there  may  he  a  future  state  of  existence  for  man,  and  that  the 
present  may  be  one  of  probation  in  relation  to  future  allot- 
ments, even  under  a  redemptive  system.  The  results  may 
show,  supposing  this  to  be  the  only  world  of  sentient  creatures, 
that  the  greatest  good  required,  not  indeed  the  perversion  of 
moral  agency  rather  than  the  right  use  of  it  under  this  system, 
but  the  very  system  under  which  the  perversion  takes  place. 
Of  course  it  may  he  true,  as  I  have  before  shown,  that  God 
prefers  the  right  use  of  moral  agency  to  its  perversion,  in  every 
instance  of  moral  action  under  the  present  system. 

It  may  be  still  further  said  on  this  point :  the  perfection  or 
imperfection  of  a  moral  system  is  not  to  be  decided, merely  by 
what  are  or  may  be  only  its  temporary  results  in  obedience  or 
disobedience,  but  by  its  nature,  its  adaptations,  tendencies  and 
probable  issues.  The  reason  is,  that  a  moral  government  may 
be  perfect,  and  yet  result  in  the  temporary  disobedience  of  its 
subjects.  Such  possibility  is  inseparable  from  its  nature  as  a 
moral  system.  It  may  be  in  a  high  degree  imperfect,  and  yet 
result  in  temporary  obedience ;  such  possibility  being  also  in- 
separable from  its  nature.  Effects  which  are  good  or  bad,  and 
which  are  connected  with  their  causes  by  a  physical  necessity, 
may  be  the  just  criteria  of  the  nature  of  their  causes.  It  is  not 
so  however  in  respect  to  the  supposed  results  of  a  system  of 
moral  government. 

Temporary  obedience  merely,  is  no  proof  of  the  perfection 
of  a  system  of  moral  government,  nor  is  temporary  disobedi- 
ence proof  of  its  imperfection;  for  such  obedience  may  exist 
under  an  imperfect,  and  such  disobedience  under  a  perfect 
system  of  moral  government.  If  therefore, from  our  knowledge 
of  the  system  itself — its  law,  its  subjects,  its  author,  his  provi- 


GOOD    AND    EVIL    TENDENCIES.  191 

dence  or  conduct  toward  his  subjects — we  have  no  means  of 
forming  a  judgment  respecting  the  tendencies  and  final  issues 
of  the  system,  then  plainly  we  have  no  sufficient  data  for  any 
conclusion  respecting  its  perfection.  It  is  indeed  quite  suppos- 
able,  that  such  premises  should  exist  in  the  case, as  not  only  to 
warrant,  but  to  demand  a  conclusion.  Be  this  however  as  it 
may,  and  momentous  as  the  question  is,  what  may  prove  in  the 
end  under  a  moral  government,  to  be  merely  temporary  re- 
sults in  obedience  or  disobedience,  are  an  utterly  insufficient 
basis  for  any  conclusion  respecting  its  perfection.  If  these  are 
the  only  sources  of  evidence  on  the  question,  then  there  is  none. 
All  that  we  can  say  is,  the  system  may  be  perfect  and  it  may 
not  be.  And  yet  philosophers  have  derived  their  principal, 
not  to  say  their  sole  objection  against  the  perfection  of  God's 
government  and  God's  character,  and  in  this  way  against  his 
revelation  and  against  all  religion,  from  the  existence  of  moral 
evil  in  the  world.  But  who  of  them  all  knows  whereof  he 
affirms  ?  Who  in  his  ignorance,  is  certain  that  any  degree  of 
moral  evil  in  this  world  is  inconsistent  with  such  issues  of  the 
system  in  a  future  state, as  shall  show,  in  brightest  manifesta- 
tion, the  perfection  of  the  system  and  the  character  of  its 
Author  ? 

But  it  may  here  be  said,  that  there  is  a  greater  tendency, 
under  the  present  system,  to  wrong  than  to  right  moral  action 
on  the  part  of  all  men,  and  that  the  author  of  the  system  de- 
signed that  it  should  be  so.  That  the  alleged  greater  tendency* 
exists  under  the  present  system  is  denied,  as  involving  an  abso- 
lute impossibility  in  the  nature  of  things.  The  objection  con- 
cedes that  men  are  capable  of  moral  action,  and  are  of  course 
moral  beings.  But  a  moral  being  is  one  whose  highest  happi- 
ness depends,  and  who  knows  that  it  does,  on  acting  morally 
right.  There  can  be  no  tendency  to  moral  action  in  a  moral 
being,  except  ultimately  to  obtain  happiness  by  acting ;  and 
the  greater  the  happiness  known  by  the  agent  to  depend  on 
one  kind  of  moral  action,  the  greater  the  tendency  to  that 
action.  When  he  knows  as  a  moral  agent  must,  that  his  high- 
est happiness  depends  on  his  acting  morally  right,  there  is  of 


*  Tendency  is  that  in  the  nature  of  an  antecedent  in  a  sequence  which  will  give 
the  certainty  of  the  consequent,  provided  there  is  not  that  in  another  antecedent 
which  will  give  the  certainty  of  the  opposite. 


192     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

course  a  greater  tendency  in  his  case  to  act  morally  right,  than 
to  act  morally  wrong.  To  suppose  a  greater  tendency  in  his 
case  to  act  morally  wrong  than  morally  right,  is  to  suppose 
that  his  highest  happiness  depends,  and  he  knows  it,  on  his 
acting  morally  wrong,  when  his  highest  happiness  does  not 
depend  on  his  so  acting,  and  when  he  knows  that  it  does  not — 
which  is  a  twofold  contradiction,  and  an  absolute  impossibility 
in  the  nature  of  things.  I  am  not  saying,  that  a  moral  being, 
with  that  knowledge  which  is  necessary  to  constitute  him  such, 
may  not  act  morally  wrong.  But  I  maintain  that  if  he  does, 
he  so  acts,  having  the  knowledge  that  his  highest  happiness 
consists  in  acting  morally  right ;  and  that  therefore  in  so  doing, 
he  does  not  act  according  to  the  greater  tendency.  JSTor  am  I 
saying,  that  when  a  moral  agent  acts  morally  wrong,  there  is 
not  a  previous  certainty  of  his  so  doing ;  nor  that  there  is  not 
a  cause,  ground,  or  reason  of  such  previous  certainty.  But  I 
maintain  that  there  is  nothing  in  these,  which,  when  speaking 
reflectively  for  the  purposes  of  philosophic  truth,  can  be  pro- 
perly called  a  greater  tendency  to  wrong  than  right  moral 
action — provided  any  thing  more  be  meant  by  the  language, 
than  that  there  is  that  in  the  nature  of  the  motive — which  in 
distinction  from  power  is  the  cause  of  the  wrong  moral  act — 
compared  with  the  motive  to  right  moral  action,  that  gives 
the  certainty  of  the  wrong  instead  of  the  right  moral  action. 
I  have  no  occasion  to  say,  that  the  phrase  may  not  be  properly, 
or  according  to  common  usage,  applied  to  the  cause  of  wrong 
moral  action  in  a  further  meaning  than  that  now  specified,  nor 
do  I  admit  that  it  can  be.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  applied,  in  a 
further  meaning,  by  none  but  philosophers,  and  only  by  that 
class  of  philosophers  and  divines  who  maintain  the  doctrine  of 
necessity  as  opposed  to  moral  liberty,  and  to  be  therefore  not  a 
proper,  but  a  mere  sectarian  or  partisan  usage.*  Granting  how- 
ever that  common  usage  sanctions  the  propriety  of  speaking  of 
a  stronger  tendency  to  wrong  than  to  right  moral  action,  still, 


*  I  know  of  no  attempt  to  justify  such  language  as  "  stronger  motive,"  "strong- 
est motive,"  "greater  power  or  strength  of  motive,"  "greater  or  stronger  tendency 
of  motive,"  to  morally  wrong  than  to  morally  right  acts  of  will,  as  the  language  of 
popular  or  common  usage.  The  popular  language  of  the  Scriptures  is  directly  and 
abundantly  the  contrary.  It  would  seem  that  divines,  like  President  Edwards, 
who  so  arbitrarily  and  unwarrantably  use  such  language,  should  well  consider  this 
topic  as  presented  in  the  Scriptures. 


THE  STRONGER  TENDENCY.  193 

as  we  have  before  shown,  it  is  in  every  such  case,  the  lan- 
guage of  appearance,  and  in  its  actual  meaning  when  thus 
employed,  entirely  false.  And  what  if  usage  sanctions  the 
propriety  of  the  language  of  appearance,  in  its  false  mean- 
ing in  certain  cases  and  for  certain  purposes,  does  this  show 
that  it  is  to  be  employed  for  scientific  uses  ?  What  if,  for 
the  ordinary  purposes  of  life,  it  is  proper  to  speak  of  the  sun 
as  rising  and  setting ;  is  the  astronomer  to  adopt  this  language 
for  the  purposes  of  science  ? 

But  it  may  be  asked — if  there  are  two  opposing  tendencies 
and  one  prevails  over  the  other,  is  not  the  former  a  greater  or 
stronger  tendency  than  the  latter?  I  answer,  that  while  this 
may  be  said  with  propriety  and  with  truth  in  respect  to  physi- 
cal or  natural  phenomena,  it  cannot  in  the  same  meaning  be 
said  respecting  moral  phenomena.  In  the  one  case,  the  oppos- 
ing tendencies  result  from  the  opposing  powers  of  opposing 
antecedents,  as  when  we  speak  of  the  greater  force  or  stronger 
arm  prevailing  over  the  weaker.  But  in  respect  to  the  ante- 
cedents of  moral  phenomena  or  acts  of  will,  there  is  no  such 
conflict  of  opposing  powers ;  and  to  speak  as  if  there  were,  is 
at  best  to  use  the  language  of  appearance  which  in  its  actual 
meaning  is  known  to  be  false.  And  further,  it  may  be  trhily 
and  properly  said,  that  there  is  a  greater  or  stronger  tendency 
on  the  part  of  every  moral  being  to  morally  right  than  to  mor- 
ally wrong  action.  If  it  be  asked  in  what  sense,  I  answer — 
not  in  that  in  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  language  would  be 
known  to  be  false,  but  in  a  very  different  meaning,  viz. :  to 
denote  the  fact,  that  in  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  a  moral 
being,  as  these  are  actually  known  to  us  on  a  priori  grounds, 
and  known  as  moral  causes  merely,  there  is  more  adaptation 
or  fitness  to  secure  right  than  wrong  moral  action.  While  no 
one  can  doubt  the  propriety  of  using  the  language  in  this 
application,  it  cannot  be  supposed  to  be  so  used, except  as  the 
language  of  appearance,  and  surely  not  to  denote  a  ground  of 
the  certainty  of  right  moral  action.  So  true  is  it  in  the  proper 
use  of  language,  that  there  is  a  greater  tendency  to  right  than 
to  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  moral  beings  in  the 
sense  now  explained,  that,  judging  on  a  priori  ground,  there 
is  far  more  reason  for  the  conclusion  that  they  will  act 
morally  right,  than  that  they  will  act  morally  wrong ;  and 
that  wrong  moral  action  on  their  part,  in  view  of  the  tend- 
Vol.  I.— 9  13 


194     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

ency  to   right  moral   action,  is  cause  for  universal  astonish- 
ment as  utterly  irrational. 

But  it  will  be  further  asked,  how  is  this  if  we  judge  a  poste- 
riori— how  is  it  when  we  see  a  whole  race  of  moral  beings 
uniformly  acting  morally  wrong  instead  of  morally  right? 
Can  we  in  view  of  such  a  fact,  say  that  there  is  not  a  greater 
tendency  in  their  case  to  act  morally  wrong  than  morally 
right  ?  I  answer ;  first,  that  without  denying  the  propriety 
of  saying  that  there  is  a  greater  or  stronger  tendency  to  wrong 
moral  action  than  to  its  opposite  on  the  part  of  men,  inasmuch 
as  the  false  language  of  appearance  is  often  proper,  I  affirm 
that  the  only  truth  in  the  case  to  which  such  language  can 
respect,  is  that  there  is  a  ground  or  reason  of  the  certainty  of 
wrong  moral  action.  There  can  be  no  evidence  from  the  uni- 
versal phenomenon  of  wrong  moral  action,  of  a  greater  tend- 
ency to  such  action  in  the  meaning  in  which  such  language 
may  now  be  supposed  to  be  properly  used.  There  may  be 
and  in  my  view  there  is,  a  ground  or  reason  for  the  certainty 
of  wrong  moral  action,  which  fact  in  the  false  and  harmless 
language  of  appearance  is  mistaken  for  a  stronger  tendency  to 
wrong  moral  action.  But  there  can  be  no  truth  in  the  actual 
meaning  of  this  language  of  appearance  thus  employed.  The 
tendency  to  right  and  to  wrong  moral  action  in  every  moral 
being  implies  no  conflict  between  opposing  poicers  or  influences 
in  which  the  one  overcomes  the  other  as  being  the  superior  or 
greater  power  or  influence.  The  only  power  in  the  case  is  the 
will,  which  is  equally  adequate  to  either  act.  Power  or  influ- 
ence as  we  have  shown,  cannot  be  predicated  of  motive  or  of 
any  thing  which  determines  the  will.  Of  course  no  greater 
tendency  which  depends  on  such  power  or  influence  can  be 
truly  inferred  or  predicated  of  it.  There  is  the  same  possibil- 
ity, so  far  as  possibility  depends  on  power,  to  either  act  instead 
of  the  other.  In  view  of  this  known  power  and  possibility  as 
given  by  this  power,  neither  the  fact  of  right  nor  of  wrong 
moral  action,  nor  the  uniformity  of  either,  can  be  the  least  evi- 
dence of  a  greater  tendency  to  one  than  to  the  other,  which 
depends  on  power  or  influence.  The  only  sense  in  which  it 
can  be  said  that  there  is  a  greater  tendency  to  right  than  to 
wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  men,  implies  nothing  which 
can  with  truth  be  called  greater  power  or  influence  to  secure 
right  than  wrong  moral  action,  which  also  gives  the  certainty 


GROUND    OF    CERTAINTY.  195 

of  right  moral  action.  Still  less  can  it  be  supposed  that  what 
may  be  called  the  less  tendency  to  wrong  moral  action,  should 
involve  any  thing  in  its  nature  which  makes  it  certain.  We 
are  indeed,  in  view  of  the  fact  of  wrong  moral  action  on  the 
part  of  men, obliged  to  admit  some  ground  or  reason  of  the  cer- 
tainty of  such  action  with  power  to  the  contrary.  But  this 
is  not  and  cannot  be  a  greater  tendency  to  such  action,  but  is  a 
ground  or  reason  of  its  certainty,  notwithstanding  a  greater 
tendency  as  above  explained  to  right  moral  action.  Such  is 
always  the  fact  when  the  mind  knowingly  chooses  the  infe- 
rior good.  If  it  be  asked,  what  gives  this  certainty  of  the 
wrong  moral  action,  we  may  or  may  not  be  able  to  assign 
some  one  antecedent  as  the  cause,  ground  or  reason  of  this  cer- 
tainty in  all  cases.  It  may  be  the  nearness  of  the  inferior  good, 
or  it  may  be  the  peculiar  vividness  of  the  mind's  view  of  it,  or 
it  may  be  any  one  of  many  other  possible  circumstances.  Nor  is 
it  in  the  lowest  degree  incredible, that  the  ground  or  reason  of 
this  certainty  should  vary  in  different  cases,  and  that  no  com- 
mon characteristic  of  such  antecedents  can  be  affirmed,  except 
that  they  give  the  certainty  of  wrong  moral  action.  Be  these 
things  as  they  may,  still  the  mind  in  every  moral  choice, 
knows  in  the  most  absolute  manner  in  which  truth  can  be 
known,  that  its  own  highest  happiness  depends  on  choosing 
morally  right.  Otherwise  the  choice  can  have  no  moral  char- 
acter. I  only  ask,  can  reasoning  from  physical  tendencies  set 
aside  this  truth  of  absolute  knowledge,  that  the  greater  is  the 
happiness  known  to  depend  on  an  act  of  choice,  the  greater  the 
tendency  to  that  act?  If  not,  then  instead  of  a  greater  tend- 
ency to  wrong  than  to  right,  there  is  a  greater  tendency  to  right 
than  to  wrong  moral  action,  under  the  present  system. 

But  it  may  be  said,  still  there  is  a  cause,  ground  or  reason 
of  the  certainty  of  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  all  men 
under  the  present  system.  This  is  readily  admitted.  But  this 
cause,  ground  or  reason  of  the  mere  certainty  of  wrong  moral 
action  giving  no  necessity  for  it,  but  implying  power  to  the 
contrary,  may  in  respect  to  divine  prevention,  be  incidental 
to  the  best  moral  system.  Or  thus,  the  present  system  not- 
withstanding this  metaphysical  imperfection,  may  be  not  only 
better  than  none,  but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator.  This 
cause,  ground  or  reason  of  the  certainty  of  wrong  moral  action 
may  be   said  to  be  a  tendency  to  such  action.     Though  it 


196     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

be  less  than  that  to  tlie  opposite,  still  it  may  be  a  tendency 
which  gives  the  certainty  of  wrong  action.  Some  degree  of 
tendency  to  wrong  action  is  unavoidable  in  a  moral  system  ; 
and  while  if  it  were  greater  to  wrong  than  to  right,  it  wonld  be 
flagrantly  inconsistent  with  a  moral  system,  yet  that  there 
should  be  that  which  gives  the  certainty  of  wrong  moral  action, 
is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  Creator's  preference  of 
right  to  wrong  moral  action  under  the  present  system.  He 
may  purpose  this  cause  of  the  certainty  of  wrong  moral  action, 
not  as  good  in  itself  or  as  the  means  of  good,  but  solely  as  an 
evil  incidental  in  the  very  nature  of  things  to  the  best  possible 
system.  He  may  prefer  the  existence  of  this  evil  and  its  con- 
sequent in  wrong  moral  action,  so  far  as  the  latter  exists,  to  the 
non-existence  of  the  best  system  and  for  no  other  reason.  But 
this  is  no  proof,  not  the  lowest  degree  of  probable  evidence, 
that  he  prefers  wrong  to  right  moral  action  in  a  single  instance 
under  the  present  system.  On  the  contrary,  according  to  the 
present  supposition  of  possible  truth, the  proof  is  decisive,  that 
he  would  prevent  this  tendency  which  results  in  wrong  moral 
action,  were  it  possible  to  him  to  do  so  and  yet  adopt  or  not 
perpetuate  the  system,  that  he  permits  it  only  as  a  metaphys- 
ical evil  inseparable  by  his  power  from  the  best  system,  and 
that  therefore  while  he  adopts  the  best  system,  he  prefers  in 
every  instance  right  to  wrong  moral  action  under  the  present 
system.  Kor  is  this  all.  Since  on  the  present  supposition  he 
prefers  the  existence  of  this  tendency  to  wrong  moral  action 
solely  to  the  non-existence  of  the  best  system,  he  does  not  pre- 
fer it  to  a  tendency  that  should  give  the  certainty  of  right 
moral  action.  On  the  contrary,  this  tendency  to  wrong  moral 
action  must  be  a  tendency  to  that  which  when  compared  with 
right  moral  action,  is  contrary  to  his  will.  Of  course  his  whole 
will  must  be  opposed  to  this  tendency  to  wrong  moral  action, 
compared  with  a  tendency  to  right  moral  action  in  its  stead. 
The  very  tendency  therefore,  alleged  as  proof  that  he  prefers 
wrong  to  right  moral  action,  implies  and  proves  on  the  present 
supposition  his  preference  of  right  to  wrong  moral  action  under 
the  present  system.  And  what  sort  of  proof  is  that  of  his  pref- 
erence of  wrong  to  right  moral  action,  which  for  any  thing 
which  can  be  shown  to  the  contrary, may  be  a  decisive  proof 
of  the  opposite  preference. 

The  grand  and  only  objection  to  our  present  position,  derived 


GOD    PREFERS    RIGHT    TO    WRONG.  197 

from  the  tendency  to  moral  evil  in  the  world,  and  its  existence 
and  prevalence,  is  then  without  the  least  plausibility. 

Here  then  I  appeal  to  the  great  fact  on  which  our  present 
argument  rests,  viz. :  that  God  has  created  men  moral  beings, 
thus  adapting  their  nature  to  right  moral  action,  and  thus,  from 
the  necessity  of  their  nature  as  moral  beings,  causing  tendencies 
to  right  moral  action,  which  clearly  manifest  his  will  or  prefer- 
ence that  they  should,  in  every  instance,  act  morally  right. 
So  far  as  tendencies  can  have  any  influence  or  bearing  on  the 
question  of  what  kind  of  moral  action  he  prefers,  the  tendencies 
to  right  moral  action  stand  forth  in  the  nature  and  circum- 
stances of  the  beings,  as  the  great  and  only  fact  to  be  taken 
into  consideration,  when  the  question  is,  what  is  his  will  in 
respect  to  the  moral  conduct  of  his  moral  creatures  ?  This  fact 
is  proof,  uncounteracted  by  the  least  opposing  evidence,  and 
therefore  unequivocal  and  decisive,  that  God  prefers  right  to 
wrong  moral  action.  Analyze  and  scrutinize  the  true  nature 
and  tendencies  of  things  as  we  may,  and  we  must  see  in  what 
God  has  done  in  respect  to  right  and  wrong  moral  action, 
adaptation,  fitness,  tendency  to  one  end,  and  to  one  end  only — 
to  right  moral  action — insomuch  that  in  this  contemplation  of 
a  moral  agent,  we  wonder  that  he  should  ever  do  wrong.  We 
count  all  wrong-doing  a  disorder,  and  a  violence  done  to  the 
nature  and  laws  of  a  moral  economy.  It  is  eternal  necessary 
truth,  that  a  moral  agent  is  a  being  so  constituted  and  so  cir- 
cumstanced, that  virtue,  perfect  moral  excellence,  is  the  sure 
and  only  means  of  his  highest  and  perfect  happiness.  All  that 
can  be  called  adaptation,  fitness  or  tendency  in  the  nature  and 
condition  of  moral  beings,  is  a  greater,  higher  adaptation,  fit- 
ness or  tendency  to  right  moral  action  than  to  wrong.  The  evi- 
dence in  the  case  all  goes  to  prove,  that  the  Creator  of  such 
beings  prefers  right  to  wrong  moral  action  on  their  part.  This 
will  of  God  stands  forth  in  the  nature  of  man  as  a  moral  being 
in  as  clear  and  bright  manifestation's  had  this  been  a  world 
of  universal  obedience  to  that  will.  The  question  of  the  Crea- 
tor's preference  of  right  to  wrong  moral  action  is  not  touched 
at  all  by  the  results  whether  in  obedience  or  disobedience. 
The  system  itself  so  far  as  any  thing  appears  to  the  contrary, 
is  not  only  better  than  none,  but,  notwithstanding  the  evil,  is 
the  best  which  a  perfect  God  could  adopt.  The  question  there- 
fore concerning  his  preference  of  right  to  wrong  moral  action, 


198  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    FROM   NATURE. 

under  this  best  system,  is  one  which  in  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,is  to  be  decided  in  view  of  its  adaptations  and  tendencies. 
If  the  system  when  thus  judged  of,  is  not  only  better  than 
none,  but  the  best  conceivable  for  aught  we  know  or  can  say 
to  the  contrary,  then  it  is  proof  decisive,  viewed  in  its  true 
nature  and  tendency,  that  its  Author  prefers  right  to  wrong 
moral  action.  If  under  this  same  system  there  had  been  uni- 
versal obedience,  it  would  have  added  nothing  to  the  evidence 
of  his  preference,  for  he  would  have  done  no  more  to  secure 
obedience  than  he  has  now  done.  The  proof  on  this  supposi- 
tion, would  be  furnished,  not  by  the  obedience  of  the  subjects, 
but  solely  by  the  nature  of  the  system;  so  that  if  the  system 
does  not  prove  his  preference  without,  it  could  not  prove  it 
with  obedience.  So  likewise,  universal  disobedience  lessens 
not  this  evidence,  for  he  does  nothing  less  to  secure  obedience 
than  had  universal  obedience  been  the  result.  If  then  the 
system  with  universal  disobedience,  does  not  prove  his  prefer- 
ence, it  could  not  prove  it  with  universal  obedience,  for  the 
system  would  be  the  same  on  either  supposition. 

Such  is  undeniably  the  true  and  only  legitimate  mode  of 
reasoning  on  this  subject.  The  question  is  not,  what  subjects 
do  ;  but  what  has  the  moral  governor  done  ?  It  is  not  what  is 
the  conduct  of  subjects  under  the  system,  but  what  is  the  sys- 
tem under  which  they  act  ?  Take  an  example.  Let  it  be  once 
ascertained  that  a  father  has  done  all  that  wisdom  and  good- 
ness dictate  to  secure  the  obedience  of  his  children,  that  the  sys- 
tem of  influence  is  perfect,  or  which  is  the  same  thing  in  the 
argument,  that  there  is  no  proof  that  wisdom  and  goodness  re- 
quired him  to  do  any  thing  more  than  he  has  done  for  the  pur- 
pose, or  that  to  have  done  any  thing  more  or  less  would  not 
have  been  for  the  worse  instead  of  the  better ;  and  his  prefer- 
ence of  obedience  to  disobedience  is  alike  conspicuous  and  un- 
deniable, whether  his  children  obey  or  disobey.  Here  then  I 
ask,  what  other  than  a  moral .  system,  and  what  moral  system 
better  than  the  present,  could  God  in  his  infinite  wisdom  and 
goodness  have  chosen,  supposing  him  to  be  infinitely  good? 
Could  he  have  adopted  a  system  of  moral  government  without 
creating  free  moral  agents  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  such 
a  jurisdiction?  Could  he  have  created  moral  beings  without 
giving  them  power  to  obey  or  disobey  under  that  system,  be  it 
what  it  might  ?     And  now  when  they  act  wrong  under  such  a 


HOW    DO    WE    JUDGE    IN    LIKE    CASES?  199 

system  of  influence,  which  for  aught  that  can  he  shown  to 
the  contra?y,  is  the  best  fitted  to  secure  their  obedience,  is 
their  wrong  doing  to  be  alleged  as  proof  that  he  prefers  it  to 
their  right  doing?  In  an  analogous  case  of  human  govern- 
ment parental  or  civil, would  disobedience  impart  the  slightest 
shade  of  obscurity  to  the  will  of  the  parent  or  the  legislator  ? 
Would  not  a  similar  system  of  adaptations  and  influences  be  as 
decisive  of  a  father's  preference  of  obedience  to  disobedience  as 
had  uniform  obedience  been  the  actual  result  ?  Why  then  is  it 
not  so  in  respect  to  God?  Why  should  we  not  be  as  charitable 
in  our  judgment  of  our  Maker  as  of  a  fellow  being  ?  Is  there  no 
possible  case  in  which  law  can  be  transgressed  without  proving 
the  insincerity  of  the  lawgiver  ?  If  so,  then  the  transgression 
of  law  is  a  solecism  and  a  contradiction,  for  there  can  be  no 
law  when  there  is  no  sincerity  in  a  lawgiver.  If  then  we  say, 
that  because  God  is  omnipotent,  he  can  secure  obedience  in 
every  instance,  and  therefore  if  he  does  not, it  must  be  because 
he  prefers  disobedience  to  obedience  in  that  instance,  then  God 
cannot  give  a  law — he  cannot  sincerely  prefer  obedience  to  dis- 
obedience in  any  case  in  which  the  latter  occurs.  There  is  no 
alternative  but  this.  Either  he  can  prevent  all  sin  in  the  case 
or  he  cannot.  If  he  cannot,  then  he  may  be  sincere  in  the  pro- 
hibition of  it  in  his  law.  But  if  he  can  and  does  not,  he  can- 
not be  sincere  in  its  prohibition  in  any  case  in  which  sin  takes 
place.  Disobedience  in  the  subject  is  decisive  proof  of  insin- 
cerity in  the  lawgiver,  and  of  course  that  there  is  no  law.  But 
if  there  is  a  possible  or  conceivable  case,in  which  the  trangres- 
sion  of  a  law  from  God  should  exist  without  proving  his  insin- 
cerity, i.  £.,  consistently  with  his  real  preference  of  obedience 
to  disobedience,  what  is  this  possible  case,  except  that  which  we 
have  proved  to  be  real?  Were  God  the  friend  and  patron  of  in- 
iquity, would  he  have  so  formed  and  ordered  all  the  adaptations 
and  tendencies  to  righteousness,  that  the  soid  of  man  should 
find  joy  unmingled  and  perfect  only  in  the  practice  of  it  ?  Has 
God  so  formed  man,  even  in  his  own  image,  that  he  never  can, 
and  knows  that  he  never  can  be  happy,but  in  the  consciousness 
of  moral  excellence,  that  he  can  secure  in  the  highest  measure 
the  gratification  of  every  part  of  his  sentient  nature, only  as  he 
spurns  every  sensual  excess ;  that  he  never  can  feel  himself 
truly  ennobled,  but  by  the  high  resolve  of  virtuous  doings,  that 
he  can  never  rise  to  his  true  grandeur  and  godlike  elevation, 


200     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

only  as  he  gives  up  himself,  his  passions  and  appetites,  to  the 
control  of  perfect  moral  principle — what  other  conclusion  can 
be  drawn  from  such  premises,  than  that  the  Being  who  formed 
us,  loves  the  virtue  that  thus  exalts,  adorns  and  blesses  his 
creatures,  and  hates  the  vice  that  degrades,  deforms  and  ruins 
them  ?  Surely  the  design  of  the  Creator  is  conspicuous  in  this 
universal  and  undeniable  tendency  of  things.  I  decide  not 
here  that  he  loves  virtue  for  its  own  sake,  or  whether  his  pref- 
erence of  virtue  to  vice  is  a  benevolent  or  a  selfish  preference, 
but  only  that  he  has  this  preference.  To  deny  it,  is  to  do  vio- 
lence to  the  most  incontrovertible  of  all  principles — it  is  to 
maintain  that  a  perfect  adaptation  to  an  end  is  no  evidence 
that  the  end  is  designed, or  that  the  best  hind  of  evidence  that 
God  can  furnish,  is  no  evidence  at  all.  The  most  august  fact 
in  the  creation  of  God,  the  moral  constitution  of  moral  beings, 
is  divested  of  all  significance  in  reasoning,  and  the  author  of 
that  constitution  of  the  high  character  of  an  intelligent  and  de- 
signing Creator.  Surely  if  the  sun  is  placed  in  the  heavens  to 
illumine  and  warm  the  earth,  if  the  rain  falls  to  water  it  and  to 
cause  it  to  bring  forth  food  for  man  and  beast,  if  food  and 
drink  are  formed  to  nourish  and  refresh  our  bodies,  then  is  the 
mind  of  man  created  to  be  conformed  to  the  law  of  benevolent 
action.  This  is  the  will — this  is  the  law  of  God.  It  comes  to 
us  in  the  very  nature  and  structure  of  the  mind — it  is  given  us 
in  the  actual  cognitions  of  the  inner  man,  in  the  knowledge  of 

~  7  O 

ourselves,  and  therefore  in  a  manner  not  less  distinct  nor  less 
impressive,  than  were  it  sent  in  thunders  from  his  throne. 

In  conclusion  I  remark,  that  the  question  we  have  now 
discussed  is  one  of  the  deepest  concern.  There  is  an  Infinite 
Being,  who  has  given  existence  to  man,  and  made  him  a  moral 
being.  It  is  the  will  of  his  Great  Creator  that  he  should  act 
either  morally  right  or  morally  wrong:  On  the  latter  suppo- 
sition, what  is  this  Infinite  Being  ?  He  is  plainly  the  most 
appalling  object  that  ever  terrified  a  phrenzied  imagination. 
You  cannot  conceive  of  another  so  fitted  to  overwhelm  with 
terror  and  dismay ;  an  Infinite  Being  preferring  wrong  to  right 
moral  action !  the  Great  God  the  friend  and  patron  of  iniquity ! 
What  ground  for  hope,  for  confidence,  for  joy,  could  remain 
under  his  dominion  ?  Who  could  pray,  or  praise,  or  love,  or 
rejoice?  Whose  hopes  would  not  perish,  whose  heart  would 
not  break,  whose  spirit  would  not  sink  and  die  in  anguish? 


ONE    OF    TWO    SUPPOSITIONS.  201 

Yet  men,  to  defend  their  schemes  of  faith,  talk  of  a  benevo- 
lent God,  who  on  the  whole  prefers  vice  to  virtue — sin  to  holi- 
ness !  What  proof  then  that  every  creature  of  his  power, 
formed  in  his  image,  will  not  become  a  fiend,  and  his  moral 
universe  a  pandemonium  ?  Dream  of  any  thing  else,  and  enjoy 
it  as  you  may,  but  dream  not,  for  consolation's  sake,  of  a  benev- 
olent God  who  is  the  minister  of  sin !  Of  all  the  absurdities 
that  ever  disgraced  Deism  or  Universalism,  or  any  other  system 
of  faith,  that  which  combines  the  character  of  the  perfect  God 
and  a  perfect  Devil  in  one  being  is  the  most  monstrous. 

Shall  we  then  adopt  the  other  supposition  ?  Then  there  is  an 
Infinite  Being,  who  has  given  a  law  to  man — whose  will  it  is, 
that  man  should  always  act  morally  right  rather  than  morally 
wrong.  This  Being  can  make  his  creature,  man,  supremely 
happy  or  supremely  miserable,  as  he  obeys  or  disobeys  his  will. 
"What  will  he  do  in  fact  ?  To  impute  to  him  the  imbecility  of 
mutable  purposes — to  suppose  the  want  of  all  purpose  in  the 
exercise  and  products  of  his  infinite  attributes,  or  an  utter  in- 
difference to  the  accomplishment  of  them,  we  cannot.  If  his 
designs  are  not  benignant,  they  are  at  least  such  in  respect  to 
vastness  of  comprehension,  strength  of  decision,  and  grandeur 
of  object,  as  to  exempt  their  author  from  contempt;  they  are 
such  as  accord  with  the  infinitude  of  his  natural  attributes. 
He  may,  for  aught  we  now  say,  be  a  benevolent,  or  he  may  be 
a  malignant  Being.  But  having  infinite  power  and  knowl- 
edge, he  will  not  so  act  as  to  incur  the  contempt  of  his  intelli- 
gent creation.  His  designs  and  doings,  in  their  nature  and 
results,  will  be  great,  like  their  author.  They  will  be  such, 
that  human  reason  cannot  look  on  the  reality  and  make  light 
of  it.  What  then  is  it  for  man  to  know  that  he  is  absolutely 
in  the  power  of  such  a  Being,  and  that  he  has  always  crossed 
his  will ! — done  what  he  could  to  defeat  the  design  of  his  Crea- 
tor in  giving  him  existence ! !  And  yet  who  is  the  man  that 
has  not  done  it  ?  There  is  no  such  man.  What  then  are  our 
prospects  ?  Is  death  the  end  of  all  ?  That  cannot  be  proved. 
What  then  is  to  be  the  issue  of  God's  great  design  in  creating 
man  a  moral  being,  the  most  exalted  in  kind  which  he  can  cre- 
ate? Will  it  be  abandoned  in  indifference  or  in  fickleness? 
Will  the  great  design  of  all  his  works  be  relinquished  as  im- 
practicable by  an  Omniscient  and  Almighty  Creator  ?  Will  it 
prove  to  be  a  plan,  for  entering  on  which  there  were  no  reasons, 
9* 


202     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

or  for  abandoning  which  new  ones  will  occur  ?  Will  this  great 
design  of  God  toward  men,  which  stands  forth  first,  and  bright- 
est, and  greatest  among  them  all,  come  to  naught  ?  Will  death 
arrest  the  whole  moral  economy  of  God,  and  bring  on  it  failure 
and  defeat  ?  I  do  not  say  here  that  it  will  not.  But  if  it  is 
rational  in  some  cases  to  hope,  is  it  not  as  rational  also  to  fear  ? 
Were  your  life,  your  every  interest,  thus  in  the  hands  of  a 
mysterious  stranger  of  your  own  species,  whose  will  you  had 
always  intentionally  thwarted,  would  you  not  rationally  fear  to 
meet  him  ?  And  when  that  stranger  is  your  Creator,  the  Infi- 
nite Being  who  has  made  you  to  obey  his  will,  and  you  have 
disobeyed  it,  have  you  no  concern  to  know  the  issues  of  the 
design  of  your  creation  ?  Is  there  to  be  no  full  and  final  con- 
summation of  this  moral  economy  ?  Are  your  wishes,  hopes, 
fancies,  dreams,  good  evidence  that  the  great  question  between 
God  and  his  moral  creation  will  go  unsettled,  and  terminate  in 
insignificant  and  degrading  mockery?  Or,  have  you  good 
reason  to  expect  that  you  shall  one  day  encounter  the  displeas- 
ure of  one  whom  you  have  so  much  displeased  ?  Can  the  will 
of  any  being — can  the  will  of  God  be  crossed,  even  that  will 
on  which  the  end  of  his  creation  depends,  and  he  not  be  dis- 
pleased ?  When  you  think  of  the  violence  done  to  your  own 
moral  nature,  and  the  practical  defiance  of  the  known  will  of 
the  Being  that  made  you ;  when  you  listen  to  that  voice  of  re- 
monstrance and  of  warning  from  within  which  you  cannot 
silence,  and  to  those  distinct  and  impressive  whisperings  of 
self-condemnation  which  you  cannot  mistake,  do  you  not  know 
that  there  is  an  account  between  yourself  and  your  Maker  yet 
unadjusted?  Can  you  feel  that  all  is  safe?  In  spite  of  your- 
selves, of  all  your  wishes  and  your  hopes,  do  you  not  fear  a 
retributive  hour — do  you  not  expect  to  meet  an  avenging 
God? 


LECTURE  II. 

8.  First  leading  proposition  continued.— God  enforces  conformity  to  his  law  by  authority.— (a) 
He  assumes  the  right  to  give  a  law. — (b)  He  dispenses  good  and  evil  as  powerful  inducements; 
— for  good  and  evil  are  the  proper  effects  of  right  and  wrong  action ; — as  self-complacency  and 
remorse  are  enjoyed  and  suffered;  reflection  can  be  avoided  only  in  part;— (c)  The  providence 
of  God  in  other  ways  works  against  evil  and  for  good  by  discipline,  restraint,  sickness,  disappoint- 
ment, death. — Forebodings  of  evil  after  death. 

Isr  support  of  tlie  proposition,  that  God  is  administering  a 
moral  government  over  men  in  some  import  of  the  language,  I 
have  adduced  the  facts — 

1.  That  men  are  moral  beings. 

2.  That  God  has  given  them  a  law  or  rule  of  action. 
I  now  proceed  to  show  as  I  proposed — 

3.  That  he  enforces  conformity  to  this  law  by  the  influence 
of  authority. 

By  this  I  do  not  intend  to  decide  whether  he  does  or  does 
not  evince  the  equity  of  his  administration  and  his  rightful 
authority.  It  is  common  to  speak  of  the  authority  of  a  parent 
or  of  a  civil  ruler,  notwithstanding  the  manifest  imperfections 
in  the  administration  of  his  government.  In  such  a  case,  we 
mean  that  he  assumes  and  exercises  the  right  to  give  law  or 
prescribe  a  rule  of  action  to  others,  and  treats  them  in  many 
respects,  as  if  this  right  truly  and  properly  belonged  to  him. 
He  does  so  particularly  by  showing  that  he  can  dispense  good 
and  evil,  and  that  it  is  his  purpose  to  do  so  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  create  a  powerful  motive — a  good  and  sufficient  reason  for 
doing  his  will  because  it  is  his  %villj  in  other  words,  for  submit- 
ting to  it  without  further  inquiry,  as  the  ultimate  standard,  the 
true  and  decisive  rule  of  duty. 

It  is  in  this  general  and  somewhat  indefinite  sense,  that  I  now 
speak  of  God  as  enforcing  conformity  to  his  will  by  the  influ- 
ence of  authority.  As  the  parent,  whatever  imperfections  and 
even  inconsistencies  may  mar  the  government  which  he  exer- 
cises over  his  children,may  still  be  said  to  govern  by  authority, 
in  like  manner  God  governs  men.  •  That  more  than  this  is  true, 
I  shall  attempt  to  show  hereafter.  This  is  all  that  I  maintain 
at  present,  it  being  necessary  to  show  that  God  is  administering 


204     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

a  moral  government  over  men  as  distinguished  from  any  other, 
before  I  attempt  to  prove  the  perfection  of  his  moral  govern- 
ment. 

I  remark,  then — 

In  the  first. place,  that  God  assumes  and  exercises  the  right  of 
giving  a  law  or  of  prescribing  a  rule  of  action  to  men.  We 
have  already  shown  in  the  preceding  lecture,  that  God  has 
clearly  manifested  his  will  to  men  in  respect  to  their  moral 
conduct  by  giving  them  a  rule  of  action.  This  is  in  its  own 
nature  an  act  of  sovereign  prerogative — an  assumption  and 
exercise  of  the  right  to  govern.  The  nature  of  virtue,  of  right 
moral  action  is  not  a  creation,  dependent  on  and  coming  forth 
from  the  divine  will.  That  does  not  make  it  right  though  it 
may  prove  it  to  be  so — in  other  words,  it  is  not  right  because 
he  wills  it,  but  he  wills  it  because  it  is  right.  But  the  nature 
of  man  is  a  creation,  making  manifest  the  design  of  his  Creator 
in  giving  him  existence.  God  as  the  author  of  man's  nature 
and  condition,  has  placed  him  under  the  necessity  of  acting 
morally  right  to  secure  his  own  well-being.  He  has,  etymolog- 
ically  speaking,  bound  him  by  the  cords  of  this  necessity,  that 
is  in  common  language,  placed  him  under  a  moral  obligation 
to  act  morally  right.  In  so  doing  God  claims  his  conformity 
to  the  rule  of  right  action.  This  God  does  not  by  compact,  not 
by  permission  or  consent — but  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  su- 
preme right  or  sovereign  prerogative.  Thus  then  the  infinite 
Being  who  made  us,  assumes  the  relation  of  a  governor  over  us 
by  law,  thus  taking  the  position  of  claiming  submission  to  his 
will,  on  the  ground  that  he  has  a  right  to  it.  I  am  not  saying 
that  he  has  this  right  (this  may  appear  hereafter) ;  but  that 
he  assumes  it  in  the  very  act  of  giving  a  law,  and  that  this  as- 
sumption is  itself  and  by  itself,  a  clear  and  convincing  intima- 
tion that  he  will  vindicate  and  sustain  this  right,  if  not  per- 
fectly, to  that  degree  which  shall  entitle  it  to  respect. 

No  man  can  think  of  the  greatness  of  God,  how  entirely  he 
has  the  happiness  of  man  at  his  own  disposal — how  clearly  he 
has  manifested  his  will  respecting  human  conduct,  and  espe- 
cially, how  worthy  of  such  a  Being  is  the  august  relation  of  a 
perfect  moral  governor,  without  feeling  a  peculiar  influence, 
an  absolute  and  imperious  aecessity  urging  him  to  unqualified 
submission  to  his  will. 

There  is  a  reason  for  this.     Nothing  is  more  certain  than  the 


111- 


ANTICIPATIONS    OF    JUDGMENT.  205 

execution  of  will,  to  the  extent  of  the  agent's  power.  On  this 
well  known  principle  it  is,  that  no  human  being,  with  the 
knowledge  of  God's  will  respecting  his  conduct,  can  contravene 
it  and  reflect  on  what  he  has  done,  without  the  apprehension 
of  some  retributive  evil,  nor  perform  it  without  anticipatin 
some  expression  of  his  favor.  How  plainly  is  this  almost  i 
stinctive  feeling  seen  in  children,  nay  in  friends,  neighbors — in 
all  relations,  that  of  utter  strangers  not  excepted.  To  imagine 
that  men  should  regard  it  otherwise  in  respect  to  God,  is  to 
suppose  them  ignorant  of  the  great  law  of  voluntary  action — 
the  law  which  connects  with  will  the  doing  of  what  is  willed, 
and  the  entire  suspension  of  this  law  in  a  Being  who  is  Al- 
mighty. Who  can  believe  that  God  would  be  pleased  with 
the  conduct  of  creatures  who  are  formed  in  his  own  image,  and 
make  no  expression  of  his  pleasure  in  good  conferred,  and  be 
displeased  with  their  conduct,  and  express  no  displeasure  in 
evil  inflicted  ?  Can  the  infinite  Being  show,  in  the  very  nature 
of  men,  the  end  for  which  he  made  them,  viz.,  right  moral 
action,  that  he  values  the  end  as  all  that  gives  importance  to 
their  being,  and  do  nothing  which  is  in  any  respect  fitted  to 
secure  the  accomplishment,  and  to  prevent  the  frustration  of 
his  will  ?  Why  else  does  he  assume  and  exercise  the  right  to 
give  law  ?  Why  appear  before  his  rational  and  moral  creation 
in  the  exercise  of  such  prerogative  ?  Why  has  he  entered  upon 
this  moral  economy,  if  it  is  to  be  abandoned  as  a  disgraceful 
mockery  in  the  view  of  his  moral  creation  ?  Is  he  too  weak  to 
maintain  and  vindicate  the  high  prerogative  he  has  assumed  ? 
This  will  not  be  pretended.  Will  his  heart  fail  him — will  he, 
in  the  tenderness  of  his  relentings,  sink  all  that  is  venerable 
and  awful  in  the  character  of  a  lawgiver  and  judge,  in  the 
weakness  of  parental  indulgence ;  and  so  consent  in  the  issue 
to  expose  himself  to  the  ridicule,  the  contempt,  and  the  defi- 
ance of  a  mere  pretender  to  authority  ?  Is  God  to  stand  before 
his  moral  creation,  in  the  assumption  of  the  high  prerogative 
of  its  sovereign  king,  and  yet  in  the  mere  pageantry  of  one 
from  whom  obedience  has  nothing  to  hope,  and  transgression 
nothing  to  fear  ?  What  an  absurdity !  Shall  God  give  a  law, 
and  leave  it  unsanctioned  by  good  and  evil  ?  Become  a  law- 
giver, but  not  a  judge  ?  Shall  his  law  be  distinctly  promulged, 
being  written  on  every  heart,  and  yet  no  judgment  and  no  retri- 
bution follow  ?    No.     The  mere  giving  of  a  law  by  our  Maker 


206     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

is  proof  that  we  live  under  a  retributive  economy.  Law  be- 
speaks a  judge.  It  tells  of  a  throne  in  heaven,  occupied  by  a 
living,  reigning  monarch,  who  takes  judicial  cognizance  of  the 
conduct  of  his  creatures,  and  executes  legal  sanctions  as  they 
obey  or  disobey  his  will. 

In  the  second  place,  God  so  dispenses  good  and  evil  to  men 
in  this  world,  as  to  create  a  powerful  inducement  to  do  his  will 
because  it  is  his  will.  By  this  I  mean,  that  God  so  dispenses 
good  and  evil  to  men  in  this  world  as  to  influence  them  to  right 
moral  action,  not  simply  by  the  appropriate  tendencies  and  con- 
sequences of  actions,  but  also  by  the  certainty  of  happiness  or 
misery,  as  they  obey  or  disobey.  The  performance  or  non-per- 
formance of  an  action,  in  view  of  its  appropriate  tendencies  and 
consequences,  is  one  thing.  But  to  perform  an  action,  because  by 
so  doing  I  shall  please,  and  by  not  performing  it  shall  displease 
another  and  a  superior  being  on  whom  my  happiness  may  or 
must  greatly  depend,  is  quite  another  thing.  The  former  I 
might  do,  were  there  no  superior  being  to  be  pleased  or  dis- 
pleased with  my  conduct.  The  latter  implies  a  direct  regard 
to  the  will  of  another ;  because  he  can,  and,  as  I  have  reason  to 
believe,  will  dispose  of  my  happiness  or  misery  according  to 
my  actions.  To  be  governed  by  this  is  to  act  from  the  influ- 
ence of  authority.  What  I  now  claim  is,  that  God  dispenses 
good  and  evil  to  men  in  this  world  in  order  to  create  this  influ- 
ence; i.  <?.,  so  that  we  have  reason  to  believe,  that  by  right 
moral  action  we  shall  secure  his  favor,  with  its  appropriate 
expressions  in  good  conferred,  and  by  wrong  moral  action  shall 
incur  his  displeasure,  with  its  appropriate  expressions  in  evil 
inflicted.  I  am  not  now  saying  what  degree  of  good  and  of 
evil  we  are  to  expect  from  obedience  and  disobedience;  but 
that  we  are  led  by  the  actual  providence  of  God  to  expect  good 
and  evil  as  the  consequences  of  right  and  wrong  action,  in  such 
a  degree  as  to  make  it  for  our  true  interest  to  please  him. 

I  remark  then,  that  amid  all  the  seeming  mystery  connected 
with  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world,  there  is 
one  fact  too  palpable  to  be  denied,  viz. :  so  far  as  good  and 
evil,  happiness  and  misery,  are  seen  to  depend  on  the  moral 
conduct  of  man,  (and  they  are  seen  to  depend  on  it  to  a  great 
extent)  all  that  good  is  the  effect  of  virtue,  and  all  that  evil  is 
the  effect  of  vice.  I  know  indeed  that  it  is  maintained  by  some, 
that  vice  often  produces  more  happiness  than  virtue  would 


ACTIONS    AND   THEIR    TENDENCY.  207 

produce  in  its  stead.  This  I  utterly  deny.  In  some  cases, 
greater  good  appears  to  follow  vice, than  we  in  our  short-sight- 
edness can  see  would  follow  virtue  in  its  stead.  This,  be  it 
remembered,  is  the  estimate  of  our  ignorance,  and  no  proof  of 
the  fact  alleged.  Aside  then  from  the  groundless  nature  of 
this  assumption,  there  is  another  equally  so,  viz.,  that  the  good 
which  follows  vice  is  its  direct  and  appropriate  effect.  For  in 
what  case  is  the  supposed  greater  good,  which  is  said  to  follow, 
seen  and  known  to  be  its  true  and  appropriate  effect  ?  This  is 
absolutely  impossible  in  the  nature  of  things.  Yice  consists 
simply  in  a  selfish  or  malignant  intention,  in  which  the  mind 
proposes  to  sacrifice  both  its  own  and  also  the  greater  good  of 
others  to  the  less.  The  sole  tendency  of  this  state  of  mind  is 
to  produce  such  a  result.  At  the  same  time,  the  known  ten- 
dency of  virtue  is  to  produce  the  greatest  good,  both  to  others 
and  to  the  agent.  How  then  can  vice  be  the  true  and  proper 
cause  of  greater  good  than  virtue?  How  can  it  be  the  cause 
of  that  which  it  has  no  tendency  to  produce,  and  when  virtue 
is  known  to  be  the  only  true  and  proper  cause  of  the  greatest 
good,  in  all  cases  ?  This  can  never  be  till  the  nature  of  things 
is  changed,  and  virtue  becomes  vice,  and  vice  virtue. 

"Nor  is  this  all.  Whatever  good  may  follow  a  vicious  or 
wicked  action,  of  that  good,  the  vice  or  wickedness  of  the 
action  is  not  the  true  and  proper  cause.  I  readily  admit  that 
vice  may,  in  one  sense  of  the  language,  be  said  to  be  the  means, 
and  even  the  cause  of  good,  viz.,  it  may  be  folloived  with  good. 
In  this  sense,  we  may  properly  speak  of  the  pleasures  of  sin. 
I  also  admit,  that  in  all  voluntary  action  of  that  kind  in  which 
man  aims  to  obtain  any  good,  there  is  a  tendency  to  secure  or 
produce  it,  and  of  course  that  this  is  true  of  all  voluntary  sin- 
ful action.  But  then  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  it  is  true  of 
it  only  as  voluntary,  and  not  as  sinful.  Bishop  Butler  has 
made  this  important  distinction  between  actions  and  that  qual- 
ity which  constitutes  them  virtuous  or  vicious.  lie  says,  "An 
action,  by  which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified,  or  fortune 
acquired,  procures  delight  or  advantage,  abstracted  from  all 
consideration  of  the  morality  of  such  action ;  consequently  the 
pleasure  or  advantage  in  this  case  is  gained  by  the  action  itself, 
not  by  the  morality,  the  virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  the 
action,  though  it  be  perhaps  virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus  to  say, 
such  an  action  or  course  of  behavior  procured  such  pleasure 


208  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    FROM   NATURE. 

or  advantage,  or  brought  such  inconvenience  or  pain,  is  quite 
a  different  thing  from  saying  that  such  good  or  bad  effect  was 
owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  such  action  or  behavior.  In 
one  case,  an  action  abstracted  from  all  moral  consideration  pro- 
duced its  effect.  In  the  other  case — for  it  will  appear  that 
there  are  such  cases — the  morality  of  the  action,  the  action 
under  a  moral  consideration,  i.  e.,  the  virtuousness  or  the 
viciousness  of  the  action,  produced  the  effect."  (Analogy,  P.  I. 
chap.  3.)  To  say  then  that  an  action  which  is  vicious  produces 
good,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  saying  that  vice,  as  such, 
produces  good,  or  that  vice,  in  its  own  proper  nature  and  ten- 
dency, produces  or  is  the  cause  of  good. 

Still  further ;  a  vicious  action  which  is  said  to  produce  good, 
is  complex,  consisting  of  three  elements,  viz. :  the  selfish  prefer- 
ence, which  is  the  governing  purpose  of  the  mind,  the  specific 
volition  to  perform  the  requisite  external  action,  and  the  exter- 
nal action  itself.  In  strict  accuracy  of  conception,  the  vice  is 
exclusively  predicable  of  the  selfish  principle,  and  in  no  degree 
of  the  two  other  elements  of  the  action.  If  now  we  look  at 
the  true  nature  and  tendency  of  this  selfish  purpose,  and  judge 
of  it  in  relation  to  its  appropriate  effect  on  the  mind,  and  as 
wholly  uncounteracted  by  any  opposing  cause,  what  is  it  ? 
Plainly,  its  tendency  is  to  act  on  the  conscience  in  instant  and 
overwhelming  remorse,  and  thus  to  prevent  the  overt  act 
which  is  the  true  and  proper  cause  of  the  proposed  good,  and 
so  either  to  prevent  the  acquisition  or  enjoyment  of  the  good. 
It  is  only  in  counteracting  this  tendency  of  the  selfish  prin- 
ciple by  at  once  searing  and  hardening  conscience  into  a  state 
of  insensibility,  that  the  pleasure  aimed  at  can  be  experienced. 
Is  it  then  the  nature  and  tendency  of  this  selfish  principle  to 
produce  happiness  in  the  human  mind,  when  its  only  tendency, 
uncounteracted,  is  to  overwhelm  it  in  the  instant  agonies  of 
remorse?  The  same  remarks,  mutatis  mutandis,  apply  to 
virtue.  All  the  good  or  happiness  then  which  follows  vice, 
and  in  this  sense  is  said  to  be  produced  by  it,  is  known  to  re- 
sult from  something  else  than  vice  as  its  true  and  proper  cause ; 
and  all  the  evil  that  follows  virtue,  is  known  to  result  from 
something  else  than  virtue  as  its  true  and  proper  cause.*  So 
that  the  true  tendency  of  virtue,  uncounteracted  by  opposing 

*  Vide  Lecture  VH. 


SELF-COMPLACENCY    AND    REMORSE.  209 

causes  to  produce  happiness  and  nothing  but  happiness,  both 
to  the  agent  and  to  others;  and  the  tendency  of  vice  uncoun- 
teracted  by  opposing  causes  to  produce  opposite  results,  are 
never  in  the  providence  of  God  in  the  least  obscured  by  the 
good  or  evil  which  may  ensue.  It  follows  therefore,  that  so 
far  as  happiness  and  misery  in  this  world  can  be  traced  to 
the  moral  conduct  of  men  as  their  true  and  proper  cause,  all 
that  good  is,  in  the  providence  of  God,  the  proper  effect  of 
virtue,  and  all  that  evil  the  effect  of  vice.  I  speak  not  here  of 
that  happiness  and  misery  in  the  world,  which  are  not  the 
direct  and  proper  effects  of  virtue  and  vice,  but  of  those  which 
are.  Of  all  this  I  say,  the  happiness  is  exclusively  the  effect 
of  right,  and  the  misery  of  wrong  moral  action.  Why  then  is 
this  ?  What  is  the  lesson  to  be  learned  from  this  method  of 
God's  providence  ?  What  is  it,  but  that  God  is  pleased  with 
virtue  and  displeased  with  vice?  "What  is  it,  but  that  if  we 
would  secure  the  favor  and  avoid  the  displeasure  of  God,  so 
far  as  these  depend  on  our  conduct ;  and  if  we  would  hope  to 
secure  good  and  avoid  evil,  as  these  depend  on  his  feelings 
toward  us,  we  must  perform  right  and  avoid  wrong  moral 
action  ?  Surely,  no  rational  mind  can  fail  to  value  the  appro- 
bation and  deprecate  the  disapprobation  of  that  great  Being 
who  holds  the  welfare  of  his  creatures  entirely  at  his  own  dis- 
posal, as  they  shall  obey  or  disobey  his  will.  But  how,  in  view 
of  the  laws  of  his  providence,  which  are  as  undeviating  as  the 
ordinances  of  heaven — how,  except  by  right  action,  can  we 
hope  or  feel  the  least  security  that  Ave  shall  obtain  his  favor 
and  its  blessings,  or  avoid  his  displeasure  with  its  evils?  How 
powerful  then  the  persuasive  to  virtue,  as  the  only  kind  of 
moral  action  by  which  we  can  hope  for  the  approval  of  an  infi- 
nite Being;  and  howT  powerful  the  dissuasive  from  vice,  as  that 
by  which  we  must  expect  to  incur  his  displeasure.  In  other 
wrords,  how  great  the  motive  to  do  the  will  of  God,  because  it 
is  his  will. 

This  reasoning  will  acquire  still  greater  force,  if  we  consider 
more  particularly  the  appropriate  results  of  right  and  wrong 
moral  action  in  self-complacency  and  remorse.  These  results, 
with  the  delightful  anticipations  of  the  one  and  the  painful 
forebodings  of  the  other,  are,  in  every  just  estimate  of  the  good 
and  evil  of  human  life,  of  the  highest  moment  to  man.  And 
yet  how  easily,  by  different  providential  arrangements,  might 

14 


210     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

the  satisfaction  we  feel  in  right,  and  the  remorse  we  feel  for 
wrong  action,  be  prevented.  Indeed,  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  these  consequences  should  be  so  prevented,  by  the  provi- 
dence of  God,  as  to  show  on  his  part  an  indifference  to  moral 
conduct,  or  even  a  preference  of  wrong  to  right  action.  Why 
then  is  it — for  the  fact  is  undeniable — that  good  men  feel  that 
self-approbation,  with  its  sustaining  tranquillity  and  cheering 
anticipations,  which  they  value  above  all  earthly  enjoyments  ? 
They  are,  at  best,  imperfect  in  moral  character — they  have 
acted  the  part  of  rebels  against  God.  How  easily  then  might 
their  offended  Sovereign  so  order  their  condition  as  to  fill  and 
overwhelm  them  with  remorse  for  the  past,  and  with  despair 
for  the  future  ?  What  then  are  the  joyful  hope  and  triumphant 
anticipations  of  the  good  man,  but  the  most  decisive  indica- 
tions and  proofs,  furnished  by  the  providence  of  God,  of  his 
friendship  and  favor  ?  What  is  this,  but  God  manifesting  him- 
self as  the  friend  and  patron  of  virtue,  inviting  and  alluring 
man  to  do  his  will,  by  giving  a  present  reward  to  even  imper- 
fect obedience. 

On  the  other  hand,  why  does  not  God  conceal  all  displeasure 
toward  the  workers  of  iniquity?  That  excessive  tenderness 
which  some  sentimental  theologians  are  so  fond  of  ascribing  to 
the  Deity,  is  wont  in  earthly  parents  to  be  very  cautious  on 
this  point — to  be  at  great  pains  to  hide  all  displeasure,  and  to 
prevent  all  remorse  for  offences.  Such  however  is  not  the 
method  of  God  in  his  providence.  Instead  of  being  designed 
for  this  purpose,  his  providential  arrangements  are  peculiarly 
adapted  to  opposite  results.  So  much  so,  that  it  is  not  possible 
for  men  .to  avoid  the  full  measure  of  remorse  for  their  sins 
without  much  effort — without  surmounting  great  obstacles — 
without  doing  palpable  violence  to  the  most  obvious  tendencies. 
God  in  his  providence,  as  it  were,  forces  this  remorse  upon 
them  ;  and  in  such  a  manner  and  in  so  many  ways,  that  his  pur- 
pose, that  they  shall  feel  it  and  regard  it  as  an  expression  of  his 
displeasure  for  their  conduct,  becomes  conspicuous. 

The  confinement  of  the  criminal  in  his  solitary  dungeon  with 
its  inevitable  results  in  reflection  and  self-reproach,  is  not  more 
expressive  of  its  design  than  the  providence  of  God,  in  securing 
to  such  an  extent  this  species  of  mental  suffering  in  the  bosoms 
of  the  guilty,  is  of  his  purpose  to  make  manifest  his  displeasure 
toward  them.     Who,  in  the  remorse  and  painful  forebodings 


T  IT  E    FRO  V  T  D  E  X  C  E    OF    GOD.  21 1 

of  conscious  guilt,  docs  not  feel  the  tokens  of  God's  indigna- 
tion ?  Who,  under  these  frowns  of  an  infinite  being,  does  not 
find  a  powerful  motive  to  submit  to  his  will  and  his  authority? 
If  we  should  behold  the  yet  undisclosed  spectacle  of  an  assem- 
bled world,  a  judgment  seat,  and  the  judge  thereon  dispensing 
a  full  retribution  to  the  righteous  and  the  wicked,  we  should  be- 
lieve in  the  authority  of  God  as  a  lawgiver.  Why  then  do  we 
not  see  in  the  retributions  of  that  conscience  of  which  God  is  the 
author,  as  these  are  disclosed  to  us  in  the  certainties  of  experi- 
ence— why  do  we  not  see  in  this  present  judgment  and  execu- 
tion of  the  sentence,  that  God  reigns  in  the  exercise,  if  not  of  a 
righteous,  at  least  of  sovereign  authority. 

It  is  here  most  readily  conceded,  that  reflection  may  be 
avoided,  and  that  by  voluntary  absorption  in  sensual  pleasure, 
by  diverting  thought  and  sensibility  from  our  guilt,  the  full 
efFects  in  remorse  of  conscience  may  be  avoided.  Should  it 
here  be  asked,  if  the  design  of  our  Maker  be,  that  remorse 
should  follow  vice  to  impress  us  with  a  sense  of  his  displeasure, 
why  is  it  put  within  our  power  to  avoid  the  full  effect  ?  I  an- 
swer, that  the  possibility  of  our  so  doing  may  be  inseparable 
from  the  nature  of  human  mind,  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  the  greatest  good  requires  that  we  should  be  placed. 
The  benignant  designs  of  God  may  (and  we  shall  see  reason 
hereafter  to  believe  they  do)  require  that  man  should  not  be 
overwhelmed  by  the  agonies  of  remorse,  nor  left  without  its 
painful  and  salutary  forebodings.  Be  this  however  as  it  may, 
the  fact  now  alleged  does  not  at  all  obscure  the  real  tendency 
of  vice  to  this  result.  For  in  every  case  in  which  the  full  meas- 
ure of  remorse  is  not  realized,  we  know  that  we  have  counter- 
acted an  actual  and  powerful  tendency  to  that  effect ;  and  that 
there  is  nothing  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind  which  is  the 
natural  cause  of  quietness  of  spirit  as  the  result  of  vicious  prac- 
tice. In  short  there  is  nothing  to  conceal,  but  every  thing  to 
make  manifest  the  tendency  of  virtue  to  mental  tranquillity 
and  happiness,  and  of  vice  to  opposite  results.  What  then 
shall  we  conclude,  but  that  he  who  is  the  author  of  conscience, 
and  who  has  given  it  its  supremacy  and  its  power  to  legislate, 
to  judge,  and  to  execute  its  awards,  is  himself  a  lawgiver,  a 
judge,  and  the  executor  of  judgment  ?  We  should  be  satis- 
fied of  the  designs  and  dispositions  of  a  monarch,  communi- 
cated through  the  instructions  of  a  well  accredited  viceroy. 


212     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

And  what  are  the  laws  and  the  lessons  of  conscience,  but  those 
of  the  viceroy  of  the  King  of  heaven  ?  If  virtue  be  demanded 
by  the  authority  of  conscience,  and  if  obedience  be  followed  by 
a  satisfaction  and  serenity  which  form  a  rich  reward,  and  if 
vice  be  forbidden  by  the  same  authority  of  conscience  and 
visited  with  the  severe  though  temporary  agonies  of  remorse, 
then  is  it  as  rational  to  believe  that  the  author  of  conscience 
reigns  over  men  as  a  moral  governor,  as  if  we  saw  him  on  a 
throne  in  the  midst  of  us,  giving  forth  his  law  with  his  own 
voice,  and  with  his  own  hand  dispensing  gifts  to  the  obedient, 
and  inflicting  punishment  on  the  rebellious.  The  testimony  of 
conscience  is  entitled  to  our  belief  in  the  one  case, as  truly  as 
would  be  the  testimony  of  our  senses  in  the  other. 

In  the  third  place,  the  providential  dispensations  of  God  in 
many  other  forms,  duly  contemplated,  lead  to  the  same  conclu- 
sion. If  men  would  reason  concerning  the  designs  of  God 
from  his  acts,  as  they  do  from  the  acts  of  a  fellow-creature,  no 
impression  I  apprehend  would  be  more  strongly  made  on  the 
human  mind  than  that  God  reigns  over  this  world  as  a  law- 
giver;— if  not  on  the  principles  of  perfect  righteousness,  at 
least  in  the  exercise  of  sovereign  authority.  If  they  were  as 
willing  to  contemplate  God  under  this  relation  as  under  any 
other,  and  to  form  those  conclusions  which  best  accord  with 
and  explain  the  design  of  his  providential  dealings,  they  would 
see  God  in  every  thing.  And  here  the  first  premise  in  all  our 
reasonings  should  be  the  fact,  that  all  men  are  transgressors  of 
his  law;  and  beyond  all  question,  deserve  the  highest  possi- 
ble punishment,  provided  the  greatest  good  requires  a  perfect 
moral  system.  And  now,  what  is  the  treatment  of  this  sinful 
world  by  its  Maker  but  a  course  of  providence,  which  speaks 
severe  displeasure,  even  indignation,  for  their  iniquity,  mingled 
with  so  much  forbearance  and  kindness,  as  also  to  manifest  his 
love  of  righteousness  ?  Who  does  not  endure,  in  the  various 
forms  of  pain,  disappointment,  and  other  earthly  calamity, 
sufficient  evil  at  least  to  awaken  the  thoughts  of  God's  dis- 
pleasure for  his  sins ;  and  though  not  perhaps  in  his  own  case, 
yet  in  others,  how  does  God  permit  the  same  principle  of  moral 
evil  to  go  forth  unchecked,  to  desolate  human  happiness  and 
to  break  human  hearts,  that  none  may  be  ignorant  of  its  fear- 
ful and  fell  malignity,  and  of  the  woes  which  he  will  inflict 
on  the  determined  workers  of  iniquity?     What  tokens  of  the 


EVENTS    XOT    DIRECTLY    CAUSED    BY    SIN.        213 

severity  of  his  displeasure  toward  sin,  and  of  tlie  measure  of 
evil  with  which  he  may  visit  it,  does  this  world  furnish !  On 
the  other  hand,  what  restraints  does  he  put  on  human  selfish- 
ness, and  especially  in  the  methods  in  which  he  governs  it  by 
human  selfishness,  does  he  show  how  he  abhors  its  appropriate 
doings!  To  my  own  mind,  this  is  one  of  the  most  striking  and 
affecting  facts  in  his  providence — without  which  the  world 
would  become  a  very  pandemonium.  By  so  doing,  he  com- 
pels as  it  were  human  selfishness  itself  to  perform  the  very 
external  deeds  which  benevolence  would  dictate,  and  thus  se- 
cures to  a  great  extent  the  results  of  benevolence,  and  shows 
in  the  most  impressive  manner,  how  happy,  how  blessed  the 
world  would  become,  were  benevolence  the  universal  principle 
of  human  action,  and  how  it  would  rejoice  him  to  bless  a  world 
of  perfect  virtue. 

There  is  yet  another  class  of  evils,  from  which  a  most  impres- 
sive lesson  may  be  learned.  I  refer  to  those  (inflicted,  be  it  re- 
membered, on  a  sinful  world)  which  are  not  in  the  way  of  natu- 
ral consequence  the  appropriate  effect  of  sin.  In  view  of  these 
evils  brought  on  mankind,  by  famine,  tempests,  fire,  earth- 
quakes, pestilence,  and  other  like  causes,  whose  connection 
with  sin  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  is  entirely  undis- 
coverable,  what  lesson  is  taught  the  children  of  men  ?  Is  it 
said,  they  are  the  natural  results  of  the  laws  of  a  material  sys- 
tem ?  But  who  ordained  these  laws  ?  God,  the  intelligent, 
designing  author  of  this  moral  creation,  permits  their  appal- 
ling action  on  his  creatures,  all  of  whom,  we  know,  have  in- 
curred his  displeasure  by  sin  !  Can  we  then  suppose  these  evils 
to  be  imposed  without  any  reference  to  moral  character  ?  Are 
they  all  deserved,  and  is  this  fact  to  have  no  place,  in  account- 
ing for  the  infliction  ?  Are  these  natural  and  appropriate 
expressions  of  the  displeasure  of  their  Author  toward  his  sinful 
creatures,  and  yet  shall  we  affirm  that  they  are  not  so  ?  Do 
you  say  that  they  can  be  accounted  fur  in  some  other  way? 
But  can  it  be  done  as  consistently  with  all  the  facts,  and  there- 
fore as  rationally  ?  And  is  not  the  most  philosophical  solution 
also  the  most  credible  and  the  best  ?  Suppose  God  wished  to 
make  a  clear  and  strong  impression  on  the  human  mind  of  his 
high  and  awful  sovereignty,  in  supporting  his  authority  as  a 
moral  ruler;  suppose  that  he  wished  to  show  us  that  he  might 
and  that  he  woul  1  not  confine  penal  evils  to  the  mere  natural 


214     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

consequences  of  sin,  but  that,  in  vindication  of  Ms  prerogative 
to  reign,  he  had  in  store  still  other  penalties  for  the  rebellious. 
Are  not  these  evils,  and  the  manner  of  their  infliction,  exactly 
fitted  to  manifest  and  impress  his  design  %  Can  any  other  mode 
of  manifesting  it  be  conceived,  so  fitted  to  this  end  ?  Do  you 
ask,  why  are  these  evils  so  limited  and  partial? — why  does  he 
not  desolate  the  earth  in  his  anger  ?  I  answer,  that  would  con- 
ceal his  design  to  restore  man  to  duty  and  to  happiness  (as  I 
shall  show  hereafter).  God,  it  should  be  remembered,  has 
more  designs  than  one  to  make  manifest  to  his  accountable 
creatures;  and  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  show,  that  his  provi- 
dence is  in  all  respects  adapted  in  perfect  wisdom  to  this  great 
purpose.  In  some  modes  and  forms  of  providence  he  mani- 
fests one  design,  and  in  other  modes  another,  and  without  the 
least  conflict  or  incongruity  in  doing  so.  And  now  I  ask,  what 
is  that  which  we  are  considering — what  are  tempests,  earth- 
quakes, pestilences,  which  carry  desolation  and  woe  over  large 
portions  of  the  earth,  in  such  terrific  forms  as  to  compel  even 
God-defying  Atheism  to  cry  for  God's  compassion  ?  There  is 
a  way  of  testing  an  honest  judgment  on  this  question.  It  is, 
to  put  one's  self  into  circumstances  in  which  there  shall  be  no 
temptation  to  judge  unfairly,  but  every  inducement  to  judge 
honestly,  for  practical  purposes.  Let  any  one  imagine  himself 
under  some  of  these  forms  of  evil ;  the  tempest  is  bursting  on 
his  head,  the  earth  is  reeling  to  and  fro  like  a  drunken  man — 
or  the  ship  is  on  fire  in  mid-ocean — every  arm  is  palsied,  every 
face  pale  with  despair,  and  God  only  can  help — who,  despair- 
ing of  life,  would  not  feel  himself  to  be  a  sinner,  and,  filled 
with  forebodings  of  greater  evils  to  come,  ask  for  God's  mercy? 
What  then  are  these  evils,  honestly  judged  of,  but  manifesta- 
tions of  displeasure,  which  God  makes  in  the  exercise  of  his 
own  irresponsible  sovereignty,  and  in  vindication  of  his  high 
authority  as  moral  governor  ? 

Death,  separated  from  the  mode  and  circumstances  in  which 
it  takes  place,  is  an  evil  deserving  our  serious  consideration. 
What  then  is  death ;  what  is  it  to  all  those  creatures  of  God 
who  are  able,  as  God  designed  they  should  be,  to  know  and 
feel  it  as  it  is  ?  "  Death,"  in  nearly  the  words  of  another,  "  is 
a  most  serious  and  appalling  event.  It  is  nature's  supreme 
evil;  the  terror  of  God's  creation,  the  monster  king,  from  whose 
touch  and  glance  every  living  thing  recoils.       Death  destroys 


RECAPITULATION".  215 

both  action  and  enjoyment ;  it  mocks  at  wisdom,  strength  and 
beauty,  disarranges  our  plans,  robs  us  of  our  treasures,  deso- 
lates our  homes,  breaks  our  heart-strings,  and  blasts  our  hopes." 
Death  separates  us  from  all  we  know  and  love  on  earth,  extin- 
guishes affection,  confidence,  joy,  and  life  itself;  it  either  car- 
ries us  to  God's  judgment-seat  gr  it  does  not — lands  us  in  a 
state  of  untried  existence  or  in  the  gulf  of  annihilation.  "  Xo 
wonder  nature  trembles  before  it.  Reason  justifies  the  fear." 
"It  is  but  a  tribute  to  the  value  of  the  life  which  is  our  Ma- 
ker's gift.  To  make  light  of  death  is  an  outrage  on  reason,  on 
nature,  and  on  nature's  God."  To  such  an  evil  has  God  sub- 
jected man.  What  is  it  but  an  expression  of  displeasure,  an 
act  of  awful  sovereignty.  I  do  not  say  what  will  follow  it.  I 
take  as  it  is,  a  known  matter  of  fact  to  all  God's  rational  and 
moral  creatures.  What  is  it  but  a  proof  of  God's  displeasure 
— proof  that  he  reigns  in  vindictive  sovereign  majesty,  aveng- 
ing his  high  prerogative  to  rule,  if  not  in  exact  righteousness 
at  least  in  authorizing  and  compelling  reason  to  fear  a  more 
dreadful  retribution. 

Thus  I  have  attempted  to  show, that  God  enforces  conformity 
to  his  law  by  that  influence  which  I  have  called  authority.  In 
other  words,  in  view  of  what  God  has  done  in  the  creation  and 
condition  of  man  as  a  moral  being,  and  what  he  does  in  his 
providence  over  this  world,  there  is  a  very  powerful  motive  to 
do  the  will  of  God,  because  it  is  his  will.  I  now  ask  in  view 
of  wdiat  has  been  said,  is  there  any  object  more  worthy  of  being 
made  the  great  end  of  life,  than  that  of  obtaining  the  approba- 
tion and  avoiding  the  displeasure  of  that  Being  who  reigns 
over  this  world,  and  who  holds  all  destiny  in  his  hands  ?  Is 
there  any  other  way  in  which  we  can  so  rationally  hope  for 
substantial  good,  even  in  this  world — any  other  in  which  we 
can  avoid  fear — not  to  say  terror — in  the  prospect  of  leaving 
it !  Say  not  that  all  is  uncertain  after  death.  Be  it  so ;  and 
this  is  the  most  that  can  be  said  to  alleviate  the  prospect.  All 
then  is  uncertain  after  death  !  But  is  it  not  the  part  of  wisdom 
to  be  prepared  for  the  worst  ?  All  is  uncertain  after  death ! 
And  is  no  thought  to  be  taken  of  even  possible  evils — and  is  no 
preparation  to  be  made  against  them  ?  All  is  uncertain  !  But 
is  this  all  that  can  be  said  ?  Is  there  nothing  probable  after 
death?  Look  at  the  facts  ;  God  has  made  man  a  moral  being, 
fitted  to  be  held  responsible  for  his  doings — he  has  placed  him 


216     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

under  law  as  a  rule  of  action — all  adaptations,  tendencies,  the 
whole  nature  and  relations  of  things  show  that  if  man  would  be 
happy,  he  must  be  good.  Look  at  your  own  character.  In  bold, 
habitual  defiance  you  have  crossed  the  will,  and  so  incurred  the 
displeasure  of  the  infinite  Being  who  holds  all  destiny  in  his 
hands.  Look  at  his  providence.  He  tells  you  in  a  manner  not 
to  be  mistaken,  that  he  is  displeased.  He  tells  you  in  every 
painful  thought,  fear  and  misgiving,  in  every  sting  of  anguish 
that  conscience  inflicts,  in  every  evil  which  sin  brings  upon 
yourself  and  every  sinner — in  the  sorrows,  tears,  woes  and 
death  of  a  groaning  creation  around  you.  He  tells  you  also 
of  a  degree  of  displeasure  that  confines  not  its  expressions  in 
evil  to  the  direct  natural  results  of  wrong-doing.  He  shows 
himself  to  you  maintaining  his  prerogative  to  reign  by  inflict- 
ing other  evils  in  a  mode  of  awful  sovereignty.  He  will  ter- 
minate your  existence  on  earth  by  an  event  full  of  terror  as 
being  the  end  of  life,  an  event  which  will  decide  either  that 
your  soul  with  its  stupendous  faculties  will  be  blasted  into  an- 
nihilation— blessed  with  a  joyous  immortality,  or  plunged  into 
pain,  despair  and  horror.  Such  is  God.  All  this  he  hath 
done,  and  this  he  will  do.  And  is  there  nothing  probable  after 
death  ?  Tlrink  of  these  things.  Think  of  the  question  which 
death  will  decide  in  respect  to  yourself.  A  question,  the  mere 
uncertainty  of  whose  decision  is  enough  to  convulse  a  universe 
with  trembling.  Is  thoughtless  sin  then  the  wisest,  safest,  best 
preparation  for  meeting  God  in  death  ?  I  say  not  what  will  be. 
I  ask  you  only  to  think  of  what  with  fearful  probability  may 
be.  Do  you  say  you  can  meet  it  with  composure,  and  drive 
away  the  forebodings  of  conscious  guilt?  I  tell  you  no — not  if 
reason  remains  and  conscience  lives.  Nero  had  not  firmness 
of  nerve  enough  for  this.  Yoltaire,  with  his  settled  deadly 
hate  of  Christianity,  could  not  do  it.  There  is  a  God.  He 
hath  given  a  law.  That  law  to  the  guilty  mind  will  bespeak  a 
Judge.  The  throne  of  heaven  to  the  eye  of  conscience  will  be 
filled  with  a  living,  reigning,  sin-avenging  God. 


LECTURE  III 

Second  leading  proposition. — God's  administration  is  equitable — proved  by  showing,  1.  That  God 
has  given  the  best  law,  2.  That  he  distributes  good  and  evil  equitably. — In  opposition  to  this 
proposition,  the  unequal  distribution  of  good  and  evil  has  caused  the  chief  difficulty. — Various 
theories  resorted  to.— Is  the  difficulty  real  ? — (a)  Greater  difficulties  in  denying  God's  equity 
than  in  admitting  it. — (b)  No  proof  against  it ;  for  God  is  not  inequitable  in  treating  men  better 
than  they  deserve,  nor  in  treating  them  worse.  More  rational  to  regard  this  distribution  as 
explicable  in  some  unknown  way.  God  may  be  administering  a  moral  government  under  a 
gracious  economy. — (c)  There  is  satisfactory  proof  for  his  equity — the  arguments  probable  and 
cumulative. 

In  support  of  our  leading  proposition, — that  God  is  adminis- 
tering A  PERFECT  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  OVER  MEN,  I  have  at- 
tempted to  show,  that  he  is  administering  a  moral  government, 
as  a  peculiar  kind  of  government,  and  in  some  proper  import  of 
the  language.     I  now  proceed,  as  I  proposed,  to  show — 

II.  The  equity  of  his  administration. 

For  this  purpose  it  is  necessary  only  to  show — 

1.  That  God  has  given  to  men  the  best  law ; 

2.  That  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world, 
he  does  not  show  himself  as  departing  from,  but  by  this  means 
and  others,  as  adhering  to  the  principles  of  exact  equity. 

I  remark  then : 

1.  That  God  has  given  to  men  the  best  law.  What  I  main- 
tain on  this  topic  is,  that  the  law  of  benevolence,  or  the  law  of 
benevolent  action  is  the  best  law ;  and  that  God  has  given  this 
law  to  men.  After  what  has  been  said  in  previous  lectures,  I 
deem  it  sufficient  to  add,  that  men,  as  moral  beings,  know  that 
they  are  under  the  law  which  requires  them  to  prefer  the  high- 
est happiness  of  all — of  God  and  his  sentient  creation — to  every 
object  in  competition  with  it,  and  so  to  will,  purpose,  or  intend 
at  all  times,  and  in  all  circumstances,  to  do  the  greatest  good 
in  their  power. 

2.  God,  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world, 
does  not  show  himself  as  departing  from,  but  by  this  means  and 
others,  as  adhering  to  the  principles  of  exact  equity. 

If  a  moral  governor  gives  the  best  law,  and  also  does,  or 
Vol.  I.— 10 


218     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

shows  himself  determined  to  do  those  things  which  are  necessary 
to  manifest  or  express  his  highest  approbation  of  obedience, 
and  highest  disapprobation  of  disobedience,  the  equity  of  his 
administration  is  established.  He  may  not  establish  his  right- 
ful authority ;  he  may  be  a  selfish  being,  and  in  other  ways 
prove  himself  such,  yet  in  the  case  now  supposed,  the  equity 
of  his  administration  cannot  be  impeached. 

It  is  not  however  supposed,  that  God  manifests  the  highest 
approbation  of  obedience,  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of 
disobedience  in  this  world,  in  every  possible  way  or  mode  of 
their  manifestation.  It  is  not  pretended  that  he  fully  and  di- 
rectly expresses  these  feelings  in  the  distribution  of  good  and 
evil  in  this  world,  or  makes  it  according  to  the  principles  of 
exact  justice  or  perfect  equity ;  though,  as  I  claim,  this  distri- 
bution involves  no  violation  of  these  principles, — nothing  in- 
consistent with  a  strict  adherence  to  them.  What  I  maintain 
is,  that  while  he  does  not  show  that  he  adheres  to  these  princi- 
ples merely  by  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil,  his  manner  of 
doing  so,  even  in  this  world,  is  such,  that  taken  in  connection 
with  other  things,  it  fully  and  convincingly  shows  his  adher- 
ence to  them. 

This  is  quite  supposable.  A  temporary,  short  suspension  of 
full  and  exact  retribution  does  not  necessarily  involve  the  least 
departure  from,  or  violation  of,  any  of  the  principles  of  exact 
justice,  nor,  as  the  case  may  be,  does  it  in  the  least  degree  ob- 
scure the  fact,  that  a  moral  governor  adheres  to  these  principles 
in  his  administration.  There  may  be  good  and  sufficient  reasons 
for  the  temporary  suspension  of  rewards  and  punishments,  and 
at  the  same  time,  full  and  satisfactory  proofs  that  the  principles 
of  exact  justice  are  not  violated  nor  abandoned. 

The  unequal  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world, 
as  it  is  called,  has  occasioned  the  principal  difficulties  on  this 
interesting  subject.  It  has  appeared  on  a  superficial  view  of 
Divine  Providence,  to  involve  a  plain  departure  from,  or  rather 
a  palpable  violation  of,  the  principles  of  exact  justice.  The 
error  lies  in  not  regarding  the  system  of  God's  moral  government 
over  men  as  begun  or  entered  upon,  but  not  yet  finished — as  in 
progress,  not  completed — a  system,  perfect  in  all  its  principles 
as  one  of  influence,  not  yet  carried  out  into  all  its  issues  and 
results.  Hence,  it  is  often  represented,  not  only  as  imperfect 
in  its  present  stage  of  progress,  but  as  actually  marred  with 


A    DIFFICULTY    PRESENTS    ITSELF.  219 

palpable  injustice  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil.  The 
righteous  it  is  said,  are  often  cast  down  in  affliction,  while  the 
wicked  are  crowned  with  prosperity. 

Hence,  it  is  naturally  asked,  if  God  sustains  his  authority  as 
a  perfect  moral  governor  by  adhering  to  the  principles  of  strict 
equity  in  his  administration,  why  does  he  distribute  good  and 
evil  in  this  world  in  a  manner  so  apparently  inconsistent  with 
these  principles  ?  This  difficulty,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  not  been 
removed  by  any  satisfactory  explanation.  Some  theologians, 
to  give  plausibility  to  their  reasonings,  have  resorted  to  the 
theory  of  a  future  life,  in  which,  as  they  would  have  us  believe, 
these  violations  of  justice  will  cease,  and  be  followed  with  mer- 
ited rewards  to  the  righteous,  and  just  punishments  to  the 
wicked.'"  This  solves  no  difficulty;  for  it  concedes  that  the 
principles  of  justice  are  in  this  world  actually  violated;  and 
how  can  even  a  single  violation  of  justice  be  consistent  with 
the  perfect  equity  of  his  administration? — Others  that  they 
may  avoid,  rather  than  meet  and  remove  the  difficulty,  have 
adopted  an  arbitrary  and  unauthorized  notion  of  justice  in 
God,— one  which  represents  it  as  neither  dictated  by  benevo- 
lence, nor  as  consistent  with  it,  and  which  would  therefore, 
dishonor  the  throne  of  a  usurper  and  a  tyrant,  f  Thus  it  is,  that 
occasion  has  been  furnished  for  the  triumph  of  Infidelity  in  its 
favorite  conclusion, — that  the  moral  government  of  God, instead 
of  being  maintained  according  to  the  unbending  principles  of 
eternal  justice,  is  a  mere  system  of  tenderness,  which  does  not 
distinguish  between  right  and  wrong ;  and  indulgence,  which 
accommodates  itself  to  all  iniquity.  Thus  it  is,  I  may  also  add, 
that  many  who  take  the  name  of  Christians,  to  quell  the  dis- 
turbance and  alarm  which  they  feel  when  they  think  of  Heaven's 
Sovereign  as  a  God  of  justice  and  of  judgment,  sink  all  that  is 
venerable  and  awful  in  his  dominion,  into  the  lovely  and  easily 
defied  imbecility  of  parental  fondness. 

In  view  of  the  supposed  difficulty  arising  from  the  manner  in 

*  "  Shall  oppressed  righteousness  never  be  taken  under  the  protection  of  Provi- 
dence? Shall  the  cry  of  the  innocent  never  roach  the  throne  of  justice?  Are  the 
wrongs  and  grievances  of  the  good  and  the  righteous  never  to  be  redressed?" — Lo- 
gan. Sermons,  p.  240.  Even  Bishop  Butler  speaks  of  God  as  rewarding  virtue  and 
punishing  vice,  as  such,  so  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole,  have  his  deserts,  &c." 
He  speaks  of  this  as  "  the  completion  of  that  moral  government"  which  G-od  has  begun 
in  this  world. — Analogy,  p.  120.     What  language  is  this  for  a  Christian  divine? 

\  Vide  Chalmers's  Theology. 


220     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

which  God  distributes  good  and  evil  in  this  world,  it  may  be 
well  to  inquire,  before  Ave  abandon  the  equity  of  his  moral  ad- 
ministration, whether  there  are  not  greater  difficulties  in  deny- 
ing than  in  admitting  it,  or  rather,  whether  the  difficulty  which 
appears  so  formidable  is  not  rather  imaginary  than  real,  and 
whether  the  evidence  is  not  decisive  and  satisfactory,  that  he 
adheres  to  the  most  exact  principles  of  equity,  without  the 
shadow  of  violation  of  them,  in  his  moral  government  over 
men. 

Such  are  my  own  views  of  the  subject;  and  to  these  three 
topics  of  inquiry  I  shall  now  direct  my  remarks. 

I  propose  to  show  in  respect  to  the  equity  of  God's  moral  ad- 
ministration : 

In  the  first  place,  that  there  are  greater  difficulties  in  denying 
than  in  admitting  it. 

In  the  second  place,  that  there  is  no  proof  against  it ;  and 
In  the  third  place,  that  there  is  satisfactory  proof  in  support 
of  it. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  greater  difficulties  in  denying 
than  in  admitting  that  God  adheres  to  the  principles  of  equity 
in  his  moral  administration.  The  importance  and  bearing  of 
this  remark  are,  not  that  it  proves  even  if  true,  our  present 
position,  but  that  if  true,  it  shows  how  extremely  irrational  is 
the  confident  denial  of  it. 

God,  as  we  have  seen,  has  furnished  unequivocal  proofs  of 
the  fact  that  he  administers  a  moral  government  over  men. 
This  fact  creates  a  strong  presumption  against  the  supposition 
that  he  would  destroy  all  ground  of  confidence  in  his  character 
and  of  respect  for  his  authority,  by  violating  the  principles  of 
equity  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil.  The  difficulty  of 
admitting  such  a  conclusion  is  great  and  peculiar,  when  we  re- 
flect that  the  author  of  this  system  is  the  omniscient,  almighty 
and  immutable  Creator.  That  such  a  God  should  give  exist- 
ence to  moral  beings,  adapting  their  nature  to  the  great  end  of 
conformity  to  the  rule  of  benevolent  action ;  that  he  should 
show  that  rule  to  be  the  expression  of  his  will  by  every  part  of 
their  nature  and  every  circumstance  of  their  condition,  so  that 
their  perfection  in  character  and  in  happiness  depends  on  con- 
formity to  that  will ;  that  he  should  clearly  evince  his  purpose 
to  dispose  of  their  happiness  as  obedient  or  disobedient,  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  make  it  their  true  and  highest  interest  to  obey 


NO   EVIDENCE    FOR    WANT    OF    EQUITY.  221 

Ins  will ;  that  lie  should  reveal  himself  as  immutable  in  his  de- 
signs— adopt  a  course  so  fitted  to  secure  the  confiding  homage 
of  his  moral  creation,  and  at  the  same  time  utterly  defeat  that 
end  by  palpable  violations  of  equity  in  the  distribution  of 
good  and  evil — to  believe  all  this  involves  us  in  no  trivial 
difficulties.  It  is  to  suppose  that  by  one  course  of  action  he 
furnishes  entirely  sufficient  and  satisfactory  evidence  of  the 
equity  of  his  government,  and  yet  that  by  another  course  of 
action  lie  proves  the  utter  want  of  equity  in  his  administra- 
tion. That  an  earthly  ruler  should  fall  into  such  inconsist- 
ency, through  want  of  foresight  or  power,  or  from  fickleness  of 
purpose,  we  might  believe.  But  to  ascribe  such  inconsistency 
to  God,  is  to  suppose  it  to  exist  in  a  case  in  which  the  only 
known  causes  for  it  do  not  exist.  If  then  it  be  difficult  to  be- 
lieve the  equity  of  God's  moral  government  on  account  of 
the  apparently  unequal  and  unjust  distribution  of  good  and  evil 
in  the  world,  it  is  more  difficult  in  view  of  other  undeniable 
facts, to  believe  that  this  government  is  not  administered  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  principles  of  entire  equity.  If  to  believe  its 
equity  we  must  reject  evidence,  it  is  not  less  true  that  to  disbe- 
lieve its  equity  we  must  reject  evidence  more  decisive.  If  it  is 
irrational  to  believe  it,  it  is  more  irrational  to  disbelieve  it. 

I  remark — 

In  the  second  place,  that  there  is  no  evidence  from  the  distri- 
bution of  good  and  evil  in  the  world,  that  God  does  not  act  on 
the  principles  of  strict  equity  in  his  moral  administration.  The 
only  conceivable  ways  in  which  God  can  show  the  want  of 
equity  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil,  are  the  follow- 
ing :  either  by  conferring  less  good,  inflicting  more  evil  than 
is  deserved,  or  by  conferring  more  good  or  inflicting  less  evil 
than  is  merited ;  or  in  other  words,  by  treating  his  subjects 
worse  or  better  than  they  deserve. 

I  remark  then — 

That  he  evinces  no  want  of  equity  by  treating  any  of  his 
subjects  worse  than  they  deserve.  Diversified  as  are  the  moral 
characters  of  men,  there  is  one  truth  too  obvious  and  too  im- 
portant to  be  overlooked  in  this  argument — viz.,  that  none  of 
the  subjects  of  God's  moral  government  are  entitled  to  the 
least  good,  but  as  transgressors  of  his  law  deserve  evil  only. 
This  remark  I  deem  worthy  of  particular  attention,  not  only  on 
account  of  its  bearing  on  the  present  argument,  but  because,  if 


222     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

I  mistake  not,  it  has  been  overlooked  or  denied  by  most  ethical 
writers.  In  the  ablest  treatises  on  this  subject,  I  find  it  con- 
stantly assumed,  not  only  that  there  are  wicked  men  who  do 
not  receive  deserved  punishment  in  this  life,  which  is  indeed 
undeniable,  bnt  that  there  are  good  men  who  do  not  receive  a 
merited  reward — an  assumption  I  must  think  as  palpably  false 
as  can  be  easily  imagined  in  the  view  of  every  mind  which  has 
any  adequate  conception  of  the  divine  law,  and  the  principles 
of  human  action.  Recognizing  then  the  nndeniable  fact  of 
human  guilt  and  the  principles  of  merit  and  demerit  before 
advanced ;  and  remembering  how  much  more  good  all  who  are 
accountable  for  their  conduct  enjoy,  and  how  much  less  evil 
they  suffer  than  they  deserve,  God's  providential  distribution 
of  good  and  evil  is  exempted  in  one  respect  from  the  reproach 
of  injustice.  There  is  no  deficiency  of  good  as  a  reward,  there 
is  no  excess  of  evil  as  a  penalty.  All  enjoy  more  good  and 
suffer  less  evil  than  they  deserve.*  God  then  does  not  violate 
the  principle  of  equity  by  withholding  from  any  of  his  subjects 
merited  good,  nor  by  inflicting  on  any  undeserved  evil,  i.  e.,  by 
treating  any  of  his  subjects  worse  than  they  deserve. 

Again ;  God  evinces  no  want  of  equity  by  treating  any  of 
his  subjects  better  than  they  deserve.  The  good  conferred  is 
far  greater,  and  the  evil  inflicted  on  all  far  less  than  their  de- 
serts. The  main  point  however  is  not  decided  by  this  fact.  It 
is  true  indeed,  if  we  assume  that  equity  demands  the  execution 
of  penalty  immediately  on  transgression,  that  to  treat  the 
transgressor  better  than  he  deserves,  by  delaying  the  execution 
of  the  penalty,  would  be  a  violation  of  equity,  which  however 
may  allow  what  it  does  not  require.  It  allows  the  instant 
punishment  of  the  transgressor ;  but  it  cannot  be  truly  said  to 
demand  it  in  all  cases.  An  atonement  may  be  provided,  or 
delay  to  punish  may  be  required  for  some  useful  purpose,  some 
reasons  of  State.  In  respect  to  the  present  fact,  viz.,  that  God 
treats  his  subjects  better  than  they  deserve,  there  are  two  ques- 
tions to  be  decided.  One  is,  whether  he  is  executing  legal 
sanctions,  or  whether  the  good  is  conferred  as  a  legcd  reward^ 
and  the  evil  inflicted  as  a  legal  penalty.     The  other  is,  whether 

*  The  case  of  infants,  however  it  may  affect  the  question  of  divine  benevolence, 
presents  no  peculiar  difficulty  on  the  present  subject.  For  they  are  either  moral 
agents  or  they  are  not.  If  they  are,  they  are  sinners,  and  their  sufferings  are  de- 
served.    If  they  are  not,  the  present  position  does  not  respect  them. 


NO    EVIDENCE    FOR    WANT    OF    EQUITY.  223 

the  present,  or  even  any  execution  of  legal  sanctions,  in  all 
conceivable  cases,  is  necessary  to  and  demanded  by  the  perfect 
equity  of  his  administration. 

It  is  here  important  also  to  ascertain,  on  the  supposition  of  a 
violation  of  the  principles  of  equity  in  treating  subjects  better 
than  they  deserve,  wherein  such  violation  consists.  It  is  con- 
ceded then,  that  the  withholding  of  merited  good  and  the 
infliction  of  deserved  evil,  would  be  a  violation  of  the  rights 
of  the  individual  subject  or  subjects,  admitting  of  no  vindica- 
tion. Could  such  a  tact  be  found  under  the  government  of 
God,  any  attempt  to  vindicate  the  equity  of  his  administration 
would  be  vain.  But  to  treat  subjects  better  than  their  desert, 
is  at  least  no  violation  of  their  rights  as  individuals.  But  if 
it  can  be  clearly  shown  that  the  public  good  suffers  by  treating 
subjects  better  than  they  deserve,  then  the  act  is  as  truly  one 
of  injustice  to  the  public, as  the  treatment  of  individuals  worse 
than  they  deserve  would  be  an  act  of  injustice  to  them.  In 
respect  to  these  two  modes,  there  is  one  possible  and  very 
material  difference.  While  a  moral  governor  cannot  treat  sub- 
jects worse  than  they  deserve,  without  palpable  injustice  to 
them  as  individuals,  and  I  may  say  to  the  public  also,  it  is 
quite  possible  that  he  should  treat  them  better  than  their  de- 
serts, without  injustice  either  to  them  as  individuals  or  to  the 
public.  The  case  is  supposable,  that  some  temporary  delay  in 
the  execution  of  penalty  after  the  commission  of  crime,  should 
greatly  subserve  the  public  good  and  increase  the  efficacy  of 
law.  "No  rights  of  the  public,  or  of  individuals,  would  be  in- 
terfered with  or  violated  by  it,  and  no  injustice  done  to  either. 
Kor  is  this  all.  It  is  also  supposable  that  a  moral  governor, 
especially  one  of  infinite  wisdom  and  power,  should  devise  and 
adopt  some  expedient  by  which  subjects  should  be  treated 
better  than  they  deserve,  or  even  be  entirely  exempted  from 
penal  evil,  without  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  public.  Such 
cases  are  credible,  there  being  no  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
Why  then  say  that  it  can  make  no  difference,  whether  we  sup- 
pose that  God,  in  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this 
world,  executes  legal  sanctions  or  not,  since  if  he  does,  he  vio- 
lates the  principles  of  equity,  by  treating  subjects  better  than 
they  deserve;  and  if  he  does  not,  he  abandons  them  altogether 
and  leaves  his  authority  as  a  lawgiver  wholly  unsupported ; 
for  I  readily  concede,  that  if  God  does  dispense  good  and  evil 


224     MOEAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

in  this  manner,  as  legal  sanctions,  (and  this  is  extensively  main- 
tained by  theologians)  he  violates  the  principles  of  equity.  To 
treat  men  so  much  better  than  they  deserve,  and  this  in  the 
execution  of  legal  sanctions,  would  be  manifest  injustice  to  the 
public.  But  I  deny  that  there  is  the  least  evidence,  that  in 
the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world,  he  is  executing 
legal  sanctions ;  and  of  course,  that  there  is  the  least  evidence 
furnished  by  it,  that  he  is  not  adhering  to  the  principles  of 
strict  equity  in  his  moral  administration. 

On  this  position  the  decision  of  the  question  now  before  us 
chiefly  depends. 

I  remark  then — 

That  it  is  more  rational  to  regard  the  apparently  unjust 
distribution  of  good  and  evil  as  a  fact  incomprehensible  by 
us,  and  yet  in  some  unknown  manner  consistent  with  the 
equitable  administration  of  God's  moral  government,  than  to 
pronounce  it  absolute  proof  of  want  of  equity  in  his  adminis- 
tration. Let  it  be  remembered  that  the  only  possible  or  sup- 
posable  inconsistency  in  the  case  is,  that  he  treats  his  subjects 
better  than  they  deserve  during  a  very  short  period  of  their 
existence,  even  -that  of  human  life.  It  is  not  incredible  that 
there  should  be  much  that  is  incomprehensible  under  the  gov- 
ernment of  God.  This  is  indeed  no  reason  why  we  should 
overlook  or  disregard  the  least  legitimate  evidence  against  the 
equity  of  his  government;  but  it  is  a  reason  why  we  should 
carefully  discriminate  between  what  is  and  what  is  not  legiti- 
mate evidence.  If  any  thing  occurs  under  the  government  of 
God  which  we  can  pronounce  an  undoubted  violation  of  the 
principles  of  equity,  then  we  may  and  ought  so  to  do.  If  we 
knew  that  God  treated  any  of  the  subjects  of  his  moral  govern- 
ment worse  than  they  deserved,  we  should  be  authorized  and 
required  to  assert  the  existence  of  injustice  in  his  moral  admin- 
istration, and  if  we  knew  that  in  the  execution  of  legal  sanc- 
tions, or  in  that  punishment  which  he  inflicted  on  transgressors 
to  sustain  his  authority,  he  treated  any  better  than  they  de- 
served, this  too,  as  we  have  seen,  would  be  a  decisive  manifes- 
tion  of  injustice  to  the  public.  But  we  do  not  know  nor  can 
we  prove, that  the  treatment  in  question  is  in  the  way  or  form 
of  a  strictly  legal  procedure,  and  of  course  that  it  is  not  per- 
fectly consistent  with  the  equity  of  his  administration.  It  is 
not  difficult  to  see  how  or  in  what  manner  this  may  be.     A 


GRACIOUS    ECONOMY    SUPPOSABLE.  225 

temporary  delay  of  punishment  may  be  one  means  of  more 
effectually  securing  the  end  of  punishment.  As  in  human  gov- 
ernments, public  trials  are  of  great  importance  in  giving  effect 
to  law ;  so  in  the  divine,  men  in  this  world,  like  the  criminal 
waiting  his  day  of  trial  and  execution,  may  be  destined  to  meet 
God  in  judgment,  and  to  receive  a  just  retribution  in  a  future 
state  of  existence.  I  speak  here  of  the  mere  credibility  of  this, 
which  is  all  that  my  argument  now  requires.  The  reasonable 
supposition  that  punishment  may  be  delayed  as  a  useful  expe- 
dient of  moral  government,  and  that  subjects  should  for  a  little 
season  be  treated  better  than  they  deserve,  precludes  all  evi- 
dence from  such  treatment  against  the  perfect  equity  of  God's 
administration. 

Again;  there  is  yet  another  w^ay  in  which  to  treat  subjects 
better  than  they  deserve,  may  be  consistent  with  the  equity  of 
God's  moral  government.  It  is  a  reasonable  supposition  that 
God  may  he  administering  this  government  under  a  gracious 
economy,  or  through  an  atonement,  It  does  not,  as  facts  show, 
lie  beyond  the  limits  of  conjecture.  There  is  no  proof  to  the 
contrary.  Our  ignorance  of  the  ways  or  means,  by  which  God 
woidd  dispense  pardon  to  the  transgressors  of  law  consistently 
with  his  justice,  is  no  proof  that  there  are  none.  To  affirm  such 
an  impossibility  in  respect  to  God,  would  be  obvious  presump- 
tion on  the  part  of  human  ignorance.  ^Tor  does  the  fact  that 
some  heathen  philosophers  maintained  the  impossibility  that 
a  just  God  should  forgive  sin,  prove  that  there  is  not  sufficient 
evidence,  under  the  light  of  nature,  to  authorize  even  the  belief 
of  the  contrary.  To  say  nothing  of  the  prevalence  of  the  oppo- 
site opinion  evinced  by  expiatory  sacrifices,  the  assertion  of 
such  an  impossibility  must  be  admitted  to  be  false  by  the  Chris- 
tian, and  wholly  unauthorized  by  the  infidel.  It  is  not  incredi- 
ble then,  that  God  in  some  way,  or  by  some  expedient,  should, 
consistently  with  perfect  justice,  become  placable  to  offending 
man.  The  fact  therefore,  that  he  treats  the  subjects  of  his 
government  better  than  they  deserve,  furnishes  no  evidence 
that  he  does  not  administer  his  government  on  the  principles 
of  strictest  equity. 

That  there  may  be  no  misunderstanding  on  this  point,  let  me 

say  that  I  do  not  affirm  that  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil 

in  this  world,  either  is  or  is  not  consistent  with  the  equity  of 

God's  moral  administration.     I  affirm  only  the  possibility  of 

10*  15 


226     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

such  consistency, — that  there  is  no  proof  that  the  one  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  other ;  and  that,  for  aught  we  can  say  to  the 
contrary,  it  may  be  consistent  with  it.  We  know  not  cither ; 
and  as  mere  ignorance  is  not  competent  to  make  an  argument, 
neither  is  it  competent  to  make  an  objection.  The  fact,  in  and 
of  itself,  is  no  evidence  for  or  against  the  equity  of  God's  moral 
administration.  We  are  thus  turned  back  to  what  we  know, 
and  have  proved, — to  those  facts  which  we  have  already  estab- 
lished.    These,  as  I  now  claim,  and  proceed  to  show — 

In  the  third  place,  furnish  satisfactory  proof  that  God  adheres 
to  the  principles  of  equity  in  his  moral  administration.  To 
estimate  justly  the  force  of  our  present  arguments,  let  it  be 
kept  in  mind,  that  there  is  no  evidence  against  the  truth  of  our 
position, — that  there  is  not,  in  the  entire  providence  of  God, 
the  least  departure  from  the  principles  of  exact  justice,  in  his 
moral  administration.  The  question  then  is,  whether  there  are 
any  facts,  which  in  such  a  case  furnish  legitimate  and  satisfac- 
tory proof  that  he  does  adhere  to  these  principles.  This  is 
what  I  now  claim.  To  illustrate  the  nature  and  the  force  of 
this  argument,  let  us  recur  again  to  our  example.  A  skillful 
artificer  has  begun  to  make  a  watch : — so  much  of  the  ma- 
chinery falls  under  our  observation,  and  we  know  so  well  its 
essential  parts,  that  we  can  be  at  no  loss  in  respect  to  the  object 
of  its  construction.  He  has  entire  ability  to  finish,  and  to  give 
it  that  perfection,  as  a  whole,  which  shall  correspond  with  the 
absolute  perfection  of  all  the  parts  which  we  have  seen.  There 
is  no  reason  to  believe  that  he  will  not  finish  what  he  has  begun, 
while  from  his  known  decision  of  purpose  and  vigor  in  execu- 
tion, as  well  as  from  the  actual  progress  of  the  work,  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  he  will.  I  ask  now,  is  it  rational, 
or  is  it  not,  to  believe  that  the  watch-maker  will  complete  his 
work?  Will  he  omit  to  insert  the  mainspring,  or  any  other 
essential  or  important  part  of  the  machine '?  No  one  can  doubt, 
or  think  of  doubting. 

Such  then,  is  the  argument  now  to  be  presented  for  the  equity 
of  God's  moral  government  over  men.  I  shall  offer  it  only  in  a 
general  form,  intending  to  consider  it  more  particularly  hereafter. 

God  then,  has  in  fact  established  a  moral  government  over 
men,  and  actually  entered  on  its  administration.  He  has  shown 
his  great  design  to  administer  such  a  government  over  them  by 
the  constitution  of  their  nature,  and  all  the  circumstances  of 


WHAT    ISSUE    IS    PROBABLE.  227 

their  condition.  He  lias  given  tliem  a  law  or  rule  of  action, 
not  less  clearly  than  had  it  come  forth  with  a  living  voice  from 
his  throne.  In  this  fact,  and  in  all  the  modes  of  his  providence 
he  shows  himself  as  assuming  the  right  to  reign  over  men  as  a 
lawgiver ;  and  maintains  that  right  by  also  showing  that  he 
has  their  happiness  entirely  at  his  own  disposal,  and  will  in  fact 
dispose  of  it,  as  they  obey  or  disobey  his  will,  so  as  to  make  it 
for  their  true  and  highest  interest  to  obey.  He  thus  clearly 
reveals  himself  as  their  sovereign,  claiming  submission  in  the 
way  of  supreme  prerogative,  and  reigning  in  the  exercise  of 
absolute  authority.  His  administration  is  in  no  respect  marred 
by  the  slightest  act  of  injustice.  Nothing  has  transpired  to 
prevent  God,  the  next  moment,  and  with  the  ease  of  omnipo- 
tence, from  revealing  himself  in  the  glories  and  terrors  of  exact 
justice.  Will  he  ever  do  this?  Will  he,  or  will  he  not,  after 
this  short  and  momentary  life,  give  this  jierfection  to  that  sys- 
tem of  moral  government  which  he  has  begun?  Has  he  de- 
parted from  the  principles  of  perfect  justice  in  dispensing  good 
and  evil  to  his  accountable  subjects?  Never.  Will  he  ever 
depart  from  these  principles  ?  Will  he  consent,  that  this  moral 
system  shall  want  the  strength,  dignity  and  glory  which  these 
principles  alone  can  give  it,  and  terminate  in  failure,  dishonor 
and  mockery?  Will  not  a  system  of  jurisprudence  begun  by 
heaven's  Sovereign,  and  carried  forward,  not  only  without  in- 
justice, but  with  every  indication  of  exact  justice  which  the 
present  stage  of  its  progress,  so  far  as  Ave  can  say,  admits,  be 
carried  out  to  a  full  and  perfect  consummation  in  the  issues  of 
perfect  righteousness?  I  say  not  here  what  these  issues  will 
be — I  decide  not  whether  man's  probation  will  or  will  not  be 
prolonged  after  death ;  whether  a  merely  legal  economy  will  or 
will  not  be  followed  by  a  just  retribution  to  all,  nor  whether 
the  final  results  will  or  will  not  be  those  of  a  gracious  econ- 
omy. But  I  ask,  whether  the  results  will  not  show  that  God  is 
now,  and  ever  has  been  administering  his  moral  government 
over  men  on  the  principles  of  perfect  equity  ?  The  grand  ques 
tion  is,  what  idea  shall  we  form  of  God  as  the  governor  of  his 
moral  creation  ?  It  becomes  us  to  fix  on  some  view  of  God  in 
this  relation  that  shall  be  definite,  intelligible,  rational,  and  on 
which  we  can  rely.  Is  the  throne  of  God  then  sustained  only 
by  the  arm  of  his  power,  threatening  us  with  the  terrors  of 
omnipotent  despotism  ?     Has  it  no  other  basis  than  the  sensi- 


228      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

tiveness  and  imbecility  of  paternal  fondness  and  indulgence? 
Or  does  it  stand  in  its  true  grandeur  on  the  pillars  of  eternal 
justice  ?  The  first  I  concede  is  palpably  inconsistent  with  the 
abundance  and  benignity  of  his  gifts,  as  well  as  too  appalling 
to  be  admitted  even  by  those  whose  principles  lead  to  such  a 
conclusion.  If  now  we  adopt  that  view  of  God  which  repre- 
sents him  as  too  indulgent  to  adhere  to  the  unbending  princi- 
ples of  exact  justice,  then  what  is  to  be  done  with  certain  stub- 
born matters  of  fact  ?  Why  has  God  so  obviously  assumed 
the  high  prerogative  of  moral  dominion  over  men  ?  Why  has 
he  given  them  a  law  absolutely  perfect  in  precept  and  unbend- 
ing in  its  claims?  Why  in  the  very  nature,  adaptation  and  ten- 
dencies of  all  things  within  and  without  us,has  he  shown  that 
there  is  absolutely  no  sure  and  infallible  way  to  avoid  complete 
misery  and  obtain  perfect  happiness,  but  by  obedience  to  his 
law?  Why  does  he  compel  men  to  know  and  feel,  notwith- 
standing all  their  wishes  to  the  contrary,  that  whatever  may  be 
the  issues  of  his  government,  they  will  be  at  least  above  all 
contempt, — such  as  accord  with  the  attributes  of  an  infinite 
Being,  and  enthrone  him,  if  not  in  the  confidence  and  affec- 
tions, at  least  in  the  homage  and  awe  of  his  intelligent  creation? 
Why  is  it  that  he  places  himself  before  man  so  constantly  in  all 
the  majesty  and  terrors  of  absolute  and  august  sovereignty  by 
the  calamities,  woes,  and  death  of  his  sentient  creation — afflict- 
ing, agonizing  the  work  of  his  own  hands,  and  yet  never  swerv- 
ing from  the  principles  of  perfect  justice  ?  Is  this  fiction,  or  is 
it  fact?  Is  all  this  nothing  but  the  overflowings  of  sentimental 
tenderness ;  or  are  these  the  results  of  God's  displeasure  for 
man's  wickedness,  telling  us  what  perfect  justice  can, and  with 
fearful  probability  will,  do  in  some  future  hour  of  full  retribu- 
tion? Death — that  heaviest  thunderbolt  of  God's  wrath  that 
ever  falls  on  this  groaning  creation — what  is  death  ?  What  is 
it  ?  what  will  it  do  with  that  frail  imagination  of  yours  that 
God  is  all  tenderness?  Look  over  these  terrors  of  God  and  say 
are  they  to  lead  us  to  suppose  ourselves  the  mere  "  nurslings 
of  hie  fondness,"  instead  of  the  subjects  of  his  righteous  and 
holy  dominion?  Is  all  this  only  to  make  us  light-hearted  when 
death  comes  to  look  at  us  in  earnest?  Is  all  this  designed  only 
to  lead  us  to  make  merry  around  the  death-bed  of  others  or  on 
our  own,  or  to  amuse  ourselves  with  trifles  when  we  or  others 
are  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  living  God?     ]S"o.     The  fear 


TIIE    GREAT    DESIGN    OF    GOD.  229 

of  God  as  a  righteous  lawgiver  and  judge,  is  no  superstitious 
fear.  God  does  not  reveal  himself  to  us  throned  in  the  soft 
and  smiling  radiance  of  an  indulgent  deity,  caring  more  for 
our  happiness  than  for  our  moral  conduct.  He  does  not  show 
himself  diffusing  only  bliss  over  this  world  without  respect  to 
the  doings  of  those  who  dwell  on  it.  If  he  shows  himself  deserv- 
ing any  thing,  it  is  to  make  man  good  that  he  may  he  happy ; 
if  he  shows  approbation,  it  is  of  virtue ;  if  disapprobation,  it  is 
of  vice;  if  he  shows  himself  immutable  in  any  thing,  it  is  in  his 
approval  of  the  one  and  in  his  disapproval  of  the  other.  In  a 
word,  if  God  shows  himself  as  aiming  at  any  thing,  designing 
any  thing  in  his  government  of  this  world,  it  is  to  maintain  the 
perfect  equity  of  his  moral  administration.  What  he  has  so 
obviously  begun  in  the  assumption  of  this  high  prerogative,  in 
giving  his  perfect  law  to  his  moral  creatures,  and  in  this  whole 
economy  of  legislation,  he  will  finish.  It  is  his  great  design. 
To  this  all  things  else  are  manifestly  subservient.  It  is  the  all 
in  all  of  God,our  maker,to  enthrone  himself  amid  the  grandeurs 
of  eternity,  the  righteous  moral  governor  of  his  moral  creation. 
Death  will  not  arrest  the  progress  of  this  design,  nor  defeat  its 
consummation.  It  will  only  disclose  the  actual  results  of  prin- 
ciples already  manifest — only  draw  aside  the  curtain  that  now 
faintly  conceals  the  full  effulgence  of  God,  within  that  high  and 
inviolable  sanctuary,  where  justice  and  judgment  are  the  habit- 
ation of  his  throne  forever. 


LECTURE  IV. 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. — God  administers  an  equitable  moral  government. — 
The  possibility  of  a  future  state  precludes  all  objections  against  the  Divine  equity. — No  pre- 
sumption against  a  future  state  —No  proof  the  soul  is  material.— No  evidence  that  death 
destroys  the  soul. — Direct  proofs  of  a  future  state. — Kind  of  evidence  furnished. — No  cause 
known  which  can  destroy  the  soul. — Every  thing  which  has  begun  continues  to  exist. — The 
present  state  unsuitable  to  the  natural  perfection  of  man. — Argument  from  man's  moral  nature 
decisive. 

In  the  last  lecture  I  attempted  to  show  that  God  administers 
an  equitable  moral  government  over  men. 

In  considering  the  argument  against  this  position,  derived 
from  the  distribution  of  good  and  evil  in  this  world,  I  endeav- 
ored to  show,  that  the  only  fact  which  can  be  supposed  to  fur- 
nish the  least  evidence  against  the  equity  of  his  administration, 
viz.,  that  he  treats  men  better  than  they  deserve  during  this 
short  and  comparatively  momentary  state  of  existence,  furnishes 
not  the  shadow  of  such  evidence.  This  fact  I  claimed,  mi  the 
supposition  of  a  future  state,  may  answer  some  highly  useful 
and  necessary  purpose,  and  that  if  we  suppose  even  a  strictly 
legal  economy,  it  may,  like  the  temporary  delay  to  punish 
offenders  against  human  governments,  subserve  the  very  ends 
of  public  justice;  that  it  cannot  therefore,  be  alleged  as  in  the 
least  degree  inconsistent  with  the  exact  equity  of  his  moral  ad- 
ministration, or  as  involving  any  departure  from,  or  violation 
of,  the  principles  of  exact  equity.  Hence  it  was  claimed,  that 
God  might  at  any  moment  show, that  in  entire  consistency  with 
all  his  doings, he  has  ever  adhered  and  that  he  ever  will  adhere 
to  these  principles,  and  that  he  might  do  this  in  either  of  two 
ways — either  by  inflicting  a  full  and  merited  retribution  on 
all,  or  by  showing  that  he  administers  his  government  under  a 
gracious  economy.  Having  thus  shown  that  there  is  not  the 
slightest  evidence  against,  I  presented  the  direct  evidence  for, 
the  equity  of  his  moral  government.  I  showed  that  he  is  actu- 
ally administering  a  moral  government— that  to  administer 
such  a  government  over  men  is  manifestly  his  great  design — 
one  to  which  his  works  of  creation  and  providence  are  obvi- 


THE    SUPPOSITION    OF    A    FUTURE    STATE.        231 

ously  subservient;  a  design  which  stands  forth  first,  greatest, 
brightest  of  all ;  that  he  has  manifested  his  equity  by  giving  to 
men  the  best  law — the  only  law  which  a  being  of  perfect  jus- 
tice would  or  could  give ;  that  he  is  able  to  administer  his  gov- 
ernment in  perfect  equity,  and  that  he  has,  so  to  speak,  scrupu- 
lously avoided  treating  any  of  his  subjects  worse  than  they 
deserve,  while  in  treating  them  better,  he  has  not  furnished  the 
least  reason  to  doubt  hie  equity.  With  these  things  in  view,  it 
was  claimed  that  we  are  shut  up  to  one  of  these  conclusions, 
either  that  this  chief  design  of  the  Infinite  Being  will  fail  in 
defeat  and  mockery,  which  is  utterly  incredible;  or  that  he 
ever  has  been,  and  is  still  adhering,  and  ever  will  adhere  to 
the  principles  of  justice  in  his  moral  administration. 

Thus  the  supposition  or  the  bare  possibility  of  a  future  state 
is  sufficient  to  neutralize  every  objection  to  the  equity  of  God's 
moral  administration.  It  leaves  in  its  full  and  unimpaired  force 
the  evidence  for  its  equity,  which  uncounteracted  by  oppos- 
ing evidence  is  abundant  and  decisive.  Nor  is  this  all.  The 
possibility  of  a  future  state  in  connection  with  such  evidence 
for  the  equity  of  his  administration,  reveals  the  certainty  by 
revealing  the  necessity  of  a  future  state,  that  God  may  finish 
what  he  lias  begun,  and  what  as  an  omniscient,  almighty  and 
immutable  being  lie  must  finish.  We  say  then  not  only  that 
there  may  be,  there  will  be  (for  there  must  be)  a  future  state,  in 
which  God  will  unfold  by  the  requisite  issues  the  perfect  equity 
of  his  moral  government  over  men.  What  else  can  be  sup- 
posed or  thought  of?  What  otherwise  will  become  of  the 
great, the  most  obvious  design  of  God  in  the  creation  and  gov- 
ernment of  this  world  ?  Shall  we  suppose  such  a  design  aban- 
doned ?  Is  Omniscience  at  fault  in  the  plan ;  is  Omnipotence 
discomfited  in  the  execution;  arc  infinite  attributes  thwarted 
of  an  end  worthy  of  such  attributes  ;  in  place  of  reality  is  there 
pretense  and  pageantry,  instead  of  majesty  and  glory  is  there 
the  self-degradation  of  an  Infinite  Being  ?  What  shall  we  say  ? 
Plainly  without  a  future  state  of  being  for  man,  the  works  and 
ways  of  God  present  the  most  insolvable  of  all  problems — the 
most  intractable  of  all  enigmas.  His  designs,  his  doings,  his 
character,  what  he  is,  what  we  his  creatures  are,  and  what  we  are 
to  be — all  this  entire  moral  system  is  but  a  feverish  dream  of  un- 
certainty, agitation  and  pain — a  chaos  of  darkness  and  terror — - 
while  the  mere  supposition  of  a  future  state  is  like  the  word  of 


232      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

the  Creator,  when  in  respect  to  this  material  system  he  said, 
"  Let  there  be  light,  and  there  was  light."  As  a  mere  suppo- 
sition, while  it  at  once  reveals  its  own  reality,  it  pours  the  efful- 
gence of  noon-clay  on  all  the  works  of  creation  and  providence, 
and  shows  God  as  the  ^righteous  moral  governor  of  his  moral 
creation,  reigning  to  display  the  harmony,  grandeur  and  glory 
of  his  perfect  dominion. 

Tiie  necessity  of  a  future  state  in  order  that  God  may  ac- 
complish what  lie  has  so  obviously  begun,  is  decisive  as  an  ar- 
gument, and  it  is  not  my  design  to  dwell  longer  upon  this 
particular  mode  of  reasoning.  Indeed  to  see  the  great  facts  of 
creation  and  providence  which  disclose  so  clearly  the  chief  de- 
sign of  God  in  respect  to  man,  is  also  to  see  the  necessity  and 
reality  of  a  future  state  in  which  by  its  requisite  issues  the 
equity  of  God's  moral  government  over  this  world  will  be  un- 
folded. I  will  only  add  on  this  topic,  that  if  called  upon  to 
engage  in  controversy  with  one  who  denied  a  future  state,  I 
should  place  my  chief  reliance  on  this  argument,  and  feel 
strong  for  the  contest. 

The  question  however  of  a  future  state  has  been  controverted 
so  much  on  other  grounds,  and  has  been  supposed  to  involve- 
so  many  difficulties,  that  to  examine  these  modes  of  reasoning 
may  serve  to  strengthen  an  argument  in  some  minds,  if  any 
additional  strength  is  needed.  In  this  mode  of  argument,  then 
I  proceed  to  show  that — 

There  is  a  future  state  of  existence  for  man. 

I  propose  to  show  as  briefly  as  may  be : 

In  the  first  place,  that  there  is  not  even  a  presumption 
against  the  fact ;  and 

In  the  second  place,  to  offer  direct  proofs  of  the  fact  of  a 
future  state. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  not  even  a  presumption  against  the 
fact. 

Some  philosophers  have  maintained  that  the  soul  is  a  mate- 
rial substance,  or  that  its  existence  depends  on  our  bodily  or- 
ganization, and  hence  have  denied  its  immortality.  That  the 
soul  is  material,  or  that  its  existence  depends  on  any  organiza- 
tion of  matter,  is  in  my  view  wholly  a  gratuitous  and  unauthor- 
ized assumption. 

Its  immateriality  however  I  do  not  consider  as  a  fact  of  any 
importance  on  the  question  of  its  immortality.     The  only  use 


NO    PROOF   AGAINST   IT.  233 

which  seems  to  be  made  of  it,is  to  refute  an  objection  against 
the  possibility  of  the  soul's  future  existence.  It  can  however 
in  no  respect  answer  even  this  purpose,  since  the  annihilation 
of  the  soul  or  its  continued  existence  is  equally  possible  to  the 
Creator,  whether  it  be  material  or  immaterial.  It  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  the  soul  may  have  a  future  existence  whether  it  be 
a  material  or  a  spiritual  substance. 

Again ;  there  is  no  evidence  that  death  destroys  the  soul.  I 
am  not  saying  that  death  does  not  produce  this  effect,  but  sim- 
ply that  there  is  no  evidence  that  it  does  produce  it.  We  know 
to  some  extent  the  actual  effects  of  death,  but  we  cannot  say 
that  the  destruction  of  the  soul  is  one  of  them.  We  do  not 
know  on  what  the  continued  existence  of  the  soul  and  of  its 
powers  proximately  depends.  We  do  not  therefore  know 
enough  of  death  to  say  whether  it  will  or  will  not  destroy 
the  soid.  Its  existence  with  all  its  powers  in  perfect  exercise, 
may  depend  on  that  which  death  cannot  touch.  There  is  in- 
deed an  intimate  connection  in  many  respects  between  the  soul 
and  the  body.  But  we  have  no  such  knowledge  of  the  nature 
and  mode  of  this  connection,  as  to  authorize  us  to  decide  that 
the  soul  cannot  exist  without  the  body,  and  even  in  a  more 
perfect  state.  Should  this  be  proved  hereafter,  it  would  not 
contradict  or  be  inconsistent  with  any  fact  of  our  present 
knowledge.  Death  indeed  removes  the  souls  of  others  from 
our  view.  It  drops  its  dark  curtain  over  the  future,  but  it  tells 
us  nothing  of  its  doings  or  its  effects  beyond  death.  The  na- 
ture of  things  then  reveals  no  certain  connection  between  death 
and  the  destruction  of  the  soul. 

Again ;  there  is  no  evidence  from  any  known  phenomena 
against  the  future  existence  of  the  soul.  It  is  from  this  source 
that  the  most  forcible  objections  against  our  doctrine  and  the 
most  plausible  arguments  for  the  opposite  opinion  are  derived. 
What  then  are  the  phenomena — what  are  the  facts  ?  This  is 
the  question  which  must  be  answered  with  precision.  All  that 
can  be  pretended  is,  that  certain  states  of  the  body,  those  of 
disease,  of  intoxication,  of  old  age,  obviously  impair  the  mental 
faculties,  and,  as  the  case  may  be,  suspend  or  remove  all  vis- 
ible evidence  of  their  existence,  while  death  puts  an  utter  end 
to  it. 

To  the  question,  then — do  these  facts  furnish  the  slightest 
evidence  that  the  soul  ceases  to  exist  at  death  ? 


234:     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

I  answer — 

All  the  facts  now  referred  to  may  be  comprised  in  these  two 
— impaired  faculties,  and  the  suspension  or  final  cessation  of 
all  visible  evidence  of  their  existence. 

And  first,  let  us  look  carefully  at  the  supposed  evidence  from 
impaired  faculties.  That  some  diseases,  and  that  old  age  often 
impair  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  cannot  be  doubted.  But 
many  do  not  produce  this  effect ;  and  in  some  cases,  disease 
actually  destroys  life,  and  leaves  the  mind,  even  to  the  last,  in 
the  vigor  and  activity  of  perfect  health.  This  fact  shows  that 
the  mind  is  not  so  dependent  on  the  state  of  the  body  as  neces- 
sarily to  languish  and  die  under  the  very  causes  that  destroy 
the  body.  It  shows  more,  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason 
for  supposing  that  disease  destroys  the  existence  of  powers, 
which,  even  in  its  progress,  it  often  leaves  wholly  unimpaired 
till  death.  There  are  similar  exceptions  in  regard  to  the  influ- 
ence of  age.  Generally,  indeed,  as  bodily  health  and  vigor 
decay,  the  mental  faculties  decline.  If  there  are  no  decisive 
exceptions  to  this  fact,  still  there  is  nothing  sufficient  to  show 
that  the  existence  of  the  mind  necessarily  depends  on  the  life 
of  the  body.  Indeed,  the  influence  of  some  diseases,  and  of 
old  age  to  impair  mental  vigor,  is  in  no  respect  inconsistent 
with  the  supposition,  that  the  body,  in  some  particular  states, 
is  a  mere  incumbrance  to  the  mind,  and  produces  effects  which 
would  wholly  cease  by  their  separation ;  so  that  the  mind,  be- 
ing wholly  disconnected  with  the  body,  would  possess  greater 
vigor,  and  awake  to  new  and  hitherto  unknown  activity.  Here 
we  must  not  confound  one  cause  with  another;  we  must  not 
consider  disease  as  terminating  in  death,  but  disease,  as  such, 
producing  its  own  proper  and  known  effects  on  the  mind. 
Suppose  then,  (although  there  are  many  decisive  exceptions  to 
the  fact)  that  disease  always,  during  its  continuance,  impairs 
or  deranges  the  powers  of  the  mind.  Yet,  does  it  destroy 
them  ?  In  far  the  greatest  number  of  cases,  when  the  cause  is 
removed,  does  not  the  effect  cease;  or  rather,  does  not  the 
cause  often  cease,  without  the-  destruction  of  the  mind  as  its 
consequent  ?  Does  the  impairing  of  mental  powers  necessarily 
involve  their  destruction  ?  Do  you  see  and  know  any  other 
effect  of  disease  but  the  former,  and  this  merely  temporary  ? 
Does  one  effect  involve  the  other  ?  You  might  as  well  say, 
that  because  a  blow  on  the  head  produces  a  momentary  de- 


NO    PROOF    AGAINST    IT.  235 

rangement  of  the  mental  faculties,  it  actually  lands  tlie  soul  in 
annihilation. 

Do  you  say,  that  it  is  not  meant  that  disease  as  such  ever 
destroys  the  mind  ?  Why  then  is  it  so  often  asserted  ?  If  the 
meaning  he,  that  disease  weakens  the  faculties  in  many  cases 
with  greater  or  less  rapidity,  and  terminates  in  death  as  its 
proximate  effect,  he  it  so ;  hut  this  is  only  specifying  another 
result  of  disease,  viz.,  death.  Take  then  all  its  effects.  If  the 
result  of  disease,  in  mental  imbecility,  does  not  show  the  soul's 
annihilation,  does  death  prove  it  to  our  observation  or  our 
knowledge  ? 

This  brings  us  to  the  other  fact,  viz.,  the  cessation  of  all 
visible  evidence  of  the  soul's  existence.  This  is  admitted  ;  and 
be  it  remembered,  it  is  all  that  can  be  claimed.  But  does  the 
cessation  of  the  visible  evidence  of  the  soul's  existence  prove 
that  it  has  actually  ceased  to  exist  ?  The  want  of  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  a  thing  is  surely  no  proof  of  its  non-existence. 
In  some  cases,  as  that  of  drowning  when  followed  by  resusci- 
tation, the  evidence  of  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  agent 
wholly  ceases  from  our  observation.  But  who  infers  the  de- 
struction of  the  agent  ?  I  do  not  say,  that  the  cessation  of 
evidence  of  his  existence  proves  that  he  did  not  cease  to  exist ; 
this  is  proved  by  resuscitation;  but  that  the  cessation  of  the 
evidence  of  existence  docs  not  prove  that  he  did  cease  to  exist. 
I  am  willing  to  concede  that  it  shows  the  suspension  of  the 
intellectual  operations,  but  it  does  not  prove  the  non-existence 
of  the  agent. 

Between  this  case  and  that  of  death,  there  is  indeed  otic 
important  difference.  In  the  event  of  death,  the  evidence  that 
there  is  a  mere  suspension  of  the  mental  operations,  or  rather 
the  evidence  that  the  agent  continued  to  exist  furnished  by 
resuscitation,  is  wholly  wanting.  We  cannot  say  that  the  agent 
has  not,  nor  can  we  say  that  he  has  ceased  to  exist.  The  event 
of  death  proves  nothing,  and,  in  itself  considered,  authorizes 
no  belief.  And  if,  as  we  have  seen,  the  cessation  of  the  visible 
evidence  of  continued  existence  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the 
fact  of  its  continuance,  as  in  the  case  of  apparent  drowning, 
then,  in  the  event  of  death,  this  evidence  may  entirely  cease, 
and  yet  resuscitation  may  follow. 

I  admit  another  fact  often  appealed  to  in  this  argument;  viz., 
that  death  destroys  what  other  causes  of  the  suspension  of  the 


236      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

mental  powers  do  not  affect,  viz.,  the  organs  of  sensation  and 
all  the  functions  of  animal  life.  But  we  have  the  most  decisive 
proof  that  the  continuance  and  activity  of  the  mental  powers 
do  not  depend  on  the  continuance  of  the  bodily  organs.  Even 
those  ideas  which  are  derived  through  these  organs  may  be  as 
vivid  when  they  are  not,  as  when  they  are  the  media  of  recep- 
tion. Of  this  the  phenomena  of  dreams  are  decisive.  If  the 
mind  without  the  organs  of  sensation  can  recall  the  ideas  of 
sensation  without  their  objects,  a  fortiori  it  can  form  ideas  of 
sensation  without  the  organs  and  their  objects;  so  that  death 
destroys  the  powers  of  sensation  and  still  less  those  of  reflection, 
no  evidence  can  be  adduced.  To  infer  that  it  does  from  the 
mere  want  of  evidence  that  it  does  not,  is  as  truly  unphilo- 
sophical,  as  to  infer  that  sound  sleep  is  a  state  of  annihilation. 

If  it  here  be  said  that  the  cases  are  materially  different,  since 
in  one  we  have  the  evidence  of  continued  existence  from  sub- 
sequent phenomena,  I  readily  admit  it.  But  then  these  show 
that  the  conclusion  of  non-existence  is  not  authorized  by  the 
sus})ension  of  visible  intellectual  operations,  so  all  that  can  be 
said  in  a  case  in  which  such  subsequent  phenomena  do  not  ex- 
ist is,  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  continued  existence,  and  not 
that  there  is  evidence  of  non-existence. 

If  it  be  further  said  that  as  there  is  no  evidence  of  continued 
existence  after  death,  either  in  the  event  itself  or  in  any  subse- 
quent phenomena,  it  is  irrational  to  believe  in  such  existence, 
I  most  readily  admit  it,  so  far  as  death  and  its  subsequent 
phenomena  can  be  supposed  to  furnish  evidence.  We  are  not 
authorized  to  believe  in  the  future  existence  of  the  soul  on  this 
ground  merely,  nor  be  it  remembered,  are  we  authorized  to  dis- 
believe it.  When  there  is  no  evidence  there  should  be  no  faith, 
and  no  faith  should  not  be  confounded  with  believing.  If  the 
event  of  death  authorizes  no  faith  on  the  question  whether  the 
soul  will  exist  after  death,  then  it  does  not  authorize  the  belief 
that  it  does  not  exist.  The  event  of  death  then,  and  all  its  at- 
tendant and  consequent  phenomena,  are  to  be  laid  aside  as 
having  no  bearing  on  the  question  before  us.  Provided  there 
is  no  other  source  of  evidence,  we  are  bound  to  believe  nothing 
respecting  the  future  existence  of  the  soul. 

Laying  aside  then  the  event  of  death  as  having  no  bearing  on 
the  question  under  consideration,  I  proceed, 

In  the  second  place  to  offer  direct  proofs  of  a  future  state. 


PROOF    IN    SUPPORT    OF    IT.  237 

Before  I  adduce  the  proposed  proofs,  I  would  make  a  remark 
or  two  respecting  the  nature  or  kind  of  evidence  to  he  offered. 
It  is  not  pretended,  then, that  it  is  of  that  kind  which  excludes 
the  possibility  in  the  nature  of  things  of  the  truth  of  the  oppo- 
site proposition.  The  evidence  is  of  that  kind  which  logicians 
call  probable  or  moral,  as  distinguished  from  demonstrative, 
evidence  which  in  a  thousand  cases  to  one,  controls  the  prac- 
tical faith  of  men,  and  must  control  it,  or  they  must  act  the 
part  of  idiots  or  madmen.  Nor  are  there  any  arguments  either 
in  natural  or  revealed  theology  which  are  in  the  strict  sense 
demonstrative,  that  is,  the  opposites  of  which  involve  known  con- 
tradiction. This  remark  is  of  more  importance  in  relation  to 
the  present  subject  than  to  many  other  cases.  The  bare  pos- 
sibility, the  mere  may  be  that  death  is  the  end  of  our  existence, 
is  peculiarly  apt  to  prevent  or  weaken  the  force  of  the  existing 
evidence  to  the  contrary.  JSTow  let  it  be  remembered  that  a 
may  be  is  not  an  argument.  There  is  a  may  be,  that  you  will 
never  leave  this  room  alive ;  it  may  be,  that  when  you  take 
food  the  next  time  it  will  produce  strangulation  and  death, 
and  to  give  no  other  example,  it  may  be  that  if  you  reason 
yourself  into  the  belief  of  either  of  these  things,  or  that  death  is 
the  end  of  man,  you  will  reason  falsely.  How  exceedingly  ir- 
rational it  is  to  reject  moral  evidence,  and  especially  when  it 
consists  of  an  accumulation  of  probabilities  on  one  side  of  a 
question,  merely  because  there  is  a  possibility  of  the  truth  of 
an  opposite  conclusion,  all  men  see  and  feel  in  the  ordinary 
business  of  human  life.  They  know  that  on  tin's  principle 
they  could  not  act  nor  even  subsist.  God  has  made  the  hu- 
man mind  to  be  influenced  by  moral  evidence  in  assenting 
to  truth  as  really  as  in  assenting  to  truth  in  the  form  of  in- 
tuition. It  might  perhaps  be  said,  that  it  was  designedly  so 
because  it  is  necessarv  to  moral  beings  in  a  state  of  moral 
discipline.  Be  it  so  or  not,  the  philosopher  who  reasons  and 
concludes  in  morals  or  theology  with  an  argument  no  better 
than  may  be,  ought  to  be  eulogized  at  most  as  a  may  be  philos- 
opher. 

To  proceed  now  with  the  direct  proofs  of  a  future  state, 

I  remark — 

That  there  is  no  cause  known  which  will  destroy  the  exist- 
ence of  the  soul.  It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  things  will 
continue  as  they  have  done  in  our  experience,  unless  there  be 


238     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

some  cause  known  to  us  that  will  produce  a  change.  This  is 
the  kind  of  evidence  or  rather  of  reasoning  on  which  Ave  rely, 
and  on  which  the  mind  is  made  to  rest  its  belief  in  cases  innu- 
merable. For  example,  how  confidently  we  believe  on  this 
ground,  simply  that  the  sun  will  rise  and  set  to-morrow,  and 
that  our  lives  will  be  prolonged  for  some  time  to  come.  So 
powerful  is  the  influence  of  this  kind  of  evidence,  that  when  it 
accords  with  our  wishes  as  it  does  in  respect  to  the  continuance 
of  our  present  life,  it  is  often  unimpaired  by  high  degrees  of 
opposing  evidence.  Without  however  attempting  to  measure 
the  degree  of  faith  which  is  authorized  by  this  kind  of  evi- 
dence, it  is  undeniable  that  such  a  degree  as  to  make  it  prac- 
tical in  regard  to  the  business  of  life  is  not  only  authorized  but 
required.  But  if  we  have  sufficient  to  justify  or  require  any 
degree  of  faith,  that  the  life  of  the  body  will  be  continued 
another  year  or  even  another  day,  we  have  much  more  to  just- 
ify the  belief  that  the  soul  will  exist  after  death  and  forever. 
The  evidence  from  past  exj)erience  simply  considered,  may 
justly  be  viewed  as  the  same  in  both  cases.  But  in  respect  to 
the  life  of  the  body,  we  know  that  there  are  many  causes  of  its 
destruction,  some  one  of  which  may  terminate  it  at  any  hour  or 
moment ;  while  in  respect  to  the  life  of  the  soul,  we  know  of 
none  that  ever  did  or  ever  will  terminate  it.  I  need  not  say 
how  strong  would  be  our  belief  in  the  continued  endless  life 
of  the  body,  if  we  knew  no  cause  of  its  termination.  How 
firm  then  according  to  the  same  principle,  ought  to  be  our 
faith  in  the  endless  life  of  the  soul. 

The  principle  of  belief  now  referred  to  in  connection  with 
the  known  immateriality  of  the  soul,  is  that  on  which  primarily 
rests  the  universal  belief  of  mankind  in  a  future  existence. 
]Nor  can  the  soundness  of  the  principle,  nor  the  reasonableness 
of  the  faith  be  questioned.  When  has  man  known  any  thing 
to  cease  to  be,  without  a  cause?  Why  then,  in  this  case,  should 
we  believe,  that  what  has  been,  and  now  is,  will  not  continue 
to  be;  while  we  neither  know,  nor  have  the  least  reason  to 
believe,  that  there  is  any  cause  that  will  prevent  its  continued 
existence  ? 

Again;  every  thing  within  our  observation,  which  has  be- 
gun, continues  to  exist ;  it  is  therefore  reasonable  to  believe 
that  the  soul  will  do  so.  The  body  indeed  seems  to  perish ;  but 
we  know,  that  while  it  decays,  it  does  not  actually  and  truly 


NOTHING    IS    ANNIHILATED  230 

perish.  From  the  creation  of  the  visible  universe  to  the  pres- 
ent moment,  we  have  not  the  slightest  reason  to  believe  that 
one  atom  of  it  all  has  ceased  to  be.  What  we  term  decay  and 
death  in  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms  is  not  annihila- 
tion, bnt  only  a  change  of  parts  and  relations,  and  a  name  for 
another  form  of  continued  existence.  If  then  every  particle 
of  matter,  even  of  our  own  bodies,  to  which  God  has  given 
existence,  continues  to  exist,  is  it  philosophical  to  disbelieve, 
or  even  to  doubt  the  continued  existence  of  the  soul  ?  If  every 
thing  else,  after  all  that  can  be  called  decay  or  death,  continues 
to  exist,  the  rational  conclusion  is  that  the  soul  does  also.  The 
dust,  so  to  speak,  returns  to  the  dust  as  it  was  and  yet  it  is  care- 
fully preserved  ;  why  then  docs  not  the  spirit  ascend  to  God  who 
gave  it  1  Is  it  rational,  is  it  philosophical  to  deny  and  overlook 
such  analogies  ?  Where  had  been  the  discoveries  of  Newton, 
had  he  disregarded  them  ?  Where  had  been  all  science,  had  men 
not  believed  that  what  is  true  of  some  things  which  they  know, 
is  also  true  of  other  things  which  they  do  not  know  ?  It  be- 
longs to  him  who  denies  or  doubts  the  continued  existence  of  the 
soul  after  death,  to  produce  some  positive  proof  of  a  departure 
from  the  entire  analogy  of  nature  in  respect  to  this  agent.  Thus 
the  death  of  the  body,  the  very  thing  from  which  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  soul  has  been  inferred,  becomes  proof  to  the  con- 
trary. If  death  does  not  even  destroy  the  body,  or  rathe]*  if  it 
is  only  a  change  involving  the  continued  existence  of  every 
particle  of  it,  why  should  it  destroy  the  soul,  or  rather,  why 
not  result  in  its  continued  existence  ?  Which  is  the  logical  in- 
ference? Death  is  a  change  in  which  every  particle  of  the  body 
continues  to  exist,  therefore  the  soul  ceases  to  exist  j  or  death  is 
a  change  in  which  every  particle  of  the  body  continues  to  exist, 
therefore  the  soul  continues  to  exist.  In  the  one  case, the  prem- 
ises and  conclusion  have  no  conceivable  connection.  In  the 
other, they  have  the  same  that  led  Newton  to  believe  that  the 
same  law  of  gravity  which  pertained  to  a  falling  apple, controls 
the  motions  of  every  planet.  Even  if  the  mind  is  matter,  why 
i,s  it  that  not  a  single  atom  of  unthinking  matter  is  destroyed, 
and  every  atom  of  thinking  matter  must  be  annihilated  ?  Why 
is  it  that  the  almighty  Preserver  of  one  should  so  carefully  take 
care  of  its  every  particle,  and  yet  so  carefully  and  scrupulously 
annihilate  the  other?  Is  this  the  doctrine  of  reason,  of  philos- 
ophy ?     True,  we  admit  the  possibility  of  its  destruction  by  the 


240  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    FROM   NATURE. 

Creator.  But  must  not  some  reason  be  found,  some  motive  dis- 
covered for  the  exclusive  annihilation  of  that  which  we  call 
mind,  of  that  which  gives  all  its  value  and  worth  to  the  crea- 
tures of  his  power  ?  Why  should  the  Creator  of  man  preserve 
every  thing  in  his  creature  which  is  strictly  corporeal  and  com- 
paratively worthless,  and  destroy  every  thing  that  is  mental 
and  meet  for  immortality;  why  preserve  every  thing  that 
likens  man  to  the  dust  beneath  his  feet,  and  destroy  all  that 
constitutes  the  image  of  Himself?  Would  the  father  of  a  child 
do  this  ?  Would  the  maker  of  a  watch  act  on  such  a  princi- 
ple ?  Well  may  we  ask  philosophy,  if  man's  resemblance  to 
his  Maker  is  only  the  reason  for  blasting  his  creation  into  an- 
nihilation. 

Further,  I  argue  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  from  the  ob- 
vious unsuitableness  of  the  present  to  the  perfection  of  the  na- 
ture of  man.  In  the  material  world,  the  more  our  knowledge 
extends,  the  more  of  order  and  of  system,  of  design  and  of 
adaptation  appears  in  all  that  we  behold,  until  the  conviction 
is  forced  upon  us  that  the  Maker  of  all  forms  no  abortive  pur- 
poses. If  we  look  at  the  nature  and  condition  of  animals,  we 
find  a  striking  coincidence  between  them,  their  condition  being 
so  accommodated  to  their  instincts  and  their  powers,  that  the 
obvious  design  of  their  being  may  be  fully  attained  in  this 
world.  Hence  it  is,  that  while  if  we  had  nothing  to  reason 
from  but  their  past  life  with  our  ignorance  of  their  utter  de- 
struction by  death,  we  should  rationally  infer  their  future  ex- 
istence ;  yet  in  view  of  the  obvious  adaptation  of  their  nature 
to  their  present  condition,  and  of  the  fact  that  the  end  of  their 
existence  is  here  fully  attained,  it  is  irrational  to  believe  that 
they  continue  to  exist  after  death,  l^ot  so  however  in  respect 
to  man.  If  man's  being  terminates  with  his  life,  then  does  his 
present  existence  present  the  most  inscrutable  of  all  mysteries, 
the  most  insolvable  enigma  to  be  found  in  all  the  works  of 
God.  We  can  tell  with  more  or  less  confidence,  for  what  all 
things  else  are  created,  but  to  decide  what  is  the  end  of  that 
creature  of  God  for  whom  every  thing  else  is  made,  that  being 
who  bears  the  likeness  of  his  Creator,  defies  and  baffles  all 
philosophy.  Our  Maker,  who  delights  to  unfold  his  wisdom 
and  his  power  to  our  inspection  in  the  manifestation  of  the 
adaptations,  objects  and  ends  of  all  his  other  works,  even  in 
the  structure  of  an  insect,  conceals  the  design  of  the  greatest  of 


THE    DESIGN   OF    THE    CREATOR.  2±1 

them  all  in  utter  darkness ;  or  rather  what  is  far  more  inexpli- 
cable, he  shows  that  the  most  exalted  design  is  under  an  abso- 
lute necessity  of  utter  failure  and  defeat.  Nor  is  this  all.  He 
exhibits  himself  in  the  decisive  character  of  a  deceiver,  obliging 
us  to  regard  adaptations  and  tendencies  as  no  evidence  of  plan 
and  of  the  actual  results  of  his  works.  He  thus  unsettles  all 
our  principles  of  reasonings  from  these  sources,  and  whether 
such  facts  give  us  annihilation  or  immortality,  our  conclusion 
has  no  claim  to  confidence.  This  is  too  unphilosophical  for  our 
opponents  to  believe.  What  then  is  the  Creator's  great  design 
in  jnvin<2:  existence  to  such  a  creature  as  man?  If  we  consider 
his  intellectual  faculties,  the  foundation  laid  in  his  constitution 
for  unlimited  improvement,  the  wide  range  for  acquisition 
opened  through  the  immensity  of  space  and  duration ;  what  is 
man  qualified  to  become,  or  rather  what  is  he  not  qualified  to 
become  compared  with  any  thing  he  is  during  this  momentary 
life  ?  Is  it  credible  that  God  has  thus  fitted  the  human  mind 
for  progress,  furnished  it  with  so  beautiful  an  arrangement  of 
faculties  for  every  kind  of  acquisition,  and  incited  it  by  an  im- 
pulse that  ceaselessly  awakens  it  to  the  pursuit — so  formed 
it,  that  by  every  effort  it  becomes  stronger  and  more  eager  for 
further  attainments,  that  when  this  mind  has  been  thus  quali- 
fied, disciplined,  and  prepared  to  go  on  to  perfection,  the 
very  improvement  it  has  made  should  become  a  reason  for 
arresting  its  progress  in  annihilation  ?  Are  we  to  believe  that 
He  who  made  man  what  he  is,  will  destroy  his  own  work, 
merely  because  if  permitted  to  live,  he  would  accomplish  the 
high  end  for  which  he  made  him  ? 

The  argument  from  the  moral  nature  of  man  is  made  still 
more  impressive  by  the  superiority  of  its  design  and  object. 
If  there  is  no  existence  for  man  beyond  the  present  state, 
what  can  we  suppose  to  be  the  design  of  his  Creator  in  form- 
ing him  a  moral  being?  What  powers,  what  capacities  are 
involved  in  his  nature!  What  capacity  to  enjoy,  and  what 
power  to  impart  happiness  to  others  !  Who  can  reflect  on 
the  nature  of  such  a  creature,  his  intelligence,  his  suscepti- 
bility, his  will,  his  conscience,  the  dignity,  the  excellence  of 
which  he  is  capable,  the  moral  victories  and  triumphs  he  may 
win,  his  fitness  to  hold  on  his  way  with  archangels,  strong  in 
advancing  all  that  good  which  infinite  wisdom  could  devise 
and  infinite  benevolence  could  love,  the  graces  with  which  he 
Vol.  I.— 11  1G 


242     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

may  be  adorned,  and  the  beatitudes  with  which  he  may  be 
blessed,  and  not  believe  that  he  is  made  to  be  one  with  the 
God  who  created  him — a  partaker  of  his  blessedness,  a  com- 
panion of  his  eternity  ? 

If  we  consider  what  an  almost  total  failure  there  is,  even  on 
the  part  of  every  good  man,  to  attain  in  any  respect  the  great 
end  of  his  creation ;  how  weak  in  resolution  and  feeble  in  heart 
— how  little  success  in  subduing  his  passions  and  governing  his 
temper — how  much  of  life  is  spent  before  he  even  begins  to 
live  in  obedience  to  the  demands  of  duty  and  of  conscience — 
how  remote  he  is  from  the  uniform  and  settled  tranquillity  of 
perfect  virtue — what  dissatisfaction  he  feels  with  the  present, 
unappeased  by  all  the  world  can  offer — what  an  impatience 
and  disgust  with  the  littleness  of  all  he  finds — what  an  ever 
restless  nspiration  after  nobler  and  higher  things — what  anti- 
cipations and  hopes  from  futurity,  never  realized  here  on  earth 
— how  does  our  spirit  labor  under  a  sense  of  the  incongruity 
between  his  attainments  and  his  powers;  and  unless  there  is  a 
future  state,  what  an  insignificance  is  imparted  to  all  that  can 
be  called  virtue  here  on  earth,  and  also  to  man  himself. 

What  too  shall  we  say  of  all  those  proofs  of  the  power,  the 
wisdom,  the  goodness  of  the  great  Author  of  all  things,  which 
are  presented  to  us  in  all  his  works,  and  the  satisfaction  there  is 
in  knowing  and  contemplating  such  a  Being  ?  To  what  pur- 
pose are  we  rendered  capable  of  elevating  our  thoughts  to 
him,  if  we  are  never  to  learn  any  more  of  his  character  than 
we  know  in  this  short  life?  For  what  object  has  he  given 
proofs  of  his  overruling  power  and  providence,  and  excited 
man  to  look  to  him  with  submission,  confidence,  and  affection, 
if  man  has  no  interests  to  be  cared  for  but  those  of  a  day? 
Why,  in  a  word,  has  he  made  those  manifestations  of  his  God- 
head, and  of  those  relations  to  man,  and  of  man  to  himself, 
which  constitute  the  basis  of  all  that  we  call  religion,  if  all 
these  are  to  cease  at  death  ?  I  do  not  say  it  would  be  abso- 
lutely worthless  even  then,  but  it  would  sink  to  comparative 
insignificance.  It  would  be  the  religion  of  a  being  who  has  no 
God  but  for  the  brief  moment  of  this  mortal  life — the  love,  the 
hopes,  the  confidence  of  an  insect  of  an  hour,  instead  of  the 
religion  of  an  immortal,  trusting  in  God  for  the  gifts  of  his 
goodness  through  a  coming  eternity. 

Indeed,  nothing  is  more  obvious  to  reason,  than  that  life  to 


SUPPOSE    THERE    IS    NO   FUTURE    LIFE.  243 

man  would  be  but  a  short  series  of  animal  sensations,  and  death 
only  the  changing  of  the  relation  of  a  few  particles  of  matter. 
To  live  as  he  would,  and  as  well  as  he  might,  were  death  the 
end  of  him,  would  at  the  same  time  be  a  perversion  of  powers 
— an  outrage  on  nature,  unmatched  in  the  works  of  God.  The 
true  and  proper  business  of  life  would  be  changed.  All  that 
could  be  called  the  end  of  his  existence  would  become  scarcely 
worthy  of  a  thought ;  and,  as  a  being  of  a  day,  he  would  sink 
to  an  insignificance  which  would  render  the  course  he  pursued 
through  the  world,  a  concern  too  trivial  for  consideration.  Why 
then  are  those  powers  given  to  man,  which  fit  him  to  rise  to 
such  an  inconceivable  height  in  the  scale  of  being,  without  a 
motive  to  aspire  to  such  elevation,  or  the  possibility  of  attain- 
ing it  ?  Why  this  destiny  to  self-degradation  ?  In  all  his  other 
works  nothing  is  waste,  nothing  is  useless.  Every  organ,  appe- 
tite, faculty,  hope  and  desire,  in  every  creature  has  its  coun- 
terpart object.  Man  is  an  exception  to  this  absolute  univer- 
sality. For  his  moral  nature,  for  that  part  of  man  which  alone 
gives  value  to  existence  with  its  high  capacities  and  aspira- 
tions, the  universe  presents  no  objects  of  corresponding  worth 
and  greatness.  Or  rather,  viewed  in  relation  to  man's  moral 
nature,  every  thing  is  great.  The  material  universe  around 
him,  the  total  sum  of  human  existence,  the  events  that  happen  on 
our  globe  are  great.  All  the  analogies,  tendencies  and  relations 
everywhere  conspicuous,  are  great,  and  manifest  great  designs 
and  results.  This  material  system  bespeaks  a  corresponding 
moral  system  which  is  great,  and  furnishes  unquestionable  inti- 
mations of  a  vast  scheme  whose  disclosures  will  be  great.  The 
moral  system  as  here  developed  is  great  in  its  authority,  its 
law,  in  all  its  tendencies,  and  actual  results.  God  is  great. 
Man  is  great.  His  nature  bespeaks  the  dignity  of  an  immortal, 
and  looks  onward  to  the  grandeurs  of  eternity.  Eternity  is 
great.  And  yet  man,  for  whom  all  this  greatness  exists — 
placed  amid  it  all,  and  next  in  greatness  to  his  God — man, 
made,  designed,  and  fitted  for  eternity,  exists  but  a  moment ! ! 
Is  it  credible  ?  Is  it  not  a  violence  to  the  harmonies  of  crea- 
tion, a  defeat  and  failure  of  God's  designs,  that  no  rational  man 
can  believe  %  Is  it  not  giving  a  contemptible  insignificance  to 
the  very  image  of  God  in  his  own  creatures  ?  Is  it  not  reflect- 
ing most  severely  and  dishonorably  on  the  wisdom  and  the 
power  that  gives  them  existence  ?     JNro  human  mind,  with  these 


244      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

views  of  God  and  of  man,  can  rest  in  such  a  conclusion.  Shall 
a  God  of  infinite  natural  perfection  form  myriads  of  beings  so 
much  in  his  own  image,  and  doom  their  powers  to  use- 
lessness  and  waste  while  they  live,  and  the  beings  themselves 
to  an  instant  annihilation  ?  It  were  a  farce  in  creation ; 
the  infinite  God  sporting  in  the  exercise,  and  with  the  prod- 
ucts of  his  infinite  attributes.  No.  Man  is  made  for  a  higher 
purpose  than  can  be  answered  by  this  short  life;  and  that  this 
purpose  may  be  accomplished,  he  will  never  cease  to  be. 

Thus  I  have  attempted  to  show,  that  while  there  is  not  the 
shadow  of  evidence  against  a  future  state,  there  are,  entirely 
aside  from  the  moral  government  of  God,  many  considerations, 
which,  especially  when  combined,  give  a  high  degree  of  proba- 
bility of  such  a  state. 

The  argument  then  for  the  equity  of  God's  moral  govern- 
ment over  men,  as  we  have  presented  it,  stands  thus:  the 
argument,  from  the  fact  that  God  has  given  men  the  best  law, 
and  from  the  manner  in  which  he  distributes  good  and  evil  in 
this  world,  with  other  considerations,  is  in  its  nature  decisive, 
provided  there  is  no  proof  to  the  contrary.  The  mere  suppo- 
sition of  a  future  state  removes  every  particle  of  pretended 
evidence  against  the  equity  of  this  administration ;  while  with 
the  possibility  of  a  future  state,  the  necessity  of  it,  that  God  may 
complete  that  equitable  system  of  moral  government  which  he 
has  obviously  begun,  places  the  fact  of  such  a  state  beyond  all 
rational  doubt,  or  rather  forces  it  on  human  belief.  In  addition 
to  these  things,  we  have  shown,  that  aside  from  the  fact  of 
God's  moral  government,  and  on  other  grounds,  there  is  also  a 
high  probability  of  a  future  state.  Our  conclusion  then  is, that 
there  is  a  future  state,  in  which  God  can,  and  therefore  will, 
unfold  the  equity  of  his  moral  administration  over  men;  in 
other  words,  God  is  administering  an  equitable  moral  govern- 
ment. 


LECTURE  V. 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  administers  an  equitable  moral  government.— 
God  administers  his  moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy. — Explanation.— Proof  1. 
The  manner  in  which  he  administers  good  and  evil  harmonizes  with  such  an  economy. — 2. 
Distribution  of  pood  and  evil  proves  a  design  to  recover. — («)  A  virtuous  life  the  happiest. — (/') 
Gifts  of  God  tend  to  gratitude.— (t)  Natural  evils  prove  the  same  design.— (d)  Tin;  present  a 
state  of  discipline.— (t)  The  happiness  of  man  in  his  own  power.— (/)  Without  forgiveness, 
reclaiming  influences  vain.  God's  favor  can  be  secured  only  on  the  terms  which  Christianity 
prescribes,  whether  Christianity  is  or  is  not  from  God. 

It  has  been  extensively  maintained  by  the  advocates  of  reve- 
lation, that  it  is  the  exclusive  honor  of  Christianity,  not  merely 
that  it  reveals  the  mode  of  God's  favor  to  the  guilty,  but  that 
we  are  also  indebted  to  it  for  the  belief  of  even  the  possibility 
of  his  favor.  How  far  the  human  mind,  uninstructed  by  a 
divine  revelation,  would  in  fact  have  pushed  its  inquiries  on 
this  interesting  subject,  is  one  question;  how  far  it  could  have 
done  this,  is  another.  The  probability  is,  that  the  conclusions 
of  the  human  mind  would  in  fact  have  been  in  a  high  degree 
doubtful  and  unsatisfactory,  if  not  against  the  doctrine  of  the 
divine  placability.  This  however  might  easily  be  traced  to 
other  causes  than  the  want  of  sufficient  evidence  of  such  placa- 
bility. The  aversion  of  man  to  the  knowledge  of  God  would 
be  a  sufficient  cause  both  of  imperfect  investigations  and  false 
conclusions ;  Christianity  may  have  suggested  truths  or  prin- 
ciples, which  would  not,  though  they  could,  have  been  discov- 
ered without  it ;  and  in  this  way  at  least  we  may  be  able  to 
prove  the  placability  of  God,  without  assuming  any  of  the 
declarations  of  Christianity  as  of  divine  authority.  The  de- 
monstration of  a  problem  in  geometry  is  not  less  independent 
of  Euclid's  authority,  because  he  first  suggested  the  construc- 
tions on  which  the  demonstration  depends. 

Nor  is  there  any  dishonor  done  to  Christianity  by  maintain- 
ing the  sufficiency  of  human  reason  to  make  this  discovery ; 
but  rather  the  magnitude  of  the  gift,  and  the  grace  that  con- 
ferred it,  are  greatly  diminished  on  the  contrary  supposition. 


246     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

To  Christianity,  we  may  still  be  indebted  for  our  conclusion, 
in  point  of  fact,  though  not  of  necessity.  For  although  the 
doctrine  of  the  divine  placability  might  be  traced  by  the  light 
of  reason,  this  by  no  means  shows  that  revelation  was  not,  in 
one  sense,  necessary  to  the  actual  knowledge  or  belief  of  the 
doctrine.  It  only  shows  the  ground  of  that  necessity  to  be, 
not  the  want  of  evidence  in  the  works  and  providence  of  God, 
nor  of  incapacity  in  the  human  mind  to  discover  it,  but  the 
perverseness  and  criminal  blindness  of  the  mind  itself.  And 
surely  the  kindness  of  a  benefactor,  who  secures  the  actual 
vision  of  those  who  willfully  shut  their  own  eyes,  is  not  less 
conspicuous  than  that  of  one  who  first  brings  upon  them  the 
constitutional  calamity  of  blindness,  and  afterward  removes  it. 
On  this  principle,  we  see  not  only  the  grace  and  mercy  of  God 
manifested  in  the  most  illustrious  maimer,  in  giving  a  revela- 
tion to  men;  for  it  is  a  gift  to  the  guilty,  made  necessary  by 
their  own  perverseness.  On  the  other,  though  it  may  indeed 
be  a  gift  of  goodness,  it  cannot  be  a  gift  of  mercy,  there  being 
no  obligation  to  believe  without  it.  Nor  is  this  all.  On  the 
supposition  that  the  providence  of  God  clearly  evinces  his  plac- 
ability to  guilty  man,  we  have  a  double  testimony  to  the  truth 
of  the  revealed  declaration,  that  God  is  reconciling  the  world 
to  himself.  We  see  the  ways  of  God,  his  acts  and  his  doings, 
to  be  coincident  with  his  declarations ;  while  on  the  other  sup- 
position, there  is  palpable  contradiction  between  what  he  does 
and  what  he  says.  How  is  the  stamp  of  divinity  impressed  on 
God's  revelation  by  such  a  coincidence. 

It  is  not  true  however,  that  all  the  advocates  of  Christianity 
have  denied  that  the  divine  placability  can  be  discovered  from 
the  light  of  nature.  President  Edwards,  speaking  of  the  out- 
ward provision  which  God  makes  for  the  temporal  well-being 
of  man,  says,  "  that  it  is  a  great  argument,  that  God  is  not  an 
implacable  enemy  of  mankind,  in  a  settled  determination  finally 
to  cast  them  off,  and  never  again  to  admit  them  to  favor." — 
Miscel.  Observations. 

The  Apostle  also,  (Heb.  ii.  7)  has  laid  down  a  general  prin- 
ciple, which  must  be  decisive  on  this  point  with  the  believer  in 
his  authority.  "  He  that  cometh  to  God,  must  believe  that  he 
is,  and  that  he  is  the  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek 
him."  He  also  declares,  that  men,  having  not  a  revelation 
from  God,  are  without  excuse  for  not  glorifying  him  as  God. 


THE    SECOND    SUPPOSITION.  247 

(Rom.  i.  20.)  It  is  not  impossible  then  that  the  heathen  should 
come  to  God,  or  that  they  should  glorify  him  as  God ;  aud  of 
course  it  is  not  impossible  that  they  should  believe  that  he  is, 
and  that  he  is  the  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek  him. 
There  is  evidence  then  furnished  by  the  light  of  nature,  that 
God  is  a  rewarder.  True  it  may  be,  that  I  may  not  be  able  to 
exhibit  this  evidence  as  it  actually  exists.  That  it  does  exist, 
admits  of  no  doubt,  if  the  Scriptures  be  true.  With  the  full 
persuasion  of  the  fact  that  such  evidence  does  exist,  the  pro- 
priety of  attempting  to  unfold  it  cannot  be  doubted. 

The  argument  for  the  equity  of  God's  moral  government,  in 
a  previous  lecture,  rested  on  two  suppositions,  which  I  proposed 
to  show  are  matters  of  fact.  This  was  attempted  in  the  last 
two  lectures  in  respect  to  the  first  supposition,  viz.,  that  of  a 
future  state. 

It  now  remains  to  show,  that 

God  administers  his  moved  government  over  men  under  em 
economy  of  grace. 

By  this,  I  mean  an  economy  under  which,  through  an  atone- 
ment, God  can,  consistently  with  the  perfect  equity  of  his  ad- 
ministration, show  favor  to  the  guilty.  It  will  be  remembered, 
according  to  the  principles  already  advanced,  that  God,  to 
evince  the  equity  of  his  administration,  must  show  the  highest 
approbation  of  obedience  to  his  law,  and  the  highest  disappro- 
bation of  disobedience.  By  an  atonement  then,  I  mean  some 
expedient  or  provision,  by  which  he  shows  as  high  disapproba- 
tion of  transgression  as  he  would  by  the  punishment  of  trans- 
gressors. Here  I  admit  and  maintain,  that  it  would  be  wholly 
beyond  the  power  of  the  human  mind  to  devise  or  discover 
any  expedient  by  which  this  equivalent  manifestation  of  disap- 
probation could  be  made.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  remem- 
bered, that  man  is  not  to  limit  the  conceptions  of  the  omniscient 
mind  by  those  of  his  own.  Whether  man  can  or  cannot  see 
how,  or  by  what  means  an  adequate  atonement  can  be  made, 
it  would  be  manifest  presumption  to  affirm  that  the  infinite 
God  cannot.  We  must  admit  the  possibility  of  the  fact,  and 
if  we  find  good  and  sufficient  evidence,  must  believe,  that 
though  we  know  not  the  particular  mode  that  God  has  devised 
and  adopted,  yet  that  he  has  some  expedient  by  which  he  can 
reconcile  the  pardon  of  transgressors  with  the  equity  of  his 
moral  administration. 


248     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

In  support  of  the  fact,  that  God  administers  his  moral  gov- 
ernment under  an  economy  of  grace,  I  remark — 

In  the  first  place,  that  the  manner  in  which  God  distributes 
good  and  evil  in  this  world,  entirely  harmonizes  with  such  an 
economy.  This  appears  in  the  general  fact,  that  in  distributing 
good  and  evil  in  this  world,  he  evinces  no  undue  or  inappro- 
priate feelings  toward  virtue  or  vice.  That  he  shows  any  want 
of  a  due  regard  to  virtue,  cannot  be  pretended,  on  the  suppo- 
sition of  a  gracious  economy.  There  is  no  deficiency  of  reward 
— no  treating  of  virtuous  subjects  worse,  though  all  are  treated 
better  than  they  deserve,  which  perfectly  accords  with  a  system 
of  grace. 

Again;  God  evinces  no  approbation  or  disapprobation  of 
vice  as  such.  Let  us  briefly  examine  the  providential  facts 
which  can  be  supposed  to  bear  on  this  point.  We  see  that  the 
imperfectly  virtuous — and  such  only  are  the  best  of  men — do, 
so  far  as  virtue  is  in  its  nature  connected  with  self-complacency 
and  peace  of  conscience,  or  with  any  attendant  or  consequent 
happiness,  reap  the  appropriate  benefits  of  their  imperfect  vir- 
tue. These  are  indeed,  in  some  degree,  beyond  prevention, 
except  by  the  annihilation  of  the  subject,  and  are  therefore  no 
evidence  of  God's  approbation  of  sin  in  good  men,  even  under 
a  merely  legal  dispensation.  Besides,  were  these  benefits  of 
imperfect  virtue  not  experienced  by  its  subjects,  how  could 
there  be  any  evidence  of  God's  gracious  design  to  allure  men 
to  the  practice  of  virtue,  or  to  restore  them  to  his  favor  ?  It  is 
plain,  that  without  them  no  manifestation  of  an  economy  of 
grace  could  be  made;  and  instead  of  being  inconsistent  with 
such  an  economy,  they  perfectly  harmonize  with,  and  are  even 
demanded  by  it. 

Another  fact,  which  may  be  supposed  to  bear  on  the  point 
now  before  us  is,  that  those  who  are  wholly  vicious,  even  the 
most  abandoned,  experience  only  in  a  very  imperfect  degree 
the  appropriate  evils  of  vice  in  remorse  of  conscience.  In  this 
fact  we  see,  on  the  part  of  man,  an  obvious  counteraction  of 
the  design  of  God,  as  it  is  decisively  manifested  in  the  nature 
and  tendencies  of  things.  The  fact  therefore  that  wicked  men 
avoid  these  evils  by  thus  obviously  counteracting  these  tend- 
encies, is  not  properly  and  truly  the  effect  of  what  God  does, 
or  fails  to  do,  except  in  one  respect,  viz.,  that  he  does  not  place 
them  in  such  a  condition,  or  in  such  circumstances,  that  the 


ENJOYMENT    OF    GOOD.  249 

full  effects  of  vice,  in  remorse  of  conscience,  will  be  felt.  But 
to  do  so,  would  be  to  place  them  under  the  full  retribution  of 
law.  Of  course  all  indications  of  an  economy  of  grace  must 
cease,  and  absolute  despair  of  the  divine  favor  must  be  the 
consequence.  This  exemption  then,  in  the  case  of  the  wicked, 
from  the  full  measure  of  remorse  of  conscience,  while  it  evinces 
on  the  part  of  God  no  approbation  of  vice  and  no  want  of  dis- 
approbation of  it,  under  an  economy  of  grace,  is  plainly  con- 
sistent with,  and  required  by,  such  an  economy. 

Further ;  the  enjoyment  of  various  other  kinds  of  good 
which  are  not  deserved,  and  exemption  from  various  other 
kinds  of  evil  which  are  deserved  require  consideration.  I  re- 
mark then,  that  the  enjoyment  of  this  good  and  the  exemption 
from  this  evil  are  obviously  the  effects  of  those  general  laws 
whose  operation  and  results  are  seen  to  be  wholly  independent 
of  the  moral  character  of  man  as  marking  its  diversity ;  and 
that  therefore  they  do  not  evince  any  approbation  of  vice,  or 
any  want  of  disapprobation  of  it,  on  the  part  of  God.  If  we 
consider  the  enjoyments  of  this  class  possessed  by  the  imper- 
fectly virtuous  man,  we  shall  see  that  God  in  bestowing  them 
evinces  no  approbation  of  his  moral  imperfection.  For  exam- 
ple, such  a  man  by  his  skill  and  activity  acquires  wealth  with 
its  numerous  advantages  and  comforts.  But  it  is  manifest  at 
once  that  these  blessings  are  not  the  appropriate  effects  of  his 
moral  imperfections,  but  of  his  skill  and  industry.  To  confirm 
this  view  of  the  subject,  we  see  others  equally  virtuous,  either 
through  unskillfulness  or  by  unavoidable  providential  calam- 
ities, the  victims  of  poverty  with  all  its  evils.  We  are  unavoid- 
ably led  therefore  to  trace  this  class  of  enjoyments  to  other 
causes  than  moral  character,  so  far  as  the  present  question  is 
concerned.  We  see  clearly  that  the  providential  Disposer  of 
events  does  not,  in  the  distribution  of  these  favors,  act  on  the 
principle  of  expressing  approbation  of  imperfect  virtue  or  of 
vice,  but  that  they  result  from  the  operation  of  those  general 
laws,  which  act  irrespectively  of  moral  character.  These  laws 
and  their  results  for  aught  we  can  see,  must  exist,  or  the  ajmro- 
priate  indications  of  an  economy  of  grace  must  wholly  cease.* 

For  the  same  reason  the  good  things  enjoyed  by  the  vicious 
are  no  expression  of  God's  approbation  of  vice.     We  see  in- 

*  Butler's  Analogy,  Part  I.  Chap.  3,  §  4. 
11* 


250     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

deed  the  industrious  knave  cultivate  the  soil  and  reap  the  har- 
vest, and  also  the  indolent,  be  their  moral  character  what  it 
may,  leave  it  uncultivated  and  live  in  penury.  Hence  no  one 
ascribes  this  difference  in  providential  allotment  to  diversity 
of  moral  character  ;  none  regards  the  prosperity  of  the  skillful 
and  industrious  villain,  as  an  expression  of  God's  approbation  of 
his  character,  but  all  ascribe  it  to  other  causes  whose  operation 
and  effects  are  wholly  irrespective  of  moral  character.  If  it 
here  be  said,  that  under  the  providence  of  God  it  is  the  appro- 
priate tendency  of  certain  vices  to  procure  enjoyments  ;  of  ava- 
rice for  example  to  secure  wealth,  of  ambition  to  acquire  honor, 
&c,  I  reply  that  these  things  are  not  true  in  any  respect  which 
bears  on  the  present  subject ;  for  we  see  avarice,  for  example, 
acquiring  wealth  only  when  connected  with  skill  and  industry, 
while  we  find  it  existing  in  an  equal  degree  when  attended  by 
indolence  or  unskillfulness,  acquiring  nothing.  Besides,  it  is 
apparent  that  a  virtuous  regard  to  wealth,  connected  with  skill 
and  industry,  has  a  direct  tendency  to  secure  an  adequate,  not 
to  say  an  equal,  degree  of  wealth,  and  greatly  to  augment  its 
enjoyments.  Indeed  it  would  be  easy  to  show,  were  it  neces- 
sary, that  under  the  providence  of  God  the  amount  of  happi- 
ness connected  with  avarice,  ambition  and  sensuality,  is  far  less 
than  results  from  the  opposite  virtues.  The  supposed  tendency 
of  these  vices  is  not  real,  and  the  acquisition  of  wealth  by  ava- 
rice, of  honor  by  ambition  and  of  pleasure  by  sensuality,  is 
no  expression  of  God's  approbation  of  these  vices.  These  en- 
joyments then  are  to  be  traced  to  other  causes — to  that  opera- 
tion of  general  laws  which  is  independent  of  moral  character, 
and  which  is  in  no  respect  inconsistent  with  God's  disapproba- 
tion of  vice,  except  that  he  does  not  place  men  in  a  state  of 
exact  retribution;  and  therefore  under  an  economy  of  grace 
they  are  in  no  respect  inconsistent  with  his  disapprobation.  In 
other  words,  all  that  can  be  called  the  good  consequences  of 
vice,  are  the  unavoidable  results  of  those  laws  which  necessarily 
pertain  to  an  economy  of  grace,  and  therefore  harmonize  with 
and  are  required  by  such  an  economy. 

Once  more.  Exemption  from  that  class  of  evils  in  the  case 
of  the  wicked,  to  which  I  have  referred,  is  no  expression  of 
God's  want  of  disapprobation  of  vice.  This  is  sufficiently  ob- 
vious from  the  principles  already  advanced.  Such  exemption 
or  exact  retribution  is  the  only  conceivable  alternative.     At 


DISTKIBUTION    OF    GOOD    AND    EVIL.  251 

least  it  must  exist  to  some  extent,  or  tlie  system  of  general  laws 
which  for  aught  we  can  see  is  inseparable  from  an  economy  of 
grace  must  be  abandoned,  or  man  must  be  placed  in  a  state  of 
exact  retribution,  which  would  render  such  an  economy  impos- 
sible. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  mode  in  which  God  distributes  good 
and  evil  in  this  world  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  administra- 
tion of  a  moral  government  under  an  economy  of  grace,  but 
perfectly  harmonizes  with  such  an  economy.  If  now  we  re- 
flect on  the  proofs  adduced  in  former  lectures,  as  furnished 
by  the  nature  of  man  and  the  condition  in  which  he  is  placed, 
that  God  is  administering  a  moral  government  over  him  in 
some  form,  that  there  is  nothing  in  his  providential  dispensa- 
tions at  all  inconsistent  with  his  adhering  to  the  strict  princi- 
ples of  equity  in  his  administration,  but  clear  and  satisfactory 
intimations  that  he  does  adhere  to  them,  then  we  are  shut  up 
to  one  of  these  conclusions ;  viz.,  either  God  will  execute  after 
the  short  respite  of  human  life  a  full  and  exact  retribution  on 
every  individual  of  this  sinful  world ;  or  show  that  he  is  admin- 
istering his  government  under  a  gracious  economy.  If  we  re- 
flect again  on  the  view  of  the  subject  that  has  now  been  given, 
particularly  on  the  fact,  that  while  in  all  his  dispensations  God 
so  scrupulously  avoids  any  expression  of  feelings,  which  appear 
to  be  at  variance  with  a  due  degree  of  approbation  of  virtue, 
and  of  disapprobation  of  vice,  every  thing  in  this  distribution 
of  good  and  evil  harmonizes  with  an  economy  of  grace,  just  as 
we  should  suppose  it  would.  We  see  also  a  coincidence  and 
harmony  which  remove  all  presumption  against,  if  they  do 
not  create  a  presumption  in  favor  of  the  conclusion,  that  God  is 
administering  an  equitable  moral  government  under  a  gracious 
economy. 

I  now  proceed  to  offer  more  direct  evidence  on  the  point  be- 
fore us,  and  remark — 

In  the  second  place,  that  God  in  the  distribution  of  good 
and  evil  clearly  and  decisively  evinces  a  design  to  restore  man  to 
virtue  and  hajipiness. 

This  design  of  God  is  so  conspicuous  and  capable  of  such  ex- 
tensive illustration  and  confirmation,  and  yet  to  every  contem- 
plative mind  is  so  remote  from  demanding  either,  that  I  shall 
advert  only  to  the  leading  sources  of  argument,  and  in  the  brief- 
est form  possible. 


252     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

I  observe — 

(1.)  That  the  providential  dispensations  of  God  furnish  deci- 
sive proof,  that  in  respect  to  worldly  or  physical  enjoyments,  a 
virtuous  course  of  life  is  the  happiest.  Whatever  may  be  the 
practical  estimate  of  mankind  on  this  question — whatever  ob- 
scurity the  sophistry  of  the  passions  or  of  the  heart  may  throw 
around  it,  none  fail  to  perceive  and  know  that  intemperance  or 
excess  of  every  kind,  i.  <?.,  selfishness  in  all  its  specific  forms  of 
action,  greatly  impairs  our  comfort  and  our  happiness  on  earth. 
In  illustration  and  proof  of  the  fact,  I  can  only  advert  to  a  few 
obvious  instances.  "Who  does  not  know  that  honesty  is  the 
best  policy?  By  honesty  I  mean  not  overt  action  merely, 
but  that  which  is  dictated  by  right  moral  principle.  Who  does 
not  know  the  advantages  of  a  virtuous  compared  with  a  vicious 
course  of  life  in  respect  to  health  and  all  our  bodily  enjoyments, 
to  the  possession  of  wealth  and  the  pleasures  it  is  capable  of 
affording — in  a  word,  to  all  those  blessings  which  we  comprise 
under  the  general  name  of  worldly  prosperity?  Here  also 
might  be  considered  the  favor,  kindness,  honor,  influence  se- 
cured by  the  one,  and  the  alienation,  neglect  and  infamy  en- 
tailed by  the  other ;  the  warm  approbation  and  interest  felt  in 
the  prosperity  of  the  virtuous,  and  the  indignation  occasioned 
by  the  triumphs  of  villainy ;  and  especially  the  obvious  desire 
of  all  men  to  sustain  in  the  eyes  of  others  a  character  for  virtue. 
How  does  this  last  fact  show  the  value  of  a  reputation  for  vir- 
tue as  the  means  of  human  happiness,  and  that  to  insure  the 
results  we  must  sustain  the  character. 

Here  it  is  proper  to  mention  the  consequences  of  virtue  and 
of  vice  to  mankind  as  subjects  of  parental  and  civil  govern- 
ments. These  are  too  obvious  to  need  any  specification.  They 
bear  however  as  directly  on  our  argument  as  any  other  forms 
of  good  and  evil,  since  they  are  the  results  of  institutions  in- 
separable from  our  earthly  condition,  and  made  so  by  the  ap- 
pointment of  God. 

The  consequences  of  a  virtuous  and  vicious  course  of  life  to 
the  inner  man  claim  a  more  particular  consideration.  I  have 
already  had  occasion  to  exhibit  the  nature  and  tendency  of  vir- 
tue to  give  perfect  happiness  to  its  subject,  and  those  of  vice  to 
produce  unqualified  misery.  I  now  refer  to  their  actual  effects, 
to  some  of  which  I  will  briefly  advert.  Consider  their  influ- 
ence on  our  worldly  desires  and  sensual  appetites,  which  if  un- 


VIRTUE    LEADS    TO    IIAPPINESS.  253 

gratified,  are  the  most  fruitful  source  of  unliappiness  to  man.  But 
let  the  objects  of  these  desires  and  appetites  be  what  they  may, 
wealth,  honor  or  pleasure,  they  are  never  gratified.  So  long 
as  they  are  uncontrolled  by  virtuous  principle,  they  are  always 
excessive,  always  stronger  than  the  nature  and  value  of  their 
object  warrant,  and  beyond  its  power  to  gratify.  Lust,  ambi- 
tion, avarice  torment  the  breast  which  cherishes  them,  and  in 
their  nature  are  only  specific  forms  of  selfishness,  deceiving, 
enslaving  and  vexing  the  mind,  while  in  their  consequences 
they  are  often  calamitous  and  dreadful.  The  abandoned 
drunkard  is  only  a  full  length  portrait  of  uncontrolled  appe- 
tite. Though  avarice,  ambition  and  other  lusts  do  not  in  each 
individual  instance  produce  the  same  degree  of  evil,  yet  the 
aggregate  which  each  has  occasioned  in  this  world  is  scarcely 
less,  perhaps  greater,  than  that  which  drunkenness  has  pro- 
duced. Assuredly  we  all  know  that  the  world  is  full  of  un- 
liappiness through  the  influence  of  ungoverned  and  selfish  aj> 
petite.  !Now  true  virtue  leads  its  possessor  to  love  and  desire 
different  objects  according  to  their  relative  and  real  value.  It 
gives  to  the  greatest  and  to  every  inferior  good  its  proper  place, 
and  thus  removes  all  excessive  desires  and  with  them  the  cause 
of  inward  torment. 

Consider  now  the  influence  of  virtue,  as  it  regulates  our  pas- 
sions. No  small  portion  of  the  unliappiness  of  man  results  from 
envy,  anger,  peevishness,  impatience,  revenge.  Who  can  deny 
their  power  to  annoy  and  torment  the  mind  ?  Who  can  say, 
as  he  wishes  for  enjoyment  to-morrow,  that  he  hopes  to  be 
angry,  fretful,'  envious,  revengeful  ?  Is  he  who  indulges  these 
tempers  happy  in  himself,  or  is  he  the  man  who  contributes  to 
the  happiness  of  others,  or  is  he  a  tormentor  of  himself  and  of 
others  ?  And  yet  these  passions  disquiet  more  or  less  every 
human  bosom  in  which  true  virtue  has  not  broken  their  do- 
minion. Look  now  at  the  man  who  governs  himself.  How 
gracefully  he  sways  the  scepter !  With  what  serenity  and  dig- 
nity he  passes  onward  through  life !  How  equable  his  career ! 
In  a  world  full  of  jarring  elements  and  violent  changes,  no 
clouds  of  discontent,  no  whirlwinds  of  passion,  obscure  or  dis- 
turb the  steady  sunshine  of  the  soul.  Like  the  sun  in  the 
heavens,  he  is  far  above  the  storms  and  tempests  that  infest 
and  darken  and  agitate  all  beneath  him. 

Similar  remarks  apply  to  all  those  peculiarities  of  temper 


254:      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

and  propensity,  which  are  seriously  calamitous  to  individuals. 
Is  one  the  victim  of  that  melancholy  that  throws  its  gloom 
over  every  bright  prospect — is  he  hurried  into  calamities  by 
indecision  and  levity  of  spirit — has  he  that  selfish  insensibility 
that  shuts  him  out  from  all  the  sympathies  and  joys  of  earthly 
friendships — has  he  become  the  victim  of  dissipation  and  way- 
ward prodigality,  what  other  remedy  so  effectual  as  to  bring 
him  under  the  influence  of  virtuous  principle  ?  What  like  this 
can  fix  the  inconstant,  embolden  the  timid,  strengthen  the 
weak,  reclaim  the  abandoned,  and  save  the  lost — what  else  can 
correct  every  infirmity,  heal  every  mental  disease,  and  give 
health  and  strength  and  perfection  to  the  soul  of  man  ? 

But  the  most  terrible  of  all  calamities  which  shake  the  soul, 
is  the  fear  of  an  avenging  Gocl.  We  know  what  thoughtless- 
ness and  worldliness,  absorption  in  business  and  pleasure,  can 
do  to  blind  us  to  this  evil.  But  we  know  as  well  that  it  cannot 
be  wholly  avoided  by  wicked  men.  Even  the  hardiest  in  guilt 
cannot  become  wholly  insensible  to  these  forebodings.  Cati- 
line and  Nero  felt  remorse  of  conscience.  The  hardihood  of  a 
fiend  cannot  prevent  it.  There  is  the  impression  of  a  futurity 
on  all  human  spirits.  Every  one  has  a  conscience.  All  know 
that  they  have  always  and  deliberately  crossed  and  thwarted 
the  will  of  another,  and  that  he  is  no  less  than  an  infinite  Being ; 
they  know,  that  thus  to  cross  the  will  of  that  Being  is  to 
offend  him,  and  that  they  have  always  done  it.  They  are 
afraid  of  death  because  they  are  afraid  of  God.  They  know 
that  if  there  is  a  just  retribution  to  sustain  the  prerogatives  of 
heaven's  Sovereign,  and  unfulfilled  penalties  to  avenge  their 
violation,  they  must  fall  on  them.  There  is  an  emphatic  voice 
of  remonstrance  and  warning  which  they  cannot  quell,  and  a 
fearful  looking  for  of  judgment  they  cannot  avoid.  What  is 
the  remedy  for  these  evils,  and  for  those  that  spring  from  this 
alienation  of  the  creature  from  his  Creator — from  this  aversion 
of  heart  to  the  Almighty  Sovereign  of  heaven  and  earth,  but 
to  return  to  affection  and  friendship — what  but  virtue,  religion  ? 
I  say  not  here  whether  God  be  placable  or  not.  But  I  ask, 
what  other  hope  have  we,  or  can  we  have,  if  not  from  conform- 
ity to  his  will  ?  Suppose  him  a  selfish,  even  a  malignant  Being, 
what  better  can  we  do  than  to  return  to  duty;  what  better,  if 
we  would  secure  the  friendship  of  such  a  Being,  than  to  do  his 
will.     If  he  is  placable — aye,  if  too  he  is  infinitely  good,  then 


ADVANTAGES    OF    VIRTUE.  255 

what  may  wc  not  hope  for  ?  The  answer  is  in  the  feelings  of 
an  immortal,  who  lias  seen  and  felt  his  desert  of  punishment — 
of  the  vengeance  of  the  Almighty,  bnt  is  now  reposing  in  the 
bosom  of  infinite  love. 

I  might  dwell  here  on  the  advantages  of  virtue  in  every  con- 
dition of  human  life.  In  youth,  what  else  can  so  protect  from 
every  danger  and  evil,  and  open  such  bright  prospects  for 
future  life  ?  In  old  age,  when  decrepitude  of  body  and  the 
sinking  faculties  of  the  mind  seem  to  open  our  graves,  what 
else  shall  console  us  ?  Under  affliction,  how  disconsolate  were 
human  sorrow,  with  no  appeal  but  to  the  unfeeling  rock  that 
crushes  us.  Friends  forsake  or  betray  us — all  whom  we  love 
die — disease  assails,  which  no  remedies  can  reach, — poverty 
sinks  us  from  affluence  to  want ;  death  comes — every  arm  is 
palsied,  every  countenance  is  pale  in  weakness  and  despair — 
what  shall  sustain  us ?  Nothing  but  virtue — nothing  but  re- 
ligion— nothing  but  doing  the  will  of  God.  The  love  of  God, 
the  fixed  purpose  to  do  his  will,  gives  hope  of  his  favor.  No- 
thing else  can  convert  our  very  trials  into  blessings,  and  give 
the  hope  of  a  brighter  world.  This  can  change  the  gloom  of 
the  dark  valley  into  the  twilight  of  an  eternal  morning,  and 
the  dark  grave  into  the  gate  of  heaven.  All  else  is  darkness 
without  light,  guilt  without  hope,  fear,  remorse,  terror,  ruin 
and  wretchedness. 

Why  then  are  there,  in  the  providence  of  God,  such  clear 
and  abundant  advantages  in  the  practice  of  virtue,  if  it  be  not 
his  design  to  allure  men  to  the  practice  of  it  ?  Why  does  he 
thus  shut  them  up  to  virtue,  to  religion,  as  their  only  hope  of 
his  favor,  if  not  to  assure  them  that  in  this  way  they  shall 
obtain  it. 

(2.)  The  blessings  of  life,  contemplated  as  the  gifts  of  a 
divine  Benefactor,  tend  by  a  strong  influence,  to  reclaim  men 
to  the  practice  of  virtue.  It  is  philosophic  truth,  that  "the 
goodness  of  God  leadeth  to  repentance."  Nor  is  there  any 
kind  of  moral  influence  so  powerfully  adapted  to  this  end  as 
manifested  kindness,  which  is  sure  to  produce  affection  in  re- 
turn. This  influence  reaches  the  last  and  lowest  stages  of 
human  profligacy;  for  few  are  so  obdurate  as  not  to  feel  its 
thrilling  efficacy.  Nor  can  I  conceive  it  possible,  that  an  un- 
perverted  mind  should  contemplate  this  sinful  world,  in  its  un- 
worthiness  of  the  favors  of  its  Maker,  and  also  the  ceaseless 


256     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

and  abundant  communication  of  blessings  to  those  who  deserve 
only  his  displeasure ;  the  solicitude  with  which  he  watches,  the 
care  with  which  he  protects,  the  compassion  with  which  he 
relieves,  the  kindness  with  which  he  blesses,  and  not  feel  a 
mighty  and  an  almost  irresistible  attraction  to  do  the  will  of 
such  a  Benefactor.  How  is  it  possible  that  intelligent  beings, 
qualified  as  we  are,  to  read  the  clear  intimations  of  our  Maker's 
will  in  our  constitution  and  circumstances  as  moral  beings, 
and  made  as  we  are,  the  constant  objects  of  his  more  than 
paternal  care  and  kindness,  can  doubt  or  disregard  his  design 
to  recover  us  to  obedience  and  to  the  enjoyment  of  his  favor? 
What  child,  in  similar  circumstances,  could  question  the  design 
of  paternal  love  ? 

(3.)  The  natural  evils  of  life  justly  and  soberly  estimated  be- 
speak the  same  design.  We  no  sooner  inquire  into  the  end 
which  these  evils  are  fitted  to  accomplish  in  respect  to  man, 
than  we  see  that  it  is  to  restrain  men  from  vice  and  restore 
them  to  virtue.  The  most  striking  fact  in  regard  to  these  evils 
is,  that  to  a  vast  extent  they  result  from  the  wrong  state  of  the 
heart  and  conduct  of  the  life.  It  is  suffering  in  connection  with 
sin,  telling  us  a  truth  we  cannot  fail  to  know,  that  if  we  would 
prevent  the  effect,  we  must  remove  the  cause ;  and  far  more 
distinctly  and  more  impressively,  that  as  God  loves  our  happi- 
ness he  loves  also  our  virtue,  and  that  he  will  secure  the  one 
only  by  means  of  the  other.  So  plainly,  so  forcibly  is  this  great 
truth  taught  in  the  providence  of  God,  that  every  man  knows 
and  feels  it  in  much  the  same  manner  as  that,  if  he  would  avoid 
the  sensation  of  being  burned  he  must  keep  himself  from  the 
fire.  By  these  evils  too  the  insufficiency  and  vanity  of  earthly 
joys  are  made  obvious  in  a  manner  the  most  impressive  to  the 
wayward  mind  of  man.  Let  him  take  his  lesson  from  these 
evils,  let  him  take  it  from  the  sufferings,  the  agonies,  the  last 
breath  of  a  dying  man,  and  who  would  not  realize  what  the 
world  is?  In  the  evils  of  life  we  are  furnished  with  abundant 
opportunities  for  the  exercise  of  all,  and  especially  of  the  more 
difficult  and  nobler  virtues.  Even  in  those  evils  to  which  we 
are  subject  through  what  we  call  inadvertence  or  rashness, 
rather  than  by  the  execution  of  any  criminal  purpose,  we  find 
a  powerful  check  to  imprudence  and  temerity,  and  an  impres- 
sive lesson  of  discretion  and  care,  which  may  be  indispensable 
to  our  moral  well-being.     Who  can  estimate  the  benefits  of 


EYILS   OF    LIFE    BENEFICENT.  257 

watchfulness  to  moral  beings?  The  necessity  of  continued  oc- 
cupation and  labor  for  our  comfortable  subsistence  is  also  indi- 
rectly, and  yet  in  the  most  important  respects  subservient  to 
our  moral  interests.  Its  single  influence  to  remove  us  from  the 
temptations  of  sloth,  and  to  deprive  us  of  leisure  to  contrive 
and  perpetrate  iniquity,  is  sufficient  to  show  its  salutary  effects 
on  the  conduct  of  men — to  show  us  that  what  we  are  so  apt  to 
esteem  one  of  the  most  intolerable  calamities,  is  one  of  the 
greatest  of  heaven's  blessings.  It  can  scarcely  be  pretended, 
that  the  moral  and  of  course  all  the  real  interests  of  a  world  in 
which  calamities,  disease,  pain  and  death  possess  so  benign  a 
tendency  and  yet  produce  so  little  good  effect,  would  be  im- 
proved by  any  diminution  of  these  evils ;  nor  can  it  well  be 
doubted  that  they  evince  the  design  of  their  author  to  re- 
strain man  from  the  perversion  of  his  moral  nature,  and  to  re- 
store him  to  virtue  and  happiness.  What  would  this  world  be 
without  these  ?  "Were  there  no  disappointments,  no  sufferings, 
no  death,  how  ferocious,  how  desperate  were  human  selfishness. 
It  would  be  a  pandemonium  rather  than  a  paradise,  over  whose 
crimes  and  woes  even  God's  mercy  would  despair.  In  a  word 
then,  in  all  the  evils  of  human  life  we  discern  only  the  disci- 
pline and  the  chastisements  of  a  father's  hand,  and  see  only 
"the  graver  countenance  of  his  love,"  intending  our  profit  by 
making  us  partakers  of  his  holiness  and  his  favor. 

The  present  state  of  man  is  obviously  one  of  trial  and  disci- 
pline, and  as  such  is  fitted  and  designed  to  form  his  character  to 
permanent  virtue.  On  this  most  important  topic  I  have  not 
time  to  dwell.  The  illustration  of  it  by  Bishop  Butler  in  his 
Analogy,  (P.  I.,  Chaps.  4  and  5,)  to  those  who  will  read  his 
remarks,  supersedes  the  necessity  of  any  attempt  on  my  part 
to  exhibit  the  subject.  Not  merely  the  theological  student 
and  the  Christian,  but  every  man  who  would  understand  the 
true  nature  and  design  of  his  existence  in  this  world,  should 
read  and  read  often,  these  chapters  of  Butler. 

The  general  doctrine  which  he  establishes  is, that  the  present 
world  is  a  state  of  moral  discipline  adapted  and  designed  to 
improve  and  ultimately  to  confirm  man  in  virtue  and  hap- 
piness in  a  future  world.  This  adaptation  he  has  traced  in  a 
variety  of  particulars  with  such  clearness  of  illustration  and 
force  of  argument,  that  the  reality  of  it  cannot  be  doubted  by 
any  candid  mind.     He  has  not  indeed  applied  this  great  fact  to 

17 


258     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

this  particular  purpose,  but  the  fact  being  admitted,  who  can 
doubt  its  application  ?  If  it  be  obvious  and  undeniable,  that  the 
constitution  of  man  and  the  entire  course  of  God's  providential 
dispensations  toward  him  are  fitted  to  reclaim  him  from  sin 
and  to  improve  and  confirm  him  in  virtue  and  happiness,  I  ask 
whence  such  adaptation,  if  God  does  not  design  to  accomplish 
this  end.  It  is  to  no  purpose  to  say  that  in  respect  to  the 
greater  part  of  men  this  design  is  not  accomplished.  The  light 
of  nature  leaves  the  future  particular  results  of  the  present 
state  in  many  respects  unknown  and  indeterminate.  Proba- 
tion, and  with  it  this  course  of  moral  discipline, may  also  be  con- 
tinued under  even  more  favorable  auspices,  till  the  end  shall 
be  accomplished  in  manner  and  degree  worthy  of  the  attri- 
butes of  its  Author.  Admit  however  the  fact  to  be  as  sup- 
posed, it  must  be  traced  to  the  voluntary  perversion  of  the 
design  of  God  on  the  part  of  men,  and  the  perversion  of  a 
design  is  decisive  of  its  reality. 

(5.)  The  happiness  of  mankind,  to  a  great  extent — I  may 
even  say  their  perfect  happiness — is  placed  in  their  own  power. 
Immeasurably  the  greatest  portion  of  the  miseries  of  human 
life  are  the  result  of  sin  and  moral  imperfection.  Suppose  that 
all  men  were  perfectly  conformed  to  the  rule  of  benevolent 
action,  how  would  this  dismal  world,  as  we  are  often  prone  to 
esteem  it,  and  darkened  and  afflicted  as  it  is  by  sin  and  its  woes, 
be  cheered  and  brightened  !  Let  all  unkindness  between  man 
and  man  cease ;  let  envy  and  malice,  fraud,  cruelty,  contention, 
covetousness,  pride,  ambition  and  sensuality  come  to  an  end ; 
let  these  be  followed  by  perfect  benevolence,  under  all  its 
forms  of  meekness,  humility,  contentment,  self-denial,  upright- 
ness, confidence,  sympathy,  a  universal  courteousness  and  cor- 
diality ;  let  benevolence  go  forth  in  an  uninterrupted  train  of 
deeds  of  beneficence,  and  liberality  pour  abroad  its  gifts,  and 
let  gratitude  and  love  reign  pure  and  unruffled  in  every  heart, 
and  these  be  attended  with  submission,  trust  and  joy,  with  the 
other  delightful  emotions  of  piety,  and  how  trivial  would  be 
every  possible  evil — how  would  this  world  of  sorrow  cease  to 
groan,  and  be  transformed  into  a  primeval  Eden !  How  would 
all  nature  smile  in  beauty  and  pour  forth  its  bounties  to  bless, 
and  the  sunshine  of  every  heart  welcome  a  present  God,  and 
tell  us  of  a  paradise  regained  !  Does  such  a  fact,  in  respect  to 
this  world  of  his  creatures,  bespeak  no  design  of  their  Maker  ? 


PERFECTION  INSURES  BLESSEDNESS.     259 

Can  an  individual  doubt,  in  respect  to  the  part  which  God  de- 
sires that  he  should  act  ?  Can  such  a  weight  of  motive  as  arises 
from  this  amount  of  good  to  each  and  to  all,  from  the  obvious 
practicability  of  its  attainment  as  placed  in  their  power,  be 
furnished  without  being  designed  to  move  such  beings  to  act 
accordingly  %  The  question  admits  of  but  one  answer,  and  this 
too  plain  to  be  stated.  The  whole  world  feels  this  influence. 
"With  it  there  is  a  sense  of  duty  and  of  obligation,  which  presses 
hard  and  almost  irresistibly  on  the  human  conscience,  to  em- 
bark in  this  enterprise  of  blessing  the  world ;  and  there  is  a 
sense  of  guilt  and  self-condemnation  which  fastens  on  the  soul, 
and  compels  those  who  live  only  to  defeat  this  design  of  their 
Maker,  to  carry  a  wounded  spirit  with  them  through  all  their 
pilgrimage.  Who  can  reflect  on  these  things  as  the  result  of 
God's  providential  dispensations,  without  regarding  them  as 
the  ceaseless  efforts  of  his  grace  to  recover  man  to  virtue  and 
to  happiness? 

There  is  another  fact,  which  has  too  important  a  relation  to 
this  part  of  the  argument  to  be  left  unnoticed;  one  which  gives 
a  peculiar  grandeur  and  glory  to  a  moral  agent — that  such  is 
the  nature  of  a  moral  being,  that  perfection  in  character  is  per- 
fection in  blessedness.  Moral  agency  involves,  in  its  very 
nature,  the  power  so  to  occupy  the  mind  and  bless  the  moral 
being  with  the  right  object  of  affection,  that  any  loss  of  good, 
and  any  pain  or  suffering  which  are  possible  in  the  case,  shall 
be  accounted  almost  as  nothing.  (I  might  say,  and  maintain 
the  position,  that  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  a  moral  being,  if 
morally  perfect,  to  avoid  all  suffering,  even  from  omnipotence 
— at  least  from  every  created  cause.  I  have  no  doubt  of  this 
fact,  as  one  given  in  the  true  philosophy  of  the  mind.)  But  I 
present  the  position  with  the  slight  qualification,  almost  entirely 
to  avoid  suffering. 

This  may  be  illustrated  in  many  forms,  and  in  the  commonest 
things.  How  frequently  then,  when  thought  and  sensibility 
are  wholly  given  to  some  object  of  absorbing  interest,  do  we 
receive  bodily  injury  without  feeling  or  knowing  the  fact  ? 
Every  thing  is  relative,  not  only  in  thought  but  in  feel  ing.  How 
unworthy  in  a  Croesus  to  grieve  for  the  loss  of  a  farthing ! 
Archimedes  was  so  absorbed  in  the  solution  of  his  problem,  that 
he  lost  his  life  in  the  sacking  of  the  city,  without  being  aware 
of  his  danger.     Soldiers,  wounded  and  bleeding  in  battle,  have 


260      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

fought  on,  insensible  of  their  wounds,  till  they  were  falling  in 
death.  Paul,  in  his  own  language,  "suffered  the  loss  of  all 
things,  and  counted  them  but  dung,  that  he  might  win 
Christ ;"  and  considered  himself  "  as  having  nothing,  and  yet 
possessing  all  things."  Martyrs,  on  the  rack  and  in  the 
fire,  have  triumphed,  with  hymns  of  praise  on  their  lips  and 
heaven  in  their  hearts.  The  nature  of  mind  explains  all  this. 
"When  then  the  object  that  engrosses  the  mind  of  a  moral 
being  is  God — as  he  is,  his  designs,  the  end,  the  results  at 
which  he  aims  and  which  he  will  accomplish — when  the 
heart,  the  whole  soul  of  a  moral  being,  is  fixed  as  it  may  be 
on  such  an  object,  and  so  becomes  "filled  with  all  the  fullness 
of  God,"  why  should  it  be  thought  strange  that  the  tortures  of 
the  rack  and  the  fire  should  leave  the  perfect  blessedness  of 
the  mind  unimpaired  ?  Such  is  undeniably  the  nature  of  a 
moral  being.  By  perfection  in  character  he  secures  perfection 
in  happiness,  and  becomes  incapable  of  misery !  Evil,  suffer- 
ing is  possible  to  man  only  through  his  moral  imperfection. 

I  am  not  saying  that  perfect  holiness  will  ever  exist  in  this 
world ;  experience  and  observation  forbid  us  to  expect  it.  But  I 
have  called  your  attention  to  the  fact  now  stated,  that  I  might 
ask,  what  is  the  design  of  God,  in  giving  existence  to  moral 
beings  ?  Has  he  not  placed  their  happiness  in  their  power — 
happiness  without  alloy,  absolute  and  perfect?  And  what  is, 
what  can  be  his  design,  but  to  induce  man  to  attain  it ;  what 
but  to  persuade  him  to  do  the  will  and  enjoy  the  friendship 
of  his  Creator  ? 

(6.)  I  only  add  in  support  of  this  conclusion,that  if  there  is  no 
forgiveness  with  God,  and  if  the  proof  is  decisive  that  there  is 
none,  then  all  this  course  of  effort  to  reclaim  to  obedience 
must  of  necessity  be  vain  and  worse  than  in  vain.  Under  the 
conviction  that  there  is  no  forgiveness  with  God,  the  world 
would  become  desperate  in  rebellion.  That  God  then  by  the 
entire  course  of  providence  should  thus  aim  to  restore  man  to 
virtue,  and  yet  authorize  and  even  render  unavoidable  a  con- 
viction which  must  render  all  his  efforts  to  reclaim  abortive,  is 
incredible.  The  providential  dispensations  of  God  then  author- 
ize and  require  the  conclusion  that  there  is  forgiveness  for  the 
guilty.  Indeed  in  view  of  what  has  been  said,  I  ask  is  there  in 
the  entire  providence  of  God  any  thing  in  the  least  degree  in- 
consistent with  this  great  design  of  his  grace — is  there  any 


RECAPITULATION.  261 

want  of  adaptation  in  the  means  adopted  for  its  accomplish- 
ment; can  any  course  of  providential  dispensation  be  conceived 
more  decisively  expressive  of  a  design  to  restore  a  lost  world  to 
duty  and  to  happiness. 

I  now  recur  to  what  I  claim  to  have  proved,  that  God  is  ad- 
ministering his  moral  government  on  the  principles  of  exact 
equity.  In  view  of  this  fact  we  are  brought  to  the  unavoidable 
conclusion,  that  he  will  in  a  future  world  unfold  these  principles 
either  in  exact  retribution  or  through  an  atonement.  The  former 
is  indeed  far  more  probable,  than  that  he  has  abandoned  the 
principles  of  eternal  justice  in  his  moral  government.  At  the 
same  time  that  man's  present  state  is  simply  that  of  respite 
from  deserved  punishment  under  a  merely  legal  dispensation, 
must  be  regarded  as  highly,  even  altogether  incredible,  when 
compared  with  the  supposition  of  a  gracious  economy.  In 
view  then  of  the  equity  of  God's  administration,  and  all  those 
influences  to  restore  man  to  virtue,  and  those  intimations  of 
forgiveness  so  conspicuous  in  this  course  of  his  providence,  the 
only  conclusion  is  that  God  is  administering  his  moral  govern- 
ment through  an  atonement,  or  under  a  gracious  economy. 

One  remark  in  conclusion.  You  see  that  if  you  ever  become 
the  objects  of  God's  favor,  you  must  do  so  on  the  same  ground 
and  on  the  same  conditions  which  Christianity  reveals  and  pre- 
scribes. Without  an  atonement  for  your  sins,  like  that  which 
Christianity  reveals,  there  is  no  hope  that  you  can  be  forgiven; 
without  repentance  for  sin,  the  renunciation  of  it  by  doing  the 
will  of  God,  and  a  cheerful  unqualified  trust  in  his  pardoning 
mercy,  there  is  no  true  happiness  for  you  here  or  hereafter. 

Come  then  and  act  up  to  the  dictates  of  right  reason.  If  you 
have  not  proof  that  Christianity  is  from  God,  you  have  proof 
that  with  God  there  is  forgiveness  for  the  penitent  sinner,  and 
for  none  but  him.  There  is,  there  can  be  no  religion  for  you 
but  one  whose  basis  is  an  atonement  for  sin — a  religion  which 
involves  a  penitent  and  a  contrite  heart  which  hopes  for  mercy 
from  God  as  the  righteous  avenger  of  sin.  Act  up  then  to  the 
dictates  of  your  sober  judgment — conform  the  dictates  of  con- 
science to  the  will  of  the  Being  who  made  you,  who  in  all  his 
providence  either  smiles  to  invite  you  to  his  friendship,  or 
frowns  only  to  deter  you  from  the  guilt  and  the  ruin  of  sin. 
Embrace  that  religion  by  which  the  infinite  God,  your  Maker, 
your  Redeemer  would  bless,  and  without  which  he  will  curse 


262     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

you  forever — that  religion  which  is  the  perfection  of  your  na- 
ture, the  end  of  your  existence.  If  truth  is  better  than  false- 
hood, if  happiness  is  more  desirable  than  misery,  if  God  as  your 
friend  is  better  than  God  as  your  enemy,  if  to  meet  him  as  your 
Saviour  is  better  than  to  meet  him  as  the  avenger  of  sin,  if  to 
go  to  his  judgment-seat  fearless  and  triumphant  is  better  than 
to  go  there  in  despairing  terror,  if  heaven  is  better  than  hell, 
choose  this  hour  with  a  penitent,  humble  and  steadfast  heart, 
the  service  of  a  redeeming  God. 


LECTURE  VI. 

Second  leading  proposition  continued,  viz.— God  administers  an  equitable  moral  government; 
also,  God  administers  a  moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy. — Proof  3.  We  must 

*  suppose  God  to  administer  his  government  in  the  way  of  exact  retribution,  or  through  an 
atonement. — One  of  these  is  true,  or  God  is  deficient  in  power,  or  malignant  in  intention. — 
Just  conception  of  Benevolence  in  God. — What  is  Justice  in  God. — Infidels  have  false  views  of 
both. — Dispensations  of  God's  Providence  prove  him  not  to  be  weak. — The  equity  of  a  mural 
government  can  be  consistent  with  mercy  only  through  an  atonement. — Alternative  for  the 
unbeliever. 

In  the  preceding  lecture,  I  entered  on  the  proof  of  the  prop- 
osition, that  God  is  administering  an  equitable  moral  govern- 
ment over  men  under  an  atonement. 

I  now  resume  the  same  subject,  and,  wTith  some  recapitulation 
of  principles  and  arguments  adduced  in  former  lectures,  shall 
attempt  to  prove  the  same  thing,  by  showing — 

In  the  third  place,  that  the  only  admissible  suppositions  are, 
that  God  is  administering  his  moral  government  over  men 
either  in  the  wray  of  exact  retribution,  or  through  an  atone- 
ment ;  and  that  as  the  former  supposition  is  wholly  inadmis- 
sible, it  follows  that  he  is  administering  it  under  an  atonement, 
I  propose  to  show — 

First,  That  God  is  administering  his  moral  government  over 
men  either  in  the  wray  of  exact  retribution  or  under  an  atone- 
ment ;  and 

Secondly,  That  he  is  administering  it  not  in  the  former,  but 
in  the  latter  mode,  or  under  an  atonement. 

First.  God  is  administering  his  moral  government  over  men 
either  in  the  one  or  the  other  of  these  modes  of  administration. 
If  he  is  not,  it  must  be  that  it  is  either  through  want  of  power, 
or  through  an  unkind  or  malignant  intention  toward  individual 
subjects,  or  through  that  excessive  lenity  which  sacrifices  the 
general  good  to  individual  happiness. 

It  is  not  through  want  of  power.  On  this  point  no  argument, 
in  view  of  the  omnipotence  of  God,  can  be  necessary. 

It  is  not  through  malignant  intention  •  i.  «?.,  not  w7ith  the  de- 
sign of  inflicting  punishment  hereafter  with  undue  severitv,  or  of 


264     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

treating  his  subjects  worse  than  they  deserve.  This  supposition 
would  be  wholly  gratuitous,  since  there  is  not  a  pretense  that 
in  the  whole  course  of  his  providence  there  is  the  least  viola- 
tion of  individual  rights.  J^or  would  it  be  merely  gratuitous, 
but  against  strong  evidence  to  the  contrary.  Every  thing  that 
can  bear  on  the  question,  in  the  divine  administration,  is  decis- 
ive of  benevolence  to  man;  all  that  can  be  alleged  with  the 
least  plausibility,  against  the  exact  equity  of  his  government, 
being  the  fact  that  he  treats  his  subjects  better  than  they 
deserve — a  fact  surely  very  remote  from  authorizing  even  a# 
conjecture  that  he  will  treat  them  hereafter  more  severely. 
Besides,  malignity  itself,  though  the  manifestation  of  it  might 
subvert  rightful  authority,  cannot  violate  the  principles  of 
equity,  in  treating  the  rebellious  subjects  of  God  (and  such  are 
all  men)  worse  than  they  deserve,  for  they  all  deserve  evil. 
God  then  cannot  be  supposed  to  depart  from  the  principles  of 
exact  equity  in  his  moral  administration,  through  malignant 
intention  toward  individual  subjects. 

Again;  nor  can  he  be  supposed  to  do  this  through  excessive 
lenity.  This,  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  often  presented,  is  the 
most  plausible  of  the  suppositions  which  are  now  to  be  ex- 
ploded, and  derives  its  plausibility  wholly  from  the  name  given 
it.  It  is  called  benevolence,  and  thus  held  up  to  our  admira- 
tion as  the  sum  and  perfection  of  moral  excellence  and  beauty. 
And  what  is  more  calamitous  to  the  cause  of  truth,  the  defend- 
ers of  the  equity  of  God's  government  have  often  conceded, 
that  benevolence  is  the  proper  name  of  the  thing  intended ; 
denying  that  the  divine  moral  perfection  is  comprised  in  this 
attribute,  even  when  an  apostle  has  said  that  "  God  is  love," 
and  maintaining,  that  justice  in  God,  instead  of  being  only  a 
modification  or  specific  form  of  benevolence,  is  another  and 
distinct  attribute,  dictating  and  demanding  what  benevolence 
forbids.* 

Let  us  then  form  some  definite  conceptions  on  this  most 
momentous  of  all  questions — what  is  benevolence  in  God  f  At 
least  let  us  distinguish  it  from  what  it  is  not,  and  from  what 
often  bears  its  desecrated  name.-f  What  then  is  benevolence  in 
God? 

*  Dr.  Chalmers'  Bridgewater  Treatise. 

f  I  am  not  here  deciding  that  God  is  benevolent,  but  only  reasoning  ex  concessis; 
i.  e.,  on  the  assumption  of  the  infidel,  that  God  is  benevolent. 


THE    STRONGHOLD    OF    INFIDELITY.  265 

Is  any  thing  wliicli  does  not  disapprove  and  abhor  sin  as  the 
supreme  evil,  and  which  will  not  show  even  the  highest  disap- 
probation of  it  ?  In  opposition  to  this,  we  are  told  that  such 
is  not  the  benevolence  of  God,  and  that  instead  of  viewing  him 
in  the  character  of  a  just  and  righteous  Sovereign,  we  are  to 
regard  him  in  no  other  relation  than  that  of  a  benignant,  ten- 
der parent,  who  so  delights  in  the  happiness  of  his  family,  that 
to  promote  it  he  will  sacrifice  all  that  can  be  called  law,  jus- 
tice and  equity. 

We  here  come  to  the  stronghold  of  Infidelity.  Let  us  then 
ascertain  the  precise  question  to  be  decided.  It  is  not  whether 
God,  as  a  benevolent  Being,  delights  in  the  happiness  of  his 
moral  creation,  and  desires  to  promote  it  in  the  only  way  in 
which  it  can  be  secured.  But  can  he  accomplish  that  end 
without  the  influence  of  an  equitable  moral  government;  in 
other  words,  can  God  be  benevolent  without  being  just  f 

What  then  is  benevolence  in  God  f  And  what  is  justice  in 
God  f  Benevolence  in  God  is  a  disposition  to  secure  the  high- 
est happiness,  and  to  prevent  all  misery.  Of  course  it  must 
disapprove,  hate,  and  abhor  that  which  necessarily  destroys 
the  highest  happiness  and  tends  to  produce  all  misery.  But 
such  is  the  nature  and  tendency  of  sin.  What  then  is  justice 
in  God?  It  is  simply  one  specific  form  or  modification  of 
benevolence;  i.  c,  in  respect  to  sin,  it  is  benevolence,  and  no- 
thing but  benevolence,  disapproving,  abhorring,  and  determin- 
ing to  punish  sin  in  the  subjects  of  his  government,  as  that 
which  undermines  his  authority,  and  tends  to  destroy  the  high- 
est, happiness,  and  to  produce  all  evil.  God  then,  as  a  benevo- 
lent being,  must  feel  the  highest  disapprobation  and  abhorrence 
of  sin.  In  proportion  as  he  loves  happiness  and  hates  misery, 
he  must  abhor  sin,  as  that  which  destroys  the  one  and  produces 
the  other.  To  suppose  a  benevolent  God  then,  who  is  not  also 
a  just  God,  is  to  suppose  a  benevolent  God  who  is  not  benevo- 
lent. 

Nor  is  this  all.  God  as  the  governor  of  moral  beings  must 
show  by  his  acts  that  he  thus  disapproves  of  and  hates  sin.  He 
must  come  before  his  kingdom  with  the  demonstration  of  his 
benevolence  in  the  form  of  justice,  either  by  a  retribution  or 
some  equivalent  manifestation  of  his  supreme  abhorrence  of  this 
evil.  Words  without  actions  in  such  a  case  are  no  proof  in  a 
question  of  character.  In  a  moral  kingdom  all  results  in  hap- 
Vol.  I.-12. 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

piness  and  misery  depend  on  the  moral  conduct  of  its  subjects, 
and  that  depends  on  the  influences  nnder  which  they  act.  Of  all 
these  there  is  one  which  is  absolutely  essential ;  viz.,  that  of  the 
moral  governor's  supreme  approbation  of  right  and  supreme  dis- 
approbation of  every  wrong  moral  action  on  their  part.  This  is 
the  only  influence  by  which  as  a  moral  governor,  he  can  move 
them.  Motives  as  consisting  simply  in  natural  good  and  evil, 
whether  furnished  by  the  perceived  nature  and  tendencies  of 
action,  or  through  the  medium  of  promised  good  and  threat- 
ened evil,  are  not  the  influence  of  moral  government.  This  in- 
fluence arises  only  from  the  perfect  character  of  the  governor, 
as  manifested  in  his  supreme  approbation  of  right  and  supreme 
disapprobation  of  wrong  moral  action.  If  he  has  these  feelings 
then  he  will  manifest  them  by  his  acts.  To  suppose  otherwise, 
is  to  suppose  him  not  to  use  the  most  perfect  means  for  the 
most  perfect  end ;  to  give  no  evidence  of  his  real  character  and 
of  his  right  to  govern — no  proof  that  he  is  not  the  friend  and 
patron  of  iniquity,  none  that  he  is  entitled  to  the  confidence  or 
submission  of  his  subjects.  Nay  more,  it  is  to  suppose  him 
to  give  decisive  proof  to  the  contrary ;  for  in  such  a  case,  if  he 
had  the  feelings  of  supreme  approbation  of  right  and  supreme 
disapprobation  of  wrong  action  he  would  manifest  them.  The 
good  of  his  kingdom  demands  it.  Benevolence  dictates  and 
imperiously  requires  it,  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  best  end. 
If  then  he  does  not  manifest  these  feelings,  the  proof  is  deci- 
sive against  their  existence,  and  of  course  that  he  is  not  worthy 
of  the  confidence  and  submission  of  his  subjects,  and  not  enti- 
tled to  the  throne. 

Were  the  whole  moral  universe  a  heaven  of  joy  and  rap- 
ture, what  security  for  its  continuance  even  for  an  hour  ? 

And  why  under  the  government  of  a  selfish  deity,  will  not 
all  good  and  all  hope  terminate  at  any  moment  in  the  agonies 
and  woes  of  sin  ?  "What  sort  of  obedience  to  God  would  that 
be,  secured  by  such  influences,  when  there  is  no  ground  of  con- 
fidence, respect  or  love  furnished  in  his  character  ?  And  what 
such  ground  could  there  be  in  the  character  of  a  God  whose  so- 
called  benevolence  dispenses  with  all  justice  and  all  equity, 
which  does  not  supremely  abhor,  but  actually  patronizes  and 
befriends,  protects  and  rewards  iniquity  ?  Than  that  sort  of 
benevolence,  there  is  nothing  worse  in  point  of  principle  in 
Satan  himself.     Adorn  it  with  what  tender  names  you  will, 


THE    PROVIDENCE    OF    GOD.  267 

of  parental  love  and  kindness,  yon  wonld  actually  despise  it 
in  an  earthly  parent  or  a  civil  magistrate,  and  it  ought  to  be 
and  would  be  despised  in  God  himself  by  all  his  intelligent 
creation.  It  sinks  all  that  is  venerable  and  awful  in  heaven's 
sovereign  as  a  God  of  benevolence,  guarding  the  general  good 
of  his  kingdom  at  the  sacrifice  of  individual  good,  not  into  that 
which  is  lovely,but  into  that  which  is  contemptible.  Such  is 
the  God  whom  Infidelity  worships,  cheating  itself  with  names 
and  words,  while  in  the  incense  it  offers  to  a  fancied  deity,  it 
despises  the  object  of  its  own  adoration.  Nay,  rather  it  for- 
gets that  the  real  object  of  its  homage  is  and  must  be  in  prin- 
ciple, a  being  of  absolute  selfishness  or  infinite  malignity.  I 
only  ask,  is  it  possible,  is  it  conceivable,  that  a  benevolent 
is  not  also  a  just  God  ?  Can  there  be  a  benevolent  God 
who  does  not  supremely  abhor  and  who  will  not  show  that 
he  abhors  the  worst  thing  in  the  universe  ?  Can  a  perfectly 
benevolent  God  be  supposed  to  depart  from  the  principles  of 
eternal  righteousness?  Will  he  despoil  his  high  and  inviolable 
sanctuary  of  all  its  sacredness — his  dominion  of  all  its  majesty? 
Will  he  yield  to  that  excessive  lenity  or  indulgent  tenderness 
which  will  darken  all  his  glories — will  he  by  this  most  fearful 
act  of  infinite  malignity  fill  his  moral  creation  with  terror  and 
dismay  ? 

Let  us  now  briefly  appeal  to  the  providence  of  God.  Here 
let  it  be  remembered,  that  God  must  be  supposed  either  to  be 
strictly  just  as  a  moral  governor,  or  to  be  so  concerned  for  the 
happiness  of  individual  subjects,  that  he  consents  for  their  sake 
to  sacrifice  the -equity  of  his  moral  government,  and  with  it  the 
highest  happiness  of  his  moral  kingdom.  Do  then  the  dispen- 
sations of  his  providence  authorize  us  to  ascribe  to  him,  even  in 
conjecture,  the  latter  character?  Why — if  he  relincpiishes  the 
character  of  a  righteous  moral  governor  for  that  of  an  in- 
dulgent  parent — does  he  give  such  clear  and  decisive  indica- 
tions of  his  supreme  approbation  of  virtue  and  disapprobation 
of  vice?  Why  does  he  render  it  the  most  manifest  of  all  truths, 
that  there  is  no  way  in  which  man  can  secure  his  own  perfect 
happiness,  or  be  safe  against  perfect  misery,  except  by  the  prac- 
tice of  virtue  ?  Why  has  he  created  beings  whose  very  nature 
and  condition  on  the  least  reflection,  bring  before  the  mind  the 
everlasting  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  moral  action, 
and  constrain  them  to  feel  that  by  the  latter  they  are  defeating 


268     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

the  high  end  of  their  own  creation,  and  doing  the  most  palpa- 
ble violence  to  the  will  of  an  infinite  Creator  ?  Why  if  reluct- 
ant to  make  man  ultimately  as  miserable  as  strict  equity  de- 
mands— why  if  thus  indifferent  to  the  rights  of  the  public,  is 
there  no  instance  of  individual, or  at  least  of  public  injustice? 
Why,  if  God  is  all  tenderness,  does  he  so  distinctly  express  his 
displeasure  toward  iniquity  in  the  various  ways  of  his  provi- 
dence, and  actually  produce  such  fearful  forebodings  of  a  com- 
ing retribution,that  the  heart  of  every  man  trembles  while  going 
on  in  iniquity — that  every  man  is  afraid  of  death  because  he  is 
to  meet  God?  Why  is  it  that  no  error,  artifice  or  system  of 
opinions  has  ever  been  devised,  adequate  to  quell  the  dread  and 
the  disturbance  which  the  wicked  feel  when  they  think  of  the 
Sovereign  of  heaven  ?  Why  is  it  that  Universalism,  Infidelity, 
Atheism  have  so  often  cried  for  his  mercy  when  summoned 
by  death  into  his  presence  ? 

Advert  to  another  class  of  evils ;  I  mean  those  which  God 
brings  on  men,  not  as  the  natural  consequence  of  crime,  but  in 
the  exercise  of  his  high  and  irresponsible  sovereignty,  such  as 
those  which  result  from  disease  and  pestilence.  Is  there  not 
a  cause?  Who  can  suppose  that  they  are  brought  on  moral 
beings  without  reference  to  their  character  ?  Who  that  knows 
that  he  is  a  sinner,  a  rebel  against  God,  can  feel  these  evils  in  his 
own  person  without  the  reflection,  if  not  that  he  deserves  them, 
at  least  that  God  is  not  too  good  to  inflict  the  extremest  evils  on 
his  creatures  ?  What  is  their  design  but  to  tell  us  of  a  degree 
of  displeasure,  which  confines  not  its  expressions  in  evil  to  the 
direct  natural  results  of  wrong  doing,  and  that  he  has  still 
other  and  more  fearful  treasures  of  wrath  for  the  workers  of 
iniquity?  What  if  all  the  sufferings  and  death  which  have 
been  endured  on  the  face  of  this  earth  since  its  creation,  could 
be  arrayed  before  the  eye  in  present  and  distinct  vision  ?  What 
if  all  the  sorrows  and  pains,  and  sighs  and  tears,  and  all  the  dis- 
tress by  sickness,  pestilence,  famine,  earthquakes,  shipwrecks, 
wars,  the  rack,  the  gibbet,  and  the  fire — what  if  all  the  weep- 
ing wridows  and  orphans,  all  the  lamentation  and  mourning 
of  parents  and  children,  of  husbands,  wives,  brothers,  sisters — 
what  if  all  the  massacres,  the  shrieks,  agonies  and  groans  of 
the  dying — the  seas  of  human  blood  and  the  mountains  of 
human  corpses — what  if  these  scenes  of  woe  and  horror  which 
have  been  witnessed  on  earth  could  be  brought  before  us,  and 


THE    ALTERNATIVE.  269 

all  be  acted  and  felt  over  again  as  a  present  reality  under  our 
direct  inspection.  How  should  we  be  overwhelmed,  and  what 
should  we  think  of  that  God  who  made  and  governs  such  a 
world  as  this?  With  such  a  spectacle  of  terror  before  us, 
should  we  reflect  on  nothing  but  his  tenderness,  and  with  our 
consciousness  of  guilt  expect  nothing  but  favors  from  his 
hands?  What  does  the  history  of  this  world  disclose,  if  not 
visible  marks  and  traces  of  the  vengeance  of  God  upon  it,  in 
every  age  and  every  hour?  And  do  these  bespeak  mere  in- 
dulgence? Surely  whatever  other  weakness  or  inconsistency 
may  be  ascribed  to  God,  nothing  is  more  inconsistent  with  the 
whole  course  of  his  providential  dealings  with  men,  than  the 
weakness  or  inconsistency  of  excessive  lenity.  On  whatever 
other  basis  man  may  rest  his  hopes  of  God's  favor,  that  of  mere 
tenderness,  it  w^ould  seem,  must  be  the  last.  The  entire  history 
of  his  providence  furnishes  not  an  instance  of  kindness  at  the 
expense  of  justice,  but  discloses  to  all  who  read  the  record,  a 
severity  of  dispensation  which  proclaims  that  a  sovereign  law- 
giver and  a  righteous  judge  is  on  the  throne  of  the  universe. 
We  do,  we  must  see  a  God  frowning  at  sin.  And  if  amid  these 
frowns  we  also  witness  the  smiles  of  mercy,  still  they  are  too 
dark  and  awful  to  authorize  the  hope  of  his  favor  through  the 
mere  relentings  of  tenderness. 

We  are  then  brought  to  the  conclusion,  that  God  is  administer- 
ing an  equitable  moral  government  over  men,  either  according 
to  the  principles  of  exact  retribution  or  through  an  atonement. 
In  other  words,  God  will  show  his  supreme  disapprobation  of 
sin,  either  by  inflicting  unmingled  and  endless  misery  on  a 
world  of  transgressors,  or  by  some  other  expedient  which  shall 
equally  manifest  such  disapprobation. 

Solemn  and  tremendous  as  is  this  alternative,  it  is  and  must 
be  real ;  and  from  it  there  is  no  escape,  according  to  any  prin- 
ciples of  correct  reasoning.  The  benevolence  of  God,  if  we 
assume  it  as  the  infidel  does — his  providence,  in  all  its  facts 
and  principles — every  consideration  that  bears  on  the  subject, 
conducts  to  our  conclusion;  while  no  fact,  no  principle,  fur- 
nishes the  least  opposing  evidence.  Deny  our  conclusion,  and 
you  deny  the  perfect  justice  of  God  ;  deny  his  justice,  and  you 
must  deny  his  benevolence.  Admit  then,  that  he  is  a  God  of 
absolute  selfishness,  of  infinite  malignity,  or  admit  his  benevo- 
lence, and  with  it  his  supreme  abhorrence  of  sin,  and  the  mani- 


270     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

festation  of  that  abhorrence,  either  in  an  exact  retribution  here- 
after or  through  an  atonement. 

This  brings  us  to  the  question,  in  which  of  these  only  possible 
or  conceivable  modes,  is  God  administering  his  moral  govern- 
ment over  this  sinful  world  f     This  leads  me  to  say, 

Secondly,  That  he  is  administering  it,  not  in  the  former 
mode,  but  under  an  atonement. 

This  position  is  fully  sustained  by  two  facts  and  a  principle. 
The  facts  are  these:  the  first,  that  God  is  administering  an 
equitable  moral  government  over  men;  the  second,  that  the  en- 
tire course  of  his  providence  bespeaks  his  design  to  restore  man 
to  duty  and  to  favor.  The  principle  is,  that  the  perfect  equity 
or  justice  of  a  moral  governor,  can  be  reconciled  with  mercy  to 
transgressors  only  through  an  atonement. 

In  respect  to  the  first  of  these  facts,  we  have  seen  that  God 
administers  a  moral  government  over  men;  that  he  does  it 
through  the  medium  of  the  best  law;  and  that  this  fact,  un- 
counteracted  by  any  opposing  evidence,  is  decisive  proof  of  the 
perfect  equity  of  his  administration ;  that  instead  of  furnishing 
any  opposing  evidence,  the  entire  course  of  his  providence  shows 
him,  as  it  were,  most  scrupulously  avoiding  every  shadow  of 
injustice — discloses  the  true  tendency  of  obedience  to  his  will, 
to  bless,  and  of  disobedience,  to  ruin  the  soul  of  man  forever, 
and  exhibits  him  in  that  severity  of  dispensation  which  com- 
ports only  with  the  majesty  of  a  sovereign  lawgiver  and  right- 
eous judge.  We  have  seen  that  he  has  destined  the  subjects 
of  his  government  to  a  future  state  of  being,  thus  furnishing 
an  opportunity  for  the  perfect  display  of  the  equity  of  his 
administration ;  while  the  manner  in  which  he  removes  them 
to  that  world  tells  of  such  a  result,  in  the  most  fearful  forebod- 
ings of  every  departing  spirit ;  and  that  whether  we  assume 
and  reason  from  his  benevolence  or  from  the  facts  of  his  provi- 
dence, no  other  supposition  can  for  a  moment  be  admitted,  than 
that  of  the  perfect  equity  of  his  government.  Shut  up  then 
to  this  conclusion  on  the  one  hand,  we  see  at  the  same  time  on 
the  other,  the  most  satisfactory  indications  of  his  benignant 
design  to  restore  man  to  duty  and  favor.  The  same  course  of 
providential  dispensations,  along  with  the  lessons  it  gives  of 
the  equity  of  his  administration,  shows  not  less  clearly  the  les- 
sons of  his  mercy  to  the  penitent  transgressor.  Every  thing,  as 
we  have  seen,  entirely  harmonizes  with  such  an  economy,  and 


AN    ATONEMENT    NECESSARY.  271 

is  fitted  and  adapted  to  the  end  of  bringing  man  back  to  his 
duty  and  the  friendship  of  his  Maker ;  every  motive  which 
can  reach  and  move  a  rational,  voluntary  being,  whether  de- 
rived from  his  present  or  future  well-being ;  every  thing  in  the 
form  of  manifested  kindness  and  good-will  on  the  part  of  a 
divine  Benefactor;  every  thing  in  the  form  of  paternal  chas- 
tisement, in  the  nature  and  condition  of  man,  adapted  and 
designed  to  form  his  character  to  permanent  virtue ;  his  happi- 
ness placed  so  completely  in  his  own  power  as  a  moral  being — 
every  thing  to  invite  to  obedience,  and  to  awe  from  transgres- 
sion, which  is  conceivable  in  such  a  system;  while  all  these 
adaptations,  influences,  efforts  to  reclaim,  must  be  worse  than 
in  vain — must  evince  even  malignity  of  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  Creator,  if  he  has  no  design  to  forgive  and  to  save. 

With  these  things  in  view,  let  us  now  advert  to  the  principle, 
viz.,  that  the  perfect  justice  of  God,  as  a  moral  governor,  can 
he  reconciled  with  mercy  to  transgressors  only  through  an  atone- 
ment. This  is  the  impossibility,  already  sufficiently  illustrated, 
that  God  should  be  either  benevolent  or  just,  without  manifest- 
ing his  supreme  abhorrence  of  sin.  I  need  not  say,  that  it  were 
easy  for  infinite  wisdom  to  devise,  and  infinite  power  to  exe- 
cute, a  plan  by  which  such  a  manifestation  shall  be  made,  in 
the  pardon  of  transgressors.  Here  then  let  us  judge,  whether 
God  has  not  adopted  some  plan  by  which  the  principles  of 
eternal  justice  are  consistent  with  favor  to  a  revolted  world. 
What  else  can  be  true,  or  even  supposed  possible,  but  that  he 
is  administering  a  perfectly  equitable  system  of  moral  govern- 
ment over  men  under  an  economy  of  grace  ? 

I  say  not  here  what  will  be  the  actual  results  of  this  economy 
in  a  future  world.  All  that  the  light  of  nature  can  give  on 
this  point  is  at  most,  the  general  conclusion,  that  these  results 
will  be  such  as  will  accord  with  that  benignity  of  design  so 
conspicuous  in  his  providential  dealings.  The  great  fact  itself 
however,  appears,  to  my  own  mind,  to  be  shown  by  all  the 
evidence  of  which  the  nature  of  the  case  admits.  If  it  be  pos- 
sible to  manifest  to  rational  beings  the  adoption  of  such  a  sys- 
tem without  a  revelation,  i.  <3.,  by  merely  providential  dispen- 
sations, I  see  not  why  the  evidence  actually  furnished  of  A  just 
God  and  a  Saviotjk,  does  not  demand  the  most  unhesitating 
belief. 

To  conclude.     If  these  things  are  so,  we  see  on  what  ground 


272     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

Infidelity  must  stand.  The  infidel  must  believe  either  in  a 
malignant  Deity,  or  in  a  future  exact  retribution  of  this  sinful 
world,  or  in  the  great  cardinal  fact  of  Christianity,  viz.,  that 
there  is  an  atonement  for  sin.  Let  us  look  at  this.  If  the  infi- 
del denies  a  full,  just  and  exact  retribution  of  this  sinful  world, 
and  also  an  atonement  for  sin,  then  he  is  shut  up  to  the  admis- 
sion of  a  selfish,  malignant  Deity.  He  may  call  him  benevolent; 
but  it  is  a  name  without  the  reality.  Such  a  God  is  not  be- 
nevolent, for  he  is  not  just.  He  is  unjust.  He  is  regardless, 
reckless  of  the  greatest  happiness  of  his  moral  creation — unjust 
to  his  kingdom — malignant. 

Again ;  if  now  the  infidel  still  denies  an  atonement  for  sin, 
and  admits  the  benevolence  of  God,  then  he  is  shut  up  to  the 
admission  of  a  full  and  exact  retribution  of  this  sinful  world  in 
utter  and  endless  misery.  On  his  own  premises  there  is  no 
escape.  If  any  thing  is  true  in  moral  reasoning,  it  is  this :  that 
a  benevolent  God,  as  a  moral  governor,  and  thus  the  guardian 
of  his  kingdom,  must  feel  and  must  express  an  abhorrence  of 
the  supreme  evil  of  sin,  and  must  make  that  expression  either 
by  a  full  and  exact  retribution  or  in  some  other  way;  i.  e., 
through  an  atonement.  The  infidel  denies  an  atonement.  The 
consequence  is  inevitable.  Every  subject  of  God's  moral  gov- 
ernment is  a  transgressor,  and  doomed,  without  hope,  to  utter 
and  endless  misery.  Does  he  say,  this  is  in  itself  incredible, 
impossible  ?  I  reply,  it  is  neither.  The  destruction  of  such  a 
world  as  this  for  its  rebellion  against  God,  may  be  less,  in  com- 
parison with  his  universal  kingdom,  than  the  penalties  which 
every  benevolent  parent  inflicts  on  his  children  compared  with 
the  end  of  their  infliction ;  it  may  be,  as  I  have  said,  an  infini- 
tesimal compared  with  unlimited  vastness.  The  infidel  then, 
on  his  present  premises,  is  compelled  to  admit,  that  every 
human  being  is  doomed  to  everlasting  destruction.  And  if  he 
will  adopt  such  premises,  let  him  abide  the  conclusion.  He 
professes  to  reason.  Let  him  see  that  he  adopts  premises  that 
throw  the  midnight  of  despair  over  a  guilty  world ;  premises, 
which  give  only  "  a  certain  fearful  looking-for  of  judgment 
and  fiery  indignation." 

Again;  if  the  infidel  denies  that  such  a  retribution  awaits 
this  sinful  world,  and  still  maintains  that  God  is  benevolent, 
then,  as  a  rational  man,  he  must  admit  an  atonement,  even 
that  of  Christianity.    If  God  is  benevolent,  he  is  also  just ;  and 


THE    ATONEMENT    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  273 

if  liis  justice  is  not  manifested  and  vindicated  by  a  future  just 
retribution,  then  it  must  be  by  an  atonement.  But  will  any 
rational  man  admit  an  atonement  and  reject  that  which  Chris- 
tianity reveals  ?  Let  him  ask,  how — by  what  other  means  or 
expedient — can  a  sin-avenging  God  become  merciful  to  trans- 
gressors of  his  law  ?  How  can  he  make  a  manifestation  of  his 
abhorrence  of  sin  equal  to  that  of  turning  a  rebellious  world 
into  hell  ?  How  can  the  throne  of  eternal  justice  be  upheld  in 
all  its  strength  and  glory,  and  the  defied  penalties  of  sin  be 
averted  from  the  guilty  ?  Here,  all  is  mystery  and  utter  dark- 
ness. Before  this  problem,  the  intellect  of  man  retires  baffled, 
and  confounded.  ~No  answer  can  be  given;  no  conception  can 
be  formed.  Christianity — Christianity  alone,  gives  the  solution. 
Christianity  alone  reveals  a  triune  God,  and  shows  us  his  throne 
upheld  by  the  man  that  is  also  the  eternal  Logos,  and  a  guilty 
world  redeemed.  Christianity  thus  solves  the  problem  which 
God  alone  can  solve.  Christianity,  on  this  most  momentous 
of  all  subjects,  and  with  this  sufficient  proof  of  its  divine  ori- 
gin, removes  all  rational  doubt,  satisfies  all  rational  inquiry, 
and  gives  all  rational  assurance.  If  there  is  an  atonement  for 
sin,  then  we  safely  affirm,  it  is  and  must  be  that  which  Chris- 
tianity describes.  It  is  the  only  adequate  atonement  conceiva- 
ble by  the  human  mind.  It  is  this  alone  which  can  still  the 
agitations  of  conscious  guilt,  and  bring  relief  to  the  laboring 
heart  of  sinful  man.  In  its  very  nature  and  perfection,  it  bears 
the  impress  of  God  as  its  author.  And  can  man,  reasoning 
from  his  necessities  as  a  sinner  against  a  just  and  holy  God, 
and  admitting  the  fact  of  an  atonement  for  sin,  deny  the  atone- 
ment of  Christianity  ?  No  man  has  done — no  man  ever  will 
do  it.  The  only  alternative  here  is,  either  no  atonement,  or  the 
great  atonement  of  the  son  of  God. 

You  see  then  what  ground  the  infidel — every  man  that  rea- 
sons from  any  possible  premises  in  the  case,  must  take.  He 
must  either  deny  the  benevolence  of  God, — i.  <?.,  believe  in  a 
selfish,  malignant  deity,  or  in  a  benevolent  God,  with  a  future 
just  retribution  of  this  sinful  world  ;  or  he  must  receive  Chris- 
tianity, with  its  great  atoning  sacrifice. 

And  now,  what  are  the  facts  ?  The  infidel  rejects  all  atone- 
ment for  sin.  He  rejects  the  doctrine  of  a  future  retribution, 
and,  of  course,  actually  lands  in  the  belief  of  a  selfish,  malignant 
deity  !  I  know  indeed,  that  the  words  will  not  suit  him;  that 
12*  18 


274     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  EROM  NATURE. 

lie  calls  God  benevolent,  and  loves  to  dwell  on  the  goodness, 
and  the  kindness,  and  the  tenderness  of  the  Creator  toward  his 
creatures,  as  if  he  could  cause  an  infringement  on  the  Godhead 
by  mere  words,  or  compliment  it  with  tender  epithets  out  of 
its  own  divinity,  and  so  make  a  benevolent,  an  unjust  God. 
Such  is  however  the  fact,  in  his  own  conceptions.  He  con- 
ceives of  a  God  who  will  sacrifice  the  majesty  of  law,  the  glory 
of  his  moral  dominion,  and  the  happiness  of  his  moral  creation, 
in  tenderness  to  rebels ;  a  God,  who  stands  before  his  intelli- 
gent universe  the  friend  and  patron  of  iniquity.  This  is  the 
real,  the  only  conception  which  he  can  form.  It  is  no  exag- 
geration, no  caricature;  it  is  given  in  his  avowed  creed  of  a 
benevolent  God  who  is  not  just.  In  the  sincerity  of  my  heart 
then  I  say  it ;  and  if  the  infidel  would  reflect  on  his  own  con- 
ception, he  would  see  that  the  real  object  of  his  homage, 
instead  of  a  perfect  God,  is  a  perfect  demon.  Man,  sinful, 
immortal  man,  has  nothing  better  to  confide  in,  than  the  tender 
mercies  of  an  infinite  fiend  ! 

And  now  permit  me  to  add ;  Christianity  is  false  or  Chris- 
tianity is  true.  If  false,  then  you  must  either  believe  in  a  self- 
ish malignant  deity,  and  consent  to  dwell  forever  amid  the 
darkness  and  terrors  of  his  fearful  dominion,  or  you  must  be- 
lieve in  God's  benevolence  and,  abide  the  more  fearful  doom  of 
his  just  and  eternal  indignation.  If  Christianity  is  true — I  had 
almost  said,  if  it  can  be  true — if  there  is  but  a  slight  probability 
of  its  truth — -if  it  reveals  what  the  intellect  of  man  could  never 
have  conceived — tells  us  of  an  adequate  and  perfect  atonement 
for  sin  under  the  government  of  a  holy  and  just  God;  and  prof- 
fers pardon  and  life  where  otherwise  all  is  hopeless  guilt  and 
death  for  eternity ;  if  it  thus  harmonizes  with,  illustrates,  unfolds, 
confirms  the  clearest  intimations  of  his  providence — then  what 
is  Christianity,  and  what  is  Infidelity  ?  Christianity  with  only 
these  characteristics  comes  as  a  messenger  from  God  with  God's 
credentials.  It  conducts  us  into  the  very  sanctuary  of  his  glories, 
where  justice  reigns  and  mercy  triumphs  in  still  brighter  splen- 
dor. In  this  holy  of  holies  it  points  us  to  the  great  and  perfect 
sacrifice  for  this  world's  redemption,  and  shows  us  without  a 
vail  of  mystery,  a  just  God  and  yet  a  Saviour.  Infidelity  sneers 
and  prefers  a  malignant  deity.  The  infidel  rejects  the  message, 
denies  the  proof,  despises  the  sacrifice,  and  seals  his  own  dam- 
nation.    "Who  that  has  reason   and  will  use  it,  will  reject 


CONCLUSION.  275 

Christianity  for  the  darkness,  the  terrors  of  Infidelity  ?  Who 
that  has  reason,  will  reject  Christianity,  with  its  consolations 
in  time,  its  prospects  for  eternity,  its  deliverance  from  sin  and 
hell,  its  regions  of  immortality  and  joy — its  God — its  Saviour? 
The  gospel — the  gospel — how  unquestionable — how  sure  its 
announcement  of  its  own  character — "glad  tidings  of  great 
joy  to  all  people!" 


LECTURE   VII. 

Third  leading  proposition:  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — This  proved  by  his  benevo- 
lence.— Different  opinions  in  respect  to  the  method  of  proving  his  benevolence. — If  it  cannot  be 
proved  by  the  light  of  nature,  it  cannot  be  proved  at  all. — The  Scriptures  assert  and  assume  that 
this  benevolence  is  manifest  by  the  light  of  nature. 

To  establish  the  leading  proposition  before  us ;  viz.,  that 
God  is  administering  a  perfect  moved  government  over  men,  it 
is  necessary,  as  we  have  already  said,  to  prove  the  equity 
of  his  administration  and  also  his  rightful  authority.  The 
former  I  have  already  attempted.  To  prove  the  latter,  it  is 
necessary  to  show  his  competence  and  also  his  disposition 
to  govern  in  the  best  manner.  His  competence  is  proved  by 
showing  that  he  is  a  being  of  infinite  knowledge  and  power. 
His  disposition  to  govern  in  the  best  manner,  which  involves 
also  his  perfect  or  infinite  benevolence,  now  claims  our  con- 
sideration. 

Whether  God  is  a  being  of  perfect  benevolence,  is  seen  at 
once  to  be  one  of  the  most  momentous  of  all  the  inquiries  which 
can  engage  the  human  mind.  It  is  not  difficult  for  men  to  be- 
lieve in  what  they  may  regard  as  the  goodness  of  God,  under 
an  entirely  false  conception  of  its  nature ;  nor  is  it  uncommon 
that  men  believe  it,  even  with  some  just  views  of  what  it  is, 
without  ever  having  seen  or  heard  or  formed  an  argument  by 
which  it  can  be  proved.  I  need  not  say  of  what  high  concern 
it  is  to  us,  not  only  that  we  have  a  right  apprehension  of  the 
nature  of  God's  goodness,  but  that  our  faith  in  its  unchange- 
able reality  rest  on  evidence  which  can  be  weakened  by  no 
sophistry,  and  which  can  be  shaken  by  no  skepticism.  "We 
have  seen  how  prone  the  human  mind  is  to  form  fundamen- 
tally false  views  of  the  nature  of  God's  goodness,  and  to  hazard 
all  the  interests  of  its  immortal  being  on  its  own  vain  imagina- 
tions— mere  pictures  of  its  fancy. 


THE    ARGUMENT    FOR    GOD'S    BENEVOLENCE.     277 

I  must  be  allowed  to  say,  that  I  have  not  met  with  any  proof 
of  this  divine  attribute,  or  any  argument  from  reason  in  sup- 
port of  it,  which  would  stand  the  test  of  a  close  logical  scrutiny. 
JSTor  can  it  be  pretended  that  there  is  such  an  argument  fully 
drawn  out  and  formally  maintained  in  the  Scriptures.  Am  I 
then  asked,  whether  I  suppose  that  the  faith  in  God's  moral 
perfection,  of  the  pious,  of  those  in  humble  life  as  well  as  of 
the  great,  the  wise,  and  the  learned,  lias  had  no  sufficient 
basis  or  warrant  ?  That  is  another  question,  and  one  to  be  an- 
swered with  a  decided  negative.  It  is  one  thing  for  the  mind 
to  perceive  proof  or  evidence,  or  even  to  go  through  a  process 
of  reasoning  which  fully  sustains  a  conclusion,  and  another  to 
state  that  process;  and  especially  so  to  state  it,  that  it  shall  be 
exposed  to  no  objections  which  that  mind  cannot  answer.  As 
the  knowledge  of  what  a  man  is,  what  a  tree  is,  what  govern- 
ment is,  what  law  is,  what  virtue  is,  is  different  from  that 
which  enables  one  to  state  with  exact  precision  what  he  knows, 
so  for  the  minds  of  men  universally,  to  apprehend  the  evidence 
of  God's  goodness  in  such  a  manner  as  to  authorize  and  de- 
mand their  faith,  and  to  be  a  just  ground  of  condemnation 
if  they  disbelieve,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  being  able  to 
present  in  formal  statement,  all  the  premises  and  principles  on 
which  a  just  conclusion  depends,  with  such  logical  precision, 
that  the  argument  when  stated,  shall  be  unansAverable.  How 
much  false  reasoning  has  been  used  by  great  and  good  men 
in  support  of  truth  !  How  many  just  conclusions  have  been 
adopted  and  acted  upon,  even  with  reason,  for  which  men 
can  give  no  reason  ! 

The  difficulties  which  have  been  supposed  to  embarrass  the 
great  question  now  before  us,  have  led  some  minds  of  singular 
acuteness  and  power  to  conclude,  that  there  is  no  proof  from 
any  source,  or  from  all  sources  combined,  that  God  is  good. 
Some  have  maintained,  that  the  benevolence  of  God  can  be 
proved,  both  from  the  light  of  nature  and  from  revelation,  as 
separate  and  independent  grounds  of  argument;  others,  that  if 
proved  at  all,  the  argument  must  be  derived  chiefly ;  others, 
that  it  must  be  derived  wholly  from  revelation ;  and  others 
still,  that  a  conclusive  argument  can  be  derived  exclusively 
from  the  light  of  nature,  and  that  otherwise  the  divine  benev- 
olence cannot  be  proved  at  all. 

It  has  been  a  question  with  some,  whether  it  be  of  any  impor- 


278     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  PROM  NATURE. 

tance  that  the  two  sources  of  proof  be  separated  from  each  other. 
That  they  should  frequently  be  combined,  especially  in  popular 
exhibitions  of  the  subject,  I  believe;  that  having  evinced  the  be- 
nevolence of  God,  by  satisfactory  proof  from  the  light  of  nature, 
we  can  and  may  augment  it  by  appealing  to  revelation,  I  see  no 
reason  to  doubt.  At  the  same  time,I  am  convinced  that  we  must 
find  satisfactory  proof  of  the  benevolence  of  God  from  the  light 
of  nature,  before  we  can  appeal  with  the  least  propriety  or  force 
to  revelation ;  and  that  of  course  the  light  of  nature  must  be 
resorted  to,  as  furnishing  a  separate  and  independent  ground 
of  argument.  If  this  be  not  done,  then  we  must  come  to  the 
revelation  of  God  without  proof  of  his  moral  perfection,  either 
assuming  his  veracity,  which  is  only  one  form  of  his  benev- 
olence, and  therefore  involves  the  very  thing  to  be  proved, 
without  which  we  are  forbidden  by  the  laws  of  evidence  to 
believe  his  declarations.  The  bearing  of  these  considerations 
upon  heathenism,  and  deism  or  infidelity,  are  sufficiently  ob- 
vious to  show  the  importance  and  necessity  of  producing 
from  the  light  of  nature,  if  possible,  the  universal  and  un- 
hesitating belief  of  the  perfect  benevolence  of  the  Creator.  To 
the  mind  not  fully  convinced  of  the  goodness,  and  consequently 
of  the  truth  or  veracity  of  God,  the  questions,  whether  God  has 
actually  given  a  revelation  to  the  world,  and  what  that  revela- 
tion contains,  must  be  comparatively  trivial  and  uninteresting 
inquiries. 

Beyond  this,  if  there  is  no  proof  of  God's  moral  perfection 
from  the  light  of  nature,  then  revelation  itself  finds  the  human 
mind  free  from  all  obligation  to  him,  which  results  only  from 
these  prior  proofs,  and  which  imparts  such  high  concern  to  the 
inquiry,  whether  such  a  being  has  given  to  man  the  oracles 
of  eternal  truth.  How  entirely  different  the  questions  are, 
whether  a  perfect  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  the  world, 
and  whether  it  can  only  be  claimed  to  be  a  revelation  from  a 
being  whose  moral  perfection  can  be  legitimately  doubted  or 
denied. 

Besides,  if  God,  in  his  works  of  creation  and  providence, 
manifests  his  goodness  to  the  clear  apprehension  of  his  moral 
creatures,  who  can  doubt  their  obligation  to  mark  his  footsteps 
here,  and  to  adore  and  worship  with  grateful  praise  amid  these 
displays  of  his  Godhead  ?  Who  shall  refuse  "  to  look  through 
nature  up  to  nature's  God,"  because  he  has  in  his  revelation 


CAN    IT    BE    PROVED    FROM    REVELATION?  279 

manifested  tlie  same  glories  in  still  brighter  splendors  ?  If  he 
has  opened  two  books  before  us,  why  should  we  not  learn  from 
both  what  God  is?  Especially,  if  the  light  of  nature  furnishes 
the  only  proof  of  the  moral  perfection  of  the  Creator  in  such 
a  respect,  that  without  it,  none  which  is  sufficient  and  satisfac- 
tory can  be  furnished  by  revelation,  then,  in  exploring  the  field 
of  evidence  spread  out  before  us  in  the  wTorks  of  God,  the  most 
diligent  research  becomes  us. 

In  expressing  the  opinion  that  the  benevolence  of  God  can- 
not be  proved  from  revelation,  I  would  not  be  understood  to 
affirm,  that  when  the  fact  is  once  fairly  proved  from  the  light 
of  nature,  additional  evidence  in  support  of  it  cannot  thus 
be  derived.  When  I  am  convinced,  on  sufficient  grounds,  of 
the  excellence  of  another's  character,  I  reasonably  regard  those 
acts  which  may  proceed  from  benevolence  as  actually  proceed- 
ing from,  and  as  additional  proofs  of  it.  Nor  would  I  be 
understood  to  say,  that  no  aid  can  in  any  respect  be  derived 
by  us  from  a  revelation,  in  the  investigation  of  this  subject. 
This  is  quite  possible.  Thus,  without  assuming  the  veracity  of 
God,  which,  as  I  have  said,  would  be  assuming  the  thing  to  be 
proved,  the  revelation  may  contain  propositions  whose  truth 
the  mind  perceives,  independently  of  their  divine  authority. 
These  propositions  may  furnish  the  premises  of  a  conclusive 
argument.  The  argument  however,  would  still  be  one  from 
reason,  as  truly  as  a  demonstration  of  a  problem  in  geometry, 
though  it  depends  on  the  definitions  of  Euclid.  A  revelation 
may  even  contain  the  same  argument  which  is  furnished  by  the 
light  of  nature.  In  this  case  also,  it  would  be,  strictly  speak- 
ing, one  from  reason,  though  reason  would  never  have  discov- 
ered it  without  a  revelation. 

I  shall  now  attempt  to  show, 

That  the  benevolence  of  God  cannot  he  proved  by  any  argu- 
ment derived  merely  from  revelation,  as  distinguished  from  an 
argument  derived  from  the  light  of  nature. 

Every  proof  on  this  subject,  derived  merely  from  revelation, 
must  depend  on  some  declaration  or  declarations  of  its  Author. 
These  must  be  supposed  to  consist  of  those  in  which  he  directly 
declares  his  own  moral  perfection,  or  of  those  in  which  he  as^ 
serts  such  designs  and  doings,  as  in  their  own  nature  shall  be 
proof  of  his  moral  perfection.  In  neither  case  however,  can 
mere  declarations  be  relied  on,  any  further  than  we  assume 


280     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

and  rely  upon  the  veracity  of  the  author.  But  veracity  in 
God,  in  the  only  form  in  which  Ave  can  rely  upon  it  in  him,  is 
only  one  form  of  his  benevolence,  and  necessarily  implies  it. 
To  assume  his  veracity  then,  is  to  assume  his  benevolence, 
which  is  the  very  thing  to  be  proved.  Or  thus :  if  we  rely  on 
the  veracity  of  the  Author  of  revelation,  we  must  do  so  either 
with  reason  or  without  reason.  If  with  reason,  then  we  have 
proof  of  his  veracity,  and  of  course  of  his  benevolence,  prior  to, 
and  independently  of  his  declarations.  If  we  rely  on  his  vera- 
city, prior  to  and  independently  of  his  declarations,  without 
reason,  then  we  gratuitously  assume  his  veracity,  and  of  course 
his  benevolence ;  that  is,  we  assume  the  very  thing  which  is  to 
be  proved.  If  then  the  benevolence  of  God  cannot  be  proved 
from  the  light  of  nature,  it  cannot  from  revelation,  and  there- 
fore cannot  be  proved  at  all. 

The  contrary  however,  has  been  strenuously  maintained ; 
and  it  may  give  more  satisfaction  if  we  examine  some  of  the 
grounds  of  this  claim.  These,  so  far  as  I  deem  them  worthy 
of  notice,  are  the  three  following,  viz. : 

1.  It  is  claimed  that  the  declarations  of  any  being,  and  there- 
fore of  God,  are  entitled  to  credit,  on  the  general  principle 
which  gives  credibility  to  testimony. 

2.  It  is  claimed,  that  any  being  may  establish,  and  that 
God  has  established  his  character  for  veracity,  on  the  ground 
of  the  uniform  coincidence  of  his  declarations  with  facts — as 
that  many  of  the  historical  facts  of  Scripture  are  confirmed 
by  profane  history  ;  that  all  its  predictions,  promises,  and 
threatenings,  have  in  due  time  been  fulfilled ;  and  that  in  this 
way  we  have  a  full  confirmation  of  the  veracity  of  their 
author. 

3.  It  is  claimed,  that  the  Scriptures  themselves,  in  their  own 
character,  or  in  the  nature  of  what  they  assert  concerning  God, 
his  designs  and  doings,  especially  the  giving  of  his  perfect  law, 
with  the  pure  and  holy  precepts  of  the  gospel,  the  grand 
scheme  of  redemption,  and  his  purpose  to  counteract  and  over- 
rule all  evil  for  the  production  of  the  highest  good  of  the  uni- 
verse, furnish  abundant  and  decisive  proof  of  the  benevolence 
of  God. 

]N~ow  it  is  obvious,  that  the  question  at  issue  depends,  in 
each  of  these  modes  of  reasoning,  on  the  veracity  of  the  wit- 
ness.    If  this  be  not  presupposed  and  assumed,  there  can  be 


HOW    FAR    TESTIMONY    IS    CREDIBLE.  281 

no  argument  or  proof  in  either  case.  What  I  claim  then  is, 
that  the  assumption  of  the  veracity  of  the  witness  is,  as  the 
case  is  now  presented,  made  on  grounds  which  are  wholly  in- 
sufficient, and  in  a  manner  forbidden  by  the  laws  of  just  rea- 
soning. 

And  first  in  regard  to  testimony,  and  the  general  principle 
of  its  credibility.  It  is  so  obviously  for  the  interest  of  men,  in 
most  cases,  to  speak  truth  rather  than  falsehood,  that  there  is  a 
strong  and  convincing  probability  that,  in  most  cases,  they 
actually  do  so.  With  this  probability  the  results  fully  accord ; 
for  men  speak  truth  in  a  vast  majority  of  instances.  A  decla- 
ration, with  these  presumptions  in  favor  of  its  truth,  is  what 
we  call  credible  testimony,  and  what  we  justly  esteem,  in 
many  cases,  even  from  a  stranger,  good  and  conclusive  evi- 
dence. But  how  is  it,  when  presumptions  against  its  truth, 
and  not  in  its  favor,  exist?  If  he  who  testifies  is  justly  pre- 
sumed to  be  liable  from  a  regard  to  his  own  interest  to  do  so 
falsely,  it  destroys  the  weight  of  his  testimony.  Hence  no 
man  is  allowed  to  testify  before  any  civil  tribunal  in  his  own 
case.  "  If  I  bear  witness  of  myself,"  said  the  Saviour,  "  my 
witness  is  not  true." 

Here  then  we  have  one  principle  which  utterly  vitiates  all  the 
supposable  proof  of  God's  benevolence,  which  is  derived  merely 
from  revelation,  whether  he  bears  witness  of  himself  in  assert- 
ing it,  or  in  the  form  of  asserting  other  facts  as  proofs  of  this. 
Who  does  not  know  how  well  it  comports  with  the  character 
of  the  most  selfish  and  ambitious  of  rulers,  even  of  the  veriest 
tyrants,  to  boast  of  their  benevolent  designs,  and  to  parade 
their  schemes  of  public  utility  for  the  advancement  of  their 
selfish  purposes  ?  Can  we  then  rely  with  confidence,  and  this 
in  a  case  in  which  our  highest  interests  are  pending,  on  the  ve- 
racity and  so  on  the  mere  testimony  of  another,  when  he  may 
be  under  a  powerful  inducement  to  testify  falsely  ?  But  the 
case  before  us  is  much  stronger.  It  is  one  in  which,  if  real 
benevolence  exist,  proof  of  it  must  also  exist,  and  yet  does  not. 
It  is  maintained  on  one  side  of  the  present  question,  that  God 
as  the  Creator  and  providential  governor  of  the  world,  fur- 
nishes by  his  acts  no  proof  of  his  benevolence.  Now  such  a 
fact,  if  it  be  a  fact,  is  entitled  to  something  more  than  a  mere 
negative  influence  in  the  argument.  It  is  a  direct  positive  proof 
against  his  benevolence  which  sets  aside  every  possible  declara- 


2m 


MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 


tion  of  it.  To  what  purpose  would  a  parent  whose  treatment 
of  his  dependent  offspring  for  a  long  course  of  years,  had  given 
no  proofs  of  his  love,  make  and  repeat  assertions  of  his  kind- 
ness? It  is  the  hypocrisy  which  unmasks  itself  by  saying  to 
the  naked  and  to  the  hungry,  "  Depart  in  peace,  be  ye  warmed 
and  filled,"  and  giveth  nothing.  "  As  the  body  without  the 
spirit  is  dead,"so  benevolence  without  works,  as  truly  as  faith,  is 
dead  also. 

This  mode  of  reasoning  applies  not  less  to  the  Creator  than 
to  his  creatures.  That  he  should  give  existence  to  such  a  world 
as  this,  and  govern  it  by  his  providence  for  thousands  of  years, 
and  yet  furnish  no  convincing  evidence  of  his  goodness  to  the 
pensioners  of  his  bounty — that  the  most  sincere  and  humble  in- 
quirer into  the  ways  of  his  providence  should  be  unable  to  find 
the  least  trace  of  goodness — one  solitary  footstep  of  benevo- 
lence to  call  forth  his  gratitude  and  praise — this  surely  were 
enough  not  merely  to  authorize  doubt  and  suspicion,  but  it 
would  amount  to  a  direct  and  positive  proof  against  his  good- 
ness. If  he  is  good,  why  are  there  no  proofs  of  his  goodness  in 
his  acts  ?  Why  is  the  wide  field  of  his  providence  thus  barren 
of  all  that  can  bespeak  the  love  of  the  Creator  to  his  own  crea- 
tures ?  What  has  employed  the  resources  of  his  Godhead,  while 
his  dependent  offspring  have  been  thus  forsaken  and  unblessed  ? 
Actions  speak  louder  than  words.  His  providence  tells  his  char- 
acter, and  is  a  full  revelation  of  a  selfish  heart.  And  is  such 
evidence  to  be  set  aside  by  his  own  testimony  to  his  own 
excellence  ?  Is  such  the  character  of  the  being,  revealed  by 
the  most  decisive  of  all  manifestations,  confirmed  by  the  most 
unquestionable  of  all  proofs,  by  acts  and  doings,  by  his  treat- 
ment of  the  myriads  of  his  dependent  creatures  since  time 
began ;  and  is  he  to  command  our  confidence  by  mere  asser- 
tions of  his  goodness  ?  Are  mere  words  to  be  believed  ?  Are 
creatures  with  such  an  experience  at  the  hands  of  their  Creator, 
to  be  required  to  render  to  him  the  homage  of  their  gratitude 
and  praise  ?  Every  voice  would  be  dumb,  every  heart  would 
be  cold.  And  yet  on  no  other  basis  have  many  able  divines 
rested  the  proof  of  God's  benevolence. 

But  we  are  told  that  God  has  established  his  character  for 
veracity  on  the  ground  of  the  uniform  coincidence  of  his  dec- 
larations with  facts.  With  our  authorized  and  habitual  con- 
victions that  the  Author  of  the  Scriptures  is  a  being  of  perfect 


DECLARATIONS  UNSUPPORTED  BY  WORKS.  283 

goodness  and  truth,  our  belief  in  his  testimony  is  justly  con- 
firmed and  strengthened  by  tracing  the  exact  and  uniform  co- 
incidence between  his  declarations  and  facts.  But  how  would 
it  be,  provided  we  had  no  antecedent  reason  to  believe  that  he 
would  speak  truth  rather  than  falsehood ;  and  especially  if  we 
had  good  antecedent  reason  for  denying  his  moral  perfection, 
and  with  it  his  veracity?  Though  we  suppose  a  coincidence 
between  facts  and  the  declarations  of  another  to  any  indefinite 
extent,  still  there  are  other  ways  in  which  he  may  wholly  for- 
feit a  character  for  veracity.  There  is  truth  in  the  vulgar  say- 
ing— that  he  who  will  steal  will  also  lie.  A  man  may  uni- 
formly speak  truth  from  selfish  considerations,  and  yet  in  other 
ways  evince  that  want  of  moral  principle  which  destroys  all 
ground  of  confidence  in  his  veracity,  and  pre-eminently  in  his 
declarations  of  the  excellence  of  his  own  character.  Be  the 
coincidence  then  between  facts  and  the  declarations  of  God 
what  it  may,  still  the  principles  already  stated  apply.  In  the 
case  supposed,  he  testifies  in  his  own  case,  while  were  he  per- 
fectly benevolent,  there  would  be  proof  of  his  benevolence 
from  his  works.  These  considerations,  especially  the  latter, 
set  aside  all  evidence  from  his  mere  assertions  that  he  is  good, 
and  even  prove  that  he  is  not  good.  This  is  obviously,  entirely 
overlooked  by  those  who  maintain,  that  the  coincidence  of 
his  declarations  with  facts  is  proof  of  his  veracity.  They  as- 
sume that  a  failure  to  manifest  his  goodness  by  his  works,  is  no 
proof  that  he  is  not  good.  The  more  however  we  should  re- 
flect on  such  a  fact,  if  it  were  a  fact,  the  stronger  would  be  its 
impression.  For  how  could  this  world  of  creatures  thus  cast 
away  from  the  favor  and  affection  of  their  Maker — thus  doomed 
to  an  exile  and  an  orphanage  in  which  no  tokens  of  paternal 
love  should  gladden  their  existence — how  could  they  confide 
in  the  character  of  such  a  Father  ? 

But  it  is  said,  that  in  his  revelation  God  declares  his  will  in 
the  form  of  his  perfect  law,  as  well  as  the  great  design  of  redeem- 
ing mercy,  and  the  purpose  to  render  evil,  even  moral  evil,  the 
means  of  the  highest  possible  good  to  his  creation.  Be  it  so. 
But  then  it  is  his  mere  declaration  which  has  no  higher  claims 
to  our  confidence  than  any  other.  As  testimony  in  respect  to 
his  own  particular  designs,  it  is  his  testimony  to  his  own  excel- 
lence. It  is  his  own  testimony  of  his  unexecuted  will  as  a 
lawgiver,  and  of  his  unexecuted  purposes  as  a  providential 


284     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

disposer  of  events.  And  not  only  so, — it  is  testimony  de- 
signed to  evince  his  goodness,  when,  according  to  the  suppo- 
sition on  which  we  reason,  there  is  no  proof  of  his  goodness 
from  his  works ;  and  when  therefore  as  we  have  shown,  there 
is  decisive  proof  that  he  is  not  good  ;  and  of  course  when  no 
confidence  is  due  to  the  supposed  testimony. 

But  let  us  briefly  advert  to  the  particular  facts  which  are 
now  alleged.  And  to  take  the  last  first ;  it  is  said  that  the 
Scriptures  teach  that  moral  evil  in  the  world  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good,  and  will  be  overruled  for  the  pro- 
duction of  this  result ;  and  great,  even  the  chief  reliance  in  this 
argument  has  been  placed  on  this  assumption.  Without  here 
proposing  a  full  examination  of  this  gratuitous  assumption,  I 
shall  simply  say  that  the  Scriptures  teach  no  such  dogma ;  and 
that  if  they  did,  it  would  prove  that  their  author,  in  preferring 
the  worst  kind  of  action  to  the  best,  is  himself  the  worst  of  beings ; 
is  insincere  as  a  lawgiver,  the  friend  and  patron  of  sin,  and  an 
enemy  to  the  happiness  of  his  own  creation.  But  it  is  said  that 
in  his  revelation  God  has  given  to  men  the  best  law.  This  is  ad- 
mitted ;  and  further, that  the  act  of  giving  such  a  law  is  good  and 
sufficient  evidence  of  his  goodness  were  it  uncounteracted  by  op- 
posing evidence.  He  has  given  the  best  law.  But  how  shall  we 
know  that  this  law  is  a  real  expression  of  his  will,  especially  if, 
as  it  is  also  said,he  prefers,  all  things  considered,  wrong  to  right 
moral  action  ?  The  act  of  giving  the  best  law  is  no  prool  of  his 
benevolence,  unless  it  be  also  proved  that  the  law  is  a  real  ex- 
pression of  his  will,  of  his  preference  of  right  to  wrong  moral 
action,  all  things  considered.  But  it  would  not  be  out  of  char- 
acter for  a  deceiver  to  resort  to  the  artifice  of  giving  the  best 
law  for  the  very  purpose  of  deception ;  and  especially  when  it 
is  supposed  as  it  now  is,  that  all  his  other  acts  and  ways  of 
providence  fail  to  prove  his  goodness  and  so  prove  that  he  is 
not  good,  how  can  we  doubt  that  the  act  is  done  for  the  pur- 
pose of  deception?  I  am  not  saying  that  the  well  attested  fact 
that  God  has  revealed  the  best  law  can  have  no  place  in  any 
argument  for  his  goodness,  but  in  view  of  the  supposed  fact 
that  there  is  no  other  proof  of  his  goodness  from  his  works  of 
creation  and  providence,  that  the  giving  of  the  best  law  can 
furnish  no  proof  of  his  goodness,  but  is  rather  to  be  viewed  as 
an  artifice  of  deception. 


DECLARATIONS    UNSUPPORTED    BY    WORKS.       285 

But  it  is  said  that  God  in  his  revelation  declares  his  great 
design  of  redeeming  mercy.  This  is  of  course  admitted.  But 
it  is  still  simply  his  own  declaration,  and  the  same  objections 
lie  against  this  as  against  all  others  considered  as  proofs  of 
his  goodness.  The  excellence  of  this  scheme  is  obvious  and 
undeniable..  But  what  does  it  amount  to  but  proof  of  wis- 
dom to  devise  the  most  perfect  means  for  the  most  perfect 
end,  while  it  so  greatly  fails  to  accomplish  under  the  govern- 
ment of  its  author,  the  end  to  which  it  is  adapted,  and  for 
which  it  is  professedly  devised  ?  And  under  this  aspect,  how 
is  it  to  be  regarded  when  it  is  supposed  that  the  works  of  his 
providence  decisively  disprove  his  goodness,  except  as  another 
artifice  to  deceive  his  dependent  creatures  ? 

The  general  principle  on  which  the  preceding  discussion  has 
proceeded  is,  that  works,  not  words,  are  the  legitimate  evidence 
on  a  question  of  character.  Though  cases  occur  in  which  dec- 
larations are  coincident  with  conduct,  and  augment  the  proof 
of  moral  rectitude,  and  though  they  may  be  entitled  to  credit, 
when  they  can  be  supposed  to  be  made  only  with  a  benevolent 
design  ;  yet  in  all  cases  in  which  the  declarations  may  be 
fairly  traced  to  some  selfish  or  sinister  design,  and  especially 
in  which  benevolence  or  moral  rectitude,  if  it  exist,  will  mani- 
fest itself  in  conduct  and  does  not,  the  proof  is  decisive  against 
the  existence  of  such  a  principle. 

"The  word  of  God  itself,"  says  President  Edwards,  "is  no 
demonstration  of  the  supreme  distinguishing  glory  of  God  any 
otherwise  than  by  the  works  of  God,  and  that  in  two  ways. 
First,  as  we  must  have  the  perfections  of  God  first  proved  by 
his  works,  in  order  to  know  that  his  word  is  to  be  depended  on. 
Secondly,  as  the  works  of  God  appealed  to  and  declared  in  the 
word  of  God,  declare  and  make  evident  that  divine  greatness 
and  glory  which  the  word  declares.  There  is  a  difference  be- 
tween declaration  and  evidence.  The  word  declares,  and  the 
works  are  proper  evidence  of  what  is  declared." — Miscell. 
Observations. 

If  these  remarks  are  just,  then  whatever  illustrations  or  ad- 
ditional evidence  of  the  divine  goodness  may  be  furnished  by 
those  works  and  designs  of  God,  which  are  declared  in  his 
word,  when  we  have  acquired  confidence  in  his  moral  per- 
fection by  a  contemplation  of  his  works  of  creation  and  provi- 


286      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

dence,  it  is  plain  that  without  this  previous  ground  of  con- 
fidence, the  word  of  God  can  furnish  no  sufficient  proof  that 
he  is  good. 

The  Scriptures  also  fully  sustain  the  views  which  have  now 
been  taken  of  this  important  subject.  First,  in  demanding  the 
faith  of  men  in  Christianity,  they  always  either  assume  on 
sufficient  grounds  the  moral  perfection  of  God,  or  they  prove 
it  from  the  light  of  nature.  In  those  cases  in  which  men  ad- 
mitted the  moral  perfection  of  God,  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  and 
his  apostles  for  the  most  part  at  least,  rest  their  claim  for  the 
reception  of  the  gospel,  on  the  fact  that  its  doctrines  and  its 
precepts  are  from  God.  In  those  other  instances  in  which  the 
claim  could  possess  no  force  with  men  who  did  not  admit  the 
moral  perfection  of  the  Deity,  or  when  they  would  increase  its 
power,  they  appealed  to  the  works  of  God.  One  of  the  most 
decisive  of  these  arguments,  when  properly  understood, is  used 
by  our  Lord  in  the  short  but  incontrovertible  assertion,  "  He 
maketh  his  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good,  and  sendeth 
rain  on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust."  Matt.  c.  v.  v.  45.  To  ap- 
preciate the  force  of  this  argument  however,  we  must  revert 
to  the  concession  of  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  and  the 
corresponding  and  proper  assumption  of  our  Lord;  viz.,  the 
great  fact  of  God's  perfect  moral  government  over  men  as  the 
best  means  of  the  best  end,  and  as  such  the  only  system  wor- 
thy of  a  perfect  God.  With  this  great  fact  admitted  by  the 
mind,  we  at  once  see  and  feel  the  force  of  our  Lord's  appeal 
to  the  ceaseless  and  rich  bounties  of  God's  providential  good- 
ness, as  conferred  on  creatures  so  guilty  and  so  ill-deserving. 
Another  is  made  by  the  apostle  when  enforcing  on  the  Gen- 
tiles at  Lystra,  and  also  at  Athens,  their  obligation  to  become 
the  worshipers  of  the  true  God:  "  Who  in  time  past  suffered 
all  nations  to  walk  in  their  own  ways  ;  nevertheless,  he  left  not 
himself  without  witness — in  that  he  did  good,  and  gave  us  rain 
from  heaven,  and  fruitful  seasons,  filling  our  hearts  with  food 
and  gladness."    Acts,  xiv.  16,  17 ;  and  xvii.  23,  28. 

Secondly.  The  apostle  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to 
the  Romans,  very  fully  affirms  that  the  moral  perfection  of 
God  is  manifest  under  the  light  of  nature.  Here  he  not  only 
asserts  the  abundant  manifestation  of  God  in  his  works,  even 
his  whole  deity,  but  on  this  basis  declares  that  under  these 


DECLARATIONS  UNSUPPORTED  BY  WORKS.  287 

manifestations  merely,  they  are  without  excuse,  because  they 
glorified  him  not  as  God.  What  more  could  men  do  even 
under  the  light  of  revelation?  And  to  put  the  particular 
question  now  at  issue  beyond  all  further  debate,  the  apostle 
expressly  asserts  their  inexcusableness,  because  they  were  un- 
thankful. I  only  ask  how  could  they  be  under  obligations  to 
be  grateful  to  a  being,  of  whose  goodness  they  had  no  proofs 
and  which  therefore  they  were  bound  to  disbelieve  ? 


LECTURE  VIII. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — The  benevo- 
lence of  God  may  be  proved,  1.  From  his  natural  attributes. — Nature  of  the  argument. — 2. 
From  his  works.— Preliminary  definitions  and  explanations.— God  is  proved  to  be  perfectly 
benevolent,  by  showing,  (a)  that  the  present  system  may  be  the  best  possible;  (/;)  that  it  is 
the  best  possible. — Prop,  (a)  considered. — Objection  from  existence  of  evil. — Evil  is  natural  and 
moral.— Natural  evil  considered  in  the  sufferings  of  infants,  of  animals,  and  of  men  as  moral 
beings. 

To  complete  the  argument  for  the  perfection  of  God's  moral 
government  over  men,  it  remains  to  prove  his  benevolence. 

On  this  interesting  subject  we  have  two  sources  of  argument 
— the  natural  attributes  of  God,  and  his  works  of  creation  and 
providence. 

I.  The  argument  from  his  natural  perfections. 

This  argument  has  not,  I  think,  been  often,  if  ever,  presented 
in  its  full  force.  It  being  obvious  that  the  evidence  from  this 
source,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  after  all  depend  in  one  re- 
spect on  what  appears  in  his  works — so  depend  on  this,  that  if 
they,  including  what  he  does  and  fails  to  do,  furnish  decisive 
proof  against  his  benevolence,  little  reliance  can  be  placed  on 
any  argument  derived  from  his  natural  attributes.  Hence  in 
almost  all  inquiries  on  the  subject,  the  attention  has  been 
chiefly  and  properly  directed  to  the  works  of  God ;  and  in  view 
of  the  difficulties  which  these  are  supposed  to  offer,  the  argu- 
ment from  the  former  source  has  rarely  been  presented  as  hav- 
ing the  strength  which  it  actually  possesses.  In  saying  this 
however,  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  it  has  any  force,  until 
the  difficulties  which  result  from  the  existence  of  evil  are  fully 
removed.  If  this  can  be  done,  or  if  all  decisive  proof  against 
his  benevolence  can  be  removed,  then,  in  my  view,  this  argu- 
ment will  be  in  a  high  degree  conclusive. 

I  will  here  briefly  attempt  to  unfold  the  nature  of  it,  assum- 
ing that  there  is  no  counteracting  evidence  from  any  other 
source. 

To  estimate  this  kind  of  evidence  of  moral  character — that 
which  arises  from  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  moral  be- 


ARGUMENT    FROM    GOD'S    WORKS.  280 

ings — it  should  be  remembered,  that  while  it  is  quite  supposa- 
ble  that  it  should  be  wholly  counteracted  by  opposing  evidence 
from  conduct  or  works,  it  is,  when  thus  uncounteracted,  in  a 
high  degree  convincing  and  satisfactory.  As  contemplated,  for 
example,  our  first  parents  in  paradise,  or  the  angels  in  heaven, 
and  reasoned  a  priori  from  their  constitution  and  circumstances, 
w^ith  no  opposing  evidence,  we  should  conclude  strongly  in 
favor  of  their  moral  perfection.  If  however,  we  had  known 
other  beings  of  the  same  constitution  and  in  similar  circum- 
stances, who  had  sinned,  our  confidence  in  this  conclusion 
would  be  greatly  diminished;  and  if  such  cases  were  common, 
it  would  be  lessened  still  more,  until  it  is  easy  to  see  that  we 
should  reasonably  doubt,  or  form  an  unfavorable  opinion. 

In  respect  to  the  Infinite  Being,  this  a  priori  argument  can 
be  weakened  only  by  one  or  both  of  these  considerations — that 
beings  far  inferior  to  him,  though  formed  in  his  image,  have 
become  selfish ;  and  that  no  account  can  be  given  of  existing 
evils  under 4iis  government,  which  shall  be  consistent  witli  his 
benevolence.  The  former  consideration  loses  nearly,  if  not  all 
its  influence,  from  the  fact  that  the  beings  are  creatures,  finite, 
and  greatly  limited  in  their  powers,  to  say  nothing  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  they  commence  their  moral  existence.  The  argu- 
ment then,  from  the  infinite  natural  perfections  of  God,  for  his 
benevolence,  if  weakened  at  all,  must  be  weakened  only  by  the 
existence  of  evil.  This,  we  hope  to  show  hereafter,  has  no  such 
influence.  If  so,  then  the  argument  from  his  natural  perfec- 
tions is  justly  regarded  as  conclusive. 

II.  The  argument  from  his  works. 

There  is  perhaps  no  single  question  in  natural  theology,  to 
the  investigation  of  which  more  theological  talent  has  been 
applied,  than  to  this — whether  the  benevolence  of  God  can  be 
proved  from  the  light  of  nature,  or  from  his  works?  The  dif- 
ficulties which  have  been  supposed  to  pertain  to  it,  and  which 
have  been  regarded  as  peculiarly  formidable,  result  from  the 
existence  and  prevalence  of  evil  in  the  world.  Accordingly, 
the  problem,  whence  cometh  evil  under  the  government  of  a  per- 
fect God,  has  employed  from  the  earliest  ages  the  ingenuity 
of  speculative  minds,  and  given  rise  to  various  theories  for  its 
solution.  The  most  celebrated  of  these  are  the  theory  of  pre- 
existence,  the  theory  of  the  Manicheans,  and  the  theory  of  opti- 
mism. The  last  of  these,  if  we  understand  by  it  the  general 
Vol.  I.-13.  19 


290     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

doctrine,  that  the  present  system  of  means  and  influences,  com- 
pared with  any  other,  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  has 
not  only  obtained  the  greatest  prevalence,  but  seems  to  me  to 
be  the  only  one  which  is  entitled  to  consideration.  Different 
philosophers  however,  who  have  agreed  in  this  general  doc- 
trine, have  adopted  two  different  specific  theories,  or  have 
maintained  two  kinds  of  optimism.  One  class  have  maintained 
that  all  evil,  both  natural  and  moral,  is  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good  ;  while  the  other  has  denied  this  in  respect  to 
moral  evil,  and  maintained,  that  in  respect  to  divine  preven- 
tion, it  is  incidental  to  the  best  system  of  means.  These  spe- 
cific theories  then  agree  in  this :  that  the  system  which  God 
has  adopted,  including  both  the  beings  created  and  the  influ- 
ences under  which  they  act,  is  to  him  the  best  possible  system. 
They  agree  also  in  respect  to  natural  evil,  that  it  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good,  but  differ  in  respect  to  moral 
evil,  as  I  have  already  stated.  They  both  proceed  however  on 
the  assumption,  as  every  theory  to  be  in  the  lowest  degree 
plausible  as  a  vindication  of  the  divine  benevolence  must,  that 
there  is  an  impossibility  somewhere  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  God  should  adopt  a  system  wholly  excluding  moral  evil. 
They  differ  however  in  respect  to  the  question,  where  in  the 
nature  of  things  this  impossibility  lies ;  the  one  supposing  it  to 
be  in  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  as  being  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good,  and  that  therefore  God  could  not  produce 
the  highest  good  or  happiness  without  sin  or  moral  evil  as  the 
means  of  it ;  the  other  supposes  that  the  impossibility  may  or 
does  lie,  not  in  the  nature  of  moral  evil^  but  in  the  nature  of  a 
moral  system,  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  and 
that  therefore  God  could  not  produce  the  highest  happiness 
without  adopting  a  moral  system,  to  which  moral  evil,  in  re- 
spect to  his  prevention,  is  incidental. 

If  time  allowed,  it  might  be  useful  to  show  how  the  contro- 
versies on  this  subject  have  been  occasioned  and  prolonged  by 
the  ambiguities  of  language, and  unauthorized  assumptions  in 
reasoning.  This  however  I  shall  attempt  no  farther  than  I 
think  it  necessary  to  give  precision  to  some  of  the  phraseology 
which  I  adopt  in  the  present  discussion. 

By  benevolence  then,  when  applied  to  God,  I  mean  a  dispo- 
sition or  governing  purpose  to  produce  the  greatest  good,  or 
the  highest  happiness  in  his  power.     Of  course,  to  evince  his 


D  E  F  E  C  T I  V  E    A  11  G  U  M  E  N  T .  291 

benevolence,  lie  must  show  that  lie  actually  does  that  which  is 
fitted  on  the  whole  to  produce  the  greatest  good  in  his  power. 
It  is  however  maintained  by  some  able  writers  on  the  subject 
of  the  divine  goodness,  to  be  a  sufficient  proof  of  it,  that  there 
is  more  happiness  than  misery  in  the  world,  and  that  the  pres- 
ent system,  with  its  results,  is  better  than  none.  It  is  undoubt- 
edly true,  that  unless  these  things  are  so — at  least,  unless  it  can 
be  shown  that  the  present  system  with  its  results  is  better  than 
none,  it  can  furnish  no  proof  of  the  benevolence  of  the  Creator. 
But  if  these  facts  be  established,  it  will  not  follow  necessarily 
that  God  is  benevolent ;  for  that  there  is  more  happiness  than 
misery  in  the  world,  is  no  proof  that  the  Creator  might  not 
have  produced  a  still  greater  amount  of  happiness  than  he 
does  or  will  produce ;  nor  from  the  fact,  that  the  present  sys- 
tem with  its  results  is  better  than  none,  does  it  follow,  that  the 
Creator  might  not  have  adopted  a  system  still  better.  And 
surely  no  argument  can  be  necessary  to  show  that  a  perfectly 
benevolent  Creator  will  adopt  the  best  system  in  his  power. 

In  this  assertion  however,  it  is  not  implied  that  God  has  not 
given  existence  to  some  other  world  or  worlds,  in  which  there 
is  more  happiness  than  in  this.  My  meaning  is,  that  if  God  is 
benevolent,  he  could  not  have  made  a  better  world  than  this 
in  its  stead.  For  it  by  no  means  follows,  that  because  he  has 
made  another  world  in  which  there  is  more  happiness,  that  be- 
nevolence did  not  require  the  creation  of  this.  Not  to  have 
created  just  such  a  world,  or  to  have  created  any  other  in  its 
stead,  might  have  ruined  all  other  worlds.  Nor  is  this  all. 
The  existence  of  this  world  may  be  better  than  its  non-exist- 
ence, as  resulting  in  a  greater  amount  of  happiness  to  the  uni- 
verse than  would  exist  without  it.  Not  to  have  created  this 
world  just  as  it  is  compared  with  creating  it,  or  creating  any 
other  in  its  stead  compared  with  creating  this,  might  have 
diminished  the  amount  of  happiness  on  the  whole,  compared 
with  that  which  depends  on  the  creation  of  this  world. 

There  is  perhaps  no  view  of  this  subject,  which  has  so  much 
plausibility,  and  which  is  more  apt  to  embarrass  the  investiga- 
tion of  it,  than  that  now  adverted  to.  God  it  is  said,  or  thought, 
has  made  one  heaven  of  perfect  happiness,  why  not  make  an- 
other, instead  of  such  a  sinful,  suffering  world  as  this  ?  I  an- 
swer :  you  overlook  at  least  two  things,  either  or  both  of  which 
may  be  true  in   fact ;  the  one  is,  the  mutual  dependence  of 


292      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

worlds,  like  that  of  the  members  of  a  human  body  ;  the  other 
is,  that  not  to  have  created  this  world  might  have  left  a  defi- 
ciency in  the  sum  of  happiness  in  the  universe,  which  could 
not  have  been  supplied  by  creating  any  other  in  its  stead.  Be 
these  things  however,  as  they  may,  the  position  is  incontrovert- 
ible, that  a  benevolent  God  will  produce  the  greatest  good  in  his 
jpoiuer ;  and  that  therefore  whatever  he  does  in  any  given  in- 
stance, must  be  not  only  better  than  to  do  nothing,  but  the  best 
thing  which  he  can  do  in  that  instance. 

It  is  well  here  to  recur  to  an  important  distinction  made  in 
another  connection,  between  the  greatest  possible  good,  and  the 
greatest  good  possible  to  God.  It  has  been  often  assumed,  that 
the  greatest  good  possible  or  the  greatest  conceivable  good,  is 
possible  to  God;  and  that  therefore  the  greatest  conceivable 
good,  and  the  greatest  good  possible  to  God  are  identical.  This 
is  obviously  an  unauthorized  assumption.  For  what  is  plainer, 
than  that  God  may  have  created  a  system,  which  will  result  in 
the  greatest  good  possible  to  him  ;  i.  <?.,  the  greatest  good  which 
he  can  secure ;  but  which  would  result  in  still  greater  good, 
were  creatures  to  employ  their  powers  in  a  perfect  manner. 
Whether  it  is  to  be  assumed,  that  God  can  so  control  the  agency 
or  actions  of  his  creatures,  as  to  secure  the  greatest  possible 
good,  which  would  result  from  his  agency  and  theirs  combined 
and  perfectly  employed,  will  be  a  topic  of  future  inquiry.  The 
only  remark  demanded  for  my  present  purpose  is,  that  if  it  may 
be  true,  that  the  greatest  possible  good  is  not  possible  to  God, 
then  it  cannot  be  necessary  to  the  proof  of  his  benevolence  to 
show,  that  he  has  secured,  or  will  secure,  the  greatest  possible 
good ;  for  it  is  obvious,  that  a  being  decisively  evinces  his 
benevolence  who  shows  that  he  does  all  the  good  possible  to 
him,  though  less  good  be  produced  than  would  have  been,  had 
others  afforded  their  active  co-operation. 

The  phrase,  greatest  possible  good,  is  often  used  by  different 
writers,  and  even  by  the  same  writer  in  different  senses,  and 
has  thus  occasioned  controversy  and  false  conclusions.  Hence 
has  resulted  the  doctrine,  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good.  Assuming  that  a  benevolent  God  must  produce 
the  greatest  possible  good,  meaning  the  greatest  possible  on 
the  supposition  that  creatures  produce  as  much  good  by  their 
agency  as  they  can,  many  have  inferred,  and  justly  from  such 
premises,  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  possi- 


GREATEST    GOOD    POSSIBLE    TO    GOD.  293 

ble  good.  For  if  the  greatest  possible  good,  that  is,  the  great- 
est good  possible  from  the  combined  agency  of  God  and  of 
creatures,  is  produced,  then  it  is  done  by  that  agency  as  actu- 
ally employed,  and  is  of  course  produced  to  a  vast  extent  by 
sin.  Of  course,  there  could  not  have  been  as  much  good  ef- 
fected by  any  action  of  creatures  in  its  stead,  as  by  sinful  action. 
Sinful  action  therefore,  would  be  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  possible  good.  Not  here  to  dwell  on  the  palpable  ab- 
surdity, that  the  worst  kind  of  action  should  be  the  best  kind 
of  action ;  nor  even  to  specify  other  absurdities  equally  pal- 
pable, involved  in  this  supposition,  I  wish  only  to  remark, 
that  it  cannot  be  necessary  to  maintain,  that  sin  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good,  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the 
benevolence  of  God.  If  the  present  system  is  better  than  none, 
it  will  be  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  benevolence 
of  the  Creator  to  show,  that  he  will  secure  as  much  good  as  he 
can,  or  as  is  possible  to  him,  although  more  good  would  have 
been  the  result,  had  men  done  their  duty.  It  is  surely  a  strange 
principle,  that  a  being,  to  evince  his  benevolence,  must  produce 
more  good  than  he  can,  even  all  the  good  which  might  be  pro- 
duced by  the  active  co-operation  of  all  other  beings;  or,  that 
it  is  not  enough  for  this  purpose,  that  he  produce  the  greatest 
good  in  his  power. 

The  question  then  is  this  : —  What  is  sufficient  proof  of  this 
fact  f  I  answer,  these  two  things  ;  that  it  appears  that  what 
he  does  is  better  than  to  have  done  nothing ;  and  that  there  is 
no  proof  that  he  could  have  done  better.  If  these  two  things 
can  be  shown,-  they  afford  sufficient  and  decisive  evidence  that 
he  does  all  the  good  in  his  power,  and  is  therefore  benevolent. 
This  proof  may  be  increased. 

When  what  he  does  is  better  than  to  have  done  nothing,  and 
when  there  is  no  proof,  that  he  could  have  done  better,  then, 
if  what  he  does  can  be  clearly  shown  to  be  fitted  in  its  true 
nature  and  tendency  to  produce  the  highest  conceivable  or  the 
highest  possible  good,  this  greatly  augments  the  proof  of  his 
benevolence ;  because  it  most  decisively  proves  that  he  has  done 
all  the  good  he  can,  whether  the  greatest  conceivable  good  be 
actually  produced  or  not. 

Take  for  illustration,  a  system  of  parental  education.  Sup- 
pose it  plainly  better  than  none,  and  that  there  is  not  the  slight- 
est reason  to  believe  that  the  parent  could  have  done  any  thing 


294     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

better  than  he  lias  done,  who  could  doubt  his  benevolent  inten- 
tion ?  In  addition  to  these  things,  suppose  the  system  adopted 
by  the  parent  is  seen  and  known  beyond  a  doubt,  to  be  fitted 
to  accomplish  the  result  in  the  highest  conceivable  degree,  then 
who  can  doubt  whether  he  has  done  all  he  could  to  accomplish 
the  best  result,  whether  it  be  actually  secured  or  not  ? 

On  these  simple  and  obvious  principles,  I  now  propose  to 
prove  that — 

God  is  perfectly  benevolent. 

I  propose  to  show — 

1.  That  the  present  system  may  be  not  only  better  than  none, 
but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator. 

2.  That  it  is  not  only  better  than  none,  but  is  the  best  pos- 
sible to  the  Creator. 

The  design  of  the  former  position  is  to  meet  in  the  outset  of 
our  argument  the  full  force  of  the  objection  to  God's  benevo- 
lence, which  is  derived  from  the  existence  of  evil.  For  if  the 
present  system,  notwithstanding  the  evil  which  exists,  may  be 
not  only  better  than  none,  but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator, 
then  the  existence  of  evil  furnishes  no  evidence  at  all  that  God 
is  not  perfectly  benevolent. 

The  common  assumption  by  those  who  regard  the  present 
subject  as  embarrassed  with  difficulty  is,  that  evil  so  far  as  it 
exists,  is  so  much  evidence  against  the  benevolence  of  the 
Creator.  It  is  however  an  assumption  which  in  this  unquali- 
fied form  is  flagrantly  gratuitous.  It  is  not  true  that  the  com- 
munication of  good  or  the  infliction  of  evil  simply  considered 
determines  the  design  of  its  author.  Good  may  be  imparted 
by  malevolence,  and  evil  may  be  inflicted  by  benevolence  or 
kindness.  This  remark  in  respect  to  evil  is  of  vital  importance 
in  the  present  discussion,  and  one  with  which  the  mind  should 
be  familiar.  There  are  two  principles  in  respect  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  evil  in  this  world,  which  furnish  a  triumphant  vin- 
dication of  the  divine  benevolence  ;  viz. : 

First,  Evil  which  is  or  which  may  be  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good  possible  to  God,  may  be  inflicted  by  benev- 
olence, and  is  therefore  no  proof  against  his  benevolence. 

Secondly.  Evil  which  is  or  which  may  be  necessarily  inci- 
dental {in  respect  to  GooVs  prevention),  to  that  which  is  the  neces- 
sary means  of  the  greatest  good  possible  to  God,  is  no  evidence 
that  God  is  not  benevolent. 


SUFFERINGS    OF    INFANTS    AND    ANIMALS.       295 

These  two  principles  may  be  illustrated  by  an  example.  A 
surgeon  amputates  the  arm  of  a  patient  to  save  his  life.  There 
are  two  evils  in  the  case.  One  is  the  loss  of  the  arm,  and  this 
is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good.  The  other  is  the 
pain  or  suffering  which  is  inseparable  from  the  operation,  and 
this  is  necessarily  incidental,  so  far  as  the  physician's  power  to 
prevent  it  is  concerned,  to  that  which  is  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good  in  the  case.  Kow  who  does  not  see  how  very 
irrational  and  perverse  one  must  be,  in  this  view  of  the  evils 
supposed,  or  even  if  he  only  knew  that  they  might  be  such 
evils,  to  deny  the  kindness  of  the  physician  in  this  attempt  to 
save  the  life  of  his  patient. 

Under  these  two  classes,  I  claim  that  all  the  evil  in  this 
world  may  be  comprised,  and  that  therefore  it  does  not  fur- 
nish the  slightest  evidence  against  the  benevolence  of  God. 
This  I  shall  now  attempt  to  show : 

The  evil  in  the  world  is  natural  evil  and  moral  evil.  I  pro- 
pose to  consider — 

1.  Natural  evil. 

All  natural  evil  may  be  comprised  in  the  sufferings  of  in- 
fants, the  sufferings  of  animals,  and  the  sufferings  of  men  as 
moral  beings. 

1.  The  sufferings  of  infants.  If  infants  are  to  be  considered 
as  moral  and  accountable  agents — a  doctrine  which  cannot  be 
learned  from  the  light  of  nature,  their  case  furnishes  no  pecu- 
liar difficulty,  since  on  this  hypothesis  it  cannot  be  shown  that 
they  suffer  more  than  they  deserve.  If  however  they  are  not 
moral  agents'  at  this  period  of  existence,  they  are  soon  to  as- 
sume this  relation  with  all  its  responsibilities,  and  in  circum- 
stances of  powerful  temptation  from  natural  good.  How  far  it 
may  be  useful  to  such  beings,  to  know  by  experience  what 
natural  evil  is,  before  accountability  commences,  how  far  such 
knowledge  may  be  necessary  to  weaken  the  poAver  of  tempta- 
tion by  augmenting  the  dread  of  the  consequences  of  sin,  how 
far  it  may  serve  to  restrain  from  desperate  wickedness,  and  even 
to  prevent  subsequent  reformation  from  becoming  morally  im- 
possible, it  does  not  become  us  to  decide.  Some  degree  of  suf- 
fering inflicted  by  the  parental  hand,  even  previous  to  ill  desert, 
is  the  indispensable  means  of  teaching  the  child  its  duty,  and 
thus  securing  submission  to  parental  authority. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  human  ignorance  is  not  competent  to  as- 


'296  MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

sert  that  the  sufferings  of  infancy  are  not,  much  less  that  they 
cannot  be,  either  incidental  to  the  necessary  means  of  the  great- 
est good,  or  be  themselves  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good  possible  to  God. 

2.  The  sufferings  of  animals.  These  also  may  be  unavoid- 
ably incidental  to  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good 
possible  to  God,  or  the  necessary  means  of  that  good. 

It  is  undeniable  that  a  great  proportion  of  the  sufferings 
of  the  animal  creation,  is  occasioned  by  man ;  and  though 
we  are  prone  to  inquire  why  they  were  made  with  such 
capacities  of  suffering,  yet  it  is  too  much  for  human  igno- 
rance to  determine,  that  they  could  answer  all  the  purposes 
of  their  existence  without  these  capacities.  It  may  be  true 
that  the  greatest  good  required  that  animals  should  be  what 
they  are, and  men  what  they  are,  and  that  it  were  impossible 
to  prevent  those  sufferings  of  the  former  which  result  from  the 
cruelty  of  the  latter.  With  respect  to  those  sufferings  which 
result  from  the  fact,  that  different  tribes  of  animals  prey  on 
each  other,  assuming  that  the  greatest  good  required  that  they 
should  be  what  they  are  in  other  respects,  these  sufferings  may 
also  be  unavoidably  incidental  to  their  nature  and  condition ; 
or  this  method  of  destruction,  while  some  method  may  be  re- 
quired to  prevent  the  evils  of  superfecundity,  or  to  furnish  that 
additional  enjoyment  that  results  from  the  succession  of  one 
race  after  another,  may  be  the  means  of  greater  good  in  that 
increased  happiness  which  is  derived  from  this  species  of  food, 
than  could  be  produced  without  it.  Be  these  things  however,  as 
they  may,  it  is  plainly  too  much  for  human  ignorance  to  assert 
that  the  sufferings  of  animals  may  not  be  either  the  unavoidable 
result  of  the  necessary  means,  or  be  themselves  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good  which  is  possible  to  the  Creator. 
Nor  does  it  become  us  to  decide,  even  on  the  supposition  that 
no  conceivable  mode  can  be  devised  to  explain  the  suffering  of 
animals,  which  shall  be  consistent  with  the  Creator's  goodness 
to  them,  that  no  purposes  can  be  answered  by  it  in  respect 
to  his  moral  kingdom,  which  are  worthy  of  his  benevolence. 
The  very  mysteriousness  of  this  providential  procedure,  may 
well  heighten  the  awe  of  man  toward  the  supreme  Disposer  of 
all.  For  if  he  inflicts  such  an  amount  of  suffering  on  this  part 
of  his  unoffending  creation,  what  has  man  to  expect  for  his 
provocations  and  crimes  ?    What  a  lesson  does  the  fact  of  ani- 


SUFFERINGS    OF    MEN.  297 

mal  suffering  read  to  us  respecting  the  sovereignty  of  the  Cre- 
ator? Who  can  say  that  this  is  not  in  many  cases  the  indis- 
pensable means  of  convincing  man  that  God  can  and  will  in- 
flict suffering  on  him,  and  thus  of  keeping  the  moral  universe 
in  awe  of  its  rightful  sovereign  ?  Without  however,  insisting 
that  any  of  these  specific  suppositions  accord  with  what  is  real, 
it  is  sufficient  enough  for  my  purpose,  that  the  objector  cannot 
show  that  they  do  not.  It  is  enough  that  they  may,  in  these 
and  still  other  ways,  which  our  minds  have  not  conceived  of, 
be  consistent  with  the  benevolence  of  the  Creator.  It  is  a  case 
in  which  he  might,  for  aught  we  can  show  to  the  contrary,  fur- 
nish ample  explanation  of  his  goodness,  and  it  must  be  shown 
that  he  cannot,  or  the  objection  from  animal  suffering  must  be 
abandoned. 

3.  The  sufferings  endured  by  men,  as  moral  beings.  These, 
with  the  sufferings  of  infants  and  animals,  include  the  whole  of 
natural  evil.  The  consistency  of  natural  evil,  so  far  as  it  is  en- 
dured by  beings  who  are  accountable  to  their  Creator  for  their 
moral  conduct,  with  his  benevolence,  it  would  seem  could  never 
be  called  in  question,  if  it  be  remembered  how  much  less  these 
sufferings  are  than  they  deserve.  For  the  most  abundant  good- 
ness admits  at  least,  that  each  should  suffer  all  that  he  deserves. 
If  it  should  here  be  said,  that  the  greatest  good  did  not  require 
a  system  of  moral  government,  and  that  therefore  to  establish 
it,  and  to  inflict  suffering  on  the  transgressors  of  its  law  is  not 
consistent  with  benevolence,  I  reply  that  this  is  a  new  objection, 
taken  not  from  the  infliction  of  suffering,  nor  from  the  degree 
of  it,  but  from  the  nature  of  the  system.  In  other  words,  the  di- 
vine goodness  is  impeached  on  the  ground,  that  God  has  adopted 
a  system  of  moral  government.  This  topic  will  presently  be 
examined.  The  objection  therefore  now  under  consideration, 
and  which  is  taken  from  the  sufferings  of  men  who  are  account- 
able for  their  conduct,  is  abandoned.  And  well  it  may  be,  so 
far  as  there  can  be  any  question  respecting  the  divine  goodness 
toward  men  in  their  individual  capacity.  For  with  what  face 
can  men  who  suffer  immeasurably  less  than  they  deserve,  com- 
plain that  God  is  not  good  to  them  ? 

On  the  supposition,  and  wTe  are  authorized,  after  what  has 
been  said  to  make  it,  that  the  greatest  good  required  this  sys- 
tem of  moral  government,  the  sufferings  of  men  as  its  account- 
able subjects,  instead  of  proving  that  God  is  not  good  because 
13* 


298     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

they  are  so  great,  are  proof,  if  of  any  thing,  that  he  is  not  good 
because  they  are  not  greater.  For  if  there  be  any  proof  from 
this  fact,  it  must  be  that  he  disregards  the  public  good,  by  not 
inflicting  the  full  penalty  of  the  law  on  transgressors.  The 
consistency  of  this  fact  with  his  goodness,  i.  e.,  with  his  regard 
to  the  public  good,  has  been  already  evinced.  It  is  worthy  of 
remark,  that  many,  not  to  say  all,  writers  on  the  present  sub- 
ject, have  overlooked  the  most  plausible  ground  of  objection, 
viz.,  the  deficiency  of  human  suffering  compared  with  human 
demerit,  and  rested  their  objection  on  the  high  degrees  of  it 
which  exist;  an  objection  which  it  would  seem  could  be  made 
by  none  but  the  culprit  himself,  and  this  only  because  he  is 
perversely  blind  to  the  measure  of  his  own  guilt. 

Besides  this  answer,  furnished  according  to  the  first  principle 
laid  down,  the  second  principle  supplies  another  equally  deci- 
sive. For  who  can  doubt  the  necessity  and  utility  of  this  influ- 
ence of  human  sufferings  ?  We  have  already  shown  that  they 
are  not  legal  sanctions,  but  simply  paternal  chastisements — cor- 
rective dispensations,  whose  design  to  recover  men  to  virtue 
and  to  happiness  cannot  be  unseen  or  unacknowledged  by  the 
most  perverse.  Yiewed  in  this  light,  they  are,  as  we  shall  show 
hereafter,  to  be  ranked  among  the  most  decisive  proofs  of  our 
heavenly  Father's  kindness  toward  the  froward  and  guilty 
children  of  men.  It  may  be  said,  that  there  are  general  laws 
established  by  the  Creator,  which  would  still  continue  and  re- 
sult in  great  natural  evil  to  men,  were  they  exempt  from  sin ; 
that  teeth  would  still  decay  and  ache,  that  manifold  calamities, 
by  accidents,  by  diseases,  &c,  would  still  be  the  portion  of  man 
in  this  world ;  that  this  shows  that  the  sufferings  which  are 
brought  on  men  are  not  the  consequences  of  sin,  but  result  from 
those  laws  and  tendencies  of  things  which  the  Creator  has  es- 
tablished, irrespectively  of  man's  moral  character. 

This  objection  I  have  already  had  occasion  to  notice,  though 
under  a  different  bearing.  It  deserves  however,  particular 
notice  in  this  application  of  the  facts  on  which  it  rests. 

In  answering  this  objection,  it  is  important  to  ascertain  with 
as  much  precision  as  may  be,  how  much  and  what  kinds  of 
evil  would  still  befall  men,  were  they  to  become  perfectly  and 
universally  holy.  And  here  it  is  undeniable,  that  if  all  the 
sufferings  that  result  directly  and  indirectly  from  human  selfish- 
ness, under  all  its  modifications  of  ambition,  pride,  envy,  ava- 


SUPPOSE  THERE  WERE  NO  SIN".        299 

rice,  lust  and  excess ;  and  from  all  its  acts  in  war,  contest, 
fraud,  falsehood  and  violence,  were  to  cease  from  the  earth;  and 
if  these  were  to  be  succeeded  by  universal  benevolence,  under 
all  its  modifications  of  kindness,  forgiveness  and  compassion, 
with  all  the  bright  and  inseparable  train  of  beneficent  deeds; 
and  if  with  these  things  were  to  be  associated  that  piety,  which 
by  its  confidence,  its  hopes,  and  its  joys,  can  sustain  and  cheer 
and  gladden  the  soul,  even  under  the  severest  trials;  in  a  word, 
if  perfect  and  universal  holiness  were  to  reign  on  the  earth, 
human  miseries  would  shrink  away  almost  from  human  thought. 
So  trivial  would  be  our  remaining  sufferings,  compared  with 
the  abundance  of  our  bliss,  that  we  could  scarcely  think  of 
them,  except  as  at  most,  inexplicable  phenomena,  for  which  an 
omniscient  Creator  could  easily  account,  and  which  could  there- 
fore never  awaken  a  doubt  in  respect  to  his  overflowing  good- 
ness. 

Nor  ought  it  here  to  be  forgotten  what  effects  universal 
holiness  would  produce  on  the  animal  constitution  of  man,  in 
removing  its  present  tendencies  to  disease  and  pain — on  the 
mental  constitution,  in  its  greater  vigor  and  more  successful 
activity,  in  its  discoveries  of  remedies  for  the  remaining  ills  of 
life,  and  of  the  means  of  improving  in  all  respects  our  earthly 
condition.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  these  things  might,  not  to  say 
would,  be  beyond  all  our  present  conceptions.  That  the  world, 
under  these  causes,  would  approximate  to  its  paradisiacal  state 
of  happiness,  can  hardly  be  deemed  a  chimerical  anticipation 
by  any  one  who  compares  the  improvements  and  blessings  of 
civilized  life,  especially  under  the  influence  of  Christianity,  with 
a  state  of  barbarism. 

It  might  still  be  insisted,  that  no  such  diminution  of  human 
sufferings  would  result  from  these  causes,  as  to  preclude  the 
force  of  the  present  objection,  that  still  many  of  the  laws  of 
nature  would  continue  to  operate,  and  to  produce  pain,  disease, 
and  death  itself.  To  this  I  Avould  further  reply,  that  it  is  not 
incredible  that  the  world,  and  the  laws  of  its  phenomena,  are 
formed  and  established  by  the  Creator  as  the  fit  and  best  resi- 
dence of  those  whose  universal  and  perpetual  sinfulness  he 
foresaw ;  and  that  what  now  goes  on,  without  change  or  varia- 
tion, in  these  laws  and  their  results,  because  there  is  no  change 
in  the  human  character  to  demand  it  or  to  render  it  useful, 
would  undergo  all  those  alterations  from  the  hand  of  the  Cre- 


300     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

ator,  which  should  render  the  world  a  fit  residence  of  holy 
beings,  should  such  a  transformation  of  human  character  take 
place.  Even  such  changes,  so  far  as  they  would  be  requisite, 
would  be  slight,  if  what  has  been  said  of  the  benign  efficacy  of 
universal  holiness  be  true,  and  might  be  easily  effected,  if  not 
by  natural  causes,  at  least  by  the  miraculous  power  of  the 
Almighty. 

Or,  if  this  be  not  a  satisfactory  supposition,  it  is  still  remote 
from  an  incredible  hypothesis,  that  the  Being,  who,  as  we  have 
already  shown,  reveals  himself  so  illustriously  as  the  rewarder 
of  them  that  diligently  seek  him,  should  translate  to  a  world 
of  perfect  happiness  those  whose  character  should  fit  them  for 
that  exalted  state  of  being. 

But  not  to  dismiss  the  objection  even  here.  Let  the  facts  on 
which  it  rests  be  conceded  in  their  utmost  extent ;  let  it  be 
granted,  that  many  evils  would  still  befall  us  in  this  world  as 
the  result  of  its  established  laws,  though  men  universally  were 
to  become  holy ;  that  teeth  would  decay  and  ache,  bones  be 
subject  to  fracture  and  pain,  and  the  body  to  disease  and  death; 
still  it  is  quite  possible,  and  may  therefore  be  supposed,  that 
this  remainder  of  evil  should  be  either  the  necessary  means  of 
a  benevolent  end,  or  inseparable  from  the  necessary  means  of 
such  an  end. 

It  is  not  enough  to  say  of  this,  class  of  evils,  as  Dr.  Paley 
has  said,  "  that  they  are  never  perceived  to  be  the  object  of  con- 
trivance." There  is  doubtless  truth  in  his  remark,  and  it  is 
happily  illustrated  when  he  says,  "  teeth  are  contrived  to  eat, 
not  to  ache."  And  again — "  no  anatomist  ever  discovered  a 
system  of  organization  calculated  to  produce  pain  and  disease ; 
or,  in  explaining  the  parts  of  the  human  body,  ever  said,  this 
is  to  irritate,  this  to  inflame,  &c."  Though  there  is  truth  in 
the  remark  that  the  teeth  are  not  contrived  to  ache,  yet  the 
fact  falls  short  of  the  point  of  the  objection  which  it  is  designed 
to  meet;  for  the  objector  will  ask,  who  made  the  teeth? — did 
not  an  omniscient  and  omnipotent  God  ? — and  why,  knowing 
that  if  made  they  would  decay  and  ache,  did  he  not,  as  he 
might  have  done,  make  them  so  that  no  such  evil  should  fol- 
low? I  answer,  that  so  far  as  the  objection  maintains  that 
these  evils  could  and  would  have  been  prevented  by  a  benevo- 
lent Creator,  it  asserts  what  cannot  be  proved.  For,  allowing 
that  the  evils  now  adverted  to  would  still  befall  men,  though 


CONCLUSION.  301 

perfectly  holy,  it  is  not  impossible  that  they  are  either  the 
necessary  means  of  good,  or  inseparable  from  such  means.  It  is 
not  incredible  that  even  perfectly  holy  beings,  to  answer  in  the 
best  manner  the  purposes  of  an  immortal  existence,  may  need 
to  pass  through  a  course  of  moral  discipline,  of  which  the  ex- 
perimental knowledge  of  natural  evil  shall  be  an  indispensable 
part.  To  suffer  from  carelessness  or  indiscretion,  is  eminently 
fitted  to  produce  watchfulness  and  prudence,  and  may  in  this 
case  be  even  necessary  to  prevent  the  successful  assaults  of 
temptation  in  the  present  or  a  future  world.  And  even  suffer- 
ing, which  shall  be  unavoidable  by  any  means,  may  be  indis- 
pensable to  give  a  strength  and  permanence  to  the  principle 
of  submission  to  the  divine  will,  which  God  could  secure  by  no 
other  means.  But  it  cannot  be  necessary  to  imagine  the  spe- 
cific forms  and  ways  in  which  the  evils  of  life  now  referred  to 
may  be  the  necessary  means  of  a  benevolent  end,  or  insepara- 
ble from  such  means.  According  to  the  principles  we  have 
laid  down,  to  show  that  such  may  he  the  fact,  is  enough  to 
remove  all  the  weight  of  this  objection. 

I  have  thus  attempted  to  show,  that  the  natural  evil  which 
there  is  in  the  world  furnishes  no  evidence  that  God  is  not 
benevolent.  The  argument  rests  on  the  general  and  undenia- 
ble principle,  that  the  mere  existence  of  evil,  resulting  either 
directly  or  indirectly  from  the  agency  of  any  being,  is  not 
evidence  that  he  is  not  actuated  by  a  benevolent  purpose.  We 
have  seen  that  evil  may  he  inflicted  from  a  benevolent  design, 
and  this  in  different  ways,  or  on  different  principles.  We  have 
seen  also,  that  all  the  natural  evil  which  there  is  in  the  world, 
for  aught  we  know  or  can  prove  to  the  contrary,  may  he  in- 
flicted according  to  some  one  or  more  of  these  principles,  from  a 
benevolent  design  on  the  part  of  the  Creator.  Why  then  should 
this  evil  be  alleged  as  proof  that  he  is  not  benevolent  ?  Is  not 
chastisement  dictated  by  love,  and  are  its  sufferings  properly 
alleged  as  proof  of  unkindness  ?  and  though  we  cannot  say  that 
all  the  natural  evil  in  the  world  either  is  or  maybe  placed  in  this 
category,  yet  we  say  that  it  may  he  as  truly  the  dictate  of  kind- 
ness as  the  corrections  of  a  father's  hand.  In  this  view  of  the  sub- 
jective may  conclude  that  the  existence  of  natural  evil  is  abso- 
lutely no  evidence  that  the  present  system,  with  its  results,  is  not 
the  best  system  possible  to  God.  It  may  therefore  be  the  best  sys- 
tem possible  to  God,  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  natural  evil . 


LECTURE  IX. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — God  is  benevo- 
lent, because  the  present  system  may  he  the  best  possible. — Objection  from  the  existence  of 
moral  evil. — There  may  be  an  impossibility,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  it  should  be  prevented. 
Assuming  that  a  moral  system  may  be  the  best,  1.  It  may  be  impossible  to  prevent  all  sin 
under  a  moral  system.— 2.  If  this  is  not  true,  it  may  be  impossible  under  the  best  moral 
system. 

In  the  last  lecture,  I  commenced  the  argument  in  support  of 
the  benevolence  of  God  by  proposing  to  show, 

That  the  present  system  may  be  not  only  letter  than  none,  but 
the  best  possible  to  the  Creator. 

In  that  lecture  I  considered  the  objection  to  the  divine  be- 
nevolence, derived  from  the  existence  of  natural  evil.  I  now 
propose  to  consider  that  which  is  derived  from  the  existence 
and  prevalence  of  moral  evil. 

This  is  justly  esteemed  the  principal  objection.  It  is  de- 
manded, if  natural  evil  is  a  necessary  and  useful  consequence 
of  moral  evil,  why  did  not  God  prevent  moral  evil  ?  Why  did 
he  not  adopt,  as  he  might  have  done,  a  moral  system,  which 
should  result  in  the  perfect  and  endless  holiness  and  happiness 
of  his  moral  creation;  at  least  one  which  should  have  pre- 
vented the  present  extensive  prevalence  of  moral  evil  ?  Or,  if 
this  was  impossible,  then  it  may  be  demanded  again,  why 
adopt  a  moral  system  at  all ;  or,  if  he  could  not  adopt  a  moral 
system,  nor  any  other  which  should  be  better  than  none,  then 
why  adopt  any  system  of  creation  ? 

This  I  think,  is  the  objection  derived  from  the  existence  and 
prevalence  of  moral  evil  in  its  full  force.  And  it  is  obvious 
that  it  derives  all  its  plausibility  from  the  single  assumption, 
that  God,  either  by  adopting  a  different  system  from  the  pres- 
ent, or  none  at  all,  could  have  done  better  than  he  has  done.  It 
is  equally  obvious,  that  fully  and  fairly  to  meet  this  objection, 
it  is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  present  system,  notwithstanding 
the  existence  and  prevalence  of  moral  evil,  may  be  not  only 
better  than  none,  but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator.     For  if 


THE    PHRASE,    MORAL    SYSTEM.  303 

it  may  he  true,  then  there  is  no  evidence  or  proof  to  the  con- 
trary, and  none  is  authorized  to  assert  it.  Of  course  the  objec- 
tion is  groundless,  and  must  be  abandoned. 

That  the  present  system  may  he  better  than  none,  I  shall  for 
the  present  take  for  granted,  and  this  for  two  reasons ;  one  is, 
that  in  view  of  the  excess  of  happiness  over  misery  in  the 
world,  the  possibility  that  the  present  system  is  better  than 
none  can  scarcely  be  supposed  to  need  proof;  the  other  is,  that 
I  shall  hereafter  have  occasion  to  prove  that  it  is  better  than 
none.  Indeed,  I  have  adverted  to  this  part  of  the  objection 
rather  as  what  might  be  said,  than  as  what  has  been  or  is  likely 
to  be  strongly  urged.  It  is  important  however  to  show  in 
this  part  of  the  discussion,  that  the  present  system,  notwith- 
standing the  existence  of  moral  evil,  may  he  the  best  possible 
system  to  the  Creator. 

By  the  word  system,  or  the  phrase  moral  system,  must  be 
meant  all  that  which  results  in  moral  action,  or  in  any  way  de- 
termines it  to  be  what  it  is,  including  the  nature  of  the  moral 
beings  themselves,  and  all  the  influences  under  which  they  act 
as  such  beings.  The  system  must  thus  be  distinguished  from  its 
results  in  moral  action,  as  a  cause  from  its  effect,  and  thus  be 
viewed  as  not  including  either  sin  or  holiness  as  any  part  of 
the  system  under  which  they  exist. 

Some  who  maintain  that  the  present  system  not  only  may 
be,  but  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  attempt  to  show,  that 
the  reason  that  God  does  not  prevent  moral  evil  under  it,  is 
not  that  there  is  any  impossibility  in  the  nature  of  this  moral 
system,  or  of  any  moral  system,  that  he  should  prevent  it ;  but 
that  the  moral  evil  which  exists,  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good.  When  it  is  said,  that  there  is  no  impossibility 
that  God  should  prevent  all  sin  under  the  present  system,  the 
meaning  must  be,  either  that  he  can  prevent  it  by  some  changes 
which  would  not  impair  its  essential  nature,  or  by  direct  inter- 
positions of  his  power  on  the  mind,  thus  leaving  the  nature  of 
the  system  wholly  unchanged  in  every  other  respect. 

In  opposition  to  this  theory,  it  is  now  maintained  that  there 
may  he  an  impossibility,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  God 
should  prevent  all  sin  under  any  moral  system  whatever,  and 
the  present  degree  of  moral  evil  under  the  best  moral  system; 
and  that  therefore  moral  evil  in  its  present  degree  may  exist, 
not  because  it  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  but 


304:     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

because,  in  respect  to  divine  prevention,  it  is  incidental  to  a 
moral  system,  which  is  not  only  better  than  no  system,  bnt  the 
best  possible  to  the  Creator. 

The  former  of  these  theories  has,  in  my  own  view,  been  so 
fully  abandoned,  even  by  its  professed  advocates  in  recent  con- 
troversy, that  I  shall  not  here  attempt  a  full  exposure  of  its  in- 
trinsic absurdities  and  obvious  inconsistencies  with  acknowl- 
edged truths.  I  propose  to  notice  it  only  as  it  may  come  in 
my  way,  in  defending  the  theory  which  I  adopt. 

If  it  can  be  shown,  that  there  may  be  an  impossibility  in  the 
nature  of  things,  that  God  should  prevent  all  moral  evil  under 
a  moral  system,  and  the  present  degree  of  moral  evil  under  the 
best  moral  system,  then  it  will  follow,  that  the  moral  evil 
under  the  present  system  may  exist;  because,  in  respect  to 
divine  prevention,  it  is  incidental  to  one  which  is  not  only  bet- 
ter than  none,  but  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  and  is  there- 
fore no  evidence  against  his  perfect  benevolence. 

Before  I  proceed  directly  to  sustain  this  theory,  I  deem  it 
important  to  remark,  that  no  prejudice  against  it  ought  to  be 
entertained  by  the  disciples,  and  especially  by  the  advocates  of 
Christianity.  It  has  often  been  said,  that  the  existence  of  moral 
evil  under  the  government  of  a  perfect  God,  is  a  profound,  un- 
solvable  mystery,  and  that  it  has  hitherto  baffled  the  research 
of  the  most  powerful  minds  in  every  age.  Hence  we  are  often 
met  with  the  reproving  interrogatory,  why  not  let  it  alone  f  I 
answer,  first,  because  the  enemies  of  truth  will  not  let  it  alone ; 
and  for  the  defenders  of  truth  to  shun  the  inquiry,  is  to  aban- 
don it  without  a  defense,  and  to  concede,  in  the  field  of  argu- 
ment, a  complete  triumph  to  IJniversalism,  to  Deism,  and  to 
Atheism.  When  the  universalist  reasons  thus :  God  is  infinitely 
good,  and  therefore  disposed  to  make  all  his  creatures  holy  and 
happy  forever;  he  is  omnipotent,  and  can  secure  this  result, 
and  therefore  most  certainly  will  secure  it ;  and  when,  on  the 
basis  of  this  conclusion,  he  forces  the  doctrine  of  endless  pun- 
ishment, by  false  interpretation  from  the  sacred  page — when 
the  infidel,  from  the  same  premises,  comes  to  the  same  conclu- 
sion respecting  the  holiness  and  happiness  of  God's  moral  crea- 
tion, and  either  because  he  has  more  sense  or  candor  than  the 
former,  admits  that  this  doctrine  of  future  punishment  is  plainly 
taught  in  the  Scriptures,  and,  for  this  very  reason,  denies  that 
a  benevolent  God  is  the  author  of  the  book ;  and  when  the 


PARABLE    OF    THE    TARES.  305 

atheist,  on  the  supposition  of  a  benevolent  and  an  omnipotent 
God,  infers  that  there  could  be  no  evil,  and  because  there  is 
evil,  denies  the  existence  of  such  a  being,  it  is  in  vain,  and 
worse  than  in  vain,  to  cry  out  "mystery"  in  refutation  of  the 
argument.  Such  men  as  Yoltaire  and  Hume,  and  multitudes 
of  far  inferior  discernment,  know  that  this  is  not  reasoning. 
Their  reply  is,  we  knew  that  you  could  not  answer ;  and  they 
despise  you  for  holding  opinions  which  you  are  confessedly 
unable  to  defend.  But  further;  the  inquiry  concerning  the 
origin  of  moral  evil  is  not  to  be  avoided,  for  the  Bible  has  not 
shunned  it.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  incredible  that  it  should. 
Who  can  believe  that  Christianity  has  been  given  to  the 
world,  exposed  to  an  objection  which  is  incapable  of  all  refuta- 
tion, and  which  undermines  not  only  its  divine  origin,  but  the- 
ism itself?  It  has  not.  Its  divine  author  has  formally  stated 
and  fully  solved  the  great  problem,  whence  cometh  moved  evil? 
lie  has  solved  it  for  the  instruction  not  merely  of  philosophers, 
but  of  the  people,  and  on  substantially  the  same  principle  on 
which  it  is  now  proposed  to  solve  it  by  reason.  This  he  has 
done  with  unsurpassed  perspicuity  and  force,  in  "  the  parable 
of  the  tares  of  the  field."  In  this  parable  we  are  taught  the 
following  truths : 

1st.  That  the  kingdom — the  reign  of  heaven — the  moral 
government  of  God  under  a  gracious  economy — is  perfectly 
fitted  to  its  great  design  of  reforming  and  saving  all  men. 

2d.  That  the  fact  that  there  are  wicked  men,  or  that  there 
is  moral  evil,  rather  than  its  opposite,  under  this  best  system, 
is  in  direct  -  contravention  of  this  great  design  of  its  divine 
author. 

3d.  That  the  reason  that  moral  evil  exists,  is  that  there  is  an 
impossibility,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  God  should  pre- 
vent it,  under  the  system,  which  exempts  him  from  all  respon- 
sibility in  respect  to  its  existence ;  and 

4th.  That  the  interpositions  requisite  to  remove  the  evil, 
would  do  more  hurt  than  good,  by  diminishing  the  amount  of 
holiness  under  the  system.* 

*  In  confirmation  of  this  view  of  the  parable,  I  ask,  whether  the  householder 
did  not  prefer  a  crop  of  pure  wheat  to  one  mingled  with  tares,  all  things  considered  ; 
whether  he  preferred  the  tares,  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  to 
wheat  in  their  stead;  whether  the  introduction  of  the  tares  when  men  slept,  did 
not  involve  an  impossibility  on  his  part  of  preventing  it,  which  exempted  him  from ! 

20 


306     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

Here  then  we  have  the  same  solution  of  the  problem  whence 
cometh  moral  evil,  which  is  now  proposed  with  only  this  differ- 
ence, that  what  the  Saviour  teaches  as  a  fact,  a  doctrine,  is  now 
for  a  particular  purpose  in  argument,  proposed  merely  as  a 
theory  or  possible  truth.  Why  should  such  a  theory  be  en- 
countered with  prejudice  on  the  part  of  the  friends  and  advo- 
cates of  Christianity  ? 

I  now  proceed  to  show  on  the  principles  of  reason,  that — 

There  may  he  an  impossibility  in  the  nature  of  things,  that 
God  should  prevent  all  sin  or  moral  evil  under  the  best  system. 

Assuming  what  will  probably  not  be  denied,  that  a  moral 
system  may  be  the  best  system,  I  propose  to  show : 

1.  That  there  may  be  an  impossibility  that  God  should  pre- 
vent all  sin  under  a  moral  system ;  and 

2.  That  if  it  be  possible,  that  he  should  prevent  all  sin  under 
any  moral  system,  there  may  be  an  impossibility  that  he  should 
prevent  all  sin  under  the  best  moral  system. 

1.  There  may  be  an  impossibility  in  the  nature  of  things, 
that  God  should  prevent  all  sin  under  any  moral  system  what- 
ever. 

That  such  an  impossibility  may  exist,  is  evident  from  the 
nature  of  a  moral  system,  for  it  necessarily  includes  the  exist- 
ence of  moral  beings;  and  sin  or  moral  evil  cannot  be  pre- 
vented in  moral  beings,  by  any  power  or  influence  which  de- 
stroys their  moral  agency.     To  suppose  this,  is  to  suppose  sin 

all  responsibility  in  respect  to  their  existence,  and  remove  the  necessity  of  any  fur- 
ther vindication ;  and  whether,  if  he  had  foreseen  the  attempt  to  introduce  them, 
he  would  not  have  prevented  their  introduction,  if  he  could,  without  incurring  a 
greater  evil  than  their  introduction?  Are  not  these  the  undeniable  facts  and  prin- 
ciples by  which  the  Saviour,  in  this  parable,  vindicated  the  character  of  God,  in 
view  of  existing  moral  evil  in  the  world  ?  Can  philosophy  show  the  vindication  to 
be  founded  in  false  principles  ?  If  it  should  here  be  asked,  who  made  the  devil  ? 
I  answer,  God  made  the  devil,  but  he  made  himself  a  devil.  If  it  be  said,  that  still, 
as  a  creature  of  God,  God  is  responsible  for  his  character, — I  answer,  the  parable 
obviously  proceeds  on  the  opposite  assumption,  viz. :  that  according  to  the  popular 
view  of  the  subject,  the  devil  is  the  great  enemy  of  God,  and  of  his  designs,  for 
whose  character  and  conduct  God  is  not  responsible — no  more  so,  than  the  house- 
holder is  for  the  character  and  conduct  of  his  enemy.  Otherwise,  the  professed 
explanation  of  the  parable  is  a  gross  sophism,  designed  to  deceive  those  to  whom 
it  was  addressed.  Whether  therefore  we  say,  that  the  devil  is  the  personification 
of  the  source  of  evil  in  the  world,  or  a  real  person,  and  therefore  a  creature  of  God, 
still  our  Lord  assumes  the  existence  of  this  source  of  evil  as  that  for  which  God  is 
not  responsible,  and  as  that  which  results  in  an  impossibility  that  God  should  pre- 
vent the  evil  which  exists  under  the  present  system. 


THE    IMPOSSIBILITY    DEFINED.  307 

to  be  prevented  in  moral  beings  who  are  not  moral  beings. 
But  moral  agency  implies  free  agency — the  power  of  choice — 
the  power  to  choose  morally  wrong  as  well  as  morally  right, 
under  every  possible  influence  to  prevent  such  choice  or  action. 
Moral  agency  and  of  course  moral  beings  can  no  more  exist 
without  this  power,  than  matter  can  exist  without  solidity  and 
extension,  or  a  triangle  without  sides  and  angles.  Let  it  then 
be  kept  in  mind  that  I  now  speak  of  preventing  sin  in  moral 
beings,  free  moral  agents,  who  can  sin  under  every  possible  in- 
fluence from  God  to  prevent  their  sinning.  But  if  such  beings 
do  what  in  this  respect  they  can  do  under  every  possible  influ- 
ence from  God  to  prevent  their  sinning,  they  certainly  will  sin 
when  it  is  impossible  that  God  should  prevent  their  sinning. 
And  why  may  it  not  be  so  ?  Who  knows  or  who  can  prove, 
that  such  cases  will  not  occur  under  any  possible  moral  sys- 
tem ?  No  man  knows  nor  can  prove  it.  Therefore  let  no  man 
assert  it.  There  may  be  an  impossibility  that  God  should  pre- 
vent all  sin  or  moral  evil  under  any  moral  system.  The  as- 
sumption that  God  can  prevent  all  moral  evil  in  a  moral  sys- 
tem, is  wholly  groundless  and  unauthorized,  and  the  objection 
to  his  benevolence,  derived  from  the  existence  of  moral  evil, 
which  rests  entirely  on  this  assumption,  is  also  groundless,  and 
ought  to  be  abandoned. 

I  do  not  say  that  there  is  an  impossibility  that  God  should 
prevent  all  sin  under  a  moral  system  ;  nor  even  that  it  may  not 
be  true  that  there  is  not  such  an  impossibility ;  but  I  affirm 
simply,  that  there  may  he.  This  is  sufficient  for  my  present 
purpose,  that  of  answering  the  objection  to  the  divine  benevo- 
lence, derived  from  the  existence  of  moral  evil.  For  on  this 
supposition, moral  evil  under  the  present  system,  in  respect  to 
divine  prevention,  may  he  incidental  to  a  system  which  may 
be  not  only  better  than  none,  but  the  best  possible  to  the 
Creator ;  and  is  therefore  no  proof  against  his  benevolence. 

Here  this  grand  objection  to  the  benevolence  of  God  might 
be  left  as  fully  refuted.  But  many  things  may  be  said  to 
strengthen  the  objection  and  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  reply 
to  it,  which  has  now  been  made. 

These  things  may  be  comprised  in  alleging  that  the  sup- 
posed theory  is  inconsistent  with  the  omnipotence  of  God,  and 
in  supposed  proofs,  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin  in  a  moral 
system. 


308     MOKAL  GOVERNMENT  EROM  NATURE. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  often  alleged  that  to  suppose  that  there 
may  be  any  impossibility  that  God  should  prevent  all  sin  in  a 
moral  system,  is  highly  dishonorable  to  God,  inasmuch  as  it 
virtually  denies  his  power  as  an  omnipotent  Being.  The  plau- 
sibility of  this  gratuitous  assumption  is  such  to  most  minds, 
through  want  of  reflection,  that  it  has  perplexed  the  argument 
for  God's  benevolence  more  than  every  other  consideration.  In 
reply  to  this,  I  claim  in  the  first  place  that  they  who  assert  that 
any  impossibility  that  God  should  prevent  all  moral  evil  under 
a  moral  system,  is  inconsistent  with  his  omnipotence,  should 
either  prove  the  assertion  or  retract  it.  What  right  has  any 
one  in  reasoning  to  assert  what  he  neither  knows  nor  can  prove 
to  be  true  ?  Who  does  not  know  that  there  is  a  kind  of  impos- 
sibility in  many  cases,  which  God  has  no  power  to  remove  or 
overcome.  It  is  impossible  that  God  should  cause  a  thing  to 
be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time,  that  he  should  make  two 
and  two  to  be  five,  or  a  part  equal  to  the  whole.  There  is  an 
impossibility  to  God  in  each  of  these  cases  which  involves  a  con- 
tradiction. Reminding  the  objector  of  what  every  tyro  in  rea- 
soning knows,  that  this  kind  of  impossibility  limits  the  power 
of  God  in  such  a  sense  as  fully  to  justify  us  in  denying  his 
power  in  such  cases,  let  him  address  himself  to  an  argument 
showing  that  the  same  kind  of  impossibility  does  not  exist  in 
the  case  now  under  consideration.  When  he  shall  do  this,  we 
shall  begin  to  suspect  that  his  present  objection  to  our  theory  is 
something  more  than  either  designed  or  undesigned  sophistry. 
I  reply  again  to  this  assertion  with  a  denial  of  its  truth.  The 
impossibility  now  supposed  of  God's  preventing  all  sin  under  a 
moral  system,  if  it  be  real,  is  not  inconsistent  with  his  omnipo- 
tence. It  is  not  that  kind  of  impossibility  which  is  given  by  a 
direct  conflict  between  the  power  of  the  creature  and  the  power 
of  God,  because  the  power  of  the  creature  to  sin  is  superior  to 
God's  power.  Such  a  direct  conflict  between  the  power  of 
moral  beings  to  sin  and  God's  power,  is  as  inconceivable  as 
that  the  forces  which  produce  the  motion  of  the  planets  should 
be  interfered  with  by  the  power  of  motives  or  arguments.  The 
direct  prevention  of  sin,  or  which  is  the  same  thing,  the  direct 
production  of  holiness  in  moral  agents  by  dint  of  Omnipo- 
tence, is  an  absurdity,  inasmuch  as  it  implies  that  God  is  the 
efficient,  proximate  natural  cause  of  their  moral  acts,  and  that 
they  act  morally  without  acting  as  moral  agents,  i.  <?.,  without 


THE    IMPOSSIBILITY    DEFINED.  309 

being  tlic  proximate,  efficient  causes  of  their  own  acts.  What 
then  is  the  impossibility  of  God's  preventing  all  sin  in  moral 
beings, which  it  is  now  supposed  may  exist?  I  answer:  It  is 
an  impossibility,  the  supposition  of  which  involves  a  contradic- 
tion in  the  nature  of  the  case.  It  is  the  impossibility  of  God's 
preventing  moral  beings  from  sinning  by  any  thing  which  lie 
can  do,  when  beings  who  can  sin  in  despite  of  God,  do  in 
this  respect  what  they  can  do.  To  suppose  that  in  such  cases 
they  should  be  prevented  from  sinning,  is  to  suppose  them  to 
sin  and  to  be  prevented  from  sinning  at  the  same  time,  which 
is  a  contradiction  and  an  impossibility.  And  would  such  an 
impossibility  if  it  exists, dishonorably  limit  the  power  of  God? 
Would  it  imply  the  want  of  any  degree  of  that  power  which 
constitutes  omnipotence?  Must  we  then,  if  we  could  duly 
honor  God,  assert  that  he  has  power  to  accomplish  contradic- 
tions, or  to  accomplish  that,  which  for  aught  that  can  be  shown 
to  the  contrary,  may  involve  a  contradiction  and  an  impossi- 
bilitv  in  the  nature  of  things — assert  that  to  be  true  of  God 
which  for  aught  that  can  be  known  or  proved  to  the  contrary, 
may  be  false?  Is  God  honored  by  the  confident  asseverations 
of  mere  ignorance,  and  on  such  a  basis  is  either  his  goodness  or 
his  omnipotence  to  be  denied  ?  Plainly  if  the  supposed  impos- 
sibility of  God's  preventing  all  moral  evil  under  a  moral  sys- 
tem actually  exists,  it  no  more  dishonorably  limits  his  power 
than  the  impossibility  that  the  act  should  be  prevented  and  not 
prevented  at  the  same  time,  or  than  two  and  two  should  be 
five,  or  a  part  equal  to  the  whole. 

It  is  also  to  be  said,  that  the  doctrine  that  sin  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good,  denies  the  power  of  God  in  the 
same  sense  as  that  in  which  the  theory  now  maintained  can  be 
said  to  deny  it.  According  to  this  doctrine  God  cannot — he 
has  not  power  to  secure  the  greatest  good,  without  sin  as  the 
means  of  this  end.  It  limits  the  Holy  One  of  Israel  by  the 
impossibility  of  securing  good,  which  results  from  the  nature  of 
sin ;  for  it  assigns  this  impossibility  as  the  very  reason  for  the 
existence  of  sin.  Thus  on  both  schemes,  an  impossibility  in 
the  nature  of  things  is  involved.  In  the  one  case  it  is  main- 
tained that  there  may  be  an  impossibility  of  God's  preventing 
all  moral  evil  under  a  moral  system,  resulting  from  the  nature 
of  moral  agency  as  involving  power  to  sin  under  every  possible 
influence  to  prevent  it ;  in  the  other,  that  there  is  an  impossi- 


310     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

bility  that  God  should  produce  the  greatest  good  without  sin, 
resulting  from  the  nature  of  sin  as  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good. 

If  either  theory  is  true,  God  may  be  properly  said  to  be  lim- 
ited by  an  impossibility  in  the  nature  of  things.  And  which  is 
the  most  dishonorable  to  him,  the  supposition  that  he  cannot 
produce  the  greatest  good  without  sin  as  the  means  of  it ;  or  that 
he  cannot  prevent  that,  the  prevention  of  which  may  involve  a 
contradiction — i.  e.,  he  cannot  prevent  beings  from  sinning  who 
can  sin  in  despite  of  his  power  to  prevent  them?  The  former  is 
utterly  absurd  and  inconceivable.  For  how  can  it  be  impossi- 
ble that  God  should  produce  the  greatest  good  by  the  best  kind 
of  moral  action.  Or  how  can  it  be.  true  that  he  cannot  pro- 
duce the  greatest  good  without  that  kind  of  moral  action, 
which  is  fitted  to  destroy  all  good  and  to  produce  all  evil? 
How  can  that  which  is  confessedly  wholly  an  evil,  only  an 
evil — an  evil  without  qualification,  be  the  necessary  means  of 
the  greatest  good?  How  can  the  worst  kind  of  action  con- 
ceivable, be  the  best  kind  of  action?  If  not,  then  how  can  it 
be  impossible  that  God  should  produce  the  greatest  good  with- 
out sin  as  the  means  of  it  ?  Plainly  the  supposition  of  such  an 
impossibility  is  the  most  palpable  of  all  impossibilities.  There 
can  be  no  such.  If  then,  one  of  the  supposed  impossibilities 
must  exist,  shall  we  suppose  it  to  be  that  which  may  or  that 
which  cannot  exist. 

Further ;  there  is  no  conceivable  theory  by  which  the  benev- 
olence and  omnipotence  of  God — in  other  words,  by  which  the 
existence  of  a  perfect  God  can  be  vindicated,  without  supposing 
an  impossibility  in  some  respect  that  he  should  prevent  moral 
evil,  which  is  consistent  with  his  benevolence  and  his  omnipo- 
tence, and  which  is  the  reason  of  his  not  preventing  it,  The  most 
plausible  argument  ever  devised  in  defence  of  Atheism  is  prob- 
ably that  of  Epicurus.  This  argument,  when  applied  to  moral 
evil,  is  substantially  the  following:  "God  either  would  prevent 
all  moral  evil,  and  could  not  /  or  he  could  prevent  it,  and  would 
not ;  or  he  neither  would  nor  coidd  prevent  it ;  or  he  both  would 
and  could  prevent  it.  If  he  would  and  could  not,  then  he  is  not 
omnipotent ;  if  he  would  not  and  could,  then  he  is  not  good ;  if 
he  neither  would  nor  could,  then  he  is  neither  good  nor  om- 
nipotent ;  if  he  both  would  and  could,  then  moral  evil  would 
not  exist.     But  moral  evil  does  exist.     Therefore  there  is  no 


THE    ATHEIST'S    ARGUMENT.  311 

God  who  is  both  good  and  omnipotent."  Now  where  lies  the 
fallacy  of  this  boasted  argument?  an  argument  which  in  some 
form  has  been  often  repeated  in  triumph  even  to  the  present 
day.  There  are  two  assumptions  in  this  argument,  one  of 
which  is  fully  authorized  ;  the  other  is  wholly  unauthorized. 
The  former  is  that  moral  evil  is  not  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good,  but  is  wholly  an  evil ;  for  if  it  be  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good,  it  would  not  be,  as  is  claimed  in 
this  argument,  inconsistent  with  the  divine  goodness.  This 
assumption  is  fully  authorized ;  for  how  can  the  worst  kind  of 
moral  action  conceivable,  be  the  best  kind  of  moral  action? 
The  other,  is  the  assumption  that  if  God  cannot  prevent  all 
moral  evil  under  any  and  every  created  system,  then  he  is  not 
omnipotent ;  for  if  there  may  he  an  impossibility  that  God  should 
prevent  all  moral  evil  under  a  moral  system,  or  under  the  best 
system,  which  impossibility  is  consistent  wTith  his  omnipotence, 
then  the  fact  that  he  cannot  prevent  it,  is  no  proof  that  he  is 
not  omnipotent ;  while  if  there  can  be  no  such  impossibility, 
then  God  as  both  good  and  omnipotent  would  prevent  all 
moral  evil.  But  he  does  not,  and  it  follows  therefore  from  the 
present  assumption,  that  if  God  is  good  he  is  not  omnipotent. 
Indeed  the  existing  moral  evil  being  wholly  an  evil,  must  be 
supposed  to  exist,  either  because  if  God  is  good,  he  is  not  om- 
nipotent ;  or  because  if  he  is  omnipotent,  he  is  not  good,  or  be- 
cause he  is  neither  omnipotent  nor  good ;  or  because  there  is 
an  impossibility  of  his  preventing  the  evil,  which  impossibility 
is  consistent  with  his  goodness  and  his  omnipotence.  Thus  we 
are  driven  by  unanswerable  reasoning  either  into  blank  Atheism, 
or  into  the  admission  of  some  impossibility  of  God's  preventing 
all  moral  evil,  which  impossibility  is  consistent  with  his  good- 
ness and  his  omnipotence.  Such  an  impossibility  may  result 
as  we  claim, from  any  moral  system,  or  at  least  from  the  best 
system.  The  assumption  then  that  there  can  be  no  such  im- 
possibility, or  that  if  God  cannot  prevent  all  moral  evil  under 
any,  even  under  the  best  system,  then  he  is  not  omnipotent,  is 
unauthorized ;  and  constitutes  the  fallacy  of  the  foregoing  argu- 
ment for  Atheism, 

It  is  here  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  advocates  of  the  doc- 
trine, that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good, 
while  they  advance  in  so  doing  that  which  is  palpably  absurd, 
also  maintain  the  groundless  assumption  of  the  atheistic  argu- 


312      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

ment.  To  vindicate  the  goodness  of  God,  they  maintain  the 
palpable  absurdity,  that  what  is  wholly  an  evil  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good ;  and  to  vindicate  his  omnipotence, 
that  there  is  no  impossibility  of  his  preventing  all  moral  evil 
tinder  any  moral  system  whatever.  They  thus  give  their  sanc- 
tion to  a  principle  which  by  just  reasoning  sustains  downright 
Atheism.  For  if  sin  is,  and  who  does  not  know  it  is,  wholly  an 
evil,  and  if  there  is  no  sense  in  which  God  cannot  prevent  it 
under  the  present  system  consistently  with  his  omnipotence, 
then  in  view  of  the  existing  sin  it  follows  either  that  God  is  not 
good  or  not  omnipotent,  or  that  he  is  neither  good  nor  omnipo- 
tent. 

But  it  is  claimed,  that  there  is  the  most  decisive  proof  that 
God  can  prevent  all  sin,  under  any  moral  system  whatever. 

1.  It  is  said,  that  as  an  omnipotent  Being,  he  must  have 
power  to  direct  and  control  the  conduct  of  his  creatures  as  he 
pleases,  or  according  to  his  will.  By  the  will  of  God  must 
here  be  meant,  either  his  will  as  a  lawgiver,  in  which  he  pre- 
fers, all  things  considered,  that  right  moral  action  should  (not 
shall)  take  place  in  all  cases,  rather  than  wrong ;  or,  his  provi- 
dential will — his  decree — in  which  he  purposes  that  the  event 
willed  shall  take  place.  If  the  former  will  be  meant,  then  it 
is  not  admitted  that  God  has  power  to  control  the  conduct  of 
his  creatures,  in  all  cases,  according  to  that  will.  It  is  unde- 
niable, that  he  does  not  in  all  cases ;  while  it  is  equally  so,  that 
as  benevolent  and  omnipotent,  he  would  thus  control  it,  were 
there  no  impossibility  of  his  so  doing,  consistent  with  his  be- 
nevolence and  omnipotence.  Such  an  impossibility  is  of  course 
not  inconsistent  with  these  attributes.  If  by  the  will  of  God, 
be  meant  his  providential  will — his  decree — then  I  deny  that 
he  has  such  a  will  to  prevent  the  sin  which  actually  takes  place. 
Foreseeing  the  certainty  of  the  sin,  he  could  not  will  nor  pur- 
pose actually  to  prevent  it ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  must,  rather 
than  prevent  it  by  destroying  moral  agency,  or  for  some  other 
reason,  have  purposed  its  actual  existence.  God  therefore, 
whatever  may  be  his  will  as  a  lawgiver,  has  no  will  or  purpose 
that  any  sin  shall  not  take  place,  which  does  take  place.  He 
has  power  actually  to  direct  and  control,  as  he  wills  actually  to 
direct  and  control,  the  conduct  of  his  creatures,  and  of  course, 
power  to  bring  to  pass  whatsoever  he  wills  shall  come  to  pass. 

2.  It  is  often  said,  that  it  is  incredible  that  God  should  not 


ANSWER    TO    OBJECTIONS.  313 

be  able  to  prevent  all  sin  in  moral  beings  by  tlie  influence  of 
motives.  I  answer,  that  if  there  may  he  such  an  impossibility, 
then  such  an  impossibility  is  not  incredible.  Indeed,  why  is  it 
incredible  that  God  should  not  be  able,  by  motives,  to  prevent 
beings  from  sinning,  who  possess  power  to  sin  under  all  possi- 
ble motives  which  he  can  employ  to  prevent  them. 

3.  It  may  be  said,  that  God  can  create  moral  beings  of  such 
a  nature  as  shall  certainly  prevent  their  sinning.  If  by  "  such 
a  nature,"  be  meant  what  some  mean,  viz.,  a  holy  nature  as  a 
constitutional  property  of  the  beings,  I  deny  that  such  a  nature 
can  be  literally  created  by  God.  To  suppose  holiness-  to  exist 
in  a  creature  of  God,  prior  to  all  voluntary  exercise  or  act  on 
the  part  of  the  creature,  is  to  suppose  holiness  to  exist  before 
it  exists,  which  is  absurd.  In  short,  whatever  nature  God  may 
be  supposed  to  create  in  moral  beings,  they  must  have  power 
to  act  morally  wTrong,  under  every  preventing  influence  from 
God.  And  who  can  prove  that  such  beings  will  not  act  mor- 
ally wrong,  and  that  it  may  not  be  impossible  that  God  should 
prevent  it  ? 

4.  The  appeal  is  often  made  to  facts.  It  is  said,  that  God 
does  and  can  prevent  some  moral  beings  from  sinning ;  and  if 
he  can  prevent  some,  he  can  prevent  all.  This  is  a  palpable 
non  sequitur.  All  moral  beings  have  the  power  to  avoid  sin- 
ning, as  well  as  power  to  sin.  That  some,  who  have  the  power 
to  avoid  sinning,  should  be  prevented  from  sinning,  is  indeed 
altogether  credible.  But  why  is  it  not  also,  that  it  should  be 
impossible  for  God  to  prevent  some  from  sinning,  who  have 
power  to  sin  under  every  possible  preventing  influence.  To 
deny  such  impossibility,  is  "  talking  quite  at  random,  and  in 
the  dark."  Besides,  there  are  no  known  instances  of  the  pre- 
vention of  sin  in  moral  beings,  except  under  a  system  in  which 
others  have  not  been  prevented.  And  how  do  the  facts  alleged, 
prove  that  God  could  have  prevented  all  sin,  either  under  the 
present  moral  system  or  under  any  other?  Nor  could  the  sin 
of  any  who  have  sinned,  have  been  prevented  by  God  without 
some  changes  and  interpositions  for  the  purpose.  Those  requi- 
site to  prevent  one  sin,  and  especially  to  prevent  all  the  sin 
which  has  taken  place,  supposing  the  system  in  other  respects 
to  be  the  same,  might,  in  despite  of  future  preventing  interpo- 
sitions, have  resulted  in  more  sin  than  could  have  been  pre- 
vented.   To  assert  therefore  that  God  might  have  prevented 

Vol.  I.— 14. 


314     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

all  sin  in  a  moral  system,  or  in  any  moral  system,  is  to  make 
mere  arbitrary  assertions,  no  man  knowing  enough  of  possibili- 
ties in  the  case,  to  adduce  the  shadow  of  proof  of  the  truth  of 
what  he  asserts. 

5.  But  the  objector  may  appeal  (and  I  readily  consent  that 
he  should)  to  the  facts  of  revelation.  He  may  speak  of  angels, 
who  have  never  sinned  and  never  will,  and  of  the  redeemed  in 
heaven,  who  never  will.  But  revelation  brings  to  our  knowl- 
edge neither  angels  nor  men  confirmed  in  holiness,  except  those 
wTho  are  confirmed  under  a  moral  system  in  which  sin  takes 
place.  And  who  can  show  that  any  changes  requisite  to  pre- 
vent the  sin  which  has  taken  place,  supposing  that  such  changes 
might  have  been  made,  would  not  have  resulted  ultimately  in 
a  vast  increase  of  sin  ?  It  may  be  said,  that  our  first  parents 
were  for  a  time  holy,  and  that,  had  their  circumstances  been 
continued  exactly  the  same,  they  would  have  continued  holy ; 
for  the  same  antecedents  would  have  been  followed  with  the 
same  consequent.  I  answer,  that  it  is  impossible,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  that  the  antecedents  should  continue  exactly  the 
same.  When  they  had  lived  one  day  or  hour  in  obedience  to 
the  divine  will,  some  things  were  necessarily  true  of  them 
which  were  not  when  they  had  thus  lived  but  half  a  day,  or 
half  an  hour.  One  change  in  the  antecedents  might  lead  to 
another.  In  the  progress  of  their  being,  how  many  thoughts 
and  feelings — what  diversified  associations  and  excitement  of 
constitutional  propensities  would  arise,  which  never  occurred 
during  the  short  period  of  their  continued  obedience !  And  il 
none  but  the  omniscient  Being  could  foresee  these  things,  then 
who  but  he  can  pronounce  on  the  result  ? 

6.  If  the  objector  should  still  insist,  that  a  God  of  infinite 
wisdom  and  power  might  have  devised  and  adopted  a  moral 
system  which  would  have  excluded  all  moral  evil,  then  I  ask, 
what  moral  system  ?  Can  lie  specify  it  ?  Can  he  delineate 
minutely  its  essential,  constituent  elements  ? — the  exact  nature 
and  degree  of  influence  it  must  possess,  that  it  may  be  effectual 
to  prevent  all  moral  evil  ?  Could  any  thing  be  more  presump- 
tuous and  audacious  than  such  an  attempt  ?  And  if  he  does 
not  know  what  moral  system,  or  that  any  moral  system  would 
be  effectual  to  the  prevention  of  all  moral  evil  under  it,  how 
does  he  know  that  God  could  devise  such  a  system  ?  I  am  not 
saying  that  he  could  not ;  but  I  affirm,  that  no  one  can  prove 


OBJECTIONS    CONSIDERED.  315 

that  lie  could.  The  fact  that  moral  beings  can  sin  under  any 
and  every  preventing  influence  from  God,  forever  precludes  the 
possibility  of  proving  a  priori,  that  they  will  not,  and  that 
there  may  not  be  an  impossibility  that  God  should  prevent  all 
moral  evil  under  a  moral  system.  It  may  be,  that,  had  the 
nature  of  man,  or  his  circumstances,  or  both,  been  different  in 
any  respect  from  what  they  are,  or  had  any  other  influence  in 
kind  or  degree  been  resorted  to  than  has  been,  the  system  in 
other  respects  being  the  same,  then  the  consequence,  in  despite 
of  any  and  all  further  preventing  interpositions,  would  have 
been  an  immeasurably  greater  amount  of  moral  evil  than  has  re- 
sulted, or  will  result  from  the  present  system.  Had  the  powers 
of  man  been  greater  than  they  are;  had  he  commenced  exist- 
ence with  the  more  perfect  faculties  of  manhood ;  had  his  sus- 
ceptibilities, propensities,  circumstances,  been  in  any  manner 
different,  the  results  in  moral  evil,  for  aught  we  know  or  can 
prove  to  the  contrary,  would  have  been  vastly  worse  than  those 
of  the  present  system  as  it  is.  Under  the  imagined  change  for 
the  better,  still  man  might  have  sinned.  To  sin  in  circumstances 
more  favorable  to  virtue,  might  imply  greater  strength  in  the 
sinful  principle  or  purpose,  formed  in  resistance  of  the  greater 
obligations  and  motives  to  virtue — even  a  desperation  which 
would  render  vain  all  efforts  to  reclaim ;  which  would  prevent, 
by  rendering  useless,  an  economy  of  grace,  and  thus  result  in 
universal  and  hopeless  sin  and  woe. 

7.  Should  the  objector  still  insist,  that  some  changes  might 
have  been  adopted  by  an  all-wise  and  omnipotent  Creator, 
which  would  have  prevented  the  present  prevalence  of  moral 
evil,  I  ask,  what  changes  ?  Does  he  say,  greater  force  of  intel- 
lect, and  consequently  more  just  and  adequate  views  of  the 
nature  and  relations  of  the  great  objects  of  moral  choice  would 
have  secured  the  end  ?  I  reply,  that  men  do  not  sin  through 
any  such  deficiency  in  this  faculty  of  the  soul,  as  to  show,  that 
to  augment  its  strength,  would  change  the  result  in  practice. 
Besides,  any  finite  strength  of  intellect  is  consistent  with  power 
to  sin,  and  cannot  therefore  be  alleged  as  proof  that  the  subject 
of  it  will  not  sin. 

8.  Is  it  then  said,,  that  greater  strength  of  intellect,  and  a 
diminished  strength  of  the  propensities  to  natural  good,  would 
secure  the  result;  I  reply,  that  however  vigorous  the  intel- 
lectual  perceptions,  and   however  weak  the  propensities   to 


316     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

natural  good,  so  long  as  the  latter  are  real,  and  such  as  are 
essential  to  moral  agency,  they  must  be  capable  of  an  excite- 
ment which  shall  render  possible  the  choice  of  their  gratifica- 
tion, since  otherwise  moral  agency  could  not  exist.  It  is  im- 
possible therefore  to  prove  a  priori,  that  such  a  moral  agent 
will  not  sin. 

9.  Is  it  then  said  by  the  objector,  that  if  sin  were  to  be  fol- 
lowed with  the  immediate  execution  of  its  curse  on  the  trans- 
gressor, this  would  certainly  diminish  the  degree  of  moral  evil 
in  the  world  ?  I  answer,  that  the  consequences  might  be 
immeasurably  worse.  Indeed,  when  we  reflect  that  mankind 
actually  possess  sufficient  intellectual  capacity  to  perceive  the 
difference  between  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  and  the  infi- 
nite preponderance  of  motive  to  the  former  compared  with  the 
pleasures  of  sin,  and  think  of  the  universal  sinfulness  of  our  race, 
the  presumption  rests  on  no  slight  basis,  that  to  make  this  world 
a  place  of  immediate  retribution,  would  be  to  change  it,  with  all 
its  bright  prospects  from  a  state  of  trial,  into  a  world  of  despera- 
tion in  sin  and  suffering.  In  such  a  system,  one  sin  would  cut 
off  all  hope  of  the  divine  favor;  and  who  could  decide  that  all 
would  not  sin  once  ?  Thus  the  amount  of  moral  evil  might  far 
surpass  what  now  exists,  and  this  world,  instead  of  being  a 
place  of  probation,  cheered  with  intimations  of  mercy  and  for- 
giveness, might  become  the  theater  of  retributive  vengeance  to 
all. 

10.  Should  the  objector  propose  any  other  emendation  of  the 
system,  it  would  be  equally  nugatory.  No  one  is  competent 
to  devise  or  suggest  a  change,  which  he,  or  any  other  man,  can 
pronounce  to  be  an  improvement,  without  the  most  palpable 
presumption.  To  show  how  utterly  groundless  are  all  objec- 
tions to  the  present  system,  derived  from  the  existence  of  moral 
evil,  we  need  only  remark,  that  the  present  state  of  man  is,  or 
at  least  may  be,  one  of  moral  discipline,  in  reference  to  the 
formation  of  his  moral  character  for  immortality ;  that  it  is,  or 
at  least  may  be,  peculiarly  fitted  to  give  stability  to  moral 
principle,  and  thus  to  secure  ultimately  immutable  moral  per- 
fection in  man ;  and  that  every  thing  which  pertains  to  it,  as 
a  system  from  God,  may  be  indispensably  necessary  to  secure 
the  greatest  amount  of  holiness  and  happiness  to  the  uni- 
verse which  God  can  secure.  Who  then  shall  say,  or  be  re- 
spected for  saying,  that  any  change  in  the  system  which  he 


OBJECTIONS    CONSIDERED.  317 

can  devise  or  suggest,  would  improve  it  ?  Who  would  take 
the  responsibility  of  effecting,  if  he  could,  the  least  alteration 
in  the  system  which  the  supreme  Creator  has  adopted  ? 

11.  After  all,  the  objector  may  say,  if  man  cannot  devise  a 
system  of  greater  perfection  than  the  present,  this  is  no  proof 
that  the  Creator,  a  being  of  infinite  perfection,  cannot.  I  reply, 
that  this  is  a  mere  evasion  of  the  point  at  issue.  My  object 
has.  not  been  to  prove  that  the  Creator  could  not  have  devised 
and  adopted  a  better  system  than  the  present ;  though  I  may 
hereafter  show  that  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  that  he 
could  not ;  but  to  show  that  it  cannot  be  proved  that  God 
could  have  adopted  a  better  system  than  the  present — that  it 
may  be  true,  so  far  as  existing  evil  is  concerned,  that  he  could 
not,  and  that  the  assertion  that  he  could,  is  presumptuous 
in  the  extreme.  Hence  the  objection  to  God's  benevolence 
derived  from  the  existence  of  moral  evil  and  therefore  from 
natural  evil,  and  which  is  designed  to  show  that  the  present 
system  is  not  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  being  founded 
wholly  in  the  ignorance  of  the  objector,  is  to  be  laid  entirely 
aside  as  nugatory  and  vain.  The  conclusion  is,  that  it  may 
he  impossible  that  God  should  exclude  all  moral  evil  from 
a  moral  system  y  and  of  course  from  the  best  moral  sys- 
tem ;  and  that  therefore,  great  as  the  amount  of  morcd  evil  is 
under  the  present  system,  it  may  be  the  best  possible  to  the 
Creator. 

Some  theologians  however,  instead  of  receiving  the  theory  as 
now  presented,  have  proposed  a  modification  of  it,  maintaining 
that  while  God  can  prevent  all  sin  under  some  moral  system, 
it  may  be  true  that  he  cannot  prevent  all  sin  under  the  best 
nloral  system.  More  particularly  they  maintain  that  the  pres- 
ent system  may  be  the  best,  inasmuch  as  it  comprises  those  high 
degrees  of  temptation  and  other  moral  means,  which  while  they 
become  the  sure  occasion  of  the  sin  of  some,  are  necessary  to 
secure  higher  degrees  of  holiness  on  the  part  of  others,  and  thus 
higher  degrees  of  happiness  on  the  whole,  than  God  could  se- 
cure under  some  other  system,  under  which  he  could  prevent 
all  sin. 

My  objection  to  this  modification  of  the  theory  already  pre- 
sented, is  not  that  it  asserts  that  it  may  be  true  that  God  can- 
not prevent  sin  under  the  best  moral  system.  That  this  may 
be  true,  I  assert  and  maintain.     But  my  objection  is  twofold; 


318  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    FROM   NATURE. 

viz.,  the  theory  asserts  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin  under  some 
moral  system ;  and  that  it  affirms  certain  specific  or  particular 
characteristics  of  the  present  moral  system  as  those  which  may 
constitute  it  the  best  system,  when  there  is  much  reason  for  be- 
lieving that  they  do  not. 

I  proceed  then  to  say : 

First.  That  the  affirmation  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin 
under  some  moral  system,  is  gratuitous  and  unauthorized.  I 
know  no  advocate  of  this  part  of  the  theory,  who  has  at- 
tempted to  prove  the  affirmation  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin 
under  some  moral  system.  I  admit  that  it  may  he  true  that 
he  can  ;  but  claim  to  have  shown  that  it  may  be  true  that  he 
cannot.  If  there  is  no  proof  either  that  God  can  or  that  he 
cannot  prevent  all  sin  under  any  moral  system  whatever,  then 
the  affirmation,  that  he  can  prevent  all  sin  under  some  moral 
system,  is  wholly  unauthorized.  Besides  when  it  is  once  admit- 
ted that  God  cannot  prevent  all  sin  under  a  moral  system  which 
is  the  best,  how  can  it  be  shown  that  he  can  prevent  all  sin  un- 
der a  moral  system  which  is  not  the  best?  May  it  not  be  true 
for  aught  that  appears  to  the  contrary,  that  God  cannot  pre- 
vent all  sin  under  any  other  moral  system,  as  well  as  that  he 
cannot  under  the  best  moral  system?  Is  not  the  assertion 
then  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin  under  some  moral  system, 
altogether  unauthorized  ?  Is  there  any  evidence  or  proof  that 
the  assertion  is  true  rather  than  false  ?  Secondly.  There  is  not 
only  no  proof  that  the  higher  degrees  of  temptation  with  other 
moral  means,  which  are  supposed  to  be  essential  to  the  best 
system,  are  necessary  to  secure  or  will  secure  the  highest  degrees 
of  holiness,  but  much  evidence  to  the  contrary.  How  does  it 
appear  that  a  moral  being  cannot  love  God  with  all  his  heart, 
mind,  soul  and  strength,  i.  <?.,  as  much  as  he  can  love  him, 
under  a  low  as  well  as  under  a  high  degree  of  temptation,  or 
as  well  under  one  system  of  means,  as  under  another  ?  How 
can  it  be  shown  that  a  moral  being  can  or  will  love  God  more 
than  he  can — more  than  with  all  his  strength,  because  tempta- 
tion is  great  ?  Can  it  be  shown  that  his  strength  will  be  in- 
creased as  temptation  is  increased?  And  if  this  cannot  be 
shown,  how  can  it  be  rendered  in  the  lowest  degree  probable 
that  the  greater  the  temptation  to  sin,  the  greater  will  be  the 
degree  of  holiness  ?  On  the  contrary,  if  there  is  any  principle 
to  be  reasoned  from  in  the  case,  it  is  that  the  greater  the  degree 


POSITIVE    CONSIDERATIONS.  319 

of  temptation  to  sin,  other  things  being  the  same,  the  less  will 
be  the  degree  of  holiness.  It  is  on  this  very  principle  that  or- 
thodox divines  as  a  class,  account  for  the  universal  depravity  of 
unrenewed  men,  and  the  low  degree  of  holiness  in  those  who 
are  renewed.  They  trace  these  results  to  the  high  degree  of 
temptation  which  arises  from  their  propensity  to  sin.  Is  it  a 
uniform  fact  that  the  increase  of  temptation  results  in  the  in- 
crease of  holiness?  Is  temptation  a  means  of  grace?  Or  is  it 
to  be  received  as  a  general  principle,  that  if  good  men  would 
be  perfect  in  holiness,  they  must  shun  temptation?  There  is 
plainly  a  strong  probability  then,  against  the  supposition,  that 
to  increase  the  degree  of  temptation  should  increase  the  degree 
of  holiness.  But  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  let  it  be  con- 
ceded that  such  would  be  the  result  of  high  degrees  of  tempta- 
tion in  respect  to  a  part  of  the  subjects  of  a  moral  system; 
how  does  it  appear  that  what  would  thus  be  gained  in  holiness 
and  happiness  by  them,  would  not  be  more  than  overbalanced 
by  greater  degrees  of  sin  and  misery  to  another?  If  it  be 
said  that  it  may  not  be  so,  the  answer  is,  that  it  may  he  so,  and 
there  is  no  evidence  that  it  would  not  be  so,  not  to  say,  the 
probability  is,  that  it  would  be  so.  Thirdly.  There  can  be  no 
proof  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin  under  a  moral  system,  or 
that  having  adopted  a  moral  system,  he  can  prevent  all  sin 
without  destroying  moral  agency.  Suppose  what  is  called  the 
best  system  of  means  and  measures  to  be  adopted,  God  either 
can  or  he  cannot  prevent  all  sin  under  this  system,  and  of  course 
without  destroying  moral  agency.  If  he  can  prevent  all  sin 
under  this  best  moral  system,  and  this  by  the  mere  exertion  of 
his  power,  without  at  all  changing  the  system  of  means,  and  of 
course  without  destroying  moral  agency,  why  does  he  not  thus 
prevent  all  sin  ?  Would  an  omnipotent  being  in  such  a  case 
deprecate  the  requisite  interposition  of  his  power?  Why  then 
as  a  benevolent  and  an  omnipotent  being,  does  he  not  interpose 
his  powTer,  and  thus  prevent  all  sin  and  secure  perfect  holiness 
and  happiness  forever  under  this  best  system  of  means  and  meas- 
ures? Is  it  said  that  sin  itself  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good  ?  But  this  preposterous  dogma  the  advocate  of 
this  theory  rejects.  Can  any  reason  then  be  given  why  God, 
having  adopted  the  best  system  does  not  prevent  all  sin,  except 
that  he  cannot  without  destroying  moral  agency  ?  Is  it  said 
that  to  prevent  all  sin  by  the  supposed  interposition  of  power, 


320  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    FROM    NATURE. 

would  be  preventing  it  "  in  such  a  way  as  would  derange  and 
impair  the  best  possible  system  of  means  ?"  But  the  system  of 
means  according  to  the  supposition,  is  unchanged.  It  remains 
the  same  in  all  that  gives  it  excellence,  or  constitutes  it  the  best 
system  of  means,  whether  sin  be  prevented  in  the  manner  sup- 
posed or  not.  "Why  then  is  not  all  sin  prevented  by  the  sup- 
posed interposition  of  divine  power  ?  Is  it  said  that  it  may  be 
true  that  to  prevent  all  sin  and  to  secure  universal  and  perfect 
holiness  and  happiness  forever  by  this  method,  would  lessen 
the  amount  of  holiness  and  happiness  compared  with  what 
would  otherwise  exist  ?  Be  it  so.  But  it  may  also  be  true 
that  such  would  not  be  the  effect;  and  the  reason  that  God 
does  not  prevent  all  sin  may  be  another;  viz.,  that  he  cannot 
without  destroying  moral  agency.  Besides,  the  thing  sup- 
posed, viz.,  that  God  should  prevent  all  sin  under  the  system, 
and  by  so  doing  lessen  the  comparative  amount  of  holiness,  is 
impossible.  To  suppose  less  holiness  than  perfect  holiness  or 
the  highest  possible, to  be  the  effect  of  the  supposed  divine  in- 
terposition, is  to  suppose  less  holiness  than  ought  to  be,  which 
is  sin ;  and  surely  God  cannot  be  supposed  to  adopt  a  method 
of  preventing  all  sin  which  will  produce  sin  !  Is  it  then  said 
that  God  cannot  prevent  all  sin  and  secure  universal  and  per- 
fect holiness  forever  under  the  best  system,  merely  by  the 
direct  interposition  of  his  power  ?  Be  it  so.  Then  the  ques- 
tion returns,  how  does  it  appear  that  he  can  prevent  all  sin 
forever  under  any  moral  system,  that  is,  prevent  it  forever 
without  destroying  moral  agency?  By  doing  this  he  can  pre- 
vent all  sin.  How  does  it  appear  that  he  can  prevent  it,  if  he 
introduces  a  moral  system  without  destroying  moral  agency  ? 
It  is  admitted  that  it  may  be  true  that  God  cannot  prevent  all 
sin  under  the  best  moral  system.  Why  may  it  not  be  true  that 
the  very  reason  that  he  cannot,  is  that  he  cannot  prevent  all 
sin,  having  adopted  any  moral  system,  without  destroying 
moral  agency  ?  And  if  this  may  be  the  reason  that  he  cannot 
prevent  all  sin  under  the  best  moral  system,  why  may  it  not 
be  a  reason  that  he  cannot  under  any  other  system  which  is 
not  the  best  ?  Adopt  what  moral  system  he  may,  the  possibil- 
ity of  sinning  which  is  given  by  moral  agency  in  despite  of 
divine  power  to  prevent  it  remains,  and  excludes  all  proof  that 
sin  will  not  take  place  under  the  system.  2s~o  man  therefore 
can  either  know  or  prove,  that  there  is  any  way  in  which  God 


SIX,    UNDER    THE    BEST    SYSTEM.  321 

can  prevent  all  sin  if  lie  adopts  a  moral  system,  unless  lie  de- 
stroys moral  agency. 

I  now  proceed  to  show  as  I  proposed : 

2.  That  if  it  be  conceded  that  God  can  prevent  all  moral  evil 
under  some  possible  moral  system,  it  may  still  be  impossible 
that  he  should  prevent  all  moral  evil,  even  the  present  degree 
of  moral  evil  under  the  best  moral  system. 

I  do  not  say  that  conceding  the  former,  the  latter  would  be 
probable.  Still  it  may  be  true,  that  were  God  to  adopt  the 
system  under  which  he  could  prevent  all  moral  evil,  either  on 
account  of  the  small  numbers  of  beings  which  the  system 
would  require,  or  on  account  of  their  limited  capacity,  or 
for  some  other  reason,  he  would  greatly  lessen  the  happiness  of 
his  creation  compared  with  adopting  another  system  under 
which  he  cannot  prevent  all  moral  evil.  The  present  moral 
system  as  consisting  of  a  given  number  of  moral  beings,  and 
possessing  exactly  the  nature,  the  powers,  susceptibilities,  pro- 
pensities which  they  do  possess,  and  placed  in  exactly  the 
circumstances  in  which  they  are  placed — for  aught  that  ap- 
pears to  the  contrary,  may  be  the  only  system  by  means  of 
which  God  can  produce  the  highest  happiness  which  he  can 
produce. 

Any  other  system,  which  would  prevent  the  existing  degree 
of  moral  evil — if  such  a  system  be  possible — might  greatly  im- 
pair the  results  in  happiness,  as  these  depend,  not  indeed  on 
the  existence  of  moral  evil  as  the  means  of  happiness,  but  on 
the  nature  of  the  moral  system  itself;  that  is,  on  the  number 
and  nature,,, the  powers  and  capacities  of  the  beings,  and  the 
various  kinds  of  influence  and  sources  of  happiness  which  the 
best  moral  system  includes.  There  may  then  be  an  impossi- 
bility, not  indeed  that  God  should  produce  the  greatest  good 
without  the  existing  moral  evil  as  the  means  of  it,  but  that  he 
should  prevent  the  existing  moral  evil  under  the  present  sys- 
tem. Moral  beings,  under  this  best  moral  system,  must  have 
power  to  sin,  in  despite  of  all  that  God  can  do  under  this  system 
to  prevent  them;  and  to  suppose  that  they  should  do  what  they 
can  under  this  system,  viz.,  sin,  and  that  God  should  prevent 
their  sinning,  is  a  contradiction  and  an  impossibility.  It  may 
be  true  that  such  beings,  in  this  respect,  will  do  what  they  can 
do — that  is,  will  sin — when  of  course  it  would  be  impossible 
that  God,  other  things  remaining  the  same,  should  prevent 
14*  21 


322     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

their  sinning  without  destroying  their  moral  agency.  Grant- 
ing then  the  possibility,  that  God  should  prevent  all  sin  under 
some  moral  system,  still  it  may  be  impossible  that  he  should 
do  it,  without  either  adopting  some  other  system  of  means  than 
the  best,  or,  having  adopted  the  best,  without  destroying  it  by 
destroying  moral  agency. 

In  opposition  to  this  conclusion  however,  there  are  some  who 
will  still  reply,  that  "with  God,  all  things  are  possible;"  that, 
as  an  omnipotent  being,  he  can  prevent  all  sin  under  one  sys- 
tem of  means  and  measures  as  well  as  under  another,  even  as 
well  without  means  as  with ;  that  he  can  prevent  all  sin  in 
moral  beings,  by  the  direct  and  immediate  interpositions  of 
mere  omnipotence — by  mere  dint  of  power — by  acts  of  literal 
creation,  producing  holiness  in  all. 

It  is  readily  admitted,  that  in  the  true  sense  of  the  language, 
"All  things  are  possible  with  God."  But  what  are  often  and 
properly  called  things  in  one  sense,  cannot  be  properly  called 
things  in  another.  In  the  most  general  sense,  any  mere  object 
of  thought  is  properly  called  a  thing.  Of  these  objects  there 
are  two  classes.  The  one  class  are  things  (thought-things) 
which  are  not  real,  and  those  which  are  not  possible ;  while  the 
other  class  are  things  which  are  either  real  or  possible.  Thus 
to  make  two  and  two  equal  to  five,  is  impossible.  Does  it  then 
imply  any  deficiency  of  power  in  God,  that  he  cannot  make 
two  and  two  equal  to  five?  No  more  does  it  imply  any 
deficiency  in  power  on  his  part,  that  he  cannot  prevent,  in  sup- 
posable  cases,  beings  who  can  sin,  in  despite  of  his  power,  i.  e., 
moral  beings  from  sinning,  under  the  best  moral  system.  In 
the  nature  of  things,  there  may  be  an  impossibility  which  in- 
volves a  contradiction.  If  such  impossibilities  limit  the  power 
of  God,  or  are  inconsistent  with  his  omnipotence,  who  can  be- 
lieve or  assert  his  omnipotence?  When  it  is  said,  that  "with 
God  all  things  are  possible,"  who  can  suppose  that  the  all 
things  includes  things  which  involve  contradiction  and  im- 
possibility in  their  very  nature,  and  infer  that  God  can  make 
two  and  two  to  be  five,  or  the  diameter  of  a  circle  to  be  equal 
to  its  circumference,  or  can  prevent  beings  in  all  cases  from 
sinning,  who  can  sin,  under  every  preventing  influence  from 
him? 

Is  it  then  said,  that  God,  as  an  omnipotent  being,  can  pre- 
vent all  sin  under  one  moral  system  as  well  as  under  another — 


CORRECT    VIEWS    OF    OMNIPOTENCE.  323 

as  well  without  means  as  with  ?  Then  I  ask,  why  can  lie  not 
secure  any  other  result  without  means  as  well  as  with? — why 
can  he  not  secure  the  greatest  good,  without  sin  as  the  means 
of  it;  and  if  he  can,  how  is  sin  the  necessary  means  of  this 
end  ?  If  it  is  limiting  the  power  of  God  to  suppose  that  he 
cannot  accomplish  his  designs  without  means,  then  it  is  limit- 
ing his  power  to  assert  that  he  cannot  secure  the  greatest  good 
without  sin  as  the  7neans.  It  is  wholly  unsupported  by  facts ; 
for  in  what  instance  lias  God  ever  prevented  sin  in  a  moral 
being,  without  means  ?  It  is  absurd  and  self-contradictory.  If 
sin  be  prevented  in  moral  beings,  it  must  be  prevented  by  their 
acting,  and  acting  morally  right,  in  view  of  motives.  Is  it  then 
said,  that  God  can  prevent  all  sin  in  moral  beings  by  any  de- 
gree of  motives,  and  especially  by  that  degree  which  is  com- 
prised in  the  best  moral  system  ?  But  who  knows,  or  can 
prove  this,  who  is  authorized  to  assert  it  ?  No  one.  The  asser- 
tion is  wholly  arbitrary,  and  he  who  makes  it  knows  not 
whether  lie  asserts  truth  or  falsehood.  That  system  of  means 
and  measures,  which  is  necessary  to  the  greatest  good  which 
God  can  secure,  may  be  inconsistent  with  God's  preventing  all 
moral  evil  under  the  system.  According  to  this  view,  sin  is 
wholly  an  evil — evil  in  all  its  tendencies;  and  still  God  per- 
mits and  purposes  its  existence,  rather  than  not  adopt  the  best 
moral  system.  As  the  husbandman  does  not  sow  good  seed  in 
his  field  for  the  sake  of  the  tares,  i.  e.,  because  he  prefers  tares 
to  wheat ;  but  notwithstanding  the  tares,  which  he  may  foresee 
will  come  in  among  the  wheat,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  good, 
which  will  still  far  overbalance  the  evil;  so  God  may  have 
adopted  the  present  moral  system,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  sin, 
or  of  any  good  of  which  it  is  the  means,  but  notwithstanding 
the  evil,  and  for  the  sake  of  the  overbalancing  good,  of  which 
the  system  is  the  necessary  means. 

After  all,  the  great  question,  concerning  the  goodness  and  the 
power  of  God,  which  results  from  the  existence  of  moral  evil 
under  his  government,  depends  not  so  much  on  either  of  the 
particular  theories  which  have  now  been  propounded,  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  other,  as  on  an  assumption  which  is  opposed  to 
both,  viz.,  that  God  can  prevent  all  moral  evil  under  any  moral 
system  whatever,  by  the  direct  and  immediate  interpositions 
of  mere  power.  It  is  this  which  is  relied  upon  in  common  by 
atheists,  deists,  universalists,  and  a  large  class  of  orthodox  di- 


324      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

vines,  in  their  reasonings  on  the  subject.  "We  have  seen  how 
this  assumption,  in  connection  with  other  premises,  leads  to 
Atheism,  Infidelity,  and  Universalism ;  and  also  how  utterly 
feeble  and  insufficient  is  the  defence  of  the  orthodox  against 
these  errors,  while  they  admit  its  truth.  So  long  as  this  as- 
sumption is  made  and  conceded — so  long  as  it  is  admitted  that 
God,  by  the  mere  interpositions  of  his  power,  can  prevent  all 
moral  evil  under  any  moral  system  whatever,  the  problem, 
why  does  he  not  prevent  it,  will  remain  incapable  of  solution. 
Kor  can  it  be  thought  strange,  that  one  class  of  minds,  in  view 
of  existing  moral  evil,  should  deny  the  existence  of  a  being  of 
boundless  goodness  and  power ;  that  another  should  deny,  that 
the  book  which  asserts  the  endless  sin  and  misery  of  multitudes 
of  our  race  is  a  revelation  from  a  perfect  God ;  that  another, 
receiving  the  book  as  divine,  should  deny  that  it  contains  a 
doctrine  so  plainly  inconsistent  with  the  character  of  its  author. 
That  moral  evil,  with  its  manifold  calamities  and  woes,  exists, 
cannot  be  denied ;  and  so  long  as  it  is  admitted  that  a  benevo- 
lent God  can,  by  the  mere  interpositions  of  his  power,  prevent 
the  evil  under  the  best  system,  the  conclusion,  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent,  will  be,  either  that  there  is  no  such  being,  or  that 
if  there  is,  he  will  sooner  or  later  terminate  the  evil,  in  the 
universal  holiness  and  happiness  of  his  moral  creation.  The 
monstrous  absurdity,  that  sin  is  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good,  will  not  be  received  by  all  as  the  only  alterna- 
tive except  that  of  Atheism ;  or  if  received  as  such  by  some, 
still  the  undeniable  truth  that  a  benevolent  God  will  do  all  the 
good  he  can,  will  not  be  rejected  by  all  for  the  sake  of  avoiding 
Infidelity  and  Universalism.  The  error  obviously  lies  in  the 
gratuitous  and  unauthorized  assumption,  that  there  can  be  no 
impossibility  of  God's  preventing  moral  evil  under  a  moral 
system,  or  at  least  under  the  best  moral  system,  which  impos- 
sibility shall  be  as  truly  consistent  with  his  omnipotence,  as  is 
the  impossibility  of  making  two  and  two  to  be  five,  or  a  part 
equal  to  the  whole.  When  this  truth,  that  there  may  be  such 
an  impossibility,  shall  be  seen  and  familiarized  by  the  mind,  as 
presented  by  just  views  of  moral  agency  and  of  a  moral  sys- 
tem, then,  and  not  till  then,  can  the  present  system,  notwith- 
standing the  existence  of  moral  evil,  be  seen  to  stand  forth  as 
an  eternal  monument  of  the  wisdom,  power  and  goodness  of 
its  Author ;  then,  and  not  till  then,  will  men  learn  to  vindicate 


SIN    UNDER    THE    BEST    SYSTEM.  325 

the  ways  of  God  to  man,  not  by  the  far-fetched  and  unnatural 
principles  of  a  vain  philosophy,  but  by  the  natural,  obvious, 
common-sense  principle,  by  which  they  vindicate  and  applaud 
the  wisest  and  best  of  earthly  rulers,  when  his  laws  are  trans- 
gressed— the  principle,  that  notwithstanding  the  evil  he  has 
done,  he  has  done  the  best  thing  which  he  can  do. 


LECTURE  X. 

Third  leading  proposition  continued,  viz. :  God  governs  with  rightful  authority. — God  3s  benevo- 
lent.— 2.  The  present  system  not  only  viay  be,  but  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator. — (a)  It 
is  better  than  none. — Happiness  greater  than  misery  in  this  life.— Eesults  in  a  future  world. — 
(l>)  It  is  the  best  possible. — No  proof  that  a  better  could  be  adopted. — The  present,  in  its  nature 
and  tendencies,  is  the  best  conceivable,  and  therefore  the  best  possible. — This  argued  under 
two  heads;  1.  From  its  general  form  as  a  moral  system,  in  respect  to  the  kind  of  beings  and 
the  kind  of  influence  used. — 2.  From  its  particular  forms  as  a  moral  system,  as  involving  influ- 
ences from  the  nature  and  tendencies  of  moral  action,  from  moral  government,  from  an  equita- 
ble moral  government,  and  the  same  with  a  gracious  economy. — Remark. 

Lnt  the  two  preceding  lectures,  I  have  attempted  to  show  that 
there  is  no  proof  against  the  benevolence  of  God,  by  showing 
that  the  present  system,  with  its  results,  may  be  not  only  better 
than  none,  but  may  be  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator. 

I  now  proceed, 

To  offer  direct  proofs  of  his  benevolence. 

Before  I  adduce  the  proposed  proof,  I  will  give  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  argument  on  which  I  rely.  A  system  under  which 
evil  exists,  may  be  shown  by  decisive  evidence  to  be  the  best 
possible  system.  It  is  obvious  however,  that  this  must  be 
shown  in  a  somewhat  different  manner  from  what  it  would  be 
were  there  no  evil  connected  with  the  system.  To  illustrate 
then  by  an  example :  a  physician  may  perform  the  best  pos- 
sible operation  of  which  the  case  admits,  in  amputating  the 
limb  of  a  patient,  notwithstanding  the  pain  which  is  insepa- 
rable from  it.  If  all  that  can  be  shown  in  the  case  is,  that  the 
evils  connected  with  the  operation  may  be  either  inseparable 
from  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  or  may  be  them- 
selves the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  then,  although 
the  operation  would  .not  prove  the  physician  to  be  benevolent, 
it  would  oblige  us  to  admit  that  he  may  be  benevolent,  not- 
withstanding these  evils.  The  question,  when  judged  of  merely 
by  the  facts  now  supposed,  ought  to  remain  undecided;  or 
rather,  cannot  be  decided  in  the  negative.  To  this  point,  our 
preceding  discussion  respecting  the  question  of  the  divine  be- 
nevolence, so  far  as  it  depends  on  the  existence  of  evil,  has 
conducted  us. 


INTRODUCTORY    SUPPOSITIONS.  327 

Let  it  now  be  supposed,  that  to  amputate  the  diseased  limb 
is  better  than  to  do  nothing,  and  that  there  is  no  evidence  that 
the  physician  has  not  done  the  best  thing  in  his  power,  and 
there  is  good  reason  to  believe  the  benevolence  of  the  physi- 
cian in  the  act,  This  may  be  said  to  be  the  lowest  ground  on 
which  we  are  authorized  to  believe  that  he  is  benevolent.  It 
is  however,  sufficient  for  this  belief. 

We  will  now  suppose  a  stronger  case — that  the  amputation 
of  the  limb  is  known  to  be  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest 
good,  and  that  all  the  evils  connected  with  it  either  may  le 
inseparable  from  it,  so  far  as  the  power  of  the  physician  to 
prevent  them  is  concerned,  or  may  he  themselves  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good.  In  such  a  case  we  have  better 
grounds  for  awarding  to  the  physician  a  benevolent  design  in 
the  operation. 

We  will  now  suppose  a  case  still  stronger.  Suppose  not  only 
that  the  amputation  of  the  limb  is  known  to  be  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good,  and  that  all  the  evils  connected 
with  it,  except  those  which  are  the  necessary  means  of  the 
greatest  good,  are  inseparable  from  the  operation  beyond  the 
power  of  the  physician  to  prevent  them  ;  that  they  result  solely 
from  the  voluntary  intemperance  of  the  patient  himself,  and 
this  when  the  physician  does  every  thing  in  his  power  to 
prevent  them,  and  the  only  legitimate  conclusion  is,  that  he 
is  as  benevolent  as  had  this  class  of  evils  not  existed.  If  we 
still  further  suppose,  in  respect  to  the  other  class  of  evils, 
viz.,  those  which  are  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good, 
that  they  become  thus  necessary  only  by  the  perverseness  of 
the  patient  himself  in  his  intemperance,  then  the  conclusion 
is,  that  the  physician  is  as  benevolent  as  had  these  evils  not 
existed,  while  these  evils  become  themselves  proof  of  his  be- 
nevolence. 

On  these  suppositions,  it  is  obvious  that  the  benevolence  of 
the  physician  is  as  fully  proved  by  the  supposed  operation,  as 
the  using  of  the  best  means  of  the  best  end  can  prove  him  to 
be,  or  as  had  results  in  good,  without  the  slightest  degree  of 
evil,  followed  in  the  case,  If  now  we  suppose  once  more,  that 
he  combines  with  this  operation  every  other  expression  of  real 
kindness,  then  more  indisputable  and  decisive  proofs  of  benev- 
olence could  not  be  furnished.  By  all  these  forms  of  proof,  it 
is  now  claimed  that  the  benevolence  of  God  is  evinced  to  the 


328      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  PROM  NATURE. 

human  mind  by  that  system  of  things,  with  its  results,  which 
he  has  adopted. 

The  argument  as  a  whole,  may  be  thus  stated  in  a  hypo- 
thetical form,  with  the  conclusion  : 

If  there  is  no  proof,  so  far  as  results  are  concerned,  that  God 
could  have  adopted  a  better  system  than  he  has  adopted — if 
this  system,  in  view  of  its  results,  is  better  than  none — if  this 
system  be  the  best  possible  to  God,  and  so  the  necessary  means 
of  the  greatest  good  possible  to  him  to  secure — if  all  the  evil 
connected  with  the  system  is  either  inseparable  from  the  best 
system,  in  respect  to  divine  prevention,  or  is  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good  possible  to  God ;  and  if  God,  in 
addition  to  all  this,  actually  shows  kindness  to  his  creatures,  in 
every  other  conceivable  form  which  is  consistent  with  the  great- 
est good  possible  to  him — then  it  will  follow,  that 

God  is  benevolent — even  as  benevolent  as  had  the  best  pos- 
sible, or  best  conceivable  results,  been  actually  secured. 

Having  attempted  to  show  that  the  present  system  may  ~bc 
not  only  better  than  none,  but  the  best  possible,  I  now  proceed 
to  show  as  I  proposed : 

2.  That  it  is  not  only  better  than  none,  but  is  the  best  pos- 
sible to  the  Creator. 

(1.)  The  present  system  is  better  than  none.  This  I  propose 
to  show : 

First.  From  the  comparative  amount  of  happiness  and  misery 
in  the  present  world. 

Secondly.  From  the  results  of  the  present  system  in  a  future 
world. 

I  appeal — 

First ;  to  the  comparative  amount  of  happiness  and  misery 
in  the  present  world. 

We  claim  then,  that  the  amount  of  happiness  so  far  tran- 
scends the  amount  of  misery,  as  to  put  an  end  to  all  doubt  on 
the  question,  whether  the  present  system  with  its  results  is  not 
far  better  than  none.  To  contemplate  the  actual  experience  of 
men,  and  to  institute  such  inquiries  as  the  following,  must  de- 
cide this  question.  Where  is  the  individual  to  be  found  who 
does  not  at  every  moment  of  life  enjoy  so  much  in  present  pos- 
session, or  in  hope  of  future  good,  as  to  render  his  existence  de- 
sirable? How  few— how  very  few  are  the  instances  of  calamity 
and  suffering  with  which  manifold  and  rich  blessings  are  not 


AMOUNT    OF    HAPPINESS.  329 

combined — how  few  individuals  within  our  own  knowledge, 
who  are  not  enjoying  every  useful  and  necessary  gift  of  divine 
bounty,  and  prepared  and  qualified  to  enjoy  any  additional 
happiness  that  might  be  furnished !  Who  is  not  ready  to  wel- 
come the  knowledge  or  information  that  gratifies  curiosity — 
to  be  entertained  with  the  humor  of  the  wit,  or  the  ingenuity 
of  the  artist?  What  an  amount  of  all  that  can  be  called  hu- 
man misery,  is  chiefly  imaginary;  and  how  may  that  which  is 
real  be  diminished  by  contentment,  by  submission,  or  by  resort- 
ing to  available  sources  of  happiness.  Even  when  war,  famine 
and  pestilence  pour  in  their  floods  of  suffering  and  distress,  how 
large  a  portion  of  the  wide  earth,  untouched  by  their  desola- 
tions, exhibits  scenes  of  joy  and  gladness,  while  the  sufferers 
themselves  cling  to  life  through  the  remembrance  of  joys  that 
are  past,  or  the  hope  of  those  that  may  come !  In  short,  when 
we  look  over  the  world  and  see  all  its  millions  with  exceptions 
which  scarcely  are  to  be  thought  of,  retiring  to  rest  every 
night,  with  the  quiet  and  assured  anticipation  of  the  supply  of 
the  essential  wants  of  to-morrow,  and  reflect  that  this  is  founded 
only  on  the  uniform  experience  of  the  past,  how  can  we  fail  to 
pronounce  this  a  happy  world — one  at  least  in  which  existence 
is  far  better  than  non-existence  ?  If  we  turn  our  thoughts  to 
the  innumerable  sources  of  enjoyment  in  the  animal,  rational 
and  moral  departments  of  creation — if  we  contemplate  the  in- 
visible existence  that  peoples  every  leaf,  the  sportive  mazes  of 
the  insect  tribes  that  abound  in  the  atmosphere  and  the  waters 
— the  notes  of  joy  which  are  heard  from  every  grove,  the  de- 
lighted activity  of  the  larger  animals,  the  wonderful  provision 
made  for  their  supply  of  food,  the  obvious  and  nice  adapta- 
tions in  their  nature  and  condition  for  their  comfortable  or 
joyous  existence;  if  we  consider  man's  capacity  for  enjoyment 
from  the  wide  creation  around  him,  through  the  organs  of 
sense,  and  the  amount  of  good  which  would  in  this  way  be  fur- 
nished, were  the  means  of  it  never  perverted ;  if  we  think  of 
the  numerous  channels  of  higher  pleasures  which  are  opened 
to  man  in  his  intellectual  and  social  nature,  and  reflect  how 
these  are  supplied  by  the  everflowing  streams  of  divine  bounty 
in  all  the  tender  relations  of  life ;  and  then  reflect  on  the  anni- 
hilation of  all  these  earthly  joys  in  the  utter  darkness  and  deso- 
lation of  non-existence,  how  can  we  either  wish  not  to  have  been 
or  to  cease  to  be  ? 


330     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

If  we  contemplate  men  as  moral  beings,  how  are  the  vicious 
and  guilty  even  exempted  by  divine  compassion  from  the 
overwhelming  agonies  of  remorse ! — how  are  the  virtuous 
solaced  and  gladdened  as  with  the  peace  of  heaven!  !Nor 
ought  we  to  overlook  the  capacity  of  happiness  involved  in 
the  very  nature  of  moral  beings ;  what  a  condition  of  per- 
fection and  of  bliss  it  places  within  their  power,  and  one 
not  to  be  despaired  of,  but  rather  to  be  hoped  for  and  ex- 
pected by  the  well-founded  belief  of  the  enrapturing  truth, 
that  God  is,  "  and  is  the  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek 
him." 

If  now  we  take  the  most  gloomy  view  of  human  existence, 
so  far  as  it  can  bear  on  the  present  inquiry,  we  can  at  most 
find  but  here  and  there  an  individual  bosom  so  desolate  of  all 
good,  so  oppressed  with  present  griefs  and  gloomy  forebodings, 
as  to  consent  to  plunge  into  the  dark  gulf  of  non-existence, 
wThile  myriads  are  exulting  in  life  and  its  joys.  How  would 
these  myriads,  instead  of  counting  their  existence  undesirable, 
prefer  its  endless  duration  as  it  is,  rather  than  hazard  a  dimi- 
nution of  their  happiness  by  any  essential  and  yet  uncertain 
change  in  their  condition?  Supposing  the  prospect  of  im- 
provement to  be  fair  and  promising,  very  few  with  the  uncer- 
tainty remaining  whether  the  change  would  not  be  for  the 
worse  instead  of  for  the  better,  would  rationally  in  their  own 
view  incur  its  risk.  This  shows  how  we  value  life,  being  so 
well  satisfied  with  its  blessings,  that  to  hazard  the  uncertain- 
ties of  a  change  in  our  condition  of  existence,  would  be  deemed 
the  height  of  folly.  It  shows  how  readily,  were  the  alternative 
a  great  diminution  of  happiness  or  non-existence,  we  should 
prefer  the  former,  and  how  appalling  would  be  the  prospect  of 
ceasing  to  be,  compared  with  our  present  existence  and  the 
abundance  of  its  joys.  Every  thing  in  human  society,  in  the  de- 
vices of  man,  the  laws  made  to  protect  human  life,  the  remedies 
used  to  heal  diseases,  the  safeguards  from  accident  and  danger, 
the  provision  of  food  and  raiment,  in  short,  every  preservative 
of  life,  shows  that  its  loss  is  esteemed  the  greatest  to  which  man 
in  this  world  is  liable.  To  preserve  life  is  the  great  end  to 
which  human  solicitude  has  ever  been  directed,  and  for  which 
human  ingenuity  and  skill  have  been  exhausted.  Nor  can 
there  be  a  doubt  that  it  would  still  be  so,  were  death  known  to 
be  an  eternal  sleep — at  least  to  such  an  extent,  as  to  show  how 


AMOUNT    OF    HAPPINESS.  331 

• 

highly  man  values  tlie  existence  wliicli  his  Creator  gives  him  in 
the  present  world. 

Should  it  here  be  said,  that  I  have  now  taken  but  a  partial 
view  of  the  results  of  the  present  system — that,  although  it  be 
true  that  our  earthly  existence  merely,  is  greatly  to  be  preferred 
to  non-existence,  yet  there  is  a  future  state,  and  a  majority  of 
men  actually  leave  this  world  with  that  character,  which  in- 
sures their  future  unmingled  and  endless  misery — I  answer  as 
before,  that  if  we  suppose  a  majority  of  men  to  die  in  sin,  the 
light  of  nature  does  not  decide  that  the  present  life  is  the  whole 
of  man's  probation;  and  that  therefore  it  may  he  true,  that  the 
design  of  God  to  recover  men  to  virtue  and  to  happiness,  so 
conspicuously  manifested  here,  will  secure  the  perfect  happi- 
ness of  far  the  greater  part  of  mankind  hereafter.  Indeed,  this 
cannot,  from  the  light  of  nature,  be  shown  to  be  in  the  lowest 
degree  improbable.  Here  then  I  might  form  a  conclusive 
argument  for  the  divine  benevolence,  thus :  as  there  is  no  evi- 
dence that  God  is  not  doing  all  the  good  in  his  power,  or  that 
he  could  adopt  a  better  system  than  the  present ;  and  as  the 
present  system,  in  view  of  its  results  in  the  present  world,  is 
better  than  none,  it  follows  that  God  is  benevolent. 

But  not  to  rest  the  argument  on  this  ground  merely,  I  re- 
mark secondly,  that  the  present  system,  in  view  of  its  results 
in  a  future  world,  is  better  than  none.  Here  it  may  be  asked, 
with  some  degree  of  incredulity,  what  can  we  know,  or  ration- 
ally believe,  under  the  mere  light  of  nature,  respecting  the  allot- 
ments of  men  in  a  future  state  ?  I  answer,  we  can  know  all  that 
which  legitimate  evidence  warrants  us  to  believe ;  and  the  decla- 
rations of  God  on  this  subject  are  not  the  only  kind  of  evidence 
of  which  the  case  admits.  His  doings  may  as  truly  indicate 
his  designs,  and  tell  us  what  will  be  their  results,  as  his  decla- 
rations. 

Here  then  I  appeal  to  what  has  already  been  shown  respect- 
ing the  present  system.  I  shall  however  but  briefly  appeal  to 
these  facts,  intending  more  particularly  to  consider  them  in  a 
subsequent  argument,  to  show  that  the  present  system  is  the 
best  possible  to  the  Creator.  The  same  facts  show  that  the 
present  system  is  better  than  none,  as  they  evince  the  designs 
of  God  toward  men  in  a  future  state. 

The  facts  to  which  I  refer  are  briefly  these :  the  creation  of 
the  most  perfect  beings  in  kind ;  the  end  of  their  creation,  as 


332     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

« 

indicated  by  their  nature,  which  is  the  best  conceivable ;  the 
actual  giving  of  the  best  law,  or  rule  of  action ;  the  adminis- 
tration of  a  moral  government  involving  this  perfect  law,  and 
a  strict  adherence  to  the  principles  of  perfect  equity,  and  not 
only  this,  but  connected  with  it,  an  economy  of  grace;  every 
thing  in  the  condition  and  circumstances  of  man  fitted  to  re- 
store him  to  virtue  and  haj)piness,  and  to  secure  him  in  this 
state  of  perfection;  while  no  change  is  conceivable,  which 
would  add  perfection  to  the  system  as  the  means  of  this  high 
end.  What  then  can  we — ought  we  to  believe,  will  be  the 
results  of  such  a  system  in  a  future  world  %  Will  this  high 
design  of  a  Being  of  infinite  wisdom  and  power  be  wholly  de- 
feated %  Will  our  present  state,  so  bright  with  the  smiles  of 
his  mercy,  be  followed  by  one  only  dark  and  dreadful,  under 
the  frowns  of  his  anger  ?  When  God  is  so  clearly  aiming  to 
restore  man  to  holiness  and  happiness,  is  there  nothing  to  hope 
for  but  universal  sin  and  exact  retribution  ?  True  it  is,  that 
from  the  light  of  nature  alone,  we  cannot  in  all  respects  give  a 
definite  answer  to  the  present  inquiry.  But  we  are  constrained 
to  give  one  that  is  general,  and  altogether  decisive  on  the  point 
before  us.  The  nature  of  the  present  system,  so  clearly  and 
extensively  benignant  in  its  design,  proves  that  this  design  will 
not  be  wholly  abortive,  but  in  some  good  degree  accomplished. 
This  system,  begun  by  infinite  wisdom  and  power,  and  carried 
onward  through  all  the  generations  of  men,  clearly  indicates 
results  in  a  future  state  corresponding  with  its  own  benignity 
and  grace.  To  hesitate  or  doubt  on  this  point,  especially  in 
view  of  the  infinite  natural  perfection  of  the  Being  whose  de- 
sign it  is,  is  to  do  violence  to  the  laws  of  belief,  as  well  as  to 
disregard  and  distrust  the  only  possible  proofs  of  the  divine 
placability. 

In  view  then  of  what  we  must  suppose  will  be  the  actual 
results  of  the  present  system  in  a  future  world,  we  must  also 
believe  that  the  present  system,  viewed  in  relation  to  these 
results,  is  better — far  better  than  none,  and  the  best  possible  to 
the  Creator. 

The  way  is  now  prepared  to  offer  direct  proofs  of  the  benev- 
olence of  God  from  his  works. 

Argument  I.  The  first  argument  is,  that  there  is  no  proof,  so 
far  as  results  are  concerned,  that  God  could  have  adopted  a 
better  system  than  the  present,  and  there  is  proof  that  the  present 


THE    TWO    ARGUMENTS.  333 

system  is  better  than  none.  That  there  is  no  proof  so  far  as  re- 
sults are  concerned,  that  GqcI  could  have  adopted  a  better  system 
than  the  present,  I  have  already  attempted  to  prove,  by  showing 
that  it  may  be  such  a  system  notwithstanding  the  existence 
of  natural  and  moral  evil.  If  what  has  been  said  on  this  sub- 
ject be  true,  then  their  existence  is  to  be  wholly  laid  aside 
as  entitled  to  no  consideration  in  the  argument.  We  have 
shown  that  all  existing  evils  may  be  either  the  necessary 
means  of  the  greatest  good  possible  to  the  Creator,  or  in  re- 
spect to  divine  prevention  may  be  incidental  to  the  best  sys- 
tem possible  to  the  Creator.  Of  course  if  there  be  other  facts, 
which,  were  there  no  existing  evil,  would  be  sufficient  to  prove 
his  benevolence,  then  as  the  existing  evil  furnishes  no  proof 
that  he  is  not  benevolent,  or  that  the  present  system  is  not  the 
best  possible  to  the  Creator,  this  evil  must,  in  a  fair  argument, 
be  laid  out  of  consideration.  The  present  system  may  be,  not- 
withstanding the  existence  of  the  evil,  the  best  possible  to  the 
Creator. 

Again;  it  has  been  shown  that  the  present  system  is  bet- 
ter than  none.  And  if  this  is  true,  and  there  is  no  evidence 
that  God  could  have  adopted  a  better  system  than  the  present, 
then  it  follows  that  the  present  system  is  the  best  possible  to 
the  Creator,  and  that  he  is  therefore  benevolent. 

It  may  be  well  to  remark  here,  that  the  argument,  according 
to  the  illustration  of  it  before  given,  is  cumulative.  "When  we 
have  established  the  two  premises  of  the  foregoing  argument, 
we  have  furnished  a  valid  proof  of  the  divine  benevolence,  and 
therefore  in  each  of  our  remaining  positions  we  shall  increase 
the  proof. 

I  now  offer  a  second  general  argument : 

Argument  II.  The  present  system  in  its  nature  and  tenden- 
cies is  the  best  conceivable,  and  therefore  the  best  possible  to 
the  Creator. 

I  have  said  that  the  proof  of  the  divine  benevolence  is  cumu- 
lative. What  I  claim  for  it  in  this  respect  is,  that  when  as  in 
our  first  argument,  it  is  shown  that  in  view  of  the  results  of  the 
present  system,  it  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  then  if  in 
view  of  the  nature  and  tendencies  of  the  system,  it  be  shown 
that  it  is  the  best  conceivable,  we  have  still  further  proof 
that  it  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  and  so  much  addi- 
tional proof  of  his  benevolence.     The  nature  and  tendencies  of 


334:     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

the  system,  if  they  can  be  shown  to  be  the  best  conceivable, 
now  become  in  view  of  the  perfection  of  the  system  as  judged 
by  its  results,  so  much  uncounteracted  and  independent  proof 
of  the  highest  possible  perfection  of  the  system ;  proof  as  de- 
cisive and  complete  as  were  the  system  actually  followed 
by  the  highest  conceivable  good  which  it  is  fitted  to  produce. 
Nor  is  this  all.  But  when,  as  we  have  shown,  not  only 
there  is  not  the  least  counteracting  evidence  from  any  other 
source,  but  the  present  system,  judged  of  by  its  results,  is 
the  best  possible  to  the  Creator ;  then  each  and  every  adapta- 
tion, fitness,  tendency  of  the  system  to  the  production  of  the 
highest  conceivable  good,  is  so  much  additional  proof  that  the 
Author  of  the  system  designed  the  highest  conceivable  good ; 
and  is  therefore  so  much  additional  proof  of  his  benevolence 
in  adopting  the  system.  In  this  mode  of  reasoning  then,I  now 
proceed  to  show  that  the  present  system  is  the  best  possible  to 
the  Creator,  by  proving  that  in  its  nature  and  tendencies  it  is 
the  best  conceivable  system. 
This  I  shall  attempt  to  show : 

1.  From  its  general  form  as  a  moral  system ;  and 

2.  From  its  more  particular  forms  as  such  a  system. 

That  the  present  system  then  is  the  best  conceivable,  and 
therefore  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  I  argue — 

1.  From  its  general  form  as  a  moral  system.  As  a  moral 
system  in  distinction  from  any  system  not  moral,  it  is  in  hind 
the  best  conceivable.  It  is  so,  if  we  consider  the  kind  of  beings 
and  the  kind  of  influence  which  it  involves. 

And  first  in  respect  to  the  kind  of  beings.  These  are  of  course 
moral  beings ;  and  as  such  are  formed  in  the  image  of  God 
himself.  No  other  work  of  the  Creator  could  so  employ  his  wis- 
dom and  his  power — no  other  creatures  could  be  so  exalted  in 
the  scale  of  existence — no  other  product  could  so  manifest  the 
infinitude  of  his  natural  attributes.  On  no  other  could  he  look 
with  so  much  self-complacency.  "There  is,"  said  Augustine, 
"but  one  object  greater  than  the  soul,  and  that  object  is  its 
Creator."  Had  God  then  not  adopted  a  system  of  creation 
including  moral  beings,  the  highest  place  in  the  scale  of 
created  being  had  been  vacant,  and  without  them  the  inter- 
val between  mere  animal  existence  and  God  himself,  had  been 
unoccupied. 

What  then  had  been  a  system  of  creatures,  endowed  only 


THE    HIGHEST  KIND    OF    BEINGS.  635 

with  animal  sensation,  compared  with  a  system  of  beings  capable 
of  holy  affections  and  holy  activity,  and  each  and  all  capable 
of  possessing  perfect,  even  the  highest  degree  of  happiness 
conceivable?  If  God  were  good,  what  else  could  he  do  but 
create  mind — beings  in  his  own  image,  with  intelligence  to 
know  himself,  his  character,  his  will,  his  designs,  his  works ; 
with  hearts  to  burn  with  love,  with  wills  to  obey  his  perfect  will 
— with  conscience  to  feel  the  high  deservings  of  right  and  wrong 
moral  action,  and  to  sway  all  the  powers  of  the  soul  in  the 
harmony  of  perfect  virtue;  beings  with  sympathies  and  social 
tendencies,  capable  of  living  in  the  past,  the  present,  and  the 
future — capable  of  entering  into  fellowship  with  God,  and  of 
awakening  his  confidence  and  his  complacency  as  the  executors 
of  his  high  counsels ;  beings  so  powerful  in  intellect,  as  to  be  able 
to  look  with  open  face  on  the  full  effulgence  of  his  Godhead, 
so  capacious  of  heart  as  to  receive  the  fullness  of  joy  at  his 
right  hand,  and  who  thus  filled  with  all  the  fullness  of  God, 
might  stand  around  his  throne  as  mirrors  of  his  own  creation,  to 
reflect  the  light  of  his  glory  forever  ?  For  such  a  creation  what 
shall  be  substituted  ?  The  present  system  then,  in  respect  to 
the  kind  of  beings  which  it  includes,  is  the  best  conceivable, 
and  in  this  respect,  there  being  no  counteracting  evidence,  fur- 
nishes another  independent  and  decisive  proof  of  the  Creator's 
goodness. 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  present  system,  as  it  employs  a 
moral  influence.  After  what  has  been  already  said,  I  may  as- 
sume the  position  as  incontrovertible,  that  the  universal  and 
perfect  holiness  of  a  moral  creation  is  necessary  to  the  highest 
conceivable  happiness  of  such  a  creation.  It  is  equally  unde- 
niable, that  the  kind  of  influence  which  is  peculiar  to  a  moral 
system,  is  indispensable  to  the  production  of  holiness  in  the 
least  degree  in  moral  beings.  It  is  of  course  necessary  to  the 
highest  degree  of  holiness,  and  therefore  to  the  highest  degree 
of  happiness. 

In  this  view  of  this  kind  of  influence,  and  of  the  system 
which  includes  it,  the  system  has  all  the  value  which  would 
pertain  to  a  moral  creation  made  perfectly  blessed  by  perfect 
moral  excellence.  And  who  can  estimate  the  worth  of  an  in- 
fluence which  is  indispensable  to  such  a  result  ?  Who  will 
attempt  to  conceive  of  any  other  as  its  substitute?  ISor  is  this 
its  only  feature.     There  is  a  high  and  ennobling  pleasure  in 


336  MORAL    GOVERNMENT    PROM    NATURE. 

using  this  influence,  nor  scarcely  less  in  feeling  it.  To  uphold 
and  move  the  material  universe  in  all  its  regularity  and  beauty, 
to  give  form,  and  life,  and  activity  to  the  whole  intelligent  crea- 
tion— to  pervade,  sustain,  and  animate  all  as  the  handywork  of 
Omnipotence,  is  a  source  of  high  delight  to  the  infinite  Author 
of  all.  But  to  influence  mind — to  be  the  author  of  that  system 
of  truth,  of  evidence,  of  motive,  which  is  adapted  to  control 
and  direct  intelligent,  free,  moral  beings,  and  to  secure  the 
high  end  of  their  existence — fitted  to  accomplish  such  a  result 
in  beings  with  powers  adequate  to  defeat  it — to  bring  forth  an 
influence  which  shall  give  absolute  perfection  to  a  moral  uni- 
verse for  eternity,  without  in  the  least  infringing  on  the  noble 
prerogative  of  their  freedom,  imposes  a  new  demand  on  omnip- 
otence, and  imparts  a  grandeur  and  glory  to  God's  dominion, 
which  excludes  from  thought  every  other. 

At  the  same  time,  to  be  the  subject  of  such  influence — to 
live  under  that  system,  and  those  manifestations  of  truth,  which 
are  thus  adapted  to  move  moral  beings,  and  to  secure  such  re- 
sults— a  system  which  has  tasked  the  wisdom  and  the  power 
of  the  infinite  Being,  and  whose  results  can  fail  only  through 
the  perverseness  of  creatures,  when  in  respect  to  the  kind  of 
influence  God  could  do  no  more;  to  have  such  interests  placed 
within  one's  own  power — committed  to  choice,  enlightened  and 
guided  by  intelligence  to  comprehend  them — to  be  able  to  se- 
cure the  result  designed  by  an  act  of  will,  and  if  secured,  to 
say,  "  I  have  done  it,  when  I  could  have  done  the  opposite" — 
to  live  under  a  system,  where  the  alternative  is  the  self-perfec- 
tion or  self-destruction  of  an  immortal  being — this  is  to  occupy 
a  place  of  exaltation  and  dignity,  which  none  can  transcend  or 
equal.  If  such  a  being  rises,  what  a  height  of  glory !  If  he 
falls,  what  ruin!  The  alternative  is  indeed  tremendous,  but  is 
demanded  by  the  essential  perfection  of  the  system,  and  its 
foreseen  and  glorious  results.  Every  tendency  justly  estimated 
is  adapted  to  a  successful  and  triumphant  issue.  The  influence 
from  the  doom  foreseen  is  only  salutary.  It  can  be  incurred 
only  by  voluntary  perversion  and  fault ;  it  can  come  only  by 
the  great  law  of  choice  between  life  and  death,  without  which 
a  more  dreadful  ruin  must  come  to  all — without  which  the  in- 
finite Being  himself  must  sacrifice  his  perfect  character,  and 
with  this  his  perfect  blessedness. 

Such  then  is  the  influence  which  is  involved  in  the  present, 


THE    HIGHEST    KIND    OF    INFLUENCE.  337 

as  a  moral  system.  How  degrading  to  creatures,  liow  unwor- 
thy of  a  perfect  God,  were  any  other  in  its  stead !  How  re- 
pulsive, how  revolting  a  system  of  coercion — or  rather,  what 
degrading  absurdity  in  the  thought  of  controlling  moral  beings 
by  physical  agency,  or  by  the  mechanism  of  cause  and  effect ! 
The  mind,  created  in  God's  image,  must  be  governed,  if  at  all, 
by  the  influence  which  moves  him  in  all  his  doings — even  by 
that  truth  which  fixes  and  reveals  the  eternal  relations  of 
things,  and  gives  the  soul  its  life  in  perfect  holiness  and  perfect 
bliss.  Without  this  influence  of  the  system,  what  will  become 
of  its  issues,  in  all  the  self-complacency,  free,  voluntary,  joy- 
ous activity,  and  eternal  triumphs,  of  which  perfected  moral 
beings  are  capable?  On  this  influence  in  distinction  from 
every  other,  these  results  all  depend.  Its  tendency  is  to  pro- 
duce such,  and  only  such — even  the  highest  conceivable  good 
of  the  best  conceivable  system  of  creatures.  This  tendency  of 
this  influence  in  a  system  which  is  better  than  none,  and  which, 
for  aught  that  can  be  shown  to  the  contrary,  is  the  best  possi- 
ble to  the  Creator,  is  as  conspicuous,  and  as  obviously  designed 
by  its  Author  to  secure  its  benign  and  blessed  results,  as  were 
they  actually  secured.  The  present  system  then,  as  it  involves 
a  moral  influence  in  distinction  from  any  other,  is  the  best 
conceivable,  and  in  this  respect  furnishes  another  independent 
and  decisive  proof  of  God's  benevolence. 

That  the  present  system  is  the  best  conceivable,  and  there- 
fore the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  I  argue — 

2.  From  its  more  particular  forms  as  a  moral  system.  Here 
I  appeal  to  it  as  comprising  four  particular  forms  of  a  moral 
system :  that  influence  to  secure  perfection  in  character  and  in 
happiness,  which  results  from  the  perceived  nature  and  tenden- 
cies of  moral  action ;  the  influence  of  a  moral  government ;  that 
of  an  equitable  moral  government ;  and  that  of  an  equitable 
moral  government  under  a  gracious  economy. 

In  the  first  place,  the  present  system  comprises  that  influence 
to  secure  perfection  in  character  and  in  happiness,  which  results 
from  the  perceived  nature  and  tendencies  of  moral  action. 
These  are  plainly  and  impressively  manifested  in  the  constitu- 
tion and  condition  of  the  human  mind.  I  need  not  here  repeat 
the  facts  on  this  part  of  the  subject,  which  have  been  so  re- 
cently presented.  In  view  of  them,  I  may  ask,  what  more  in 
this  respect  could  God  have  done?  The  answer  is,  nothing — 
Vol.  I.— 15.  22  " 


338  MORAL    GOYERNMEXT    FROM   NATURE. 

which  for  aught  that  appears  to  the  contrary,  would  not  have 
been  for  the  worse.  If  we  contemplate  the  knowledge  of  truth 
which  is  thus  given  to  every  mind,  in  its  source,  its  nature,  its 
power,  can  any  thing  be  conceived  in  this  respect  to  heighten 
the  excellence  of  the  system?  It  is  knowledge  of  the  fixed 
and  immutable  relations  of  right  and  wrong,  given  in  the  very 
nature  and  elements  of  our  being;  knowledge  of  good  and 
evil  in  their  highest  conceivable  degrees,  and  of  the  only  means 
of  obtaining  the  one  and  avoiding  the  other ;  knowledge  of  all 
that  man  need  to  know  as  a  being  made  for  immortality,  that 
he  may  secure  his  perfection  in  character  and  in  happiness ; 
knowledge,  which  is  pressed  upon  thought  and  susceptibility 
in  experience,  and  as  it  were  every  moment ;  knowledge,  which 
can  be  practically  resisted  and  counteracted  only  by  the  most 
desperate  violence  and  infatuation  of  which  moral  beings  are 
capable ;  knowledge  which  even  when  thus  resisted  puts  its 
firm  grasp  on  the  conscience  and  holds  it  there:  still  opens  the 
bright  visions  of  hope  in  the  self-complacency  of  virtue,  and  re- 
veals the  terrors  of  self-condemnation  in  the  remorse  of  guilt, 
and  thus  distinctly  and  at  every  step  of  life  is  telling  man  of  a 
retribution  in  that  heaven  or  hell  which  he  carries  in  his  own 
bosom ;  knowledge  therefore  which  is  fitted  so  far  as  knowl- 
edge from  these  sources  can  be,  to  secure  in  the  best  manner 
and  in  the  highest  degree,  man's  perfection  in  character  and  in 
happiness. 

This  tendency  of  this  knowledge  is  as  manifest  as  were  the 
result  actually  secured.  It  is  furnished  in  a  system  which  is  not 
only  better  than  none,  but  which  for  aught  that  can  be  shown 
to  the  contrary,  is  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator.  It  is  there- 
fore as  obviously  designed  by  the  author  of  the  system  to  se- 
cure the  result  which  it  is  fitted  to  produce,  as  were  that  result 
actually  secured.  The  present  system  then,  as  it  comprises 
that  influence  from  the  perceived  nature  and  tendencies  of 
moral  action,  which  is  fitted  to  promote  the  highest  blessed- 
ness of  God's  moral  creation,  furnishes  another  proof  of  the 
highest  conceivable  perfection  of  the  system  and  of  the  benev- 
olence of  its  author. 

In  the  second  place,  the  present  system  comprises  a  moral 
government.  Moral  government  in  the  lowest  import  of  the 
terms,  includes  a  moral  governor,  a  rule  of  action  as  the  ex- 
pression of  his  will — good   promised  to  obedience  and  evil 


PARTICULAR    FORMS    OF    INFLUENCE.  330 

threatened  to  disobedience.  These  things,  though  they  do  not 
necessarily  include  the  equitable  administration  of  a  moral 
government,  are  essential  to  what  can  be  properly  called  a 
moral  government.  Without  now  insisting  on  the  equity  of 
God's  moral  administration  over  men,  still  he  is  administering 
a  moral  government  over  them,  and  such  a  moral  government 
as  is  consistent  with  the  system's  being  the  best  possible,  and 
also  better  than  none.  In  this  view  of  a  moral  government,  I 
claim  that  it  is  an  excellence  which  is  essential  to  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  system.  Let  then  the  present  system  without, 
be  compared  with  one  which  includes  a  moral  government, 
and  be  contemplated  in  relation  to  the  great  end  of  a  moral 
system.  What  would  it  be,  when  compared  with  one  which 
exhibits  the  infinite  Creator  of  men,  as  also  their  sovereign 
Lawgiver  and  Judge?  In  this  relation  that  great  Being  is 
presented  to  the  mind  as  taking  a  deeper,  stronger  interest  in 
the  moral  conduct  of  his  moral  creatures  as  the  means  of  their 
perfection  and  happiness,  than  in  any  and  every  thing  besides. 
In  this  relation  he  makes  a  clear  expression  of  his  preference 
of  right  to  wrong  moral  action  on  the  part  of  every  subject, 
and  shows  them  that  their  highest  interests  can  be  secured 
only  by  obedience  to  his  will.  With  their  happiness  and  mis- 
ery at  his  disposal,  he  authorizes  only  the  expectation  on  their 
part  that  all  depends  on  their  conduct.  Whatever  conviction 
of  duty  then  we  may  suppose  men  to  derive  from  any  other 
source — what  additional  strength  and  power  must  be  given 
to  that  conviction  by  the  clear  and  decisive  promulgation  of 
the  will  of  God  in  exact  accordance  with  it!  How  feeble 
and  fluctuating — how  evanescent,  easily  forgotten  and  disre- 
garded the  conviction  derived  from  one  source  only,  com- 
pared with  the  same  derived  from  both  ;  how  must  the  con- 
viction of  duty  first  obtained  from  our  nature  and  condition 
and  the  tendencies  of  moral  action,  be  impressed  by  its  known 
coincidence  with  the  will,  the  law  of  Him  who  holds  all 
destiny  in  his  hands !  While  our  very  being  reveals  the  ab- 
solute and  unalterable  law,  that  if  we  would  be  happy  and 
not  miserable  we  must  be  good,  the  execution  of  this  law  is 
made  known  in  the  immutable  will  and  resistless  power  of  an 
infinite  being.  But  if  we  suppose  no  moral  government  over 
this  world,  then  no  evidence  can  be  found  of  a  retribution  for  the 
right  and  wrong  doing  of  men.     The  distribution  of  good  and 


340     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

evil  in  this  world  is  not  in  the  lowest  sense  retributive.  Aside 
from  God's  relation  as  a  moral  governor  of  men,  legal  sanc- 
tions— good  and  evil  awarded  to  sustain  authority — a  Judge  to 
approve  and  condemn,  to  reward  and  to  punish  are  not  to  be 
thought  of.  But  with  a  moral  governor  in  view,  and  he  no 
other  than  the  infinite  Creator  of  all,  holding  the  allotment  in 
the  happiness  and  misery  of  every  creature  in  his  power,  and 
giving  a  full  indication  of  his  purpose  to  make  them  in  a  high 
degree  happy  or  miserable  as  they  obey  or  disobey  his  will, 
what  other  influence  can  be  substituted  for  this,  in  a  system 
which  is  better  than  none,  and  which  for  aught  that  can  be 
shown  to  the  contrary, is  the  best  possible?  It  is  an  influence 
which  can  be  viewed  in  such  a  case  as  tending  only  to  good, 
and  to  good  in  the  highest  conceivable  degree.  The  present 
system  therefore,  as  it  comprises  a  moral  government  on  the 
part  of  God,  has  another  excellence  which  is  essential  to  its 
highest  conceivable  perfection,  and  in  this  respect  furnishes 
another  independent  and  decisive  proof  of  the  benevolence  of 
its  author. 

In  the  third  place,  the  present  system  includes  cm  equitable 
moral  government.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  equity  of  a 
moral  administration  or  of  a  moral  government  may  imply  the 
benevolence  of  the  moral  governor.  I  use  this  language  how- 
ever as  I  have  before  said,  merely  to  characterize  what  may  be 
called  his  providential  dispensations  as  being  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  of  equity,  whether  we  suppose  him  to  be  a 
benevolent  or  a  selfish  being.  In  other  words,  by  the  equity 
of  God's  moral  administration  over  this  world — I  mean  that  his 
providential  dispensations  are  what  they  would  be  on  the  sup- 
position of  his  perfect  benevolence,  without  assuming  that  such 
is  his  character.  In  this  sense  the  equity  of  his  administration 
whether  he  be  a  benevolent  or  a  selfish  being,  consists  in  his 
giving  the  best  law  or  rule  of  action,  and  in  annexing  to  this 
law  those  sanctions  in  good  and  evil  which  express  his  highest 
approbation  of  right  and  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral 
action,  and  which  are  requisite  as  such  expressions  to  sustain 
his  authority. 

I  claim  to  have  shown  already,  that  God  is  administering  in 
the  sense  now  stated,  an  equitable  moral  government  over 
men,*and  that  without  so  doing  it  would  be  impossible  that  he 
should  show  himself  to  be  entitled  to  the  least  respect  as  a 


GOD'S    EQUITY    PROVES    BENEVOLENCE.  341 

moral  governor.  The  impossibility  of  this  on  the  supposition 
of  his  not  giving  the  best  law,  will  not  be  denied.  So  if  we 
suppose  him  to  annex  to  the  best  law,  less  degrees  of  natural 
good  and  evil  than  the  highest  as  the  sanctions  of  his  law,  it 
would  show  that  he  approves  of  right  moral  action  less  than 
supremely,  and  disapproves  of  wrong  moral  action  less  than 
supremely.  Such  a  manifestation  of  feeling  toward  these  ob- 
jects would  be  decisive;  that  he  does  not  regard  things  as  they 
are ;  that  he  does  not  act  on  the  principle  of  eternal  rectitude — 
that  of  regarding  the  best  kind  of  action  as  the  best,  and  the 
worst  kind  of  action  as  the  worst ;  that  instead  of  showing  him- 
self disposed  to  sustain  his  authority,  and  to  employ  this  influ- 
ence for  the  welfare  of  his  kingdom,  he  acts  on  principles  of 
partiality,  favoritism,  injustice,  tyranny;  that  he  is  therefore  a 
selfish  and  malignant  being,  and  in  no  respect  entitled  to  the 
homage  of  his  subjects,  or  to  the  throne  he  occupies. 

But  in  the  present  system,  instead  of  thus  subverting  his 
authority  as  a  moral  governor  by  disproving  his  benevolence, 
God,  as  we  have  seen,  adheres  to  strict  equity  in  his  moral 
administration.  lie  gives  the  best  law  or  rule  of  action,  and 
by  the  requisite  legal  sanctions,  expresses  the  highest  approba- 
tion of  right,  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of  wrong  moral 
action.  lie  does  the  very  things  in  these  essential  respects 
which  he  would  do  were  he  a  being  of  perfect  benevolence ; 
the  very  things,  without  which  he  cannot  prove  his  benevolence 
and  sustain  his  authority  as  a  moral  governor.  For  what  other 
higher  or  better  influence  can  be  substituted  for  this,  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  the  greatest  amount  of  right  moral  action, 
and  thus  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  in  a  moral  creation  ? 
Could  any  higher  or  better  influence  for  the  purpose  be  derived 
from  natural  good  and  evil,  considered  as  merely  so  much  mo- 
tive employed  to  secure  right  and  prevent  wrong  moral  action  ? 
Could  it  result  from  giving  any  other  law  than  the  best — from 
expressing  in  the  form  of  law  any  other  preference  than  of  the 
best  kind  of  action  ?  Could  any  higher  or  better  influence  for 
the  same  purpose  result  from  legal  sanctions,  considered  as  the 
expressions  of  any  other  particular  feelings  or  emotions  toward 
right  and  wrong  moral  action,  than  those  of  the  highest  appro- 
bation of  the  one  and  the  highest  disapprobation  of  the  other  ? 
In  these  respects  plainly,  no  other  influence  conceivable  can 
possess  the  same  salutary  tendency.     In  this  way  only  can  he 


34:2     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

manifest  those  attributes  of  a  perfect  moral  governor,  which,  we 
call  his  holiness^  justice ; — holiness  in  all  its  love  and  compla- 
cency toward  moral  excellence,  and  in  that  inaccessible  purity 
which  recoils  from,  and  in  that  withering  abhorrence  which 
forbids  the  approach  of  the  least  moral  defilement ; — -justice  in 
that  serene  and  awful  majesty  of  its  inflexible  purpose  to  sweep 
a  rebellious  world  into  the  abyss  of  ruin,  rather  than  suifer  the 
least  obscurity  or  infringement  of  his  right  to  reign.  Under 
no  other  manifestation  of  God,  could  obedience  to  his  will  be 
rendered  as  the  will  of  a  perfect  being.  There  might  indeed, 
be  a  moral  system,  and  moral  influences,  and  if  you  please,  a 
moral  government ;  but  there  could  be  no  moral  government 
in  the  hands  of  a  perfect  being ;  none  in  that  distinctive  char- 
acter which  results  from  the  absolute  prerogative  of  rightful 
dominion.  Unless  Ave  see  God  through  the  medium  of  an 
equitable  administration,  we  cannot  see  him  as  immutably  holy 
and  just,  and  can  therefore  never  confide,  love,  and  obey.  In 
a  word,  it  is  only  through  an  equitable  moral  administration, 
that  God  as  a  moral  governor,  can  manifest  his  perfect  char- 
acter. 

Now  I  do  not  say,  that  such  an  administration  necessarily 
excludes  all  opposing  evidence  on  the  question  of  his  moral 
character;  but  that  when  it  exists,  as  it  does  in  the  present 
case  without  the  least  opposing  evidence — when  it  exists  as  an 
element  of  a  system,  which,  in  view  of  its  results,  is,  so  far  as 
we  have  seen,  the  best  possible  to  the  Creator,  it  can  be  viewed 
only  as  an  essential  element  of  the  perfection  of  the  system, 
and  as  such,  another  and  decisive  proof  of  its  perfection  and  of 
the  benevolence  of  its  Author.  In  such  a  case,  what  other 
view  can  be  taken  of  his  giving  his  perfect  law — perfect  in  its 
precept,  and  perfect  in  its  sanctions — except  that  of  the  most 
unequivocal  and  decisive  expression  of  his  supreme  and  benev- 
olent preference  of  right  moral  action,  and  as  its  consequence, 
the  highest  possible  happiness  of  his  moral  creation  ?  "What 
can  be  the  design  of  making  such  an  expression  of  these  feel- 
ings, in  this  most  impressive  form  conceivable,  except  that  by 
so  doing  he  may  secure  this  result  ?  Were  this  actually  accom- 
plished by  this  means,  who  then  could  doubt  its  adaptation  to 
the  end,  and  the  benevolent  design  of  its  Author  ?  But  its 
tendency  to  this  result  is  a  matter  of  absolute  knowledge,  and 
would  be  no  more  obvious  than  it  now  is  were  the  result  actu- 


AN    ECONOMY    OF    GRACE.  343 

ally  produced.  And  now,  when  the  design  of  its  Author  to 
secure  this  result,  instead  of  being  obscured  by  the  slightest 
shade  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  is  confirmed  by  the  manifes- 
tation of  his  benevolence  in  every  other  form,  this  design  is  as 
conspicuous  and  undeniable  as  is  the  tendency  to  this  result 
of  the  same  element  of  the  system.  Neither  can  be  denied  or 
doubted.  The  design  of  God  in  administering  an  equitable 
moral  government  over  men,  in  order  that  the  end  should  be 
produced,  for  which  it  is  perfectly  adapted,  stands  forth  as  con- 
spicuous as  were  that  end  actually  accomplished  in  the  highest 
conceivable  happiness  of  his  moral  creation.  In  view  then  of 
the  equity  of  God's  moral  administration,  we  say  that  it  is  one 
element  of  the  best  possible  system,  which  is  not  only  an  indis- 
pensable, but  an  independent  and  decisive  proof  of  equity  in 
principle ;  thus  revealing  on  the  throne  of  moral  dominion,  a 
God  of  perfect  holiness  and  perfect  justice,  and  of  course,  a  God 
of  perfect  benevolence. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  present  system  is  the  best  conceiva- 
ble, as  it  includes  an  equitable  moral  government  under  an 
economy  of  grace.  That  God  is  administering  such  a  govern- 
ment over  men,  I  persuade  myself  has  been  shown  in  former 
lectures.  We  have  seen  that  the  manner  in  which  he  distrib- 
utes good  and  evil  in  this  world  entirely  harmonizes  with  an 
economy  of  grace ;  that  while  there  is  nothing  in  the  whole 
history  of  his  providence  inconsistent  with  the  strict  principles 
of  equity  in  his  administration,  there  are  still  decisive  intima- 
tions that  he  has  not  abandoned  these  principles — that  every 
thing  in  the  manner  in  which  he  treats  this  world  of  transgres- 
sors, clearly  and  impressively  bespeaks  his  will  that  they  should 
return  to  duty  and  to  happiness,  rather  than  continue  in  sin, 
and  die  forever.  "We  see  him  furnishing  to  all  the  most  deci- 
sive proofs  that  their  highest  happiness  can  be  found  only  in 
obedience  to  his  Will — drawing  them  to  repentance  by  the  most 
powerful  influence,  that  of  manifested  kindness;  by  those  "cords 
of  love  and  bands  of  a  man,"  which  it  would  seem  no  perver- 
sity of  heart  could  resist ;  dispensing  natural  evil,  under  the 
kindest  forms  of  necessary  moral  discipline  or  paternal  chastise- 
ment, with  the  obvious  design  to  reclaim  and  bless  his  disobe- 
dient children — making  the  present  state  of  man  most  obviously 
one  of  trial  and  of  discipline,  and  as  such,  designed  and  fitted 
to  form  his  character  to  permanent  virtue  and  happiness — 


344     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

placing  man's  present  enjoyment  so  far  and  so  clearly  in  Ms 
own  power,  as  to  show  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  a 
universal  and  perfect  moral  reformation  would  transform  the 
world,  darkened  and  afflicted  as  it  is  by  sin  and  its  woes,  into 
a  primeval  paradise ;  thus  in  every  conceivable  form  and  mode 
of  dispensation,  clearly  evincing  his  power  to  sustain  such  a 
system  of  justice  and  of  grace — forbidding  a  surmise  either  of 
malignant  intention,  or  of  weak  and  indulgent  connivance  at 
iniquity,  and  so  rendering  every  other  supposition  inadmissible, 
except,  that  while  he  sustains  the  principles  of  eternal  righteous- 
ness inviolate,  he  is,  in  the  fullness  of  love  and  mercy,  aiming 
to  restore  a  lost  world  to  duty,  to  favor,  and  to  happiness. 
Thus  does  the  great  Creator  present  himself  to  his  guilty  moral 
creation,  a  just  god,  and  yet  a  saviour. 

Here  then  we  see  the  crowning  excellence  of  the  present 
system.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  specify  in  detail  those  parts  of 
God's  providence  which  are  eminently  fitted  to  extend  and 
heighten  our  admiration  of  this  system  of  justice  and  of  grace. 
To  sustain  the  principles  of  eternal  righteousness  unsullied  and 
unobscured,  and  show  himself  placable  to  the  guilty,  and  even 
solicitous  to  reclaim  and  bless — to  uphold  in  all  their  stability 
the  pillars  of  his  throne,  and  yet  give  it  the  attractions  of  a 
throne  of  grace — this  is  a  system  which  combines  with  every 
other  conceivable  excellence,  the  highest,  brightest  of  them  all, 
that  of  an  economy  of  grace.  The  present  system  then,  in  an- 
other respect,  i.  e.,  as  including  an  economy  of  grace,  is  the 
best  conceivable. 

The  argument  for  God's  benevolence,  as  thus  furnished  by 
the  light  of  nature,  may  be  thus  presented.  The  present  sys- 
tem with  its  results,  is  better  than  none;  notwithstanding  the 
evil  which  exists,  the  system  may  be  the  best  possible  to  the 
Creator ;  while  in  its  adaptations  and  tendencies  to  good,  it  is 
in  every  respect  the  best  conceivable.  God  therefore  is  benev- 
olent, Were  a  physician  to  perform  an  operation  on  a  patient, 
which  were  better  than  to  do  nothing,  and  though  connected 
with  some  pain,  might  still  be  the  best  possible,  and  in  respect 
to  all  its  tendencies,  were  it  ascertained  to  be  the  best  conceiva- 
ble operation,  who  would  doubt  his  benevolence. 

Were  it  however  my  principal  object  here  to  prove  the  be- 
nevolence of  God,  I  might  proceed  greatly  to  increase  the  force 
of  the  present  argument.      For  having  once  shown,  on  the 


OTHER  PROOFS  OF  BENEVOLENCE.       345 

premises  now  presented,  that  God  is  benevolent,  it  were  per- 
fectly legitimate  to  infer  not  merely  that  all  existent  evil  may 
he  consistent,  but  that  it  is  consistent  with  his  benevolence, 
either  as  the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good,  or  as  in- 
cidental in  respect  to  his  prevention,  to  that  system  which  is 
the  necessary  means  of  the  greatest  good. 

In  respect  to  natural  evil,  viewed  as  it  must  be,  as  the  nec- 
essary means  of  the  greatest  good,  instead  of  furnishing  an 
objection  to  his  benevolence,  it  becomes  an  additional  proof  of 
it.  As  to  moral  evil,  viewed  as  it  must  now  be :  viz.,  as  inci- 
dental in  respect  to  divine  prevention  to  a  system  in  which 
God  has  done  all  that  was  possible  to  prevent  it,  and  to  secure 
universal  holiness  in  its  stead,  it  leaves  the  benignity  of  his 
design  unobscured ;  and  we  are  obliged  to  say,  there  is  all  the 
proof  of  God's  benevolence,  which  there  would  have  been,  had 
the  universal  and  perfect  holiness  and  happiness  of  his  moral 
creation  been  the  actual  result. 

Having  arrived  at  this  point,  I  might  bring  forward,  as  still 
further  proofs,  furnished  in  the  fact  that  he  shows  kindness  to 
his  creatures  in  every  conceivable  form  which  is  consistent 
with  their  greatest  good ;  and  this,  not  in  respect  to  its  salutary 
tendencies  and  relations,  in  view  of  which  it  has  given  so  much 
force  to  our  preceding  arguments,  but  under  two  very  different 
relations:  viz.,  as  so  much  good  or  enjoyment  merely,  and  as 
such,  all  that  in  degree,  which  is  consistent  with  the  highest 
good  of  the  recipients ;  and  also,  as  so  much  good  conferred  on 
sinful,  ill-deserving  creatures,  whom,  as  a  benevolent  and  just 
God,  he  might  have  utterly  destroyed.  To  all  this  good,  we 
must  add  the  grand  and  glorious  results  of  that  system  of 
grace  and  mercy  in  future  and  eternal  happiness,  as  conferred 
on  guilty  beings  whose  endless  destruction  had  been  alike  con- 
sistent with  justice  and  benevolence. 

Here  let  us  then  advert,  first,  to  what  had  been  the  proofs 
of  God's  benevolence,  had  perfect  holiness  and  happiness  actu- 
ally resulted  to  his  moral  creation.  Wc  have  this  proof  at  hand, 
for  we  have  proved  that  he  most  truly  and  sincerely  designed 
this  result.  Let  us  now  advert  again  to  what  would  have 
been  the  condition  of  this  world  of  transgressors,  had  God,  as 
he  might,  displayed  his  benevolence  and  been  just,  instead  of 
displaying  his  benevolence  in  pardoning  grace.  Let  the  fear- 
ful results  of  exact  retribution  in  the  woes  of  the  second  death, 

15* 


346     MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

be  compared  with  the  riches  of  his  long-suffering,  and  the  ever- 
flowing  streams  of  his  providential  bounty  in  this  world,  and 
with  (as  our  previous  argument  authorizes  us  to  expect  in  the 
world  to  come)  the  eternal  blessedness  of  a  multitude  which  no 
man  can  number,  of  pure,  holy,  and  happy  spirits,  so  vast,  so 
glorious,  that  the  few  incorrigibly  wicked  whom  necessity  con- 
fines in  the  prison  of  state,  shall  be  only  as  an  unnoticed  speck 
amid  the  overwhelming  glory  of  the  whole. 

I  have  thus  attempted  to  exhibit  the  proofs  of  God's  benevo- 
lence, as  shown  by  the  light  of  nature.  And  what  other  or 
higher  proofs  could  be  furnished  by  his  works  or  his  doings,  I 
am  compelled  to  say,  is  beyond  my  power  to  conceive.  Con- 
templated as  a  state  of  trial  and  preparation  for  results  in 
eternity,  the  nature,  the  condition,  and  the  prospects  of  man, 
manifest  infinite  wisdom  and  power,  directed  by  infinite  good- 
ness, aiming  at  results  which  shall  forever  tell  the  Creator's 
capacity  to  bless.  To  specify  an  imperfection,  or  suggest  an 
improvement,  defies  the  power  of  the  human  intellect.  This 
world  then,  must  be  esteemed  not  as  furnishing  merely  some 
faint  intimations,  some  slight  grounds  of  conjecture  that  God 
is  good,  but  as  presenting  to  every  eye  that  witnesses  the  oper- 
ations of  his  hands,  one  of  the  brightest  theaters  of  his  infinite 
benevolence — a  scene  in  God's  creation,  in  which,,  counter- 
acted indeed  in  its  fullest  results  by  human  wickedness,  it  only 
awakes  to  new  and  unheard  of  desires  and  efforts  to  bless : 
benevolence  which  shines  forth  like  a  sun,  when  all  that  might 
seem  to  obscure  its  light,  only  serves  to  give  new  warmth  and 
splendor  to  its  beams.  For  in  what  brighter  forms  of  love  and 
goodness  could  God  appear,  than  as  the  God  of  redemption  to 
this  guilty,  lost  world  ? 

If  now  I  have  proved  that  God  is  a  being  of  perfect  benevo- 
lence, it  follows  that  he  administers  his  moral  government  over 
this  world  in  the  exercise  of  rightful  authority.  Having  before 
proved  that  God  administers  a  moral  government  over  men  in 
some  proper  import  of  the  phrase ;  having  shown  that  he  ad- 
ministers his  moral  government  in  equity  and  in  the  exercise 
of  rightful  authority ;  I  have  established  my  leading  proposi- 
tion, that 

God  administers  a  perfect  moral  government  over  men. 

I  conclude  with  one  reflection  on  the  views  which  have  been 
given  of  the  moral  government  of  God  over  this  world,  viz. : 


TRUTH    OF    CHRISTIANITY    DESIRABLE.  347 

Hoio  undesirable  that  Christianity  were  not  a  revelation 
from  God.  If  Christianity  is  not  a  revelation  from  God,  still 
every  thing  of  vital  importance  to  man  which  Christianity 
says,  is  true,  except  its  grand  peculiarity,  the  manner  in  which 
this  world's  redemption  from  sin  is  achieved — every  thing  is 
true,  except  its  discovery  of  a  triune  God,  the  Father,  the  Son, 
and  the  Holy  Ghost,  in  their  respective  relations  to  the  work 
of  man's  redemption  from  sin.  If  Christianity  is  not  a  revela- 
tion, still  there  is  an  infinite  being  who  has  given  existence 
to  creatures,  formed  in  his  own  image,  and  destined  to  live 
and  to  act,  for  weal  or  for  woe,  through  a  coming  eternity. 
For  the  accomplishment  of  his  eternal  counsels,  God  has  as- 
sumed the  high  relation  of  a  perfect  moral  governor  of  these 
creatures  of  his  power.  Perfectly  benevolent,  he  is  also  in- 
flexibly just.  He  will  never  sacrifice  the  majesty  of  law,  the 
glory  of  his  moral  dominion,  and  the  happiness  of  his  moral 
creation,  in  tenderness  to  rebels.  His  throne  stands  in  all  its 
grandeur  on  the  pillars  of  eternal  justice,  and,  though  changed 
into  a  throne  of  grace,  still  in  all  its  darkness  and  tempest,  it 
speaks  undiminished  terror  to  the  determined  transgressor.  It 
is  changed  into  a  throne  of  grace,  but  only  to  the  rebel  who  is 
penitent  and  contrite  in  heart.  It  is  a  throne  of  grace,  that, 
with  its  attractions  and  its  charms,  it  may  win  rebellion  to 
loyalty. 

If  then,  Christianity  is  not  a  divine  revelation,  every  thing  (I 
mean  every  thing  substantial,  for  I  certainly  admit  that  Chris- 
tianity sheds  a  new  and  brighter  light  on  all  moral  truths), 
with  the  exceptions  made,  which  Christianity  teaches,  is  true. 
Every  thing  respecting  God,  man,  time,  and  eternity — every 
relation  of  God  to  man,  and  of  man  to  God — every  relation, 
tendency,  and  consequence  of  right  and  wrong  moral  action — 
every  foundation  of  hope,  ground  of  fear,  retrospect  of  the  past, 
reality  of  the  present,  prospect  of  the  future — the  same  proba- 
tion, the  same  law,  the  same  economy  of  mercy,  the  same 
judgment  and  retribution,  the  same  heaven  and  hell — all,  all 
in  every  great  and  substantial  respect,  is  the  same.  Christian- 
ity, with  the  exception  made,  is  only  a  republication  in  brighter 
characters,  of  the  truths  of  God  and  of  nature — of  God  and 
nature  immutable  as  its  author.  If  Christianity  then  is  not  a 
divine  revelation,  where  are  we  ?  Just  where  we  are  if  it  is  a 
revelation,  with  this  difference,  the  light  it  sheds  on  the  scheme 


348      MORAL  GOVERNMENT  FROM  NATURE. 

of  redemption  is  extinguished!  How  the  perverseness  of  rebels 
is  to  be  subdued  to  love,  and  if  subdued,  how  can  a  just  God  re- 
ceive them  to  favor ;  here  all  is  mystery  unsolvable — darkness 
impenetrable,  even  appalling!  Man,  a  sinner,  and  guilty  as 
he  is,  I  admit  might  repent,  and  might  hope  for  mercy  from 
his  Maker.  But  would  he?  Man,  in  the  bondage  of  sin, 
what  chains  so  strong? — man,  dead  in  sin,  what  death  so 
hopeless?  who  shall  deliver?  what  power  shall  raise  to  life, 
give  health,  and  strength,  and  beauty  immortal  to  this  victim 
of  sin  and  death  but  the  power  of  him  who  made  him  ?  Man, 
I  said,  might  hope  for  mercy.  But  with  a  clear  perception  of 
his  fearful  guilt  and  God's  fearful  justice ;  when  looking  at  a 
sin-avenging  God  as  he  must,  and  asking,  how  can  such  a  God 
show  the  same  abhorrence  of  sin  and  yet  forgive,  which  he 
would  show  by  the  endless  destruction  of  a  rebellious  world, 
then  it  is  that  the  fears  and  dismay  of  guilt  take  hold  on  the 
spirit,  and  hope  trembles,  faulters,  expires.  I  say  not  that  it 
must  be  so,  but  that  it  always  has  been,  and  always  will  be, 
at  least  with  exceptions  not  to  be  named.  For  remember,  it  is 
not  the  hope  of  the  infidel  that  we  need — the  hope  that  God  is 
unjust — the  hope  like  his,  that  reposes  in  a  selfish,  malignant 
deity ;  it  is  not  the  hope  which  fancy  and  the  love  of  sin  beget, 
and  which  rushes  fearless  on  the  thick  bosses  of  Jehovah's 
buckler,  without  knowing  who  or  what  he  is ;  it  is  the  hope 
which  looks  upon  a  just  God,  and  with  a  sense  of  his  righteous 
indignation,  reposes  sweetly  in  his  mercy.  And  yet  there 
is  so  much  terror  here,  there  is  so  much  midnight  darkness  and 
thunder,  that  the  feeble  rays  of  mercy  do  not  suffice.  Guilt 
will  look  up  with  confidence  only  when  it  sees  the  throne  of 
God  upheld  by  the  man  that  is  his  fellow.  Take  away  "  the 
incarnate  mystery,"  extinguish  the  light  which  reveals  the 
great  atonement  of  Christianity,  (ignorance  and  presumption 
might  indeed  hope  in  a  selfish  deity,  in  an  unjust  God,  and 
realize  a  just  perdition),  but  extinguish  this  light,  the  light 
which  reveals  God's  mercy  through  his  Son,  and  let  in  the 
terrors  of  guilt  and  of  God  on  this  sinful  world,  and  how  would 
they  weep  and  howl  in  the  frenzies  of  despair !  Thanks — may 
I  not  say  it — thanks  to  the  impostor,  if  such  he  was,  who  de- 
vised the  great  atonement  of  the  gospel.  Falsehood — can  we 
say  less  ? — falsehood  is  better  than  truth  !  Imposture  ?  False- 
hood?    No.     Here  is  the  seal  of  God.     It  is  just  the  atone- 


TRUTH    OF    CHRISTIANITY    DESIRABLE.  349 

ment  which  man  needs,  the  atonement  which  he  must  have,  to 
embolden  conscious  guilt  to  approach  a  spotless  God ;  the  only 
atonement  which  will  in  fact,  give  hope  and  peace  and  heaven 
to  a  guilty  world.  God  devised  it.  God  revealed  it,  that  all 
other  manifestations  of  his  mercy  might  not  be  in  vain.  With 
no  known  instance  of  actual  forgiveness,  with  no  formal  decla- 
ration of  God  that  he  will  forgive,  with  the  burden  of  conscious 
guilt  upon  us,  and  with  no  possible  conception  of  any  expedi- 
ent by  which  God  could  show  mercy,  we  should  in  fact,  be 
conducted  to  the  most  fearful  forebodings  of  wrath.  In  this 
midnight  of  gloom  and  terror  all  our  research  and  all  our  rea- 
sonings would  actually  terminate.  And  back  again  to  this 
midnight,  from  the  light  which  beams  upon  us  from  the  gospel 
of  God  would  the  infidel  conduct  us.  Let  him  go,  if  he  will, 
into  all  this  darkness  and  dwell  amid  its  terrors.  Let  him  go, 
if  he  will,  to  the  bar  of  a  just  God  on  the  footing  of  his  own 
righteousness,  and  be  tried  by  his  innocence  or  his  merit ;  let 
him  trust  an  unjust,  selfish,  malignant  deity,  for  he  has  no 
other  God.  But  give  me  hope  in  a  God  of  mercy.  I  speak 
what  you  feel,  and  what  I  feel,  when  I  say,  I  am  a  sinner — a 
sinner  against  a  holy,  just,  and  perfect  Gocl.  I  need  his  mercy. 
I  am  a  guilty,  lost  immortal.  I  need  deliverance  from  de- 
served and  endless  misery.  Oh !  hide  not  from  me  the  mercy, 
the  abundant  mercy  of  God  in  Christ  Jesus. 


LECTURE  XI. 

APPLICATION   OF   THE   ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE,  TO    PROVE   THAT 
CHRISTIANITY    IS    FROM    GOD. 

Nature  of  Divine  Bevelation. — Argument  for  its  necessity. — Different  views  of  the  grounds  of 
this. — I.  Not  necessary,  because  man  cannot  discover  moral  and  religious  truth:  but  II.  Neces- 
sary, 1.  To  make  known  the  truth  in  the  most  perfect  method,  especially  by  language. — Absur- 
dity of  objecting  to  this  medium. — 2.  To  receive  the  practical  influence  of  such  truth. — The 
experiment  by  the  light  of  nature  decisive,  shown  by  the  ancient  philosophers. — Their  views 
scanty,  vacillating,  erroneous. — Practical  influence  feeble  on  themselves  and  others. — Preva- 
lence of  immorality. — Their  teachings  and  example  limited. 

By  a  divine  revelation,  we  may  understand  some  mode 
adopted  by  our  Creator  of  imparting  the  knowledge  of  reli- 
gious and  moral  truth  to  the  human  mind,  more  direct  than 
any  such  knowledge  obtained  by  the  light  of  nature;  or  em- 
ploying human  reason  on  the  character,  the  works  and  provi- 
dence of  God.  On  the  question  whether  a  divine  revelation  is 
necessary  to  man,  the  parties  have,  in  my  view,  often  adopted 
unqualified  assertions,  which  are  erroneous  and  even  fatal  to  a 
satisfactory  conclusion. 

On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  affirmed  that  all  the  knowledge 
which  is  necessary  or  useful  to  man  as  a  moral  being  may  be 
obtained  from  the  works  of  God,  and  that  every  other  mode  of 
discovering  truth  to  the  human  mind  on  the  part  of  God,  is 
impossible,  incredible,  and  useless.  On  the  other,  the  utter  in- 
sufficiency of  human  reason  to  make  the  least  useful  discovery 
of  moral  and  religious  truth  from  the  mere  light  of  nature,  and 
the  consequent  absolute  necessity  of  a  direct  revelation  from 
God,  have  been  strenuously  maintained.  It  is  true,  that  some 
of  the  advocates  for  the  necessity  of  a  revelation,  concede  that 
the  light  of  nature  furnishes  the  means  of  much  important 
knowledge,  and  often  seem  to  contend  only  for  the  necessity 
of  further  discoveries  by  the  light  of  revelation.  And  yet  the 
same  writers  assert  with  frequency,  "  that  human  reason  can- 


WHY    REVELATION    IS    NECESSARY.  351 

not  attain  any  certain  knowledge  of  the  will  or  law  of  God,  or 
of  the  true  happiness  of  man."*  This  incongruity,  which  ap- 
pears to  characterize  the  discussions  on  this  subject  by  leaving 
the  real  question  vague  and  indeterminate,  has  contributed  in 
no  small  degree  to  unsettle  opinions  and  to  perpetuate  discus- 
sion. To  what  extent  the  necessity  of  a  divine  revelation  exists, 
and  what  are  the  precise  grounds  or  reasons  of  it,  are  points  of 
the  first  importance  to  all  satisfactory  views  on  the  subject,  as 
well  as  to  the  termination  of  the  controversy  with  the  opposers 
of  revelation. 

It  may  be  admitted  generally  and  indefinitely,  that  a  reve- 
lation is  necessary  to  man,  and  yet  its  ends  or  purposes,  and 
the  extent,  grounds,  or  reasons  of  the  necessity,  may  be  left 
undecided.  In  a  state  of  utter  darkness,  light  is  necessary  as 
the  only  medium  of  vision.  But  we  may  suppose  a  degree  of 
light  adequate  for  a  distinct  sight  of  surrounding  objects,  and 
yet  that  a  man  should  refuse  to  see  them,  and  this  in  a  case  in 
which  Greater  light  would  result  in  actual  vision.  In  the  one 
case,  light  is  necessary,  because  man  cannot  see  without  it ; 
in  the  other,  to  secure  his  actual  vision,  because  he  loill  not. 
Again,  there  may  be  a  degree  of  light  adequate  to  the  dis- 
tinct vision  of  some  objects  and  not  of  others ;  and  the 
consequence  may  be,  either  that  neither  class  of  objects  will 
be  seen,  or  that  the  former  only  will  be.  In  these  cases,  the 
particular  purposes  or  ends,  on  account  of  which  greater  light 
is  necessary,  are  different,  as  are  the  objects  to  be  seen.  The 
grounds  or  reasons  of  the  necessity  differ — greater  light  in  the 
one  case,  being  necessary  to  actual  vision  of  any  of  the  objects; 
in  the  other,  necessary  to  the  actual  vision  of  all  the  objects. 
Further ;  a  greater  degree  of  light  may  be  necessary,  not  be- 
cause man  cannot,  nor  because  he  will  not  see  every  object, 
but  to  enable  him  to  see  every  object  with  greater  distinctness 
and  effect  than  would  otherwise  be  possible. 

So  in  respect  to  a  divine  revelation.  It  may  be  necessary 
for  a  great  variety  of  particular  purposes  or  ends,  and  the 
grounds  or  reasons  of  the  necessity  in  respect  to  these  ends 
may  be  very  different.  To  maintain  the  general  proposition 
that  a  divine  revelation  is  necessary,  is  not  fitted  to  convey 
precise  and  definite  views  on  this  important  subject,  nor  to 

*  Horxe. 


352  ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE  APPLIED. 

terminate  this  part  of  the  controversy  with  the  opposers  of  rev- 
elation. 

While  therefore,  I  maintain  the  general  doctrine,  that  a 
divine  revelation  is  necessary  to  man,  to  prevent  misapprehen- 
sion, 

I  remark — 

I.  That  a  divine  revelation  is  not  necessary  to  this  world, 
because  man  cannot  discover  much  moral  and  religious  truth 
without  it.  The  advocates  of  the  utter  incompetence  of  human 
reason  to  make  any  such  discoveries,  seem  to  have  fallen  into 
the  error,  by  mistaking  the  lamentable  ignorance  of  the  world, 
for  proof  of  an  entire  incapacity  for  knowledge,  and  from  a  mis- 
guided zeal  to  magnify  the  gift  of  a  revelation,  and  the  grace 
that  conferred  it.  That  this  mode  of  reasoning  is  unauthorized, 
may  be  confidently  decided,  in  view  of  its  intrinsic  deficiency, 
and  on  the  authority  of  revelation  itself.  It  is  intrinsically  de- 
ficient, since  the  mere  fact  of  ignorance  is  no  proof  of  incapacity 
for  knowledge.  In  revelation  itself  the  ignorance  and  crimes 
of  the  heathen  world  are  never  traced  to  incapacity  for  knowl- 
edge, but  the  clear  manifestation  of  God,  and  the  consequent 
inexcusableness  of  man  both  for  his  ignorance  and  his  crimes, 
are  constantly  asserted,  and  these  are  traced  to  the  humiliating 
fact  "  that  men  did  not  like  to  retain  God  in  their  knowledge." 

The  attempt  to  exalt  the  grace  of  God  in  the  gift  of  a  rev- 
elation by  depreciating  man's  capacity  for  knowledge,  is  still 
more  to  be  regretted.  Admit,  as  the  reasoning  assumes,  the 
entire  incompetence  of  the  human  mind  to  obtain  any  knowl- 
edge of  religious  truth,  and  the  grace  of  God  in  conferring  a 
revelation  on  the  world  is  wholly  subverted.  On  the  part  of 
men  there  could  be  neither  obligation  nor  crime.  The  neces- 
sity of  a  revelation  is  created  by  their  Maker  and  not  by  them- 
selves. Revelation  could  not  be  a  gift  to  a  sinful  world, 
criminally  resisting  the  light  of  truth  and  perverting  the  means 
of  knowledge,  and  thus  deserving  to  be  given  up  to  a  repro- 
bate mind.  But  it  is  a  provision  absolutely  necessary  to  con- 
stitute men  moral  and  accountable  beings,  and  therefore  de- 
manded, if  they  are  held  responsible  for  their  conduct  by  every 
principle  of  equity.  It  is  a  matter  of  debt,  of  justice;  and 
grace  is  no  more  grace.  This  attempt  therefore,  to  magnify 
the  grace  of  God  in  the  gift  of  a  revelation  wholly  defeats  its 
object. 


WHY   REVELATION  IS   NECESSARY.  353 

In  proof  of  the  position  that  the  human  mind  is  competent 
to  discover  much  important  truth  without  a  revelation,  I  might 
appeal  to  what  I  have  already  shown  to  be  true  concerning 
God  and  concerning  man,  from  the  mere  light  of  nature.  I 
might  appeal  also  to  the  actual  discoveries  of  such  truth,  especi- 
ally to  the  writings  of  many  of  the  ancient  philosophers. 

The  appeal  to  revelation  itself  on  this  point  would  he  still 
more  decisive.  On  this  authority  it  might  be  shown  that  man 
can  know  the  very  truths  to  a  considerable  extent,  without  a 
revelation,  which  the  advocates  for  its  necessity  affirm  that  he 
cannot  know  without  it.  For  example,  the  being  and  perfec- 
tions of  God,  his  moral  government,  his  moral  character ;  the 
law  of  his  moral  government,  and  of  course  the  sum  of  human 
duty — to  a  great  extent  the  specific  duties  toward  God,  toward 
man,  and  toward  himself;  the  doctrines  of  human  sinfulness, 
of  the  necessity  of  a  change  of  moral  character ;  the  placability 
of  God ;  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  future  rewards  and  pun- 
ishments. 

Here  it  would  be  a  very  useful  inquiry,  how  far  the  Scrip- 
tures will  bear  us  out  in  the  assertion  of  this  matter  of  fact — 
not  only  by  appealing  to  their  explicit  declarations,  and  their 
clear  implications,  but  especially  to  the  variety  of  forms,  and  to 
the  great  extent  in  which  the  sacred  writers  make  the  previous 
knowledge  of  mankind  the  basis  of  their  reasonings,  instead  of 
resting  on  their  authority  as  inspired  teachers,  although  this  is 
never  abandoned. 

But  whatever  ground  the  advocate  of  Christianity  may  take, 
the  infidel  will  admit  that  the  human  mind  is  competent  to 
discover  much  religious  and  moral  truth  without  a  revelation. 

I  proceed  to  show — 

II.  That  a  divine  revelation  is  necessary  to  the  world — 

(1.)  To  give  the  highest  conceivable  perfection  to  the  mode 
of  making  known  the  truth  to  the  human  mind. 

(2.)  To  any  extensive  and  useful  discovery  of  truth  to  the 
human  mind. 

(3.)  To  the  discovery  of  some  important  truths,  which  man 
could  not  discover  without  it. 

(1.)  A  divine  revelation  is  necessary  to  the  highest  conceivable 
perfection  of  the  mode  of  making  'known  the  truth  to  the  human 
mind.  There  are  only  two  conceivable  modes  of  discovering 
truth  to  the  human  mind  by  our  Creator:  viz.,  through  the 

23 


354  ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

medium  of  his  works  of  creation  and  providence  and  by  a  rev- 
elation. My  object  is  not  to  compare  the  excellence  or  desir- 
ableness of  these  two  modes,  bnt  simply  to  show  that  the  mode 
which  combines  both,  is  better  than  that  which  should  include 
but  one ;  or  rather  is  the  best  conceivable.  Xor  does  my  ob- 
ject require  me  to  examine  the  different  specific  modes  of 
making  a  revelation  which  are  possible,  although  it  were  easy 
to  show  the  superiority  of  that  mode  to  every  other  in  which  it 
is  claimed  that  God  has  made  a  revelation.  I  speak  only  of 
some  mode  of  revelation,  as  additional  to  the  mere  light  of 
nature,  and  maintain  that  it  is  indispensable  to  the  highest  con- 
ceivable perfection  in  the  mode  of  discovering  religious  and 
moved  truth  to  the  human  mind.  This  position  is,  to  my  own 
mind,  so  palpably  obvious,  that  had  it  not  been  denied,  it  could 
scarcely  require  or  justify  an  attempt  to  prove  its  truth.  Who 
does  not  know  the  power  of  speech  and  written  language  to 
convey  truth  with  peculiar  precision,  clearness,  and  effect? 
Why  is  it  that  the  very  men  who  deny  all  revelation,  and  pro- 
fess, while  so  doing,  to  impart  to  the  world  the  light  of  truth, 
resort  to  oral  and  written  language  as  the  medium  of  convey- 
ance ?  Why  not  leave  the  world  to  spell  out  truth  on  this 
great  question  from  the  nature  of  things,  as  affording  ample 
light  without  the  addition  of  speech  and  writing  to  instruct 
them?  Plainly  because  they  believe  that  by  this  addition 
they  adopt  the  most  effective  mode  of  imparting  knowledge 
and  of  giving  it  permanence,  impression,  and  prevalence  in  the 
minds  of  other  men.  And  will  they  pronounce  their  own  con- 
demnation, by  pronouncing  that  mode  of  conveying  truth  use- 
less, on  which  themselves  rely  as  the  best  ?  And  if  not  useless 
on  the  part  of  men,  why  useless  on  the  part  of  God  ?  God  has 
confessedly  formed  the  human  mind  to  be  taught  and  instructed 
by  himself,  through  the  medium  of  his  works.  And  is  it  not 
equally  manifest  that  he  has  formed  the  human  mind  to  be 
taught  and  instructed  through  the  medium  of  language?  Is 
not  this  mode  of  conveying  knowledge  one  which  involves 
every  facility  and  every  advantage?  If  God  has  qualified 
men  to  learn  truth  from  what  he  does,  has  he  not  also  qualified 
them  to  learn  truth  from  what  he  says?  Why  then  should 
it  be  thought  a  thing  incredible,  that  God  should  adopt  one 
method  as  well  as  the  other,  or  rather,  that  he  should  adopt 
both  ?     If  his  children  are  to  read  and  learn  his  character,  will, 


REVELATION    BY   LANGUAGE.  355 

and  designs,  their  duty  and  destiny  from  his  teachings,  why 
not  avail  himself  of  their  capacity  to  be  taught  through  the 
medium  of  language  ?  Why  may  he  not  instruct  them  by  his 
words  as  well  as  by  his  works;  why  not  give  them  two  books 
as  well  as  one — the  book  of  revelation  as  well  as  the  book  of 
nature?  Would  not  the  latter  mode  be  as  natural,  as  effectual 
— as  truly  in  accordance  with  their  accustomed  manner  of  learn- 
ing truth  as  the  former  ?  Are  not  the  advantages  of  the  latter 
so  great,  so  obvious,  as  to  render  it  exceedingly  desirable  to  all 
who  would  wish  to  learn  ?  Why  is  it  that  we  wish  every  thing 
in  art,  science,  literature,  history,  morals,  and  religion,  that  is 
true  and  of  importance  to  be  known,  reduced  to  writing  ?  Why 
is  it  that  laws  must  be  written  and  published,  that  contracts, 
bonds,  deeds,  mortgages,  every  title  to  an  estate,  must  be  put 
upon  record?  Because  this  is  confessedly  the  most  perfect 
method  of  securing  the  knowledge  of  facts.  No  man  is  igno- 
rant of  the  importance  and  necessity  of  written  records  and 
books  on  every  subject  of  moment  pertaining  to  this  world. 
And  yet  if  we  speak  of  a  book  from  God,  teaching  man  how  to 
secure  the  great  end  for  which  God  made  him,  we  talk  of  a 
useless  book — aye,  of  one  worse  than  useless.  Books  from 
men,  even  on  religion,  if  it  be  of  the  right  sort,  are  of  inesti- 
mable value ;  but  a  book  from  God,  teaching  such  a  religion 
as  God  might  be  supposed  to  teach,  would  be  a  thing  of  naught. 
You  cannot  feel  too  much  contempt  for  it !  And  this  is  a  con- 
sistency of  which  to  boast ! 

But  not  to  dwell  on  absurdity  so  glaring,  let  us  for  a  moment 
reflect  on  the  end  to  be  secured  and  the  mode  of  accomplishing 
it.  The  end  is,  so  to  instruct  this  sinful  world  in  religious  and 
moral  truth,  that  it  shall  become  effectual  to  its  moral  reforma- 
tion. Now,  without  disparaging  at  all  the  light  of  nature, 
without  supposing  God  to  reveal  one  other  truth  to  man 
than  what  may  be  learned  from  it,  I  ask  what  mode  of  bring- 
ing this  very  system  of  truth  before  the  human  mind  would  be 
best  fitted  to  the  end  to  be  accomplished  ?  Simply  that  which 
we  call  the  light  of  nature,  or  that  which  should  combine  with 
it — the  light  of  a  revelation  through  the  medium  of  human  lan- 
guage. Such  a  revelation,  such  books  from  deists,  from  infi- 
dels, are  at  least  regarded  by  themselves  as  an  improvement  in 
the  method  of  imparting  instruction  to  men.  Why  then  may 
we  not  suppose  that  such  a  book  as  God  could  make,  would 


356  ARGUMENT    FROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

also  be  an  improvement  on  their  productions  ?  Suppose  then 
God  to  qualify  certain  men,  to  declare  the  same  system  of  truth 
to  the  world  through  the  medium  of  written  language ;  sup- 
pose him  to  give  the  most  indubitable  proofs  that  they  are  thus 
qualified  and  commissioned  by  God  himself  for  this  work ;  let 
us  suppose  the  book  actually  written,  containing  simply  that 
system  of  truth  which  the  light  of  nature  discloses,  presenting 
these  sublime  doctrines  concerning  God — his  nature,  his  charac- 
ter ;  the  great  facts  respecting  man — his  nature,  his  character, 
his  destiny ;  his  relations  to  him,  promulgating  the  great  law 
of  God's  moral  government  in  its  perfect  requirement ;  its 
diverse  specific  precepts,  its  high  and  awful  sanctions ;  making 
known  an  economy  of  mercy,  unfolding  with  new  clearness  a 
future  state  with  its  regions  of  immortality  in  bliss  and  woe — 
let  us  suppose  this  system  of  truth  set  forth  to  the  human 
mind  in  all  the  simplicity,  perspicuity,  force,  and  conclusiveness 
of  which  human  language  admits ;  by  argument,  illustration, 
exemplification ;  shown  to  us  in  real  life,  embodied  in  rites  of 
worship,  and  carried  out  in  all  the  forms  of  human  action ; 
presented  in  history,  poetry,  parables,  allegory,  epistles — in 
every  conceivable  form  fitted  to  render  it  intelligible,  impres- 
sive ;  easy  to  be  fixed  in  the  memory,  and  ready  for  use  at  all 
times  ;  accessible  to  all  minds,  fitted  to  all  classes  of  men  in  all 
circumstances  and  relations ;  capable  of  being  brought  in  all 
its  clearness  and  power  on  the  human  mind,  from  the  beginning 
of  moral  and  accountable  agency,  and  ever  and  always  from 
its  own  pages,  as  well  as  through  its  ordinances  and  appointed 
ministry,  pouring  its  light  over  a  world  like  the  sun  in  mid- 
heaven.  Suppose  God  to  give  such  a  book  to  this  world,  hav- 
ing that  perfection  which  his  own  inspiration  could  give  it, 
would  it  be  no  valuable  addition  to  the  mere  light  of  nature  ? 
Would  such  instruction  from  God  possess  no  value  ?  "Would 
this  light  from  heaven,  truth  enforced  by  the  authority  of  God, 
the  very  testimony  of  the  living  God,  be  nothing  ?  Would  it 
be  nothing  to  man  that  his  God  should  speak  to  him?  Or,  is 
such  a  revelation  from  God  absolutely  necessary  to  give  the 
highest  conceivable  perfection  to  the  mode  of  discovering  re- 
ligious and  moved  truth  to  the  hitman  mind  f  Let  any  honest 
man  who  understands  the  use  and  power  of  language  answer 
this  question. 

(2.)  A  divine  revelation  is  necessary  to  secure  to  any  extent, 


WHAT    HAS    PHILOSOPHY    DONE?  357 

the  practical  influence  of  religions  and  moral  truth  on  the 
human  mind. 

In  support  of  this  position  I  shall  attempt  to  show,  that  such 
an  experiment  has  been  made,  as  to  prove,  that  the  great  end  of 
man's  creation  woui  be  entirely  defeated  without  a  revelation 
from  God.  In  other  words,  facts  enable  us  to  decide  what  the 
human  intellect  would  accomplish  in  the  discovery  of  religious 
and  moral  truth,  and  what  would  be  the  practical  results  un- 
der the  mere  light  of  nature ;  and  that  these  discoveries  and 
results  show  that  the  moral  reformation  of  men  would  never 
be  accomplished  to  any  considerable  extent,  without  a  divine 
revelation. 

The  question  is  not  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  this  light,  but  as 
to  its  actual  efficacy  in  leading  men  to  duty  and  to  happiness. 
Has  it  in  fact  ever  done  it  ? 

I  appeal  then  in  the  first  place,  to  the  ancient  heathen  philos- 
ophers. And  here  I  might  say,  there  is  great  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  nothing  in  the  writings  of  these  philosophers,  of  the 
least  value  either  in  theology  or  morals,  was  strictly  the  result 
of  their  own  mental  efforts.  Many  of  them  confess  that  they 
derived  their  knowledge  from  very  ancient  traditions,  to  which 
they  assigned  a  divine  origin.  "  What  Socrates  said  of  the 
deity,"  observes  Dryden,  "  what  Plato  writ,  and  the  rest  of  the 
heathen  philosophers  of  several  nations,  is  all  no  more  than 
the  twilight  of  revelation,  after  the  sun  of  it  was  set  in  the  race 
of  Noah ;"  while  the  Christian  fathers  furnish  abundant  proof 
that  Plato  especially  learned  much  from  the  Hebrews  while  he 
was  in  Egypt.  Of  Zoroaster,  of  whom  deists  have  had  much 
to  say,  it  has  been  shown  by  Dr.  Hyde  in  his  treatise  "  De  Re- 
ligione  Yeterum  Persarum,"  that  Zoroaster  had  been  a  disciple 
of  one  of  the  Jewish  prophets,  and  that  all  the  writings  ascribed 
to  this  philosopher  are  unquestionably  spurious.  I  cannot  but 
add  here  the  apparent  prediction,  but  yet  real  conjecture  of 
Plato,  founded  probably  on  the  traditions  and  truths  he  de- 
rived from  the  Jews  in  Egypt.  He  says,  "  We  cannot  know 
of  ourselves  what  petition  will  be  pleasing  to  God,  or  what 
worship  to  pay  him,  but  that  it  is  necessary  that  a  lawgiver 
should  be  sent  from  heaven  to  instruct  us ;"  and  such  a  one  did 
he  expect ;  and  "  oh,"  says  he,  "  how  greatly  I  do  desire  to  see 
that  man  and  who  he  is !"  He  goes  further,  and  declares  this 
lawgiver  must  be  more  them  a  man,  "for  since  every  nature  is 


358  ARGUMENT   PROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

governed  by  another  nature  that  is  superior  to  it,  as  birds  and 
beasts  by  man,  he  infers  that  this  lawgiver  who  was  to  teach 
man  what  he  could  not  know  by  his  own  nature,  must  be  of  a 
nature  superior  to  man — that  is,  of  a  divine  nature."  He  gives 
indeed,  as  lively  a  picture  of  the  person,  qualifications,  life,  and 
death  of  this  divine  man,  as  had  he  been  acquainted  with  the 
fifty-third  chapter  of  Isaiah.  He  says  "  that  this  just  person 
must  be  poor,  and  void  of  all  recommendations  but  that  of 
virtue  alone;  that  a  wicked  world  would  not  bear  his  instruc- 
tions and  reproof;  and  that  therefore  within  three  or  four 
years  after  he  began  to  preach  he  should  be  persecuted,  im- 
prisoned, scourged,  and  at  last  be  put  to  death."  "Would  it 
then  be  strange  if  all  in  the  writings  of  Plato  and  other  ancient 
philosophers,  which  has  been  held  up  to  our  admiration,  should 
have  been  directly  or  indirectly  derived  from  divine  revela- 
tion ? 

Laying  aside  however,  this  consideration,  and  conceding  all 
that  can  be  claimed  in  respect  to  the  unaided  powers  of  the 
ancient  philosophers,  let  us  inquire  what  they  actually  accom- 
plished in  morals  and  religion.  The  answer  must  be  admitted 
to  be  decisive  upon  the  point  before  us.  The  fact  appealed  to, 
is  that  of  the  employment  of  the  most  powerful  human  intellects 
on  this  subject,  with  unparalleled  devotion,  and  under  the  high- 
est advantages.  Who  will  pretend  that  more  would  ever  be 
accomplished  in  this  department  of  human  knowledge,  under 
the  mere  light  of  nature,  than  was  done  by  Socrates,  Plato, 
Seneca,  Cicero,  and  other  eminent  philosophers  of  antiquity  ? 
When  has  the  world  seen,  when  could  it  expect  to  see,  men  of 
brighter  genius,  of  higher  intellectual  power,  of  superior  liter- 
ary accomplishment,  of  such  unrivaled  industry,  toil,  and 
self-consecration  too,  in  philosophic  research  ?  Whatever  may 
be  thought  of  the  intellectual  stature  of  Bolingbroke,  Gibbon, 
Hume,  and  Yoltaire,  they  appear  diminutive  compared  with 
these  giants  of  the  Academy  and  the  Lyceum. 

What  then  did  these  philosophers  accomplish?  What  for 
themselves,  and  what  for  the  world  ? 

And  here  we  have  no  occasion  to  deny  any  excellence  or 
impute  any  imperfection  or  defect  which  is  not  real,  in  their 
systems  of  philosophy.  It  is  conceded  then  that  passages  may 
be  found  which  seem  to  express  exalted  conceptions  of  God  and 
of  some  of  his  attributes.     In  some  of  their  moral  codes,  par- 


WHAT    IIA.S    PHILOSOPHY    DONE?  359 

ticularly  in  the  Etliics  of  Aristotle  and  the  Offices  of  Cicero, 
some  beautiful  theories  of  morals  and  precepts  fitted  for  the 
regulation  of  external  conduct  are  to  be  found.  Some  of  them 
admit  that  virtue  is  the  chief  good  and  its  own  reward  ;  and 
some  of  them,  at  times  at  least,  indulged  in  sublime  specula- 
tions respecting  the  nature  and  immortality  of  the  soul.  But 
after  all,  what  was  the  amount  of  their  knowledge  or  belief  on 
these  great  subjects,  and  what  were  the  actual  results  to  them 
and  to  the  world  ? 

While  some  of  these  philosophers  asserted  the  being  of  God, 
others  openly  denied  it ;  few,  probably  none  of  them  believed 
God,  in  the  proper  sense,  to  be  the  Creator  of  the  world ;  most 
of  them  were  polytheists,  and  all  of  them  either  sincerely  or 
hypocritically  sanctioned,  defended,  and  practiced  idolatrous 
worship,  and  enjoined  it  as  the  duty  of  every  citizen. 

In  respect  to  a  future  state,  whatever  may  be  said  of  their 
arguments,  the  best  of  the  philosophers  spoke  doubtfully  ;  none 
of  them  applied  the  fact  to  its  proper  use  and  end ;  most  of 
them  entertained  of  it  the  most  puerile  and  contemptible  con- 
ceits. They  did  believe  in  future  punishment,  and  their  ideas 
of  future  rewards  were  so  indefinite,  low^,  and  sensual,  as  to 
give  no  importance  to  their  faith.  In  short,  as  to  the  merit 
and  demerit  of  right  and  wrong  moral  action,  the  happiness 
and  misery  in  kind  and  degree  of  which  the  soul  is  capable,  a 
just  judgment  of  a  righteous  God,  and  the  grand  and  awful 
idea  of  accountability — they  believed  nothing — or  at  least  en- 
tertained conceptions  so  inadequate  and  so  false  as  to  amount 
to  nothing.  - 

In  respect  to  morals,  nothing  like  a  true  system  was  to  be 
found  in  the  writings  of  any  one  of  them,  nor  of  all  of  them 
together.  On  the  great,  the  vital  question — in  fact  the  only 
question — viz.,  in  what  does  the  supreme  happiness  of  man 
consist,  Varro  tells  us  that  there  were  three  hundred  different 
opinions  among  the  philosophers.  Cicero  says,  that  these  opin- 
ions were  so  numerous  and  discordant  that  it  is  impossible  to 
enumerate  them ;  while  it  may  be  added,  that  in  respect  to 
the  true  nature  of  moral  excellence — viz.,  disinterested  love — 
true  benevolence  either  in  God  or  man — no  one  of  them  seems 
to  have  formed  a  conception.  Where  this  is  not  understood,  it 
is  in  vain  to  talk  of  morals,  of  piety,  or  religion.  Every  thing 
is  wrong  in  principle.     Call  it  by  what  names  you  will,  ascribe 


360  ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

to  it  what  restraining  and  regulating  power  you  will  on  tlio 
conduct  of  the  life,  it  is  nothing  but  the  selfish  principle,  the 
sum  and  essence  of  all  moral  evil.  Did  these  philosophers 
then  ever  teach  intelligibly  and  truly,  that  love  to  God  and 
love  to  man  is  the  sum  and  substance  of  all  moral  excellence  ? 
— that  love  is  the  fulfilling  of  the  law — and  that  all  else  with- 
out  it  is  in  a  moral  respect  nothing  but  sin  ?  So  far  as  I  can 
find,  never  in  any  decisive  instance,  while,  with  the  exception 
of  a  few,  instead  of  inculcating  the  expression  of  this  principle 
in  loving  enemies  and  forgiving  injuries,  they  accounted  re- 
venge lawful  and  commendable.  Pride  and  ambition  (prin- 
ciples which  have  caused  more  wretchedness  on  earth  than 
any  other),  were  esteemed  the  best  incentives  to  virtuous  and 
noble  deeds.  Suicide  was  deemed  lawful,  and  a  proof  of  true 
heroism.  Lying  lawful,  when  profitable ;  theft,  adultery,  for- 
nication, infanticide,  cruelty  to  children,  inhumanity  to  slaves, 
degradation  of  the  female  sex,  gratification  of  sensual  appetite 
and  unnatural  lusts ;  in  a  word,  the  most  flagitious  practices 
were  countenanced  on  the  part  of  the  philosophers,  both  by 
argument  and  example. 

Even  the  doctrines  of  the  wisest  and  best,  notwithstanding 
the  slight  hints  or  the  faint  and  transient  glimpses  of  truth  they 
include,  were  as  a  whole,  uncertainty,  darkness,  jargon,  pueril- 
ity. What  truth  concerning  God,  his  character,  law,  govern- 
ment ;  or  concerning  man,  his  character,  his  relations,  his  pros- 
pects, at  all  fitted  in  its  combination  with  error,  to  give  any 
just  or  adequate  conception  of  either  God  or  man,  or  to  reform 
a  lost  world  ?  The  answer  is  given  in  matter  of  fact.  Philoso- 
phers, statesmen,  poets,  priests,  and  people,  were  avowedly 
addicted  to  the  most  abominable  uncleannesses  and  crimes ; 
the  gods  they  worshiped  were  guilty  of  the  same  enormities; 
their  sacrifices  were  deformed  with  cruelty  and  the  most  horrid 
rites ;  their  sacred  groves  were  consecrated  to  prostitution, 
their  temples  were  brothels.  Think  of  such  worship  rendered 
to  the  three  hundred  Jupiters  mentioned  by  Yarro,  or  to  the 
three  hundred  and  sixty-five  gods  mentioned  by  Orpheus,  or  to 
thirty  thousand  by  Ilesiod— gods  celestial,  aerial,  terrestrial, 
and  infernal ;  gods  worshiped  by  rites  profane,  cruel,  debauch- 
ed ;  gods  worshiped  by  shameless  prostitution  and  the  immo- 
lation of  human  victims !  "With  this  entire  corruption  of  all 
religion  was  of  course  connected  an  ecpial  corruption  of  morals 


WHAT    HAS    PHILOSOPHY   DONE?  361 

both  in  public  and  private  life.  Fraud,  theft,  injustice,  suicide, 
adultery,  fornication,  systematic  abortions,  murder  of  infants, 
and  the  most  unnatural  crimes,  ambition,  hatred,  and  fell  re- 
venge ;  gladiatorial  shows,  and  all  the  atrocious  cruelties  of  war 
and  rapine  not  only  abounded  but  were  patronized,  counte- 
nanced, authorized  by  law,  connived  at  and  practiced  by 
statesmen  and  philosophers,  and  publicly  reprobated  by  none. 
From  this  source,  the  corruption  of  all  religion  and  morals, 
aided  by  the  depravity  of  the  human  heart,  flowed  forth  a 
torrent  of  crimes  and  abominations  desolating  a  world  of  all 
that  is  good  and  happy  in  virtue  and  religion,  and  leaving  all, 
all  in  moral  darkness  and  moral  death.  Its  state  became  more 
and  more  hopeless  as  time  rolled  on.  Even  in  the  land  of 
Judea  the  last  feeble  rays  of  divine  truth  were  almost  extinct, 
while  this  vast  portentous  cloud  hung  over  the  nations,  thick- 
ening, darkening,  and  foreboding  only  the  blackness  of  dark- 
ness forever. 

I  now  ask,  whether  God  has  not  made  a  sufficient  experi- 
ment on  the  question,  what  human  reason  would  accomplish 
in  the  discovery  of  religious  and  moral  truth,  and  what  would 
be  the  practical  results  under  the  mere  light  of  nature  ?  What 
reason  or  shadow  of  reason  is  there  to  believe  that  modern 
deists,  or  any  other  men,  or  any  individual  man,  under  the 
mere  light  of  nature,  and  to  the  end  of  time,  wTould  have  be- 
come wiser  or  better  than  Socrates,  Plato,  Seneca,  or  Cicero  ? 
When  or  where  has  human  genius  shone  more  brightly,  or  the 
power  and  majesty  of  the  human  intellect  more  excited  our 
admiration  and  wonder  than  in  the  poets,  the  orators,  the  legis- 
lators, the  philosophers  of  antiquity?  And  when,  to  the  end 
of  the  world,  could  we  hope  for  better  results  in  the  discovery 
of  moral  truth  in  the  formation  of  moral  character?  "What 
then  could  be  hoped  for  from  philosophy,  from  human  reason, 
under  the  mere  light  of  nature  ?  Is  not  the  experiment  abso- 
lutely decisive  ?  Is  not  the  necessity  of  a  divine  revelation  to 
secure  to  any  extent  the  salutary  practical  influence'  of  religious 
and  moral  truth  on  the  human  mind,  placed  beyond  all  denial  ? 

In  confirmation  of  this  argument,  if  it  can  need  any,  we 
might  appeal  to  many  other  considerations.  So  far  as  there 
was  any  thing  really  commendable  in  the  instructions  of  the 
philosophers,  they  were  delivered  to  their  immediate  pupils, 
and  in  no  respect  to  the  great  mass  of  the  community.    Indeed, 


362  ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

their  ethical  systems  were  far  too  refined  for  the  common  peo- 
ple ;  their  discourses  being  rather  subtle  disputations,  where 
truth  was  left  obscure,  doubtful,  and  subject  to  controversy. 
Nothing  was  settled.  What  one  affirmed,  another  denied. 
"What  could  be  expected  of  the  common  people,  when  the 
penetration  and  the  labors  of  the  philosophers  resulted  in  dis- 
agreement, contradiction,  and  uncertainty?  Allow  that  they 
discovered  and  proved  some  truths  in  speculation,  what  author- 
ity could  they  give  them  in  practice  ?  What  philosopher  could 
secure  submission  to  his  rules  of  life ;  or  what  can  human  law 
effect  in  the  renovation  of  the  heart  ?  "  Your  systems  of  vir- 
tue," says  Tertullian,  "are  but  the  conjectures  of  human  phi- 
losophy, and  the  power  which  commands  is  merely  human  ;  so 
that  neither  the  rule  nor  the  power  is  indisputable  ;  and  hence 
the  one  is  too  imperfect  to  instruct  us  fully,  the  other  too  weak 
to  command  us  effectually ;  but  both  these  are  effectually  pro- 
vided for  by  a  revelation  from  God.  Where  is  the  philoso- 
pher that  can  so  clearly  demonstrate  the  true  good  as  to  fix 
the  notion  beyond  dispute  ?  And  what  human  power  is  able 
to  reach  the  conscience  and  bring  down  that  notion  into  prac- 
tice ?  Human  wisdom  is  as  liable  to  error  as  human  power  is 
to  contempt."  What  would  be  the  influence  of  a  system  of 
truth  coming  from  man,  compared  with  that  of  the  same  sys- 
tem clothed  with  God's  authority  ?  In  addition  to  all  this,  let 
the  idolizers  of  human  reason  remember  that  the  wisest  of  the 
ancient  philosophers  and  legislators  were  fully  convinced,  by 
their  own  experience,  on  this  great  question.  Socrates  and 
Plato  both  confessed  that  they  needed  a  divine  revelation  to 
instruct  them  in  matters  of  the  greatest  consequence.  Cicero 
and  others,  instead  of  the  vain  conceits  of  some  modern  deists 
respecting  the  powers  of  man  employed  in  religious  and  moral 
inquiries,  often  acknowledged  their  imbecility  and  darkness. 
These  great  men  were  so  impressed  with  the  actual  state  of  the 
world,  and  the  waywardness  and  corruption  of  the  human 
heart,  that  they  not  only  often  acknowledged  that  there  were 
no  human  means  of  reformation,  but  expressed  a  strong  hope 
and  expectation,  that  God  would  one  day  give  to  man  a  revela- 
tion that  should  dispel  the  dark  cloud  in  which  the  human 
mind  was  involved.  In  short,  it  is  notorious  that  nearly  the 
whole  system  of  religion  and  of  worship,  with  its  sanctions 
of  future  rewards  and  punishments,  with  its  oracles,  divina- 


VALUE    OF    CHRISTIANITY.  363 

tions,  mysteries,  were  in  fact  political  expedients,  useful  fic- 
tions, originated  and  perpetuated  by  legislators,  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  keeping  the  people  in  awe,  and  under  greater  venera- 
tion for  human  laws.  If  the  world  could  stand  without  a  real 
revelation,  experience  had  proved  at  least  one  thing,  that  it 
could  not  stand  without  a  pretended  revelation  from  God. 
After  such  an  experiment  then,  an  experiment  which  left  the 
world  in  a  most  deplorable  condition  of  darkness,  crime,  and 
wretchedness;  an  experiment  which  convinced  the  very  men 
that  made  it  of  its  utter  inefficacy;  which  actually  led  them  to 
abandon  all  hope  of  the  world's  reformation  without  a  revela- 
tion from  God,  and  which  actually  compelled  them  to  resort  to 
the  pretense  of  such  a  revelation,  to  give  even  any  salutary  re- 
straining influence  to  human  law ;  I  say,  who  after  such  an  ex- 
periment can  doubt  the  absolute  necessity  of  a  revelation  from 
God,  to  secure  to  any  extent  the  reforming  influence  of  moral 
truth  on  the  human  mind  ? 

One  brief  reflection  !  What  a  value  does  the  view  we  have 
taken  of  this  world,  of  the  ignorance,  the  depravity,  the  crimes, 
the  miseries  of  mankind  in  every  age  and  in  almost  every 
country  for  six  thousand  years,  give  to  Christianity,  and  this, 
whether  it  be  a  revelation  from  God  or  not.  "Who  will  not 
read  and  study  the  Bible,  whether  he  be  an  infidel  or  a  Chris- 
tian? Christianity,  as  a  system  of  morals,  whether  it  be  of 
God  or  not,  is  true.  Here,  here,  it  gives  light  where  all  was 
uncertainty,  confusion,  darkness,  without  it.  Here,  where  the 
thickest  gloom  of  moral  midnight  overspread  a  lost  world,  it 
comes  as  the  morning  sun  to  remove  the  darkness  and  reveal 
the  day.  In  or  is  this  all.  In  its  proposed  way  of  our  accept- 
ance with  an  offended  God,  if  there  is  any  way — I  mean  in  the 
general  form  of  an  atonement  for  sin — it  is  also  true.  The 
great  question  then,  in  every  substantial  respect,  is  not  between 
Christianity  and  Infidelity,  but  between  Christianity  and  noth- 
ing. If  Christianity  is  false,  Infidelity  is  false.  Reject  the 
morals  of  Christianity  as  false,  and  all  here  is  midnight.  We 
can  know  nothing  to  be  true.  Reject  also  the  great  fact  of 
some  atonement  for  sin,  under  the  government  of  a  just  and 
perfect  God,  and  there  is  no  mercy,  no  hope.  Oh,  how  would 
Socrates,  how  would  Plato,  have  hailed  such  light  as  this ! 
Who  that  has  it  shall  despise  it  ?  Who  will  not  study,  under- 
stand, apply,  such  truth  as  the  Bible  contains?     Whose  eye 


36tL  ARGUMENT   FROM   NATURE   APPLIED. 

will  not  weep,  and  whose  heart  not  break,  that  a  fellow-crea- 
ture, a  friend,  a  companion,  is  not  willing  to  read  this  book  and 
weigh  with  candor  the  evidence  of  its  origin  from  God  ?  Oh ! 
what  maniac  madness  to  sport  on  the  verge  of  eternity,  with 
the  dream  that  Christianity  is  false — an  immortal  mind,  deny- 
ing such  truth,  and  attempting  to  sustain  and  cheer  itself,  as  it 
were,  at  the  foot  of  God's  judgment-seat,  with  the  empty, 
vapid  declamation  about  the  sufficiency  of  human  reason — and 
this  with  the  knowledge  of  the  fact,  that  for  six  thousand  years 
this  boasted  human  reason  has  only  plunged  a  lost  world  into 
error,  sin,  and  death,  without  hope!  And  if  all  these  were 
without  excuse,  what  will,  what  must  become  of  the  man  who 
will  not  love  the  truth,  and  embrace  the  truth,  and  obey  the 
truth,  which  he  knows  Christianity  reveals  ? 


LECTURE  XII. 

Argument  for  necessity  of  revelation  continued:  Prop.  2  continued — Revelation  necessary  to 
secure  the  practical  influence  of  the  truth.— Argued  from  the  state  of  Pagan  nations  at  pres- 
ent.— From  the  influence  of  Deism. — Deists  greatly  indebted  to  Christianity. — The  influence 
of  their  systems  is  feeble,  scanty  and  uncertain,  denies  the  holiness  and  justice  of  God. — Theii 
views  of  sin  and  repentance  defective. — Their  morality  superficial. — Men  are  not  made  better 
by  them. — Little  zeal  for  reforming  men  by  them. — Give  no  comfort  in  death. — Prop.  3. 
Revelation  necessary  to  make  known  truth  undiscovcrable  without  it. — Conclusion. 

In  continuing  the  argument  for  the  necessity  of  a  divine 
revelation  to  any  useful  discovery  of  truth,  I  appeal — 

In  the  second  place,  to  the  state  of  pagan  nations  at  the  pres- 
ent time. 

This  point  needs  no  illustration.  The  facts  on  this  subject 
are  familiar  to  all,  and  they  carry  with  them  their  own  infer- 
ences. 

In  the  third  place,  I  appeal  to  the  influence,  of  Deism.  It  is 
claimed  by  that  class  of  philosophers  called  deists,  that  the 
book  of  nature  is  the  only  book  to  be  studied,  or  that  deism  as 
a  system  derived  from  human  reason  under  the  light  of  nature, 
is  all  that  is  requisite  actually  to  instruct  and  guide  the  world 
in  respect  to  religion  and  morals. 

My  first  remark  on  this  part  of  the  subject  is,  that  this  class 
of  philosophers,  have  derived  the  best  parts  of  their  system 
from  the  very  revelation  which  they  reject  and  affect  to  de- 
spise. Let  it  then  be  conceded,  that  in  their  system  of  faith 
there  is  much  truth  concerning  God  and  concerning  man — 
truth,  which  human  reason  rigidly  employ v^,  might  and  would 
discover  under  the  mere  light  of  nature.  But  it  is  one  thing 
to  grant  that  these  doctrines  of  deism  are  discoverable,  and 
quite  another  to  affirm,  that  they  have  been  actually  discov- 
ered by  the  light  of  nature.  What  then  is  the  fact  ?  It  is  here 
to  be  remarked,  that  the  name  of  deist  was  unknown  till  about 
the  year  1565,  when  Christianity  had  been  in  the  world  more 
than  fifteen  centuries.  How  then  did  it  happen,  that  Socrates, 
and  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  and  all  the  wisest  philosophers  groped 


360  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

in  such  darkness  during  so  many  ages,  and  that  this  purified 
and  perfect  system  of  truth  called  deism,  should  be  first  discov- 
ered and  taught  by  men  who  lived  and  were  educated  under 
the  meridian  sun  of  Christianity  ?  Had  these  men  at  this 
period  of  the  world,  made  such  advances  in  knowledge  as  to 
leave  the  philosophers  of  Greece  and  Rome  and  all  other  na- 
tions out  of  sight,  and  to  be  able  effectually  to  guide  them- 
selves and  the  rest  of  the  world  by  their  own  reason  ?  Can 
they  lay  claim  to  superior  genius  or  mental  culture ;  or  did  the 
light  of  nature  shine  brighter  on  them  than  on  all  who  lived 
before?  This  cannot  be  pretended.  No;  what  they  knew, 
and  all  they  knew,  more  than  was  known  and  taught  by  the 
sages  of  antiquity,  they  learned  from  God's  revelation.  Chris- 
tianity had  shamed  away  the  grosser  errors  and  vices  of  the 
pagan  philosophy,  and  shed  its  blazing  light  so  intensely  on 
the  mind,  as  to  compel  men  as  it  were  to  see  its  perfect  system 
of  moral  and  religious  truth,  and  to  adopt  so  much  of  it  as 
to  shield  them  from  contempt.  They  stole  a  torch  from  the 
temple  of  God  and  called  it  the  light  of  their  own  reason.  The 
fact  cannot  be  mistaken — the  pretension  to  discovery  is  ridicu- 
lous. As  well  might  a  New  Zealander  residing  among  the 
discoveries  in  the  arts  and  sciences  made  in  Christendom  for 
the  last  hundred  years,  pretend  to  be  their  sole  author.  Are 
not  such  pretensions  to  discovery  from  the  light  of  nature  ridic- 
ulous, contemptible,  beyond  all  possible  respect  ? 

But  I  will  waive  this  point,  and  ask,  what  is  this  system  of 
truth  which  is  to  accomplish  so  much  for  the  moral  reforma- 
tion of  the  world?  No  one  can  tell  what  it  is!  To  whom 
shall  we  apply — where  shall  we  find  it  ?  Shall  we  resort  to  the 
deistical  writers  en  masse  and  listen  to  their  instructions  ?  But 
the  ear  is  stunned  with  contradiction,  inconsistency,  disagree- 
ment, controversy,  mutual  censure  and  recrimination  without 
end.  When  it  must  be  optional  in  the  highest  sense  with  all 
to  adopt  one  or  another  or  none  of  these  systems,  what  is  to  be 
expected  but  the  same  jargon  among  the  disciples, as  prevails 
among  the  masters ;  or  rather,  what  but  the  rejection  of  every 
system  ?  Or  if  every  one  is  to  read  and  judge  for  himself,  what 
will  be  the  consequence  but  confusion,  compared  with  which 
that  of  Babel  were  harmony  of  sweetest  music  ?  Who  that 
knows  any  thing  of  man,  or  of  the  experience  of  past  ages,  will 
not  regard  as  perfectly  ridiculous  the  scheme  of  bringing  this 


THE    DEIST'S    PREMISES    DEFECTIVE.  367 

world  to  receive  any  system  even  of  truth,  which  lias  no  higher 
authority  than  that  of  human  reason. 

But  further,  without  insisting  on  this  fatal  obstacle,  there  is 
yet  another.  Their  system  can  possess  no  authority,  not  even 
that  of  reason  itself.  The  most  perfect  system  of  deism  con- 
sists in  these  particulars,  that  there  is  one  God  possessing  in- 
finite natural  and  moral  perfection;  that  God  is  to  be  wor- 
shiped and  served  in  the  forms  of  piety  and  of  virtue;  that 
God  will  forgive  our  sins  against  him  on  condition  of  repent- 
ance ;  and  that  he  will  reward  the  good  and  punish  the  bad  in 
a  future  state.  Now  I  readily  admit  that  these  propositions 
are  all  true,  in  their  proper  import,  and  that  they  can  all  be 
proved  to  be  true,  by  human  reason.  But  what  I  now  main- 
tain is,  that  the  infidel  cannot,  by  reason,  prove  any  one  of 
them  to  be  true.  He  cannot,  because  he  denies  the  premises 
by  which  alone  these  propositions  can  be  thus  proved  to  be 
true.  lie  denies  the  justice  of  God,  the  equity  of  his  moral 
administration  over  this  world ;  and,  denying  this,  he  can 
prove  nothing  concerning  God  or  man  of  the  nature  of  relig- 
ious or  moral  truth  arising  out  of  the  character  of  God,  or 
the  relations  between  God  and  man.  Denying  that  God  is 
just  as  a  moral  governor,  he  cannot  prove  that  God  is  benevo- 
lent. Denying  that  perfect  benevolence  in  God  involves  in  its 
very  nature  exact  and  perfect  justice,  he  denies  the  very  nature 
of  benevolence  ;  he  denies  an  essential  element  of  all  moral  rec- 
titude, and  utterly  subverts  the  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong.  The  God  of  Infidelity  then  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  a  be- 
nevolent God-;  but  is  and  must  be  a  selfish  and  malignant  deity. 
This  spoils  alike  its  entire  system  of  theology  and  of  morals. 
A  God  of  such  a  character  cannot  have  the  least  claim  to  any 
worship  or  service  from  man,  either  in  the  form  of  piety  or  vir- 
tue. With  such  a  view  of  God, there  can  be  no  love,  no  confi- 
dence, no  gratitude,  no  piety,  no  virtue  toward  him,  for  there 
is  no  fit  object  of  these  affections.  All  moral  relations  between 
him  and  his  moral  creation  are  subverted.  Moral  obligation, 
obedience,  disobedience,  sin,  duty,  can  have  no  place.  Where 
is  moral  obligation  ?  Such  a  God  has  no  right  to  command. 
Where  is  obedience  or  disobedience  ?  He  has  no  authority. 
Where  is  the  standard  of  duty  ?  The  will  of  God  is  the  will  of 
a  selfish  or  malignant  being.  Where  is  the  object  of  one  right 
affection?     God  is  exhibited  only  as  an  object  of  abhorrence 


'368  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

and  of  dread.  Where  is  sin  against  God  ?  It  were  sinful  to 
love,  and  right  to  hate  such  a  being.  Where  is  repentance  ? 
There  is  no  cause  for  contrition  in  the  past,  and  no  return  to 
duty  for  the  future.  Where  is  forgiveness  ?  There  is  nothing 
to  be  forgiven.  Where  is  the  ground  of  trust  or  hope?  The 
vain  illusion  that  a  selfish  being,  who  is  more  likely  to  destroy 
than  to  promote  the  interests  of  his  creatures,  may  prove  in- 
dulgent through  partiality  or  favoritism.  Where  the  prospect 
of  immortality  ?  No  purpose  or  plan  of  God,  no  designs  either 
of  justice  or  mercy,  require  a  future  state  for  their  accomplish- 
ment, Where  are  rewards  and  punishments  ?  All  are  a  mock- 
ery— at  best  the  expressions  of  unjust  lenity  or  unjust  severity. 
Where  is  religion ;  where  is  virtue ;  where  is  the  principle  of 
recovery  from  the  gulf  of  moral  ruin ;  where  is  relief  for  the 
alarmed  conscience ;  where  is  mercy,  peace,  hope,  heaven ; 
where  is  a  perfect  God  ?  All  is  a  blank.  Indeed,  a  system 
of  religion  which  denies  the  gkeat  relation  of  god  as  the 
righteous  moral  governor  of  men,  is  all  error,  all  delusion. 
It  is  worse  than  not  true.  It  is  most  fearfully  false.  It  is 
worse  than  nothing,  worse  than  any  thing.  The  God  of  such 
a  system  can  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  truth  only  under  two 
aspects — as  the  patron  of  iniquity,  or  an  omnipotent  tyrant, 
Ko  God  at  all  were  better  than  the  God  of  Infidelity.  What 
man  not  already  the  hopeless  victim  of  his  wrath,  would  not 
wish  that  God  were  benevolent,  though  benevolence  involves 
perfect  justice.  Under  any  other  idea  of  him,  there  is  nothing 
but  that  which  in  wanton  malice  patronizes  iniquity  with  all  its 
woes  or  tortures,  nothing  but  that  which  is  fitted  to  overwhelm 
with  terror.  Such  then  are  the  unavoidable  results  which  rea- 
son gives  from  the  premises  of  the  infidel.  If  we  can  suppose 
him  inconsistent  enough  to  believe  any  thing  better  himself,  he 
cannot  prove  it  to  be  true,  he  cannot  enforce  it  on  the  minds 
of  other  men  by  the  authority  of  reason.  He  must  give  up 
his  premises,  and  admit  the  great  fact  of  a  just  God,  or  aban- 
don all  pretense  to  reasoning.  His  premises  do  not  give  his 
conclusions,  but  others  which  are  opposite  and  appalling.  What 
then  can  be  hoped  for,  from  a  system  of  reason  in  which  there 
is  no  reason  ?  Will  the  world  be  reformed  by  a  system  of 
faith  professedly  founded  in  reason,  and  yet  so  obviously  built 
on  falsehood  ?  Yain  is  the  dream.  Deism,  with  all  the  seem- 
ing comeliness  of  its  most  unexceptionable  form,  has,  according 


WHAT    IS    THE    INFIDEL'S    FAITH?  369 

to  its  own  principles,  no  warrant,  no  authority,  from  human 
reason.     It  is  an  utterly  baseless  system. 

But  I  have  another  inquiry  to  make  concerning  this  system : 
viz.,  what  is  it?  The  deist — at  least  a  few  deists — professes  to 
believe  that  there  is  a  perfect  God ;  that  he  is  to  be  worshiped 
and  served  by  piety  and  virtue ;  that  he  will  forgive  our  sins 
on  condition  of  repentance;  and  that  good  men  will  be  re- 
warded and  bad  men  punished  in  a  future  state. 

This,  so  far  as  it  goes,  sounds  well  in  words,  but  what  does 
he  believe  concerning  God?  He  tells  us  he  is  good.  But 
what  is  goodness  in  God  ?  We  have  seen  that  it  is  that  senti- 
mental tenderness,  that  indulgent  lenity  that  sacrifices  the  gen- 
eral good  to  individual  happiness ;  goodness  that  does  not 
abhor  the  supreme  evil,  goodness  that  refuses  to  adopt  the 
best  means  of  the  best  end.  Does  the  infidel  then  believe  in 
God  as  he  is  ?  Does  he  conceive  of  him  in  the  glory  of  that 
holiness  which  recoils  from  sin  with  supreme  and  eternal  indig- 
nation, in  the  glory  of  that  justice  which  will  maintain  his  law, 
uphold  his  throne,  sustain  the  interests  of  holiness,  and  express 
his  supreme  and  immutable  abhorrence  of  sin,  though  it  in- 
volves the  eternal  destruction  of  a  rebel  universe  ?  "Who  does 
not  know,  that  all  such  exhibitions  of  God,  are,  in  the  view  of 
infidels,  repulsive,  odious,  intolerable  falsehood?  Who  does 
not  know,  that  they  can  tolerate  no  idea  of  God  but  that  which 
exhibits  him  as  more  concerned  for  the  happiness  of  his  crea- 
tures than  for  their  virtue;  that  view  of  God, which  represents 
him  as  entirely  dispensing  with  the  eternal  nature,  relations, 
and  dependences  of  things ;  and  therefore  as  sacrificing  the  in- 
terests and  the  principles  of  righteousness  to  make  his  creation 
happy,  by  which  he  must  inevitably  make  that  creation  wretch- 
ed; that  view  of  God  which  exhibits  him  in  the  glory  of  his 
mercy,  sacrificing  his  justice,  in  the  plenitude  of  his  goodness  as 
a  tender,  indulgent  friend  and  patron  of  iniquity — a  selfish  ma- 
lignant deity?  Such  is  the  good,  the  benevolent,  the  perfect 
God  of  Infidelity !  I  ask  here,  are  these  words  merely,  and  not 
things?  The  same  hollow  emptiness,  the  same  meaningless 
nothing,  or  rather  the  same  fearful  falsehood  characterizes  every 
part  of  the  infidel's  creed.  What  is  sin  ?  A  venial  evil — the 
merest  trifle — nay,  rather,  so  far  as  it  exists,  the  best  means  of 
the  best  end !  What  greater  practical  error  than  to  believe  the 
worst  kind  of  moral  action  to  be  the  best  kind  of  moral  action  ? 
16*  24 


370  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

Where  is  the  true  exhibition  of  the  nature  and  tendency  of  sin 
against  God,  as  hostility  to  him  and  all  good  and  the  source  of 
absolute  and  universal  woe ;  as  the  subversion  of  God's  law, 
his  government,  his  throne,  his  kingdom,  as  the  destruction  of 
all  good — yea,  of  God  himself,  as  the  infallible  source  of  misery, 
unmingled,  complete,  eternal.  Are  such  the  views  of  the  true 
nature  and  tendency  of  sin  which  Infidelity  gives  us  ?  Nothing 
like  it.  They  are,  of  all  things,  the  views  which  infidels  most 
abhor.  That  sin  is  such  an  evil,  involving  such  fell  destruction, 
such  guilt  or  ill-desert,  and  that  a  perfect  God  must  feel  and 
act  toward  it  accordingly,  is,  in  their  estimation,  the  most  in- 
credible of  all  nonsense.  These  views  of  sin  are  the  false, 
absurd,  austere,  gloomy,  self-torturing  views  of  hair-brained 
fanatics. 

With  such  conceptions  of  God  as  the  infidel  entertains,  what 
must  that  be  which  he  calls  piety?  Can  love,  reverence,  confi- 
dence, submission,  gratitude,  joy,  be  exercised  toward  the  God  of 
Infidelity?  How  preposterous.  Can  every  thing  be  taken  away 
from  the  character  of  God  which  awakens  dread  and  disturb- 
ance when  sinful  beings  think  of  heaven's  Sovereign  ;  can  every 
moral  attribute  of  the  Godhead  be  amalgamated  into  one — that 
of  unqualified  tenderness;  can  all  that  is  venerable  and  awful  in 
God  be  sunk  into  that  which  is  so  grateful  to  the  rebel ;  with 
such  a  view  of  God  can  the  heart  of  his  worshiper  feel  the  holy 
reverence  and  awful  love  which  are  due  to  a  perfect  God? 
True  piety,  in  all  the  sacredness  and  solemnity  of  devout  emo- 
tion, adoring  the  tender,  sentimental,  weak-hearted  God  of  In- 
fidelity !  When  does  the  infidel  contemplate  God  in  his  true 
character,  that  awful  goodness  which  connects  misery  with  sin, 
and  welcome  the  aspect  of  such  a  God  ?  When  does  he  look 
upon  that  august  and  inviolable  sanctuary,  where  the  fires  of 
his  indignation  forever  burn  to  guard  the  approach  of  the  least 
moral  pollution,  and  adore,  and  love,  and  praise,  with  grateful 
and  exulting  joy?  We  all  know  that  such  a  God  is  the  object 
of  aversion  and  ridicule,  and  even  of  blasphemy,  with  infidels. 
All  their  piety,  all  their  joy  in  God,  is,  and  can  be,  nothing 
but  those  selfish,  sordid  emotions  which  are  founded  in  the  be- 
lief that  an  unprincipled  deity  will  be  indulgent  to  them  in 
their  rebellion. 

And  further ;  what  is  that  which  the  infidel  calls  repentance  f 
xsot  sorrow  for  sin  as  it  is — not  as  hostility  to  God,  and  the 


INFIDEL    VIEWS    OF    RELIGION.  371 

frustration  of  his  designs ;  not  sorrow  for  sin,  as  that  which  in 
the  estimation  of  God  and  of  truth,  deserves  his  wrath  in  the 
endless  misery  of  the  sinner.  But  rather,  it  is  regret  for  a  tri- 
vial evil,  for  that  toward  which  God  feels  no  supreme  abhor- 
rence, hut  which  he  on  the  whole  prefers  to  its  opposite — sor- 
row in  a  word,  for  that  which  in  their  estimation  and  in  that  of 
God, is  the  best  means  of  the  best  end,  with  a  determination  to 
forsake  it!  And  as  to  future  rewards,  what  are  these — what  is 
the  heaven  of  Infidelity  ?  Nothing  positive,  nothing  definite — 
a  general  undefined  state  of  happiness  irrespective  of  moral 
character.  It  may  be  the  heaven  of  Mohammed,  or  it  may 
be  the  blissful  elysium  of  heathen  poetry,  or  a  paradise  of 
earthly  sweets  in  some  other  form.  But  it  is  not  a  world  of 
happiness,  because  sin  is  not  there,  and  because  holiness  is 
there  reigning  in  all  its  purity  and  its  joys.  The  happiness  of 
the  infidel's  heaven  is  not  that  which  is  peculiar  to  holy  spirits 
in  communion  with  a  holy  God.  It  is  any  thing  but  a  perfect 
God  in  fellowship  with  creatures  bearing  his  perfect  image.  And 
what  is  future  punishment?  Not  a  supreme  and  endless  misery 
inflicted  as  the  expression  of  the  wrath  of  God  against  sin  ;  but 
at  most  paternal  chastisement,  disciplinary  evil,  kind  inflictions 
to  reform  and  to  save ;  evil  inflicted  according  to  the  exigency, 
so  that  they  who  are  not  reformed  by  less  shall  be  reformed  by 
more,  so  that  rebellion  itself,  much  as  it  may  abhor  the  service 
of  God,  shall  be  compelled  by  dint  of  suffering  to  surrender  to 
God's  authority,  and  thus  to  serve  him  at  best  with  a  rebel 
heart.  No  other  motive,  nothing  but  the  compulsory  influence 
of  natural  evil  is  thought  of  or  presented.  Thus  it  is  that  Infi- 
delity in  its  fairest  form  is  plausible  in  ivords  only.  In  'respect 
to  truth,  it  means  nothing  which  it  seems  to  mean.  It  knows 
nothing  of  God  as  he  is — nothing  of  holiness  or  of  sin,  of  piety, 
virtue,  repentance,  or  of  the  nature  of  those  influences  by  which 
alone  moral  beings  can  be  governed  and  blessed.  All  it  means 
under  its  fair  show  of  words, is  error  the  most  destructive.  And 
in  further  confirmation  on  this  point,  I  appeal  to  any  man  ac- 
quainted with  the  writings  or  the  character  of  infidels,  and  ask, 
is  there  a  more  palpable  solecism  than  a  pious  infidel — a  de- 
vout, spiritual,  heavenly-minded  infidel  ? 

If  now  we  appeal  to  Infidelity's  code  of  morals,  what  is  it? 
True  morality  is  in  the  heart.  Men  talk  of  good  morals.  What 
are  they?   Benevolence  in  the  heart;  love  to  God  and  love  to 


dl2  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

man.  Holiness,  a  spiritual  principle,  which  as  much  surpasses 
all  that  infidels  call  morality  as  a  living  man  does  a  dead  man. 
In  all  the  writings  then  of  infidels,  I  fearlessly  affirm,  that  the 
inculcation  of  the  great,  the  true,  the  only  principle  of  morality 
cannot  be  found.  It  follows  of  course,  that  whatever  else  may 
be  true  of  their  system,  it  includes  not  the  slightest  tendency 
to  reform  men  in  respect  to  morality.  In  most  if  not  in  all 
cases,  there  is  an  open  and  avowed  contempt  for  many  of  the 
particular  virtues  which  adorn  the  character  of  man  as  a  social 
being,  and  which  are  essential  to  the  happiness  of  an  earthly 
community.  At  the  same  time  the  most  heartless,  sordid  self- 
ishness is  inculcated  in  many  forms,  and  many  of  the  most 
degrading  and  destructive  vices,  with  an  almost  unlimited  in- 
dulgence of  the  sensual  appetites,  are  countenanced  and  even 
formally  vindicated.  A  few  testimonies  from  the  least  excep- 
tionable of  deistical  writers  must  suffice  on  this  topic.  Lord 
Herbert  asserts  that  lust  and  anger  are  no  more  to  be  blamed 
than  the  thirst  occasioned  by  the  dropsy,  or  the  drowsiness 
produced  by  lethargy.  Mr.  Hobbes,  that  the  civil  law  is  the 
only  foundation  of  right  and  wrong — that  every  man  has  a 
right  to  all  things,  and  may  lawfully  get  them  if  he  can.  Lord 
Bolingbroke  resolves  all  morality  into  self-love,  meaning  selfish- 
ness, and  teaches  that  ambition,  the  lust  of  power,  sensuality 
and  avarice  may  be  lawfully  gratified  if  they  can  be  safely, 
that  man  lives  only  in  the  present  world,  that  the  chief  end  of 
man  is  to  gratify  the  appetites  and  inclinations  of  the  flesh, 
that  adultery  is  no  violation  of  the  law  of  nature,  that  polyg- 
amy is  a  part  of  this  law,  and  modesty  is  inspired  by  prejudice 
or  vanity.  Mr.  Hume  maintained  that  self-denial  and  humility 
are  not  virtues,  but  are  useless  and  mischievous,  and  that  pride, 
self-valuation,  &c,  are  objects  of  moral  approbation,  that  adul- 
tery must  be  practiced  if  men  would  obtain  all  the  advantages  of 
life,  and  if  practiced  secretly  and  frequently  would  be  no  crime 
at  all !  But  I  need  not  go  into  further  details.  Substantially 
the  same  things  or  worse,  are  to  be  found  in  all  this  class  of 
writers  of  most  distinction. 

If  now  we  refer  to  their  characters,  we  shall  see  that  in 
their  practice  they  gave  proof  of  their  faith.  Lord  Herbert, 
Hobbes,  Lord  Shaftsbury,  Woolston,  Tindal,  Chubb,  Lord  Bol- 
ingbroke, Collins,  were  all  guilty  of  the  vilest  hypocrisy  and 
lying  on  the  face  of  their  publications;   professing  in  words 


CHARACTER    OF    INFIDELS.  373 

high  respect  for  Christianity,  while  they  felt  toward  it  the 
most  deadly  hate,  wearing  a  mask  of  friendship  that  they 
miorht  stab  it  to  the  heart.  The  morals  of  Rochester  and 
Wharton  were  notoriously  degraded.  Woolston  was  a  blas- 
phemer ;  Blount  was  a  suicide ;  Tindal  and  Morgan  were 
shameless  hypocrites.  Yoltaire  was  an  adulterer,  and  as  famous 
for  falsehood,  treachery,  envy,  profligacy,  low  sensuality  and 
cruelty,  as  for  his  exalted  talents.  Rousseau,  by  his  own  pub- 
lished confession,  was  a  thief,  a  liar,  and  a  debauchee.  Thomas 
Paine,  than  whom  perhaps  no  one  has  done  more  by  his  writ- 
ings to  extend  Infidelity  in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  was  in- 
famous for  his  hostility  to  all  morals  and  all  religion,  for  his 
impiety,  blasphemy,  licentiousness  and  adultery,  and  sunk  at 
last  into  all  the  filth  and  wretchedness  of  a  sot;  an  object  of 
pity  and  contempt  to  his  own  deluded  disciples. 

In  presenting  these  examples,  I  do  not  pretend  that  every 
deist  has  been  thus  degraded  by  open  vice  and  immorality. 
Doubtless  there  are  cases  in  which  pride,  respect  for  character, 
literary  ambition,  and  other  causes  have  predominated  over 
the  grosser  appetites ;  but  in  many  of  these  an  avowed  hos- 
tility to  the  true  principle  of  morals,  a  ridicule  of  the  milder 
virtues,  an  extreme  indifference  and  selfishness  in  respect  to 
the  best  interests  of  man,  have  varied  the  aspect  without  less- 
ening the  guilt  of  their  principles  or  their  conduct.  Nor  let 
it  here  be  said  that  some  of  the  professed  disciples  of  Chris- 
tianity have  also  been  depraved  and  wicked  men.  We  admit 
it.  But  this  we  reply  is  notwithstanding  Christianity — it  is  in 
spite  of  it,  riot  its  effect ;  while  the  wickedness  and  the  profli- 
gacy of  professed  infidels  are  the  genuine  fruits  and  effects 
of  their  religion  itself.  The  proof  from  facts  is  decisive.  Such 
has  been  the  character  of  the  teachers  of  the  one  system  almost 
without  an  exception,  while  the  contrary  character  has  been 
that  of  the  teachers  of  the  other,  with  almost  no  exception. 
In  respect  to  the  disciples  of  the  two  systems,  in  the  one  case  a 
hundred  to  one  have  been  openly  wicked  and  profligate,  in  the 
other  not  one  in  a  hundred  has  been. 

Again ;  infidels  themselves  do  not  believe  in  the  salutary, 
reforming  tendency  of  their  own  system.  What  have  they 
done,  I  do  not  say  to  propagate  their  faith,  but  to  propagate  it 
for  practical,  reforming  purposes  ?  what,  to  secure  any  useful 
practical  influence  on  the  human  mind  ?     Is  it  not  notorious 


o(4:  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

that  the  grand,  the  supreme  object,  end,  and  aim  of  this  class 
of  men,  has  been  to  pull  down  and  destroy  Christianity,  and  to 
set  up  Infidelity  in  its  stead?  Is  it  not  a  fact  that  Infidelity,  so 
far  as  it  comprises  truth  in  words,  is  a  mere  show,  an  empty 
pretense  of  truth,  brought  forward  only  as  matter  of  display 
in  argument;  never  as  having  any  practical  bearing  on  the 
conscience ;  never  exhibited  as  a  system  embodying  obliga- 
tions, persuasives,  motives — the  least  tendency  or  power  to  re- 
claim from  sin  and  death — but  used  as  an  imposing  semblance 
of  truth — a  foil  to  set  off  and  commend  the  most  destructive 
error.  Does  the  infidel  care  what  men  believe,  provided  only 
that  they  do  not  believe  Christianity  ?  Or  rather,  so  far  as  he 
teaches  any  thing  positive,  does  he  not  inculcate  false  views  of 
God,  of  his  character,  of  his  relations ;  and  false  views  of  man, 
his  duty,  his  character,  his  prospects?  Is  it  not  a  system  to 
console  rather  than  disturb  human  wickedness  ?  Where  are 
the  truths  brought  forth  for  practical  purposes  which  are 
taught  by  the  light  of  nature  itself?  Where,  in  the  writings 
or  addresses  of  this  class  of  men,  is  God  presented  to  the  human 
mind  as  he  is — God  in  his  holiness,  his  justice,  or  even  in  his 
mercy,  for  practical  purposes ;  where  do  you  find  any  exhibi- 
tion of  sin  as  it  is,  in  its  true  moral  deformity,  turpitude,  and 
odiousness ;  repentance  in  its  ingenuous  relentings,  its  godly 
contrition,  brokenness  of  heart,  and  abhorrence  of  all  sin ;  of 
the  graces  of  humility,  meekness,  forgiveness,  active  benefi- 
cence, with  the  self-denial  and  self-government  which  they  in- 
volve ;  where  any  exhibition  of  the  rewards  of  the  righteous 
and  the  punishments  of  the  wicked  pressed  on  the  hopes  and 
the  fears  of  men  as  incentives  to  piety  and  virtue?  Where  is 
there  any  assault  on  corrupting  error  save  that  of  Christian- 
ity, or  any  defence  of  truth,  except  that  Christianity  is  false. 
Where  is  truth  (I  speak  of  truth  taught  by  the  light  of  nature), 
developed  by  illustration,  defended  and  confirmed  by  argu- 
ment, and  pressed  home  on  the  bosoms  and  business  of  men  in 
its  practically  reforming  power ;  where  are  the  sinful  practices 
of  men  exposed  and  condemned ;  where  are  the  corrupt  princi- 
ples of  the  human  heart,  its  selfishness,  deceitfulness,its  lusts  and 
inordinate  passions,  its  worldliness,  pride,  and  rebellion  against 
God  laid  open ;  where  is  the  law  of  God  in  its  broad  and  spiritual 
demands  unfolded  ;  where  is  the  full-length  portrait  of  man 
drawn  as  a  sinner  against  God  without  excuse,  and  without 


WHY    INFIDELS    DO    NOT    PREACH.  o<0 

hope  save  in  the  mercy  of  a  just  God — mercy  without  merit — - 
mercy  that  can  save  while  justice  can  destroy;  where  is  the 
entreaty  and  the  expostulation,  the  earnest  solicitude,  the  be- 
seeching tenderness,  the  faithful  reproof,  that  true-hearted  kind- 
ness that  consults  not  the  passions  but  the  welfare  of  men,  not 
their  inclinations  but  their  duties,  that  offends  rather  than  de- 
ceives, that  utters  painful  truth  rather  than  flatters  to  destruc- 
tion, that  humbles,  and  rebukes,  and  wounds,  rather  than  not 
save ;  where  is  the  study,  and  the  toil,  and  the  prayers,  the 
compassion,  the  tears,  that  become  a  reformer  of  fellow-beings 
ruined  for  eternity  ?  Where  are  their  Baxters,  and  Leigh  tons, 
and  Doddridges,  their  Edwardses,  and  Davieses  ?  A  death-like 
silence  answers.  There  is  not  one  Christian  book  that  does  not 
contain  the  essential  elements  of  moral  truth,  illustrated,  ap- 
plied, enforced  ;  you  cannot  find  one  infidel  book  that  does. 
What  signifies  then  all  this  pretense  of  infidels  about  reform- 
ing the  world  by  the  light  of  reason?  If  there  is  truth  in  their 
system,  fitted  and  sufficient  to  reform  and  save  their  fellow- 
creatures  from  the  doom  of  sin,  and  if  they  sincerely  believe  it, 
why  not  bring  it  forth  for  this  high  purpose,  and  go  abroad  on 
this  errand  of  salvation  with  that  apostolic  zeal,  self-denial,  and 
devotedness,  which  become  such  a  cause.  Sin  still  maintains 
its  dark  and  gloomy  dominion,  with  scarcely  an  exception, 
throughout  this  wicked  world,  frowning  resistance  and  defiance 
a  gainst  God  and  goodness. 

Why,  as  true  men  and  good  men,  do  they  not  open  their 
powerful  battery  of  truth,  and  make  their  artillery  thunder  on 
the  strongholds  of  sin  and  death  ?  Honest  men,  believing  that 
they  have  the  means  of  such  a  triumph,  and  yet  doing  nothing ! 
Friends  of  God  and  of  man,  true-hearted  philanthropists,  do  you 
believe  that  Infidelity  will  reform  and  save  a  lost  world  ;  then 
apply  it  to  that  purpose,  show  your  faith  by  your  works.  In  the 
name  of  truth  and  reason  let  us  have  the  experiment.  Oh,  but 
Christianity  is  in  the  way.  Then  go  where  there  is  no  Chris- 
tianity. Christianity  in  the  way  ?  But  Christianity,  by  their 
own  confession,  is  the  best,  even  a  perfect  system  of  morals. 
Why  not  then  take  truth — truth  where  they  can  find  it — 
truth,  if  the  devil  be  the  author  of  it ;  and  carry  it  forth  in  its 
enlightening,  transforming,  and  saving  power,  upon  this  dark 
and  wicked  and  dying  world  ?  The  infidel  sincere  !  An  apostle 
of  Infidelity  loving  the  souls  of  men  ;  truly  believing  that  a 


376  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

lost  world  is  to  be  reclaimed  to  God  by  deism ;  aiming  to  ac- 
complish this  end  by  this  means !  No.  Every  thing  shows 
that  his  grand,  his  only  object  is,  to  destroy  Christianity.  He 
lives  to  annihilate  its  truths  and  to  throw  the  reins  loose  on  the 
neck  of  rebellion  against  God.  He  hates  Christianity.  He 
hates  its  author;  he  lives  with  the  watchword  on  his  lips, 
"  Crush  the  wretch ;"  and  to  any  labors,  undertaken  and  pur- 
sued from  jDrinciple,  for  the  glory  of  God  and  the  salvation  of 
men,  he  will  not  make  the  least  pretension.  Labors  for  the 
conversion  and  salvation  of  men !  There  is  not  an  infidel  who 
would  not  be  ashamed  of,  and  even  resent,  the  imputation. 

Once  more,  what  have  been  the  actual  effects  of  Infidelity, 
the  practical  results  on  the  human  mind.  I  speak  of  its 
effects  where  it  has  been  most  successful  in  respect  to  its  real 
object  of  displacing  the  influence  of  Christianity  and  securing 
the  prevalence  and  legitimate  results  of  its  own  principles. 
Here  I  might  appeal  to  the  testimony  of  that  multitude  who 
have  been  converted  from  Infidelity  to  Christianity  p  what  is 
their  conversion  in  every  instance  by  their  own  frank  confes- 
sion but  a  conversion  from  sin  to  holiness — what  is  it  in  most 
cases  but  a  conversion  from  vice,  profligacy,  hostility  to  all 
that  is  good — what  but  a  resurrection  from  moral  degradation 
and  death  ?  Facts  innumerable  of  this  kind  betray  the  camp 
of  the  enemy — they  show  us  the  interior  of  this  sepulcher. 
But  has  Infidelity  any  such  facts  to  show — facts  of  men  made 
better  by  renouncing  Christianity  for  Infidelity  ?  Converts  to 
Infidelity  from  among  devout  and  enlightened  disciples  of 
Christianity,  confessing  their  guilt  for  having  embraced  it, 
confessing  vice  and  crime,  profligacy  and  debauchery  as  the 
results  of  receiving  and  obeying  Christianity !  Baxters,  Leigh- 
tons,  Doddridges,  Brainerds,  Edwardses,  such  men  in  the  in- 
tegrity of  their  hearts  renouncing  the  corrupting  influence  of 
Christianity  for  the  sanctifying  power  of  Infidelity !  All  the 
world  knows  the  absurdity,  the  self-contradiction,  the  utter  im- 
possibility of  such  a  thing ;  and  know  as  well  that  the  differ- 
ence between  Christianity  and  Infidelity  is  the  difference  be- 
tween truth  and  error — truth  that  blesses  and  saves,  and  error 
that  curses  and  destroys  the  souls  of  men — the  difference  be- 
tween life  and  death. 

What  has  been  the  reforming  influence  of  Infidelity,  of  human 
reason  rejecting  Christianity,  or  perverting  it,  or  obscuring  its 


DOES    INFIDELITY    REFORM?  377 

light  ?  What  was  the  cause  of  the  decay  and  of  an  almost 
utter  extinction  of  religion  and  virtue  among  men,  from  the 
seventh  to  the  sixteenth  century?  The  corruption  of  Christi- 
anity left  the  human  mind  to  be  governed  by  human  reason 
and  depraved  morals,  superstitions  multiplied,  heathenism  re- 
vived under  the  garb  of  Christianity,  spiritual  tyranny  was 
established,  moral  duties  exchanged  for  vows,  pilgrimages,  aus- 
terities ;  God,  his  worship,  his  service  forgotten ;  selfishness,  vice, 
crime,  a  long,  fearful  night  of  woe.  And  what  brought  back 
the  day  ?  TV" as  it  Infidelity ;  was  it  human  reason,  unaided  by 
revelation,  or  was  it  the  book  of  God,  reopened  and  republished 
by  the  reformers? 

Take  any  period  in  this  world's  history  and  show  when  or 
where,  in  a  solitary  instance,  Infidelity  has  ever  raised  the 
human  mind  from  the  gulf  of  ignorance  and  moral  degrada- 
tion ;  show  where  Infidelity  first  planted  religion,  or  preserved 
it  when  planted,  or  revived  it  when  it  had  declined,  or  purified 
it  when  it  had  been  corrupted.*  Show  the  spot  made  bright 
and  fruitful  by  its  boasted  irradiations  of  light.  "Where  has  it 
prevailed  without  producing  darkness,  sterility,  and  death? 
Need  we  speak  of  the  actual  experiment  made  in  France  not 
half  a  century  ago  ?  Need  we  refer  to  the  corruption  of  all 
ranks  of  her  people  ?  Have  we  forgotten  the  goddess  of  rea- 
son, the  temples  of  reason,  the  religion  of  reason,  the  abolition 
of  the  Sabbath,  the  proclamation  of  death  as  an  eternal  sleep, 
and  God  voted  out  of  existence  ?  Have  we  forgotten  that  the 
reign  of  reason  was  the  reign  of  terror  ? 

I  only  ask,  on  this  part  of  our  subject,  what  are  the  effects 
of  Infidelity  in  the  hour  of  death?  This  is  the  hour  of  truth 
and  honesty.  Now  comes  a  grand  catastrophe,  and  what  is 
that  religion  worth  which  condemns,  and  deserts,  and  betrays 
the  soul  at  last.  And  what  is  the  testimony  then  of  dying  in- 
fidels ?  In  whatever  manner  infidels  die,  the  testimony  fur- 
nished by  their  deaths,  though  circumstantially  different,  is,  on 
the  main  fact,  substantially  the  same.  How  many  are  their 
confessions,  that  Infidelity  has  been  only  the  cause  of  profligacy, 
crime,  and  ruin  ?  How  many  criminals  have  avowed  that  In- 
fidelity is  the  cause  of  the  crimes  expiated  by  their  ignomini- 
ous deaths !     How  many  have  imprecated  curses  on  the  hour 

*  Wilson. 


378  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

in  which  they  first  saw  an  infidel  book,  or  on  the  murderer  of 
souls,  who  put  it  into  their  hands  !  But  who  has  heard  a  dying 
Christian,lament  or  curse  the  day  in  which  he  believed  in  his 
Saviour?  How  then  does  the  infidel  die?  Does  he  die  in 
obdurate  insensibility  ?  Often.  But  what  a  state  of  mind  to 
meet  death  with  !  What  is  the  question  now  in  a  moment  to 
be  decided?  Whether  Ins  soul,  with  its  stupendous  powers  is 
to  be  blasted  into  annihilation,  expanded  to  the  fruition  of  its 
God,  or  filled  with  endless  despair  and  woe.  And  this  soul, 
callous  to  its  every  interest,  indifferent  to  its  God,  without  a 
prayer  for  mercy,  repelling  every  thought,  suppressing  every 
emotion  that  becomes  a  dying  immortal — yes,  a  cherished, 
hardened  insensibility,  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and  so  soon  to 
meet  the  God  of  eternity — asleep,  for  aught  he  knows  or  cares, 
on  the  brink  of  everlasting  damnation! 

Does  the  infidel  die  in  the  pride  and  presumption  which 
ventures  on  the  footing  of  his  merits  to  challenge  the  justice 
of  his  God?  Thus  died  Rousseau  claiming  the  favor  of  his 
Maker,  and  affirming  that  he  returned  him  his  soul  pure  and 
immaculate  as  he  had  received  it !  What  a  lie — what  daring 
of  God  to  his  face  ! 

Does  the  infidel  die  in  the  careless  levity  of  cold-hearted 
skepticism?  Mr.  Hume  is  our  example.  He  amuses  himself. 
He  reads  perhaps  Don  Quixotte,  or  the  Tales  of  Genii.  He 
laughs  at  death,  joking  about  Charon  and  his  boat,  and  the 
fabled  Styx,  and  playing  at  his  favorite  game  of  whist.  And 
on  his  death-bed  finishes,  what  ? — his  Essay  on  Suicide,  vindi- 
cating self-murder.  Thus  dies  the  applauded  hero  of  Infidelity ! 
Thus  David  Hume  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  living  God !  What 
an  unnatural  contempt  of  death  and  of  the  tribunal  of  the  final 
Judge!  Was  it  all  pretense,  or  was  it  the  brand  of  God's 
reprobation  ?  \ 

Or  does  the  infidel  die  in  the  anguish  of  despair  ?  How  nu- 
merous the  examples — how  agonizing  their  cries!  How  did 
Paine  die?  Under  the  compulsive  power  of  conscience  he 
declared,  "  That  if  the  devil  ever  had  had  an  agent  on  earth, 
he  had  been  one."  When  his  infidel  friends  said  to  him, 
"You  have  lived  like  a  man,"  (lived  like  a  man!)  "and  we 
hope  you  will  die  like  one!"  he  said  to  one  near  him,  "  You 
see  what  miserable  comforters  I  have."  To  the  woman  whom 
he  had  seduced  from  her  husband,  her  friends,  her  religion,  he 


THE    INFIDEL    AT    DEATH.  379 

said,  "The  principles  I  have  taught  you  will  not  bear  yon 
out."  As  death  approached,  he  began  to  betray  those  terrors 
which  before  he  laughed  a't.  lie  would  not  be  left  alone  night 
nor  day,  nor  suffer  his  attendant  to  be  out  of  his  sight,  and 
often  for  a  long  time  together  would  exclaim  in  anguish,  "  O 
Lord,  help  me  !     O  Christ,  help  me!" 

Look  now  at  the  death  of  Voltaire.  This  prince  of  infidels 
is  overwhelmed  with  terror!  What  does  he  think  now  of 
his  infidel  friends?  "It  is  you,"  said  he,  "  who  have  brought 
me  to  my  present  state — begone !  I  could  have  done  without 
you  all."  What  now  does  he  think  of  that  Saviour  he  had 
pronounced  "  a  wretch  ?"  Alternately  he  blasphemes  God, 
and  supplicates  his  mercy  exclaiming,  "  O  Christ,  O  Jesus 
Christ !"  till  his  friends  flew  from  his  bedside  horror-struck, 
declaring  the  sight  too  terrible  to  be  borne."* 

I  have  no  time,  nor  is  there  need  for  comment.  I  have 
only  to  ask,  does  philosophy,  does  human  reason  in  that  form 
of  it  called  Infidelity,  supersede  the  necessity  of  a  revelation 
from  God?  What  is  Infidelity?  In  its  fairest  form,  it  is  a 
theft  on  revelation,  and  yet  refusing  to  wear  the  garb  it  has 
stolen,  except  to  cover  its  own  nakedness  and  shame !  It  has 
no  support  in  its  real  form,  not  the  shadow  of  warrant  from 
reason,  but  is  a  manifest  defiance  and  contempt  of  all  reason. 
It  has  no  truth,  no  principles.  It  obliterates  all  distinction 
between  right  and  wrong,  and  subverts  the  moral  dominion  of 
God.  It  denies  his  true  character ;  it  proposes  to  give  him 
neither  honor,  love  nor  service ;  it  despises  holy  affections, 
spiritual  enjoyments,  heavenly  anticipations,  and  gives  up  the 
whole  man  to  the  dominion  of  the  lower  appetites,  and  the 
sensuality  of  earth  and  time.  It  forgets  all  connection  with 
eternity  and  the  God  of  eternity.  Of  heaven  as  a  home,  of 
eternal  happiness  in  fellowship  with  God,  it  has  no  hope.  Of 
hell  as  the  place  of  his  retributive  wrath  it  has  no  fears.  In  a 
word,  Infidelity  is  a  total  disruption  of  the  human  mind  from 
the  only  living  and  true  God — a  wretched  device  for  the  in- 
dulgence of  the  worst  propensities  of  a  fallen  spirit.  Will 
such  a  system  reform  the  world,  or  must  we  look  to  one  which 
has  upon  it  the  stamp,  the  seal  of  truth,  of  God,  of  heaven? 

I  need  only  state  the  third  proposition,  viz. : 


*  Wilson,  Lect.  XXII. 


380  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

3.  That  a  divine  revelation  is  necessary  to  the  discovery  of 
some  important  truths  which  man  could  not  discover  with- 
out it. 

The  important  truths  here  referred  to, are  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity,  and  those  doctrines  which  depend  on  it,  as  the  doc- 
trine of  atonement  made  by  the  Son  of  God,  and  the  renewing 
influence  of  the  Spirit  of  God. 

In  conclusion,  allow  me,  my  young  friends,  affectionately  to 
entreat  you  to  avoid  Infidelity.  I  have  briefly  shown  you 
what  it  is.  Can  it  be  true  ?  Can  it  be  true  that  man,  a  crea- 
ture of  God,  and  formed  in  his  image,  is  left  to  live,  and  act, 
and  die,  under  a  system  of  faith,  so  fatal  to  the  high  end  of  his 
creation,  so  dishonorable  to  his  Father  in  heaven,  so  full  of  dark 
despair  to  the  soul?  Let  the  infidel  in  his  scorn  for  truth,  and 
in  the  miserable  pride  of  exalting  beyond  measure  the  light  of 
reason,  shut  his  eyes  on  the  glories  of  Christianity.  Let  him 
hold  up  his  feeble,  fading  taper  kindled  by  the  light  of  the  sun 
of  revelation ;  let  him  pretend  that  it  is  his  own,  and  try  to 
extinguish  the  very  luminary  at  which  he  lighted  it.  But  be 
not  deceived.  Be  not  so  lost  to  reason,  to  conscience,  to  the 
known  end  of  your  being,  so  lost  to  all  experience,  to  truth,  to 
God  and  all  real  good,  as  to  listen  to  this  empty  declamation 
about  human  reason.  Follow  him  not  in  his  infatuated  wan- 
derings. What  does  reason  teach  ?  Reason  employed  on  the 
nature  of  things,  of  God,  of  man,  of  all  moral  truth.  Reason  em- 
ployed on  facts  given  in  all  experience.  What  does  reason  thus 
employed  teach  ?  That  Infidelity  as  it  is,  is  false — that  Chris- 
tianity, whether  a  revelation  or  not,  as  a  moral  system  is  true. 
Who  does  not  feel  his  blood  chill  at  that  vain  pride,  that  love 
of  error  and  of  sin,  that  can  reject  the  moral  system  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  treat  with  scorn  and  sarcasm  and  objection,  a  sys- 
tem so  full  of  hope  and  peace  and  joy  to  his  own  guilty  spirit? 
Who  does  not  know  that  if  he  embraces  Infidelity  as  a  prac- 
tical system,  that  his  soul  is  lost,  ruined,  without  help  even 
from  its  God  ?  Who  does  not  know  that  eternal  truth  binds 
such  a  soul  in  chains  of  everlasting  darkness,  guilt  and  woe  ! 
Who  does  not  know  that  in  so  doing  he  is  playing  at  the  despe- 
rate game  of  daring  not  only  Almighty  God,  but  everlasting 
truth  ?  That  he  forms  a  hell  in  his  own  bosom,  that  God  can- 
not bless  and  save  such  a  self-ruined  immortal? 

Yield  then  to  reason.     Obey  the  truth.     Put  on  this  pan- 


CONCLUSION.  381 

opoly,even  the  whole  armor  of  God.  Now  in  the  beginning  of 
life,  in  this  season  of  temptation — in  this  condition  of  danger 
from  the  frivolity,  the  thoughtlessness,  the  vanity  of  youthful 
companions,  remember  God  your  Creator  in  the  days  of 
your  youth.  Religion  is  always  an  ornament.  In  youth  it  is 
a  finish  and  a  crown — it  gives  a  charm  to  every  accomplish- 
ment, a  luster  to  every  excellence ;  and  "  rich  are  the  tints  of 
that  beauty,  and  sweet  the  fragrance  of  those  blossoms  on 
which  in  the  morning  of  life  the  Lord  God  sheds  down  the 
dews  of  his  blessing." 


LECTURE  XIII. 

Direct  Argument. — Question  proposed. — Preliminary  remarks. — 1.  Question  to  be  decided  by 
human  reason. — Limits  of  reason. — Perversion  of  reason. — 2.  Rational  to  bftlieve  in  divine 
origin  of  Christianity  on  low  evidence. — Eolation  of  Christianity  to  our  character  and  life. — 
Conclusions  from  this  principle.— a.  Unjust  to  demand  high  degree  of  evidence.— b.  Shows 
the  true  cause  of  Infidelity. — c.  The  most  promising  method  of  convincing  men  of  the  truth. 
— rf.  The  reasonableness  of  faith  in  unlearned  men.— 3.  Common  facts  and  principles  must  be 
assumed  by  all  parties  as  premises  of  argument. — Illustrations. — How  common  premises  may 
be  fixed  and  agreed  on. — Argument  stated  in  four  propositions. — First  two  have  been  previously 
proved. 

The  inquiry  now  proposed  is — 

Whether  the  system  of  religion  contacted  ln  the  Bible 
is  from  God  ? 

Before  however  we  enter  into  the  investigation  of  this  in- 
quiry, there  are  some  preliminary  topics  which  deserve  a  brief 
consideration. 

I  remark  then, 

1.  That  the  question  proposed  must  be  decided  on  the  author- 
ity of  human  reason.  Deistical  writers  have  maintained  that 
the  belief  of  a  divine  revelation  involves  the  renunciation  of 
reason.  This  is  a  favorite  topic  with  Bolingbroke,  Yoltaire, 
Hume,  and  many  others.  "  Our  most  holy  religion,"  says  Mr. 
Hume,  "  is  founded  on  faith  not  on  reason ;  and  it  is  a  sure 
method  of  exposing  it,  to  put  it  to  such  a  trial  as  it  is  by  no 
means  fitted  to  endure."  Well  had  it  been  for  the  cause  of 
truth,  had  the  professed  friends  of  Christianity  given  no  coun- 
tenance to  this  sentiment.  Every  enlightened  friend  of  revela- 
tion will  and  must  disclaim  it.  Christianity  on  its  own  author- 
ity is  a  reasonable  service,  and  its  demand  on  all  its  disciples  is, 
"  Be  ready  always  to  give  an  answer  to  every  one  that  asketh 
you  a  reason  of  the  hope  that  is  in  you."  Reason  is  our  only 
guide  in  religion,  in  examining  the  evidences  of  a  revelation,  in 
ascertaining  its  import,  in  believing  its  doctrines,  and  in  obey- 
ing its  precepts.  If  there  ever  was  a  religion  addressed  to 
human  reason,  and  insisting  that  its  every  claim  be  adjudged 
at  this   tribunal,   that  religion  is   Christianity.      Reason  and 


TRUE    USE    OF    REASON.  383 

truth  can  never  war  with  each  other.  Reason  is  that  high 
and  noble  power,  whose  sole  prerogative  it  is  to  discover  truth, 
to  weigh  the  evidence  of  truth  and  to  receive  it,  and  it  is  not 
in  the  nature  of  the  human  mind,  to  believe  either  what  it  does 
not  understand,  or  what  when  understood,  it  regards  as  irra- 
tional or  absurd.  We  may  indeed  very  rationally  believe  that 
there  is  more  in  a  thing  than  we  understand.  We  may  believe 
a  fact,  the  mode,  the  how  of  which  we  do  not  comprehend,  but 
then  the  mode,  the  how  is  not  the  object  of  our  faith.  Con- 
cerning this,  having  no  understanding,  we  have  and  can  have 
no  faith. 

The  true  use  of  reason  in  matters  of  religion  can  easily  be 
apprehended,  if  we  would  remember  two  things — one  is,  that 
man  is  not  omniscient,  and  the  other  that  he  knows  some- 
thing. Xot  being  omniscient,  there  are  things  which  lie  be- 
yond the  grasp  of  his  intellect,  wdiich  for  aught  he  knows  may 
be  true  or  may  be  false,  and  in  respect  to  such, while  we  have 
no  evidence  either  of  their  truth  or  falsehood,  reason  forbids  all 
faith.  But  if  in  respect  to  these  things,  evidence  come  to  us, 
whether  it  be  by  extending  our  vision  by  a  telescope,  or 
whether  it  be  by  sufficient  testimony  of  men  who  have  seen 
what  we  have  not  seen,  or  by  visitors  to  our  planet  from  some 
other  parts  of  the  universe — or  whether  it  be  by  God  himself, 
or  by  messengers  from  God.  I  say,  if  we  have  legitimate  evi- 
dence respecting  things,  which  from  the  limitation  of  our  knowl- 
edge we  must  admit  may  be  true,  then  on  the  basis  of  such 
evidence,  reason  requires  faith.  To  a  well  authenticated  mes- 
sage from  God  on  such  matters,  reason  in  the  act  of  uncon- 
ditional surrender,  appears  in  its  true  dignity,  its  highest  glory. 
Who  that  knows  what  God  is,  can  refuse  to  listen  to  a  message 
which  he  believes  comes  from  him  ?  True,  if  we  could  suppose 
a  well  authenticated  message  from  God  delivering  known  false- 
hood,  then  the  case  would  be  altered.  We  should  have  oppos- 
ing decisive  evidence,  truth  opposing  truth,  reason  in  her  own 
absolute  infallibility  giving  opposite  results — reason  reduced  to 
a  quandary  from  which  with  all  its  boasted  prowess  there  would 
be  no  deliverance — reason  that  is  no  longer  reason,  but  a  name 
of  worthlessness  and  contempt.  But  reason  is  now  supposed  to 
be  in  a  condition  in  which  it  cannot  be  reason.  The  case  sup- 
posed can  never  be,  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  reason.  The 
exercise  of  reason  giving  results,  implies  truth  and  the  evidence 


384  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

of  truth.  There  cannot  be  the  former  without  the  latter.  A 
well  authenticated  message  from  God  can  no  more  deliver 
known  falsehood,  than  two  and  two  can  be  five.  If  it  does,  it 
is  not  from  God;  if  it  is  from  God  it  gives  infallible  truth. 
Eeason  then  having  ascertained  that  God  speaketh,  must  deem 
it  its  highest  honor  to  bow  to  his  declaration  with  implicit  con- 
fidence. To  oppose  such  a  message  with  fancies  and  theories 
of  our  own  devising,  is  an  infamous  violation  of  reason's  pre- 
rogative, by  exalting  shameless  ignorance  to  her  throne — and 
as  to  being  rational  or  philosophical,  is  as  ridiculous  as  was  ever 
schoolman  with  his  quiddities,  or  a  Cartesian  with  his  whirl- 
pools. 

Further ;  while  there  are  some  things  which  fall  without,  there 
are  others  that  fall  within  the  limits  of  human  knowledge  and 
human  judgment.  The  human  mind  can  and  must  judge  of 
the  truth  and  falsehood  of  many  things  for  itself,  in  entire  in- 
dependence of  a  revelation.  And  not  only  so,  it  can  judge  of 
truth  and  falsehood  within  given  limits,  and  every  item  of  its 
actual  faith  within  these  limits,  shall  be  as  truly  rational  as 
were  man  omniscient,  The  mind  is  made  to  know  some  things, 
and  to  believe  some  things.  To  refuse  to  confide  in  faith,  or 
those  judgments  which  are  given  by  evidence,  is  to  throw 
away  and  in  effect  to  annihilate  one  part  of  the  mind  itself, 
that  on  which  man  is  doomed  to  place  reliance  more  exten- 
sively than  on  any  other ;  and  he  who  does  it,  if  he  does  not 
thereby  in  fact  become,  must  expect  in  all  equity  to  be 
esteemed,  an  idiot.  This  part  of  the  mind  is  made  to  be 
used,  and  its  results  are  as  truly  and  properly  to  be  confided 
in,  as  those  of  intuition  or  demonstration.  Man  then  to  a  great 
extent  can  judge  of  truth  and  falsehood,  of  possible  and  impos- 
sible things,  of  evidence,  its  kinds,  its  weight  absolute  and 
comparative — particularly, he  can  judge  of  the  merit  and  de- 
merit of  testimony,  as  these  depend  on  the  character  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  witness,  and  on  the  subject  matter  of  what 
he  testifies.  He  can  judge  of  and  perceive  the  truth  and  false- 
hood of  such  credentials  as  the  performance  of  a  miracle  or  the 
fulfilment  of  a  prophesy,  he  can  judge  of  the  signs  of  honesty 
and  veracity,  of  dishonesty  and  imposture,  of  mental  imbe- 
cility and  strength,  of  credulity  and  incredulity,  of  soundness 
of  mind,  and  fanatical  or  enthusiastic  illusion  and  extravagance, 
as  these  are  indicated  in  the  manner,  the  style,  the  tone,  the 


WHAT    CAN    REASON    DECIDE?  385 

countenance,  the  intellectual  operations,  the  benevolent  design, 
the  uncompromising  principle,  the  undaunted  constancy  of  the 
witness.  lie  can  judge  to  a  great  extent  of  fitnesses  and  adap- 
tations, of  the  tendencies  of  the  great  principles  of  action  in  men 
and  in  God ;  of  what  is  right,  what  is  wrong,  of  what  man  is 
made  for,  of  what  he  is,  and  what  he  ought  to  be.  lie  can  see 
what  God  is,  what  he  has  done  and  has  not  done,  what  he  is 
doing,  what  he  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do.  All  this  to  a 
great  extent  reason  can  do,  has  a  right  and  is  bound  to  do. 
Otherwise  it  matters  not  as  to  the  rationality  of  our  faith, 
whether  we  are  Mahomedans,  Boodhists,  Infidels,  or  Christians. 
If  reason  can  make  no  distinctions,  discover  no  differences,  con- 
fide in  no  judgments,  it  were  as  rational  to  be  one  thing  as 
another,  to  confide  in  malignity  as  in  benevolence,  to  receive 
the  illusions  of  Satan  as  the  inspirations  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Human  reason  too  can  judge  of  the  subject  matter  of  testi- 
mony, and  this  in  every  respect  in  which  it  is  important  to  a 
sound  and  rational  conclusion.  It  can  decide  in  some  cases 
what  can  be  true,  and  what  cannot  be  true ;  and  it  can  decide 
when  it  cannot  decide  either,  and  can  thus  assign  a  limit  to  its 
own  decisions.  It  can  settle  the  important  previous  question, 
wli ether  the  subject  matter  of  the  testimony  lies  within  its 
antecedent  knowledge,  or  whether  it  does  not.  If  it  does  not, 
but  comes  to  us  as  information  from  a  region  which  reason  has 
not  explored,  and  from  its  own  limitations  cannot  explore,  then 
reason  can  judge  whether  in  its  own  nature  it  be  credible  or  in- 
credible. If  incredible,  it  can  and  ought  to  reject  it.  If  credi- 
ble, it  can  then  judge  whether  the  allegation  be  sustained  by 
evidence  or  not.  If  not  thus  sustained,  then  again  it  can  and 
ought  to  reject  it ;  if  thus  sustained,  then  why  refuse  to  learn 
from  one  competent  to  instruct  and  entitled  to  confidence? 
Again,  the  subject  matter  may  lie  within  our  antecedent  knowl- 
edge, and  cases  of  this  kind  may  be  supposed  to  be  very  diverse. 
It  may  be  one  in  which  the  knowledge  communicated  is  in- 
significant and  worthless  in  itself,  or  in  which  its  communica- 
tion from  heaven  would  be  unnecessary  and  useless  because 
already  fully  possessed  and  acted  upon,  or  one  in  which  the 
knowledge  though  highly  useful  is  not  possessed  at  all,  or  only 
partially  and  imperfectly,  or  in  which  the  knowledge  is  possess- 
ed but  perverted,  and  needs  to  be  presented  in  some  new  and 
more  impressive  form,  or  it  may  be  one  in  which  the  knowl- 
Vol.  I.— 17.  25 


386  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

edge  is  attainable  only,  but  not  attained,  and  never  will  be, 
■without  such  a  mode  of  communication,  or  it  may  be  one  which 
shall  be  characterized  by  several  of  these  facts.  Of  the  sub- 
ject matter,  in  all  these  respects  human  reason  is  competent  to 
form  the  requisite  judgment.  On  the  contrary,  the  fact  to  be 
believed  may  be  supposed  to  be  utterly  incredible  in  itself. 
For  example,  should  the  witness  tell  us  that  the  planets  do 
not  revolve  around  the  sun,  that  the  sun  itself  does  not  shine, 
that  the  rivers  do  not  run  into  the  ocean,  that  the  three  angles 
of  a  triangle  are  not  equal  to  two  right  angles,  that  a  part  is 
equal  to  the  whole,  or  that  man  is  a  perfect  being,  loving  God 
with  all  his  heart,  and  his  neighbor  as  himself,  we  should  and 
we  ought  at  once  to  confront  him  with  our  philosophical  de- 
monstrations, our  daily  experience  and  observation,  our  own 
intuition  and  consciousness.  Thus  human  reason  can  judge, 
has  a  right,  and  is  bound  to  judge  of  each  and  every  thing  re- 
specting a  revelation  which  has,  or  can  have,  any  bearing  on 
faith  or  no  faith.  Here  is  the  prerogative,  to  sit  in  judgment 
on  the  credentials  of  heaven's  ambassador,  and  on  the  message 
which  he  brings.  When  there  is  no  evidence,  let  it  have  no 
faith.  When  there  is  evidence,  let  it  judge  according  to  evi- 
dence, and  every  item  of  its  faith,  whether  in  the  form  of  assent 
or  dissent,  is  as  truly  rational  and  trust-worthy  as  were  its 
knowledge  infinite. 

But  reason  may  be  perverted.  Yes,  and  that  is  our  concern, 
and  its  consequences  will  be  ours.  Reason  may  be  perverted ; 
is  reason  then  all  our  strength  and  all  our  reliance?  Yes.  But 
when  I  say  this  I  mean  reason  ;  not  reason  perverted.  When 
I  speak  of  and  commend  Christianity,  I  mean  not  a  corrupted, 
false  Christianity.  When  I  speak  of  man,  of  his  exaltation 
and  dignity,  of  his  noble  powers,  and  the  achievements  of 
which  he  is  capable,  I  mean  not  a  corpse  corrupted  in  its  grave. 
Reason  perverted  is  not  reason,  it  is  folly,  madness.  And  be- 
cause reason  may  be  perverted,  is  it  therefore  not  all  our  re- 
liance and  all  our  strength  in  the  discovery  of  truth  ?  Reason 
may  be  perverted,  and  therefore  is  not  to  be  used!  What 
then,  in  the  name  of  reason,  shall  we  use  ?  Answer,  in  the 
name  of  reason,  and  not  use  your  reason,  if  you  can.  Or  an- 
swer with  self-consistency,  and  say  our  folly,  and  you  are 
welcome  to  the  results.  What  nonsense  to  pretend  to  prove 
by  reason  that  there  is  no  reliance  on  reason ! 


LOW    DEGREE    OF    EVIDENCE.  387 

2.  It  may  be  rational  to  believe  in  the  divine  origin  of  Chris- 
tianity, on  the  supposition  of  a  comparatively  low  degree  of 
evidence  of  the  fact.  Those  who  reject  Christianity  have  often 
insisted  that  a  peculiarly  high  degree  of  evidence  is  requisite, 
to  warrant  faith  in  the  divine  origin  of  this  system  of  religion. 
This  claim  is  based  on  the  principle,  that  a  benevolent  God  in 
giving  a  religion  to  men,  on  the  reception  or  rejection  of  which 
such  tremendous  consequences  depend,  would  not  fail  to  furn- 
ish such  a  degree  of  evidence  as  would  infallibly  secure  human 
belief.  To  this  I  reply,  that  it  either  proceeds  on  the  principle 
that  faith  can  be  compelled  by  evidence,  to  the  entire  exclusion 
of  disbelief,  or  it  does  not.  If  it  does,  it  rests  on  a  false  princi- 
ple. The  human  mind  can  disbelieve,  and  has  disbelieved, 
against  the  highest  probable,  and  even  against  demonstrative 
evidence.  Besides  a  compelled  faith  would  be  utterly  incon- 
sistent with  moral  responsibility  on  the  part  of  man.  "What 
moral  worth,  what  respect  for  God  or  confidence  in  his  charac- 
ter would  be  involved  in  a  faith  which  a  man  could  not  shun 
nor  avoid.  Nor  is  this  all,  it  is  in  fact  claiming  that  the  whole 
system  of  Christianity  shall  be  changed  from  a  moral  system 
to  one  of  physical  influence,  and  of  course  that  it  shall  neither 
be  right  to  receive  nor  wrong  to  reject  it.  The  act  of  reception 
would  be  of  physical  necessity,  not  moral  obedience.  Is  it  then 
said,  that  the  evidence  might  be  so  increased  as  to  secure  faith 
without  compulsion  ?  I  answer,  that  any  supposable  increase 
of  evidence,  instead  of  securing  faith,  might  prove  the  greatest 
calamity,  since  for  aught  that  appears,  men  might  still  reject 
that  evidence  and  thus  greatly  augment  the  guilt  of  unbelief. 
Suppose  then,  that  when  Christianity  was  introduced  into  the 
world,  it  had  been  written  in  the  heavens  above  us  in  letters  of 
light  and  fire  so  that  all  the  dwellers  on  earth  would  read  it, 
"  Christianity  is  a  revelation  from  God,"  this  would  have 
compelled  the  faith  of  men  to  the  exclusion  of  disbelief,  or  it 
would  not.  If  it  would,  then  it  would  have  been  inconsistent 
with  a  moral  system,  and  faith  itself  had  been  no  virtue.  If 
it  would  not,  then  like  any  other  miracle,  as  that  of  the  rend- 
ing rocks,  the  opening  graves,  the  rising  dead,  the  quaking 
earth  and  darkened  sun,  it  might  have  only  aggravated  the 
guilt  of  every  unbeliever.  We  are  therefore  utterly  incompe- 
tent to  decide  what  would  be  the  dictate  of  benevolence  in  the 
case.     The  rn'oper  question  for  us  then,  is  not  what  a  benevo- 


388  ARGUMENT    FROM   NATURE    APPLIED. 

lent  God  would  do,  but  what  it  is  rational  for  ns  to  do,  in  view 
of  what  he  has  actually  done.  Or,  to  present  the  question 
which  I  now  wish  to  examine,  more  precisely — is  it  rational  on 
our  part  to  believe  in  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity,  on  the 
supposition  of  a  comparatively  low  degree  of  evidence  of  the 
fact? 

The  infidel  then  will  not  complain,  if  we  impute  to  him  the 
opinion,  that  the  religion  which  he  takes  so  much  pains  to  de- 
stroy, is  unfriendly,  or  at  least  unnecessary  to  human  happiness. 
Nor,  if  he  can  make  good  this  opinion,  shall  we  have  any  con- 
troversy with  him  in  respect  to  the  reasonableness  of  his  demand 
for  a  higher  degree  of  evidence  that  this  religion  is  from  God. 
Such  a  religion  would,  in  its  very  nature,  furnish  a  strong  pre- 
sumption against  its  divine  origin,  and  a  very  high  degree  of 
evidence  be  fairly  required  to  counteract,  if  indeed  any  degree 
could  counteract,  such  a  presumption. 

But  if  a  religion  demands  our  faith  in  its  divine  origin,  and 
if  to  believe  it  divine,  is  obviously,  and  in  every  respect  essen- 
tial to  our  true  and  best  interests,  then  the  case  is  materially 
changed.  It  is  a  common  mistake,  that  a  man's  interest  ought 
to  have  no  influence  on  his  faith.  There  are  cases  in  which  it 
removes  presumptive  evidence  to  the  contrary,  and  even  be- 
comes evidence  of  truth.  Were  one  of  you  to  be  told  that 
your  father  had  disinherited  you  in  his  will,  it  would  require 
more  evidence  to  make  you  believe  it,  than  if  you  were  told 
that  he  had  bequeathed  to  you  your  portion  of  his  estate.  True 
it  undoubtedly  is,  that  his  interest  should  never  leact  him  to 
believe  without,  or  against  evidence.  But  sound  reason  often 
dictates  faith,  and  faith  that  shall  be  practical,  in  view  of  what 
may  be  termed  comparatively  very  slight  evidence.  If  in  a 
particular  case  my  interest  will  not  be  injured  by  believing — 
if  it  may  he  greatly  injured  by  not  believing,  and  if  it  may  he 
essentially  promoted  by  believing,  then  to  believe  on  the  ground 
of  slight  evidence,  so  far  as  to  control  action,  is  the  dictate  of 
sound  reason. 

That  this  principle  of  faith  is  the  dictate  of  sound  reason  and 
common  sense,  may  be  shown  by  its  universal  application  in 
all  the  affairs  of  human  life.  A  scheme  for  the  accumulation 
of  wealth  occurs  to  the  merchant,  which  can  result  in  no  possible 
loss,  which  may  produce  large  acquisition,  and  which,  neglected, 
may  involve  him  in  ruin.     A  sick  man  may  soon  die,  unless 


SUPPOSE    OUR  "WELL-BEING    IS    CONCERNED.     389 

some  proposed  remedy  be  used ;  the  use  of  it  can  do  no  pos- 
sible injury,  but  may  restore  him  to  health.  Now  what  is  the 
dictate  of  reason  in  respect  to  faith — that  degree  of  faith  which 
is  necessary  to  action — however  slight  the  evidence  or  proba- 
bility, if  it  be  real  evidence,  that  a  good  result  will  be  secured  ? 
Ought  such  evidence  to  be  rejected  or  disregarded  ?  Would 
that  be  sound  reason  ?  But  in  the  case  before  us,  we  have  in- 
terests at  stake  immeasurably  more  momentous.  We  are  con- 
fessedly in  the  hands  of  an  Almighty  Being,  and  at  his  disposal 
forever.  A  system  of  religion,  claiming  to  be  from  Him,  is  in 
our  possession,  and  demands  our  faith  in  its  divine  origin,  on 
the  alternative  of  endless  happiness  or  endless  misery.  To  be- 
lieve it  to  be  divine,  we  will  now  suppose,  can  result  in  no  real 
evil,  but  may  result  in  immeasurable  good ;  not  to  believe  it 
to  be  divine  may  result  in  immeasurable  evil.  Who  can  ration- 
ally hesitate  what  to  believe,  be  the  balance  of  probability  from 
other  sources  in  support  of  the  divine  origin  of  this  religion 
ever  so  small  ? 

The  case  would  be  still  stronger,  if  we  were  here  to  assume 
(what  would  be  perfectly  legitimate,  in  view  of  our  former 
conclusions,)  viz.,  that  to  yield  to  the  practical  influence  of 
Christianity  is  indispensable  to  man's  highest  happiness  in  this 
world.  Nor  would  it  be  too  much  to  assume,  as  a  point  con- 
ceded by  the  most  respectable  infidel  authors,  that  the  practical 
tendency  of  Christianity  is  to  perfect  man  in  character  and  in 
happiness.  If  then  we  suppose  that  a  man  may  conform  his 
character  substantially  to  this  system  of  religion,  without  be- 
lieving it  to  be  divine,  still  it  is  undeniable  that  such  a  faith 
would  secure  to  it  a  far  higher  and  more  perfect  influence.  I 
may  go  farther  still.  If  we  suppose  there  is  no  evidence  to  the 
fact  of  the  divine  origin  of  this  religion,  except  that  which 
arises  from  its  perfect  adaptation  to  man's  moral  perfection  and 
consequent  happiness,  it  were  the  highest,  noblest  act  of  reason 
to  believe.  And  further  still,  on  the  supposition  of  this  per- 
fect adaptation  to  this  high  end,  I  say,  if  Christianity  be  a  de- 
lusion, disturb  not  my  faith  in  its  divine  origin.  If  falsehood 
is  better  than  truth,  then  let  us  have  falsehood.  As  a  moral 
being,  who  has  much  to  enjoy  and  to  hope  for  in  time,  and 
who  may  live  onward  in  the  ages  of  eternity,  I  cannot  dispense 
with  the  influence  of  such  a  faith,  nor  abandon  its  consolations 
and  its  prospects. 


390  ARGUMENT    FROM   NATURE    APPLIED. 

I  might  add  did  our  limits  allow,  that  on  the  supposition  of 
a  low  degree  of  evidence  for  Christianity,  while  more  proof 
might  be  useless  and  worse  than  useless,  there  may  be  great 
advantages  in  exactly  that  degree  of  evidence  which  God  has 
furnished.  Particularly,  it  may  be  one  benignant  part  of  that 
system  of  moral  discipline  by  which  our  honesty  and  integrity 
of  principle  are  to  be  tried  and  confirmed,  by  which  men  are 
to  be  made  considerate,  impartial,  and  attentive  to  every  degree 
of  evidence ;  to  be  kept  from  levity,  and  contempt,  and  ridicule, 
on  a  subject  on  which  their  eternal  well-being,  and  that  of  a 
world,  may  depend. 

If  the  principle  of  faith  which  I  have  now  presented  be 
rational,  it  shows  the  following  things,  viz. : 

(1.)  The  injustice  of  the  demand  for  any  peculiarly  high  de- 
gree of  evidence  in  favor  of  Christianity  as  the  only  legitimate 
ground  of  faith. 

(2.)  It  shows  the  true  cause  of  Infidelity  in  those  who  make 
this  demand  for  higher  evidence,  viz.,  that  they  do  not  regard 
Christianity  as  adapted  to  promote  their  true  and  best  inter- 
ests, and  that  they  do  not  like  it  as  a  system  of  religion.  It 
involves,  in  their  view,  a  derangement  of  their  plans,  and  a 
thwarting  of  their  inclinations.  I  am  not  now  saying  whether 
they  are  right  or  wrong  in  this  opinion,  but  simply  that  such 
must  be  their  opinion.  For  when  was  it  known  that  a  man  dis- 
believed against  even  the  slightest  balance  of  probability,  while 
he  fully  regarded  it  for  his  interest,  in  every  respect,  to  believe? 

(3.)  It  shows  what,  in  many  cases,  is  the  most  promising 
method  of  convincing  men  of  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity, 
viz.,  to  show  them  its  adaptation  to  man's  present  and  future 
well-being.  If  such  be  the  real  nature  of  this  religion,  its  re- 
ception or  rejection  must  depend  greatly  on  its  being  seen  and 
understood  to  be  what  it  really  is.  As  long  as  the  thing  itself 
is  not  understood,  its  rejection,  if  not  rational,  is  not  strange, 
but  easily  accounted  for.  Why  should  a  man  receive  a  system 
of  religion  of  which  he  knows  nothing,  merely  because  some 
one  tells  him  it  is  from  heaven?  Kay  more;  why  should  he 
even  examine  the  question  of  its  divine  origin  ?  He  sees  no- 
thing in  its  nature  or  its  adaptations  that  give  any  importance 
to  the  question,  whether  it  come  from  heaven  or  not ;  nothing 
of  course,  to  render  it  worth  a  demonstration.  And  if  with 
this  ignorance  of  the  thing  itself,  we  suppose  the  conviction  to 


REAL    IMPORT    OF    THE    SCRIPTURES.  391 

be  associated  of  its  utter  uselessness,  and  even  of  hostile  tend- 
ency to  good  results,  why  should  such  a  mind,  with  these  views 
of  the  matter,  care  to  know  what  the  evidence  of  its  divine 
origin  is  ?  By  what  asseverations  of  the  divine  origin  of  Ma- 
homedanism  could  you  induce  the  population  of  New  Eng- 
land seriously  to  examine  the  question  ? 

But  now  suppose  a  man  to  become  well  acquainted  with  the 
Bible,  and  to  find  that  the  book  actually  develops  the  most 
perfect  system  of  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  most 
perfect  conceivable  end — a  mighty  scheme  for  a  mighty  pur- 
pose— a  scheme  and  a  purpose  worthy  of  an  infinite  being, 
nothing  less  than  a  scheme  or  system  of  means  to  secure  to  a 
world  of  his  intelligent  and  immortal  creatures,  perfection  in 
character  and  perfection  in  happiness.  Suppose  him  to  see 
that  the  scheme  is  as  simple  as  it  is  grand,  as  perfect  in  its 
adaptation  as  it  is  glorious  in  its  end,  as  indispensable  as  it  is 
useful — that  it  is  so  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  that  it  is  and 
must  be  so  from  the  very  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  and 
that  the  belief  of  it  as  divine  has  as  direct  a  tendency  to  secure 
the  result  in  the  absolute  perfection  of  every  human  being,  as 
the  belief  of  danger  to  produce  alarm,  or  the  prospect  of  good, 
the  desire  and  pursuit  of  it.  I  ask,  would  not  such  a  man  be 
very  apt  to  say,  "  I  shall  examine  the  evidence  of  the  divine 
origin  of  this  book,  here  is  something  worthy  of  such  an  origin, 
every  presumption  that  it  is  the  imposture  of  empirics,  villains 
and  enthusiasts  is  removed — it  may  be  from  God,  it  comports 
with  his  character,  it  is  the  very  thing  and  the  only  thing  fitted 
to  accomplish  the  design  of  Him  who  made  man,  it  is  that,  and 
exactly  that  which  a  benignant  Creator  would  do  for  his  own 
creatures — my  highest,  best  immortal  interest  may  depend  on 
the  question — I  must  see  and  know  whether  God  has  done  this 
thing  or  not."  I  am  not  now  saying  what  the  result  of  such 
an  examination  would  be,  but  that  without  some  just  knowl- 
edge of  what  Christianity  is,  no  man  will  examine  the  question 
of  its  divine  origin,  and  with  such  knowledge, no  man  who  has 
not  become  reckless  of  God,  and  of  his  own  immortal  nature 
and  immortal  interests  will  refuse  to  examine  it.  It  may  be 
from  God,  all  it  says  of  God  may  he  true,  all  it  says  of  the  Sav- 
iour, of  the  miracles  of  his  power  and  grace,  of  the  scenes  of 
immortality  and  retribution — all  it  says  of  those  who  believe 
not  may  he  true.     He  who  refuses  with  this  tremendous  perad- 


392  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

venture  in  view,  despises  God,  despises  a  soul,  the  next  greatest 
thing  to  God,  and  that  soul  is  his  own. 

(4.)  It  shows  the  reasonableness  of  faith  in  that  great  num- 
ber of  believers  in  Christianity,  who  do  not  and  who  cannot 
consistently  with  the  other  duties  of  life,  become  acquainted  with 
but  a  small  part  of  the  evidence  on  the  question.  Of  this  class 
of  men  not  one  in  a  thousand  has  the  leisure,  or  the  talents,  or 
the  learning  requisite  to  examine  and  weigh  one-half  of  the 
evidence,  especially  what  is  called  the  external  evidence. 
What  qualification  have  the  greater  part  of  believers  in  Chris- 
tianity to  enter  into  the  controversy  with  Hume  or  Yoltaire  ? 
And  have  they  therefore  no  reasonable  faith?  Have  the 
common  people  no  reason  to  believe  the  almanac  because  they 
are  not  astronomers — to  believe  that  an  eclipse  will  happen  as 
foretold  because  they  are  incompetent  to  calculate  an  eclipse 
themselves  ?  Have  the  same  class  of  men  no  reason  to  believe 
that  boats  and  locomotives  are  propelled  by  steam,  because  the 
jmilosopher  has  evidence  that  it  must  be  so,  which  they  have 
not  ?  Plainly  we  may  have  sufficient  evidence  of  truth  with- 
out having  all  that  which  others  possess.  And  in  the  present 
case,  the  author  of  the  gospel  may  have  intended  that  its  great 
object  and  end  and  its  perfect  adaptation  to  that  end,  should  be 
its  chief  evidence,  especially  to  the  great  mass  of  mankind.  Of 
this  they  may  be  perfectly  competent  judges.  This, according 
to  the  laws  of  evidence,  may  be  altogether  sufficient  to  an 
honest,  while  more  would  be  utterly  insufficient  to  a  dishonest 
mind,  and  while  to  neglect  this,  may  be  to  neglect  the  very 
ground  on  which  God  has  rested  the  proof,  and  required  belief 
of  by  far  the  greater  part  of  mankind.  Accordingly,  I  hope  to 
show  that  from  the  Bible  alone,  in  the  adaptation  of  its  con- 
tents to  man's  perfection  in  character  and  happiness,  a  most 
conclusive  argument  may  be  derived  that  it  is  from  God,  one 
on  the  strength  of  which  the  unlettered  peasant,  ignorant  as 
lie  is  of  all  history,  and  destitute  as  he  is  of  all  learning,  shall 
be  more  rational  in  his  belief  than  Hume,  Yoltaire  and  Gib- 
bon in  their  unbelief  with  all  their  scholarship. 

(5.)  If  the  principle  of  faith  before  stated  be  rational,  it  will 
enable  us  to  form  a  juster  estimate  of  the  amount  of  the  actual 
evidence,  and  to  see  how  abundant  and  overwhelming  it  must 
be  to  a  well  balanced  mind.  Nothing  is  more  remote  from 
the  truth  than  the  supposed  confession  by  the  advocates  of  Chris- 


VARIETY    OF    ARGUMENTS.  393 

tianity,  that  it  rests  its  claim  on  a  low  degree  of  evidence.  So 
far  from  it,  there  is  scarcely  any  single  question  on  which  in 
their  view  evidence  may  be  so  accumulated.  Witness  "  the 
piles  of  authorship,"  not  merely  as  made  up  of  repetitions,  hut 
of  divers  arguments  resting  on  independent  grounds,  and 
drawn  from  distinct  sources.  Let  the  works  of  Butler,  of 
Lardner,  of  Paley,  of  Wilson,  of  Erskine,  of  Gregory,  and 
many  other  modern  authors,  tell  how  in  the  estimation  of  the 
friends  of  Christianity,  its  proofs  have  been  augmented  in  later 
times  and  down  to  the  present  hour.  It  is  not  then  to  he  as- 
sumed,thsit  the  claim  for  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity  rests 
on  any  thing  like  a  low  degree  of  evidence.  It  is  a  question 
to  be  tried,  a  question  not  to  be  disposed  of  in  favor  of  such  a 
claim,  till  some  hundredth  or  thousandth  part  of  the  evidence 
shall  be  examined  and  overthrown  by  those  who  make  it.  If 
any  considerable  part  of  the  evidence  offered  and  relied  on  is 
substantial,  then  indeed  it  is  abundant  and  overwhelming. 
iSTay  more;  there  is  evidence  in  every  form,  of  every  kind 
and  degree  which  can  be  well  imagined  on  the  subject ;  evi- 
dence, in  the  language  of  another,  fitted  alike  for  "  the  high 
achievement  of  silencing  Infidelity  in  the  lofty  and  academic 
walks  of  life,  as  well  as  to  carry  Christianity  into  workshops 
and  cottages."  Christianity  in  the  fullness  of  her  strength,  if 
one-half  of  what  is  claimed  for  her  be  true,  has  arguments  for 
Jew  and  Gentile,  for  bond  and  free,  for  men  of  a  false  religion 
and  men  of  no  religion — arguments  "  by  which  she  may  con- 
front the  powers  of  literature,  and  compel  the  most  arrogant  of 
her  disciples  to  do  her  homage,  and  those  also  by  which  her 
ministers  from  the  pulpit  may  spread  a  well  grounded  faith 
amidst  the  multitude  of  the  people." 

I  am  not  now  saying  that  such  evidence  does  in  fact,  but 
only  that  it  is  claimed  to  exist ;  and  that  on  the  true  principle 
of  rational  faith,  if  only  a  considerable  part  of  what  is  claimed, 
does  exist  and  is  substantial  evidence,  then  it  is  abundant 
and  even  overwhelming,  to  an  enlightened  and  well-balanced 
mind. 

3.  While  it  is  essential  to  a  fair  argument  on  the  question 
of  a  revelation  from  God,  that  the  facts  and  principles  which 
constitute  the  premises  should  be  mutually  understood  and 
admitted  by  the  parties,  it  is  true  that  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent they  are  not  thus  understood  and  admitted.  These  facts 
17* 


394  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

are  very  numerous,  and  while  some  of  them  are  understood 
and  admitted  by  the  parties,  others  are  not,  and  others  only 
in  some  general  respects,  but  not  in  those  on  which  the  con- 
clusion depends.  I  need  not  say,  that  it  is  to  no  purpose  that 
the  parties  reason  in  such  a  case  for  the  conviction  of  one 
another.  In  my  own  view,  the  fact  that  there  has  been  so 
much  of  this  mode  of  argumentation,  is  a  principal  reason  that 
this  controversy  has  not  long  since  been  terminated,  so  far  as 
its  continuance  has  depended  on  any  show  of  argument.  I 
say  not  whose  fault  it  is.  But  so  much  is  undeniable,  that  the 
premises  of  the  argument,  if  any  thing  is  accomplished  by 
reasoning,  must  be  understood  and  admitted  by  the  parties. 
What  is  not  understood  must  be  explained,  and  if  denied  must 
be  proved  or  abandoned.  To  see  the  bearing  of  these  remarks 
let  us  take  a  case. 

Suppose  you  have  received  a  letter  from  another,  having  the 
signature  of  your  father,  and  the  question  should  arise,  whether 
it  is  actually  written  by  him.  Now  to  take  the  question  ah  in- 
itio', if  you  have  no  father,  the  debate  is  ended  before  it  can  be 
really  begun.  If  you  have  a  father,  then  there  is  room  for  the 
question  whether  the  letter  be  from  him.  Again,  if  you  have  a 
father,  and  yet  there  is  some  absolute  impossibility  that  he 
should  be  the  author  of  the  letter,  or  of  any  letter  whatever, 
this  precludes  all  further  debate ;  while  if  the  possibility  of  his 
writing  a  letter  be  admitted,  then  the  question  in  this  respect 
is  open  for  discussion.  Again,  let  it  be  supposed  that  he  is  one 
of  the  wisest  and  most  affectionate  of  parents,  and  that  the 
letter,  in  respect  to  its  contents,  is  wholly  and  even  contempti- 
bly useless  and  unnecessary,  as  advising  you  to  eat  and  drink 
and  breathe,  if  you  would  live;  or  suppose  that  without  any 
sufficient  cause  or  reason,  and  under  pretexts  known  to  be  en- 
tirely groundless,  it  consists  of  threatenings  to  injure  you — 
even  to  withdraw  all  support  and  kindness,  and  to  cast  you  out 
as  a  disinherited  exile;  suppose  that  in  one  of  these  respects 
the  contents  of  the  letter  are  absolutely  irreconcilable  with 
the  known  character  of  the  father,  here  again  there  is  a  strong 
presumption  against  the  supposed  authorship.  Again,  let  it  be 
supposed  that  the  father  is  not  only  most  judicious  and  affec- 
tionate, but  a  man  of  high  literary  and  scientific  acquisitions ; 
that  he  is,  above  all  things,  intent  to  secure  the  scholarship  of 


LETTER   FROM   A   FATHER    TO   HIS  SON".  395 

his  son,  and  peculiarly  competent  to  aid  him  in  attaining  the 
highest  literary  eminence,  and  that  the  letter  is  written  in  sub- 
servience to  this  object ;  that  it  contains  counsels,  directions, 
inducements,  and  information,  which  are  peculiarly  fitted,  and 
even  necessary,  to  secure  the  end  on  which  his  heart  is  set ;  in 
a  word,  it  is  just  such  a  letter  as  such  a  father  in  such  circum- 
stances would  write  to  such  a  son,  and  you  perceive  some  of 
the  strongest  reasons  for  believing  that  he  actually  wrote  it. 
Again,  as  we  suppose  certain  other  things  to  be  true  or  not  to 
be  true — the  handwriting,  the  style,  the  manner,  &c,  &c,  to 
be  or  not  to  be  those  of  the  father ;  or  the  letter  to  contain  or 
not  to  contain  allusions,  implications,  coincidences,  statements 
of  facts,  of  a  certain  character — these  things,  as  they  may  be 
supposed  to  be  or  not  to  be,  would  have  an  important  bearing 
on  the  question.  Again ;  let  it  be  supposed  that  the  letter  de- 
clares, that  for  the  purpose  of  placing  the  authenticity  of  the 
letter  itself  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  father  has 
done  what  in  the  case  would  be  deemed  a  very  singular  and 
extraordinary  thing — something  which  neither  he  nor  any  other 
man  ever  did  before — something  indeed,  which  if  done  would 
settle  the  question,  but  which,  in  your  view  of  the  case,  it 
is  absolutely  incredible  that  he  should  do — so  incredible,  that 
no  evidence,  especially  no  testimony,  can,  in  your  view,  when 
simply  placed  and  balanced  against  its  inherent  incredibility, 
be  esteemed  sufficient  proof  that  he  has  done  it,  and  yet  that 
the  authenticity  of  the  letter  is  made  to  depend  on  the  fact  that 
he  has  done  this  very  thing.  Here  again  is  something  which 
bears  against  the  alleged  source  of  the  letter.  But  now  again,  in 
view  of  the  high  importance  and  even  necessity  of  your  believ- 
ing it  to  be  from  your  father,  in  order  to  accomplish  its  object, 
let  us  imagine  what  was  not  before  supposed,  that  your  father 
is  fully  apprised  of  some  cause,  some  peculiar  structure  of  your 
mind,  some  propensity  or  mode  of  thinking,  that  will  prevent 
you  from  believing  the  letter  to  come  from  him  without  the 
supposed  extraordinary  marks  of  its  authenticity ;  and  that  he 
knows,  and  that  you  and  others  know,  if  the  object  of  the  let- 
ter is  to  be  attained,  this  is  altogether  the  best  way  to  attain  it. 
Now,  in  view  of  the  father's  ardent  and  supreme  desire  to 
accomplish  the  object,  there  arises  a  strong  presumption  that 
he  will  adopt  the  very  method,  which,  under  another  view  of 


396  ARGUMENT    FROM   NATURE    APPLIED. 

the  case,  appeared  so  entirely  incredible ;  for  yon  now  see  a 
reason  why  he  should  do  it,  even  one  which  renders  it  almost 
incredible  that  he  should  not. 

Thus  you  see  how,  on  the  supposition  of  one  kind  of  prem- 
ises, the  mind  is  led  to  one  conclusion,  and  on  the  supposition 
of  another  kind,  to  the  opposite  conclusion,  respecting  the  sup- 
posed origin  of  the  letter.  Just  so  it  is  in  respect  to  the  great 
question,  whether  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  man.  The 
cases  are  entirely  analogous.  And  the  force  of  an  argument 
for  a  divine  revelation  on  each  individual  mind  will  depend  on 
the  views  which  that  mind  has  of  what  God  is,  what  his  char- 
acter is,  what  his  relations  to  man  are,  what  he  has  done,  and 
what  he  has  not  done,  what  is  and  what  is  not  his  great  end  in 
man's  creation,  and  what  are  his  particular  designs  toward  him ; 
what  he  will  do  to  accomplish  his  designs;  what  man  is,  what 
his  character  is,  what  his  relations  and  his  destiny  are;  and 
what  the  Bible  is,  what  it  is  in  its  design,  adaptation  and  tend- 
ency, and  how  it  agrees  or  disagrees  with  the  character  of  God 
and  with  his  relations  and  designs  toward  man.  It  is  only  as 
we  understand  these  things,  that  we^are  competent  to  make  an 
argument  on  this  subject,  or  to  judge  of  one  when  it  is  made. 
It  is  only  as  the  parties  in  this  controversy  understand  and  are 
agreed  in  these  great  facts  and  principles  respecting  God,  and 
man,  and  the  Bible,  that  they  are  prepared  to  enter  on  the  dis- 
cussion with  any  prospect  or  hope  of  advantage.  How  could 
any  man  be  a  competent  judge  of  the  question  concerning  the 
supposed  letter,  who  knew  nothing  of  the  character,  the  designs, 
the  relations  of  the  father,  nothing  of  the  son,  and  nothing  of 
the  contents  of  the  letter  ?  You  see  then,  that  unless  the  par- 
ties in  the  present  discussion  are  agreed  in  the  premises,  the 
discussion  must  be  fruitless. 

Now  I  readily  admit,  that  in  many  of  the  facts  which  con- 
stitute the  premises  they  are  agreed,  but  I  maintain  that  in 
many  others  they  are  not ;  and  that  so  long  as  they  are  not,  the 
argument  for  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity  must  prove  in- 
effectual. I  said  they  are  agreed  in  some  of  the  premises. 
They  agree  that  there  is  a  God  of  infinite  natural  perfection ; 
that  he  is  a  being  of  a  perfect  moral  character,  or  infinitely 
benevolent,  disposed  to  secure  the  greatest  amount  of  happi- 
ness which  in  the  nature  of  things  he  can  secure;  they  agree 
that  he  is  the  providential  governor  of  the  world,  and,  as  the 


PARTIES    NOT    ENTIRELY    AGREED.  397 

omniscient  author  of  all  tilings,  his  providential  will  must  ex- 
tend to  all  actual  beings  and  events ;  they  may  also  agree  that 
he  is  the  moral  governor  of  men,  in  some  very  general  and 
indefinite  sense.  But  in  respect  to  the  particular  nature  of  the 
government  which  God  exercises  over  this  world,  and  therefore 
in  respect  to  the  precise  method,  way,  or  means  by  which  God 
aims  to  secure  the  happiness  of  his  creatures,  whether  it  in- 
volves necessarily  in  the  nature  of  things,  a  perfect  moral  gov- 
ernment of  free  moral  agents  by  law,  with  a  strict  adherence 
to  all  the  peculiar  principles  and  influences  of  such  a  system  as 
the  best  means  of  the  best  end ;  and  if  it  does,  whether  such  a 
system  does  or  does  not  in  its  own  nature  involve  the  existence 
of  evil,  natural  and  moral,  and  whether  it  does  or  does  not  in 
its  own  nature  preclude  the  final  termination  of  all  evil — 
whether  there  is  a  future  state,  and  whether  we  have  any 
means  of  deciding  what  will  be  man's  condition  hereafter— 
what  hopes  and  what  fears  he  would  be  authorized  to  entertain 
from  the  light  of  nature, — whether  man,  without  a  revelation, 
would  or  could,  on  the  basis  of  evidence,  look  forward  with 
cheering  anticipations  to  the  future,  or  whether  he  would  be 
compelled  by  the  most  decisive  evidence  only  to  forebode  a 
fearful  hour  of  retribution — on  these,  and  many  other  main 
questions,  the  parties  are  not  agreed.  Ko  one  can  have  at- 
tentively read  the  controversy  on  both  sides  of  this  great 
question,  without  seeing  that  one  of  the  parties  reasons  on 
one  set  of  premises  and  principles,  and  the  other  party  on 
another. 

Were  we  to  see  an  artificer  employed  in  constructing  a  ma- 
chine, though  we  were  ignorant  of  its  nature  and  its  design, 
still,  if  we  knew  that  he  was  neither  deficient  in  power,  skill, 
materials,  or  disposition  to  finish  it,  but  was  fixed  and  immuta- 
ble in  his  resolution  to  give  it  ultimately,  and  as  rapidly  as  the 
case  allows,  its  highest  perfection,  we  should  have  no  doubt 
that  the  machine,  whatever  it  might  be,  would  be  finished,  and 
the  end  proposed  accomplished. 

Again ;  if  now  we  suppose  the  purpose  or  end  aimed  at  to 
be  ascertained,  this  at  least,  in  many  cases,  would  give  us  the 
means  which  he  would  adopt,  or  was  adopting,  to  accomplish 
his  end.  If  his  object  was  to  propel  a  boat  through  the  water, 
we  should  expect  him,  in  these  days,  to  make  a  steam-engine. 
If  his  object  was  to  see  what  is  to  be  seen  in  the  moon,  we 


398  ARGUMENT    PROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

should  expect  liim  to  make  a  telescope;  or  if  it  was  to  mark 
the  divisions  of  time,  we  should  expect  him  to  make  a  watch 
or  a  clock. 

Again,  let  ns  now  suppose  that  the  machine  is  so  far  ad- 
vanced, that  any  competent  judge  can  decide  beyond  all  mis- 
take, both  what  the  machine  is,  and  what  is  its  object  or  end. 
Then  also  such  a  jndge  can  decide  with  entire  confidence  in 
respect  to  many  particular  things  ivhich  will  be  done  and 
vihich  will  not  be  done  by  the  artificer,  in  order  to  complete 
the  machine  and  accomplish  his  end.  Let  it  now  be  supposed 
that  you  and  I  are  spectators  of  the  progress  of  the  work,  and 
this  particular  question  to  arise  between  us  and  to  engage  us 
in  fierce  debate,  viz.,  whether  the  machine  when  finished  will 
contain  a  main-spring  or  not  f  And  let  us  further  suppose, 
that  although  there  is  in  fact  no  reason  to  doubt  on  the  point, 
that  by  some  strange  obliquity  or  imbecility  of  mind  on  the 
part  of  one  of  us,  we  are  not  agreed  as  to  what  the  machine  is, 
and  you  insist  that  the  man  is  making  a  telescope,  and  I  insist 
that  he  is  making  a  watch.  Xow  to  what  purpose  shall  we 
discuss  the  question  concerning  the  main-spring,  unless  we  can 
settle  the  preliminary  question,  whether  the  artificer  is  in  fact 
making  a  watch  or  a  telescope  ?  And  how  can  the  debate  be 
prolonged  a  moment  with  the  least  show  of  reason  until  this 
previous  question  is  correctly  decided  ? 

Substantially  like  this,  in  my  view,  is  the  state  of  the  con- 
troversy between  the  opposers  and  the  advocates  of  a  divine 
revelation.  The  former  have  such  views  of  the  character 
of  God,  of  his  object  and  end  in  the  creation  and  govern- 
ment of  this  world,  and  especially  of  the  means  he  has  actu- 
ally adopted  to  accomplish  this  end,  that  they  can  no  more 
see  a  reason  why  God  should  give  a  revelation  to  men,  and 
such  a  revelation  as  the  Bible  is  supposed  to  contain,  than 
why  a  skillful  artificer  should  insert  a  main-spring  or  a  pend- 
ulum in  a  telescope.  Hence  their  constant  asseveration — it 
is  utterly  impossible,  or  if  obliged  to  qualify  a  little  by  being 
reminded  of  God's  omnipotence,  and  of  the  manifestation  of 
his  direct  agency  in  creation,  still  they  affirm  that  consider- 
ing the  character  and  designs  of  God,  and  the  object  and  na- 
ture of  Christianity,  it  is  irrational,  even  utterly  incredible,  that 
it  should  be  the  subject  of  a  direct  interposition  from  heaven. 

The  advocates  of  Christianity  however  from  their  premises 


WHAT    MAN    CAN    KNOW.  399 

come  to  the  directly  opposite  conclusion.  With  their  views  of 
the  character  of  God,  of  his  great  object  and  end  in  the  crea- 
tion and  government  of  this  world  of  intelligent  beings,  and 
especially  of  the  means  or  system  which  he  has  adopted  for 
the  accomplishment  of  this  end,  there  is  the  same  reason  to 
conclude  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  the  world,  and 
the  very  revelation  claimed,  which  there  is  for  concluding  that 
the  supposed  artificer  in  making  a  watch,  would  insert  a  main- 
spring to  complete  the  instrument.  Why  should  not  God  as 
well  as  man  give  completeness  to  the  means  of  an  end  ? 

But  here  we  come  to  another  vital  question,  viz.,  is  man  comjM- 
tent  to  say  what  God  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do  f  Is  not  the 
subj  ect  altogether  too  high  for  us  ?  When  we  think  what  God  is,  of 
the  eternity  of  his  government,  and  of  our  distance  from  all  direct 
and  personal  observation  of  him  and  the  depth  of  his  counsels, 
are  not  the  form  and  mode  of  the  management  of  his  empire, 
wholly  inaccessible  to  all  our  faculties  ?  I  answer,  if  this  indeed 
be  so,  then  let  us  cease  all  inquiry,  for  to  what  purpose  is  it  to  in- 
quire or  reason  or  form  opinions  where  nothing  can  be  known  ? 
If  it  is  all  darkness  here,  then  it  is  as  dark  to  the  infidel  as  to 
the  Christian,  and  if  the  Christian  cannot  say  what  God  will  do, 
the  infidel  cannot  say  what  he  will  not  do.  We  may  be  right 
or  we  may  be  wrong  in  our  conclusions,  and  that  is  all  that  can 
be  said  of  the  matter.  But  is  it  credible  that  a  benevolent 
God  has  doomed  his  dependent  creatures — creatures  who  know 
that  their  all  depends  on  what  God  will  or  will  not  clo,  to  the 
darkness  and  agony  of  utter  uncertainty.  Can  it  be  that  the 
almighty  and  supreme  disposer  of  all  destiny  has  given  us  no 
intimation  of  his  designs  ?  True  indeed  it  is,  that  man  is  in- 
competent to  say  in  many  respects  what  God  will  or  will  not 
do ;  but  in  other  resj)ects,  and  we  may  safely  say  in  all  which 
are  important  to  man's  well-being,  man  is  competent  to  say 
what  God  will  and  what  God  will  not  do. 

The  great  point  here  undoubtedly  is  to  distinguish  what  we 
can  know  or  prove, from  that  which  we  cannot  know  or  prove. 
And  what  I  maintain  is,  that  we  can  do  this  to  such  an  extent 
as  to  furnish  the  sure  premises  of  irrefragable  argumentation 
on  the  most  momentous  of  all  questions  to  man,  viz.,  what 
must  be  his  destiny  and  on  what  it  depends  ?  Kor  should  it 
be  forgotten,  that  the  argument  must  of  course  be  confined  ex- 
clusively to  what  we  do  know  or  can  prove ;  and  that  we  are 


400  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

to  place  no  reliance  on  what  we  do  not  know,  ignorance  being 
alike  incompetent  to  make  either  an  objection  or  an  argument. 
The  premises  being  conceded,  all  they  involve  and  give,  must 
be  conceded  also.  If  there  is  a  benevolent  God,  then  man  can 
say,  if  such  a  God  does  any  thing,  what  he  does  will  be  better 
than  to  do  nothing.  If  he  proposes  an  end,  it  will  be  the  best 
end  which  he  can  accomplish.  If  he  adopts  the  means  of  ac- 
complishing an  end,  the  means  will  be  the  best  which  he  can 
adopt.  If  man  can  know  what  the  best  end  is,  as  he  most 
assuredly  can,  viz.,  the  highest  well-being  of  all,  and  if  man 
can  also  ascertain  what  are  the  necessary  and  best  means  of 
accomplishing  this  end,  then  he  can  say  that  God  will  pro- 
pose this  end  and  adopt  these  means.  If  man  can  ascertain 
that  a  perfect  God  has  actually  adopted  a  given  system  of 
means  for  a  given  end,  then  can  he  say  that  system  is  the  best. 
If  man  can  know  that  any  practicable  thing  is  either  essentially 
or  circumstantially  necessary  to  the  perfection  of  this  system  of 
means,  then  also  he  can  say  God  will  do  that.  Thus  knowledge 
gives  knowledge,  if  wTe  know  one  thing  we  know  another — if 
we  know  what  a  triangle  is,  we  may  know  its  angles  to  be 
equal  to  two  right  angles — if  we  know  that  whiteness  exists, 
we  know  also  that  there  is  something  white.  On  the  contrary, 
if  that  knowledge  is  wanting  which  is  necessary  to  further 
knowledge,  then  of  course  such  further  knowledge  will  not  ex- 
ist. If  I  know  that  one  has  made  a  watch,  then  I  know  what 
a  watch  is  ;  and  knowing  what  a  watch  is,  I  know  it  has  a 
main-spring — if  it  answers  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  made,  I 
know  it  must  be  wound  up,  and  if  I  also  know  either  that  no 
one  could,  or  that  no  one  would  do  this  but  the  maker,  and 
know  that  it  has  been  done,  then  I  know  that  he  has  done  it. 
But  if  I  do  not  know  any  one  of  these  things  on  which  my 
knowledge  of  another  thing  depends,  then  I  do  not  know  the 
latter.  In  the  same  manner  is  our  knowledge  of  God  and  of 
his  doings  more  or  less  extended  or  limited.  If  we  know  or 
can  prove  certain  things  concerning  God,  then  we  can  know 
and  prove  certain  other  things,  and  are  as  truly  competent  to 
say  in  such  cases  what  God  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do,  as 
we  are  in  like  cases  to  say  what  a  man  will  do,  and  wThat  he 
will  not  do. 

Xor  can  I  dismiss  the  topic  here.     To  maintain  the  doctrine 
of  this  necessary  ignorance  of  God  on  the  part  of  man,  is  not 


WHAT    MAN    CAN    KNOW.  401 

only  to  provide  a  refuge  from  the  power  of  truth,  it  is  to  sub- 
vert all  reasoning  respecting  God  and  the  relations  subsisting 
between  God  and  his  creatures.  Whether  there  be  a  God  or 
not,  whether  he  be  omnipotent,  wise  and  good  or  not,  are 
things  of  no  importance  for  man  to  know,  and  for  this  decisive 
reason,  such  knowledge  gives  no  results.  On  this  principle 
God  might  as  well  be  without  power,  without  intellect,  without 
goodness — the  idolater's  god — a  thing  "which  the  smith  fash- 
ioneth  with  tongs  and  with  hammers,"  or  such  as  the  prophet 
supposed  who  "  perad venture  sleepeth  or  is  on  a  journey,"  as  a 
being  of  infinite  perfection.  If  we  cannot  say  what  God  will 
and  will  not  do,  then  there  would  be  as  much  ground  for  love, 
for  confidence,  for  hope,  for  joy  in  one  sort  of  deity  as  an- 
other, and  to  see  omnipotent  malignity  or  even  blind  chance 
on  the  throne  of  the  universe,  would  be  as  sufficient  a  basis  for 
exultation  and  joy,  as  to  behold  a  perfect  God  reigning  there  ; 
for  whatever  perfection  be  ascribed  to  him,  there  is  no  telling 
what  he  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  know  that  it  were  better  or  more 
desirable  that  there  should  be  one  sort  of  deity  than  another, 
and  better  simply  and  solely  because  by  knowing  what  he  is, 
we  can  know  to  some  extent  what  he  will  do  and  what  he  will 
not  do,  then  we  also  know  that  the  doing  of  some  things  is  bet- 
ter than  the  doing  of  some  other  things.  And  knowing  these 
things  we  know  yet  more.  We  know  that  a  perfect  God  see- 
ing the  end  from  the  beginning,  and  being  immutable  in  his 
purposes,  will  accomplish  his  plans,  and  carry  them  on  and  out 
with  all  possible  perfection  to  their  results.  And  when  the 
plan  or  system  of  things  is  actually  adopted  and  developed  to 
our  inspection  in  its  essential  characteristics,  we  can  tell  what 
it  is  and  what  it  is  not.  We  can  decide  whether  it  is  a  system 
of  mere  physical  agents,  whether  God  reigns  merely  over  mate- 
rial forms  and  animal  life  and  sensation,  and  is  the  spectator 
only  of  the  laws  of  matter  and  the  acts  of  instinct,  or  whether 
he  has  adopted  a  moral  system,  and  reigns  over  it  according  to 
the  principles  and  laws  of  such  a  jurisdiction. 

The  argument  for  a  divine  revelation  materially  depends  on 
the  fact  that  God  is  administering  a  perfect  moral  government 
over  man. 

The  proposition  to  be  proved  from  this  source  is,  that  the 

SYSTEM  OE  RELIGION  CONTAINED  IN  THE  BlJJLE  IS  FROM  GoD. 

26 


402  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

The  argument  divides  itself  into  the  following  propositions : 

I.  God  administers  a  perfeet  moral  government  over  men. 

II.  By  the  administration  of  this  government, God  proposes 
or  decrees  to  reform  and  bless  a  great  multitude  of  our  race. 

III.  The  importance  and  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  the  ac- 
complishment of  this  end,  create  a  strong  probability  or  a  moral 
certainty  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  men. 

IY.  That  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  revelation  from  God,  and 
which  is  contained  in  the  Bible,  is  what  it  claims  to  be. 

The  first  two  of  these  propositions  have  been  sufficiently  dis- 
cussed in  preceding  lectures.  We  need  only  consider  the  two 
which  remain. 


LECTURE  XIV. 

Direct  Argument  continued. — Two  remaining  propositions  considered. — Prop.  3.  The  importance 
of  revelation  renders  it  probable,  if  not  certain,  that  God  would  give  a  revelation. — Opposed  by 
some. — Their  views  discussed. — Man  not  competent  to  decide  on  the  manner,  &c,  of  revelation. 
Recapitulation  of  argument  on  necessity  of  revelation. — Prop.  4.  That  which  claims  to  be  a 
revelation,  is  what  it  claims  to  be. — Conclusion. 

Our  third  leading  position  is  the  following,  viz. :  The  impor- 
tance and  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  the  accomplishment  of  the 
great  end  of  God  in  the  creation  and  government  of  this  world, 
furnish  a  strong  probability,  not  to  say  a  moral  certainty,  that 
God  would  give  a  revelation  to  men. 

In  the  present  lecture  I  propose  to  establish  this  position,  and 
also  briefly  the  fourth,  viz. : 

IV.  That  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  revelation  from  God,  and 
which  is  contained  in  the  Bible,  is  what  it  claims  to  be. 

I  proceed  then  to  establish  the  third  leading  position,  viz. : 

III.  The  importance  and  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  end  of  God  in  the  creation  and  govern- 
ment of  this  world,  furnish  a  strong  probability,  not  to  say  a 
morcd  certainty,  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  men. 

This  position  has  to  encounter  a  strong  prejudice,  which  I 
have  already  had  occasion  to  notice  in  another  connection. 
Among  the  advocates  of  revelation,  there  are  those  who  would 
rely  wholly  on  what  is  called  the  external  evidence  of  Christian- 
ity. They  tell  us  "  that  we  are  utterly  unable  to  say  what  God 
wTill  do,  and  what  he  will  not  do;  that  the  subject  is  altogether 
too  high  for  us;  that  we  have  had  experience  of  what  man  will 
do  in  given  circumstances,  but  we  have  had  no  experience  of 
what  God  will  do  in  given  circumstances ;  and  that  to  pretend 
to  determine  what  God  will  do,  or  what  he  will  not  do,  in  any 
given  circumstances,  is  an  act  of  glaring  rebellion  against  the 
authority  of  the  Baconian  philosophy."     That  none  of  those 


4CM:     ARGUMENT  FROM  NATURE  APPLIED. 

defenders  of  Christianity,  who  have  relied  on  the  internal  evi- 
dence, have  violated  the  true  principles  of  reasoning,  I  am  not 
concerned  to  show.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  above  opinion,  in 
the  broad  and  unqualified  form  of  statement  in  which  it  is  pre- 
sented, is  utterly  incredible,  as  well  as  destitute  of  the  least 
claim  to  the  true  mode  of  philosophizing.  For  to  what  pur- 
pose is  it  to  inquire,  or  reason,  or  form  opinions  at  all  concern- 
ing the  acts  and  the  doings  of  God,  if  nothing  can  be  known  or 
concluded  on  the  subject?  What  matter  is  it  who  or  what 
God  is,  if  from  our  knowledge  of  what  He  is,  we  can  in  no  re- 
spect infer  what  he  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do  ?  Why  is 
it  that  these  men,  who  so  zealously  contend  for  an  exclusive 
reliance  on  the  external  evidence  of  Christianity,  are  so  suspi- 
cious of  all  attempts  to  decide  what  God  will  do  and  will  not 
do  ?  Do  they  themselves  not  believe  that  a  perfect  God,  if  he 
professes  to  give  a  revelation  to  man,  will  speak  truth  in  that 
revelation?  Do  they  not  believe  that  a  perfect  God  will  not 
work  miracles  in  attestation  of  falsehood  ?  And  is  not  this 
inferring  and  believing  what  God  will  do  and  will  not  do,  in 
given  circumstances  ?  At  least  in  two  respects  then,  let  them 
qualify  their  broad  and  sweeping  position. 

Besides,  are  these  two  the  only  respects  in  which  we  are 
competent  to  say  what  God  will  do  and  what  he  will  not  do  ? 
If  there  are  no  other  acts  or  doings  which  we  can  surely  and 
safely  affirm  that  a  perfect  God  will  perform,  how  can  we  ever 
prove  that  there  is  a  perfect  God  ?  And  if  we  cannot  prove 
this  by  his  acts  and  his  doings,  and  this  on  the  principle  that  a 
perfect  God  will  do  some  things  and  will  not  do  other  things, 
then  how  can  we  know  that  he  is  a  perfect  God,  or,  if  he  gives 
a  professed  revelation,  that  he  will  speak  truth ;  or  if  he  works 
miracles,  that  he  does  not  work  them  in  attestation  of  false- 
hood ?  The  plain  matter  of  fact  is,  that  there  are  two  modes 
of  reasoning  in  respect  to  intelligent  voluntary  beings,  which 
are  alike  founded  in  experience,  and  accord  with  the  Baconian 
philosophy.  Thus,  in  certain  cases,  experience  fully  authorizes 
us  to  reason  from  the  acts  of  voluntary  beings  to  their  charac- 
ter, their  principles,  their  designs,  and  to  determine  what  these 
are.  In  other  cases,  having  ascertained  the  latter  from  their 
acts  and  doings  in  some  respects,  experience  fully  authorizes  us 
to  reason  from  these  to  their  acts  and  their  doings  in  other  re- 
spects, and  to  determine  what  these  will  be  and  will  not  be. 


OBJECTION    TO     INTEIINAL    EVIDENCE.  405 

If  I  know  that  an  artificer  lias  begun  to  make  a  watch,  with 
adequate  power  and  skill  to  finish  and  give  it  the  highest  per- 
fection, and  if  I  know  him  to  possess  an  unfaltering  firmness 
of  purpose,  I  may  infer  that  he  will  perfect  what  he  has  begun, 
as  particularly, that  he  will  insert  a  main-spring  in  the  watch. 
And  further,  if  I  know  that  he  is  fully  resolved  to  secure  in 
the  most  perfect  degree  possible  to  him  the  true  use  of  the 
watch ;  and  if  I  know  that  he  is  making,  or  has  actually  made  it 
for  the  use  of  another,  who  will  never  understand  its  true  use  un- 
less the  maker  instructs  him,  then  I  may  infer  that  he  will  give 
this  instruction;  and  if  the  requisite  instruction  respecting  the 
true  use  of  the  watch  should  be  liable  to,  or  should  be  foreseen 
to  be  actually  connected  with  some  incidental  evil,  still  it  is  quite 
supposable,  that  the  maker  should  evince,  in  the  most  decisive 
manner,  an  inflexible  purpose  to  give  not  only  the  highest  per- 
fection to  the  watch,  but' to  every  thing  which  can  be  regarded 
as  the  means  of  its  perfection;  so  that  if  the  end  fails  in  any 
degree  to  be  accomplished,  it  shall  be  seen  that  the  failure  is 
in  no  respect  truly  and  properly  attributable  to  any  thing 
which  he  has  done  or  failed  to  do.  That  such  premises  give 
such  conclusions  respecting  man  is  obvious ;  they  can  do  no 
less  in  respect  to  God,  when  it  is  remembered  that  he  is  a  Being 
absolutely  and  immutably  perfect. 

If  then  we  can  know  or  prove  certain  things  concerning 
God,  then  we  can  know  and  prove  certain  other  things  con- 
cerning him,  and  are,  in  view  of  the  immutability  of  his  pur- 
poses, more  competent  to  say  what  God  will  do  and  what  he 
will  not  do  in  given  circumstances,  than  we  are  to  decide  the 
same  things  in  respect  to  man.  If  we  can  know  or  prove  what 
the  best  end  of  creation  is,  as  we  most  assuredly  can — viz., 
the  highest  well-being  of  all — and  if  avc  can  also  ascertain 
what  are  the  necessary  and  best  means  of  accomplishing  this 
end,  then  we  can  say  that  a  perfect  God  will  propose  this  end 
and  adopt  these  means  of  accomplishing  it.  And  further,  if 
we  can  know  or  prove  that  any  practicable  thing  is  either 
essentially  or  circumstantially  necessary  to  the  perfection  of 
this  system  of  means,  or  to  secure  the  end  in  the  most  perfect 
degree  possible  to  him,  then  we  can  infer,  that  notwithstanding 
any  incidental  evils,  he  will  give  perfection  to  this  system  of 
means.  It  is  not  true,  then — it  is  indeed  utterly  incredible, 
that  a  benevolent  God  has  doomed  his  moral  creation,  even 


406  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

under  the  light  of  nature,  to  the  darkness  and  agony  of  utter 
uncertainty  in  respect  to  what  he  will  do  and  what  he  will  not 
do.  The  supposition,  as  it  would  be  easy  to  show,  subverts  all 
natural  and  all  revealed  theology. 

But  here  let  me  not  be  misunderstood.  I  am  not  saying, 
if  we  were  to  assume  simply  that  God  is  benevolent,  that  we 
could,  with  no  knowledge  of  his  doings,  make  the  same  sure 
inferences  which  we  can  now  make.  I  readily  concede  also, 
that  man  in  his  actual  condition  is  wholly  incompetent  to  say, 
in  many  respects,  or  in  respect  to  many  things,  what  God  will 
do  and  what  he  will  not  do.  The  great  point  is  to  distinguish 
what  man,  in  his  actual  condition,  can  know  or  prove,  from 
what  he  cannot  know  or  prove,  respecting  the  doings  of  God. 
The  presumption  that  fearlessly  ventures  to  dogmatize  its  de- 
cisions in  the  dark,  and  the  timidity  that  rejects  truth  in  the 
broad  daylight  of  evidence,  are  alike  reprehensible. 

To  come  then  to  the  particular  inquiry  before  us,  can  we  dis- 
tinguish what  cannot  be  known  or  proved  from  what  can  be 
known  or  proved  in  respect  to  God's  giving  a  revelation  to  this 
world?  What  I  maintain  is,  that  we  can  do  this  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  decide  with  entire  confidence  that  God  would  give 
a  revelation  to  man;  and  from  this  fact,  and  in  view  of  the 
nature,  the  adaptations  and  actual  results  of  that  system  of 
religion  which  is  contained  in  the  Scriptures,  we  must  con- 
clude that  Christianity  is  a  revelation  from  God. 

To  prevent  misapprehension  then,  and  the  confounding  of 
one  thing  with  another,  I  would  here  explicitly  concede  that 
we  may  be  wholly  incompetent  to  say  in  what  manner  God 
would  give  a  revelation  to  man,  or  at  what  time,  or  to  what  ex- 
tent. In  these  respects  we  may  be  unable  through  the  want  of 
all  requisite  premises  to  form  any  conclusion.  More  particu- 
larly in  regard  to  the  time  when  God  would  do  this,  I  would 
say,  that  under  the  mere  light  of  nature,  we  might  be  ignorant 
whether  the  revelation  would  be  made  in  this  or  a  future  state. 
Human  reason  might  be  utterly  incompetent  to  judge  whether 
man's  probation  would  not  continue  after  death,  and  whether 
further  discoveries  of  religious  and  moral  truth  would  not  be 
deferred  to  some  indefinite  period  of  man's  future  existence. 
In  regard  to  the  manner,  we  may  be  incompetent  to  deter- 
mine whether  it  will  be  orally  or  by  writing,  by  the  ministry 
of  men  or  of  some  superior  agents,  or  even  by  a  direct  com- 


THINGS    WHICH    WE    CANNOT    KNOW.  407 

munication  from  himself.  Li  regard  to  the  extent,  we  may  be 
unable  to  say,  whether  he  will  give  it  to  all  men  of  all  ages 
and  nations,  or  only  to  a  part  of  the  race.  Still  we  can  say 
that  he  will  give  it  to  such  an  extent,  as  shall  be  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  utter  defeat  and  frustration  of  his  design  in 
adopting  the  system.  If  he  does  not  give  a  revelation  to  some 
extent,  this  design  will  wholly  fail.  We  must  conclude  there- 
fore that  he  will  give  a  revelation  to  some  extent,  and  to  that 
degree  which  will  best  subserve  his  benevolent  end,  though  we 
cannot  determine  what  that  extent  is.  In  maintaining  there- 
fore that  there  is  proof  from  the  light  of  nature,  that  God  would 
give  to  men  a  revelation,  I  affirm  nothing  in  respect  to  the  time, 
the  manner,  or  the  extent  of  such  a  revelation  beyond  what  has 
now  been  stated.  On  these  topics  I  do  not  pretend  that  we 
have  the  requisite  premises  for  any  conclusion.  It  is  obvious 
however,  that  we  may  still  have  abundant  proof  of  the  fact, 
that  God  would  give  a  revelation.  We  may  have  sufficient 
premises  for  one  conclusion,  though  we  have  none  for  another. 
To  recur  to  the  example,  we  may  have  decisive  proof  that  a 
watch-maker  will  complete  the  watch  he  has  begun,  and  that 
he  will  give  the  requisite  instructions  concerning  its  true 
object,  to  him  for  whose  use  he  makes  it,  and  yet  we  may  pos- 
sess no  means  of  deciding  tvhen,  in  what  manner,  and  to  what 
extent  he  will  do  the  latter.  While  in  respect  to  these  particu- 
lar points  of  inquiry,  all  may  be  left  indeterminate  and  uncer- 
tain ;  still  the  fact  that  he  has  begun  to  make  the  watch,  that 
he  has  proceeded  so  far  in  the  work,  surmounting  all  obstacles, 
and  showing  in  every  conceivable  way  that  he  is  fully  intent 
on  the  accomplishment  of  his  design,  that  nothing  can  come 
into  competition  with  it,  nor  hinder  him  from  doing  all  that  is 
necessary  to  give  entire  perfection  to  every  thing  fitted  to 
secure  the  end  aimed  at ;  the  fact  ascertained  by  the  most 
abundant  and  decisive  experience,  that  he  for  whose  use  he 
makes  the  watch,  will  never  so  understand  it  as  to  secure  the 
end  without  instructions  from  the  maker — these  things  being 
known,  render  the  conclusion  unavoidable,  that  the  requisite 
instructions  concerning  the  use  of  the  watch  will  be  given. 
We  have  all  the  reasons  for  this  conclusion  which  are  or  can 
be  well  conceived  of,  in  respect  to  the  acts  and  doings  of  volun- 
tary beings  in  any  case  whatever.  There  is  according  to  the 
supposition,  no  possible  ground  of  doubt  in  respect  to  the  ulti- 


408  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

mate  end  of  the  watch-maker,  nor  in  respect  to  his  purpose  to 
give  the  highest  possible  perfection  to  the  means  of  accom- 
plishing it,  nor  the  necessity  of  instructions  in  the  use  of  the 
watch  to  the  perfection  of  these  means.  Who  then  can  doubt 
in  regard  to  the  fact  that  such  information  will  be  given  ? 

Such  is  the  argument  by  which  we  prove  from  the  light  of 
nature  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  men.  To  present 
the  argument,  we  now  recur  to  what  we  have  attempted  to 
prove  in  the  preceding  course  of  lectures. 

We  have  seen  that  man  from  the  nature  of  his  constitution 
and  the  condition  in  which  he  is  placed,  is  a  moral  being — 
that  conformity  to  the  law  of  benevolent  action  is  the  true  and 
only  means  of  his  perfection  in  character  and  in  happiness. 
We  have  seen  that  God,  his  Maker,  administers  a  perfect 
moral  government  over  this  world,  through  an  economy  of 
grace ;  that  in  this  system  he  aims  at  the  great,  the  best  con- 
ceivable end  by  the  best  conceivable  means,  or  that  this  sys- 
tem of  means  is  in  every  conceivable  respect  perfectly  adapted 
to  the  best  conceivable  end — that  God  has  proposed  the  high- 
est happiness  of  his  moral  creation  which  he  can  secure  as 
the  end  of  his  government;  that  he  gives  to  the  system  of 
government  which  is  the  means  of  this  end  every  conceivable 
perfection — that  to  this  end  and  the  perfection  of  this  system 
of  means  every  thing  else  in  his  whole  course  of  providence — 
all  that  can  be  called  good,  is  subservient,  and  every  thing  that 
is  evil,  if  it  can  be  made  to  contribute  to  this  end,  is  used  for 
this  purpose — that  every  evil  which  to  him  is  incidental  to  the 
system  and  unavoidable  in  the  nature  of  things,  if  the  system  be 
adopted,  is  incurred,  or  to  speak  in  the  language  of  theology,  is 
purposed  or  decreed  rather  than  not  adopt  and  carry  out  the 
system.  We  have  seen,  that  in  administering  his  moral  govern- 
ment under  a  gracious  economy,  God  manifests  himself  as  a  just 
God  and  yet  a  Saviour — that  in  this  way  he  evinces  the  fact  of 
an  atonement,  though  not  the  matter  and  method  of  it,  thus 
manifesting  the  immutability  of  his  purpose,  not  only  to  ac- 
complish the  end  of  the  system  adopted,  but  to  give  the  sys- 
tem itself  the  highest  perfection  in  respect  to  fitness  and  adap- 
tation to  its  end,  so  that  instead  of  spreading  the  gloom  of 
despair  over  this  world  of  sin  and  guilt,  he  authorizes  the 
belief  of  a  future  state,in  which  the  order,  beauty  and  splendor 
of  his  moral  administration  will  be  completed  in  the  blessed- 


WILL    THE    DESIGN    BE    ABANDONED?  409 

ness  of  the  righteous,  and  in  the  merited  punishment  of  the  in- 
corrigibly wicked — results,  which  in  the  comparative  amount 
of  happiness  and  misery,  will  fully  accord  with  the  benignity 
and  grace  manifest  in  the  system  of  means  adopted  for  their 
accomplishment. 

Such  then  is  the  great,  the  comprehensive  design  of  God  in 
the  creation  and  government  of  this  world,  as  presented  to  us 
by  the  light  of  nature.  Reason  duly  employed  on  the  subject 
gives  us  the  whole  and  every  part  of  it.  It  gives  us  not  only 
the  end,  viz.,  the  highest  perfection  of  his  moral  creation,  in 
character  and  in  happiness,  possible  to  the  Creator,  but  also 
the  perfection  of  the  system  of  means,  both  in  every  essential 
respect  as  a  system  of  moral  government  under  grace,  and  in 
every  circumstantial  respect  as  involving  all  that  can  be  con- 
ceived to  be  necessary  to  prevent  the  failure  of  the  end,  and 
to  secure  its  most  perfect  accomplishment. 

I  now  ask,  what  will  become  of  this  great  plan  of  God  the 
Creator  ?  "Will  his  design  in  creating  men  moral  beings — be- 
ings the  most  exalted  in  kind  which  he  can  create,  be  aban- 
doned through  indifference  or  fickleness  ?  Will  the  great  object 
of  all  his  works — that  to  which  every  thing  beside  is  subordi- 
nate and  subservient — be  relinquished  as  impracticable  by  an 
Omniscient  and  Almighty  Creator  ?  Will  it  prove  in  the  issue 
to  be  a  design,  for  entering  upon  which,  he  who  sees  the  end 
from  the  beginning,  will  see  that  there  were  no  reasons,  or  for 
abandoning  which  he  will  discover  new  reasons  1  Will  that 
design  of  God,  in  forming  beings  in  his  own  image,  which 
stands  forth  first,  brightest,  greatest  of  them  all,  terminate  in 
utter  failure  and  defeat?  Will  the  progress  of  this  plan  of  God 
come  to  a  sudden  end — the  moral  constitution  of  his  creatures, 
this  whole  moral  system,  be  divested  of  all  significance,  and  its 
author  of  all  his  wisdom  and  honor,  and  all  that  can  deter  from 
iniquity  and  secure  the  moral  perfection  of  moral  beings ;  all 
that  can  bless  man,  exalt  God ;  all  that  can  make  heaven 
rejoice  and  hell  tremble,  be  frittered  away  into  an  insignificant 
and  degrading  mockery  ?  If  the  immutability  of  God,  the  in- 
finite perfections  of  his  Godhead — if  the  clear  manifestation  of 
designs  worthy  of  himself — if  their  superior  excellence  as 
stamping  all  others  with  insignificance,  and  if  their  ceaseless 
development  and  unfaltering  progress  for  six  thousand  years, 
give  any  security  in  respect  to  what  God  will  do,  then  must 
Vol.  I.— 18 


410  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

we  look  for  a  full  and  perfect  consummation  of  God's  great 
design  as  the  moral  governor  of  men. 

I  now  advert  to  another  position,  which  I  persuade  myself 
has  been  fully  established  in  preceding  lectures,  viz.,  the  neces- 
sity of  a  revelation  from  God. 

I  attempted  to  show  that  there  is  a  necessity  of  such  revela- 
tion, in  three  respects : 

First.  To  give  the  highest  conceivable  perfection  to  the  mode 
of  discovering  truth  to  the  human  mind. 

Secondly.  To  any  extensive  and  useful  discovery  of  truth  to 
the  mind. 

Thirdly.  To  the  discovery  of  some  important  truths,  which 
the  human  mind  could  not  discover  without  a  revelation. 

The  question  now  is,  whether,  in  view  of  this  necessity  of  a 
revelation  as  existing  in  these  respects,  we  have  reason  to  con- 
clude that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  mam  I  proceed 
then  to  show — 

First,  that  the  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  give  the  highest 
conceivable  perfection  to  the  mode  of  discovering  truth  to  the 
human  mind,  supposing  it  to  be  necessary  for  no  other  purpose, 
furnishes  decisive  proof  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to 
men.  The  argument  here  rests  on  two  facts  which  have  already 
been  established,  viz.,  that  a  revelation  is  necessary  to  the  high- 
est conceivable  perfection  in  t/ie  mode  of  discovering  truth  to 
the  human  mind ;  and  that  God  has  actually  evinced  his  design 
to  give  perfection  to  that  system  which  he  has  adopted  to  re- 
claim and  save  this  lost  world.  That  a  revelation  is  necessary 
to  the  highest  perfection  of  a  reclaiming  system,  so  far  as  per- 
fection in  adaptation,  fitness,  and  tendency  to  secure  the  end 
of  such  a  system  is  concerned,  no  one  will  deny.  Nor  can  I 
imagine  any  possible  ground  for  doubt  on  the  question,  whether 
God,  for  this  reason,  would  give  a  revelation  to  men,  except 
one,  viz. :  the  possibility  that  through  perversion  on  their  part, 
it  might  prove  for  the  worse  instead  of  for  the  better — become 
a  curse  instead  of  a  blessing.  To  this  I  answer,  that  admitting 
this  possibility,  it  furnishes  no  proof  that  it  would  in  fact 
prove  to  be  for  the  worse,  nor  that  God  would  not  give  a  reve- 
lation. I  answer  again,  that  the  whole  history  of  his  provi- 
dence, as  I  have  abundantly  shown,  evinces  a  fixed  purpose  to 
give  perfection  to  his  system  of  moral  government  under  a 
gracious  economy,  or  to  his  system  of  reclaiming  influence 


THE    SYSTEM    PERFECT.  411 

irrespectively  of  its  foreseen  perversion  on  the  part  of  his  sub- 
jects. This  foreseen  fact  of  perversion  in  its  (almost)  absolute 
universality,  has  not  prevented  him  from  giving  to  the  system 
every  essential  perfection,  nor  from  giving  it  every  circumstan- 
tial perfection,  to  such  an  extent  as  to  remove  all  presumption 
against  the  fact ;  while  what  he  has  done  furnishes  the  highest 
probability  of  the  fact  that  he  will,  sooner  or  later,  add  that 
of  a  revelation.  Without  supposing  that  God  designs  actu- 
ally to  reclaim  and  save  one  of  the  human  race,  I  maintain 
that  one  design  of  God  is  too  conspicuous  in  his  providence  to- 
ward this  world  to  be  denied  or  doubted,  viz.,  his  design  to 
give  absolute  perfection  to  his  system  of  reclaiming  influences. 
The  fact  that  he  has  done  so  much  for  this  purpose  already,  in 
an  economy  of  grace,  bringing  every  conceivable  influence  in 
the  universe  to  bear  on  this  great  object,  and  doing  every  con- 
ceivable thing  to  accomplish  it  except  that  of  giving  a  revela- 
tion, is  as  truly  decisive  of  his  design  to  give  perfection  to  this 
system  as  had  he  done  more.  Whatever  may  be  supposed  to 
be  the  reason  for  giving  such  perfection  to  this  system  as  he 
has  actually  given — whether  he  proposes  to  reclaim  some  of 
our  guilty  race  or  not,  or  whether  we  can  or  cannot  assign  any 
reason  for  this  perfection  of  the  reclaiming  system,  or  whether 
we  can  or  cannot  say  why  he  has  not  already  added  a  revela- 
tion, supposing  that  he  has  not,  one  thing  is  decisively  proved, 
viz.,  that  he  chooses  to  give  it  the  highest  conceivable  perfec- 
tion. Take  the  case  of  the  watch-maker.  Suppose  the  work 
has  progressed  to  a  certain  point — that  he  has  done  every  thing 
but  one  which  is  necessary  for  accomplishing  the  end  proposed  ; 
he  has  finished  a  perfect  watch,  he  has  put  the  parts  together, 
has  inserted  the  main-spring,  oiled  the  machinery,  wound  it  up, 
placed  it  in  the  hands  of  a  son  for  whose  use  he  made  it ;  he 
has  done  all  this  at  no  ordinary  expense  of  time  and  labor,  and 
with  no  ordinary  degree  of  self-sacrifice;  in  a  word,  he  has 
thus  done  all  that  can  be  conceived  to  be  adapted  and  fitted  to 
secure  the  end,  except  he  has  not  told  the  possessor  of  the 
watch  how  to  wind  it  up.  And  now,  with  all  these  proofs  of 
his  real  design,  do  you,  can  you  believe  that  he  will  never  ex- 
plain that  to  him  ?  Suppose  you  cannot  tell  the  results  of  giv- 
ing this  instruction — whether  it  will  prove  for  better  or  for 
worse ;  suppose  you  can  give  no  reason  for  delaying  to  give  it 
for  a  few  minutes  or  a  few  hours,  can  you  therefore  believe  that 


412  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

the  requisite  instruction  by  the  watch-maker  on  this  material 
point  will  never  be  given  ?  This,  with  any  fair-minded  man, 
could  not  be  a  matter  of  hesitation  or  doubt.  So  in  respect  to 
the  reclaiming  system  of  God.  In  view  of  what  he  has  actually 
done  toward  giving  it  perfection  as  a  system  of  adaptations  and 
fitnesses,  there  is  decisive  reason  for  believing  that  he  will  give 
it  absolute  perfection ;  and  in  view  of  the  necessity  of  a  reve- 
lation to  this,  there  is  all  the  reason  for  believing  that  he  would 
give  a  revelation,  which  there  is  for  belies- ing  that  he  would 
perfect  the  system.  And  there  is  all  the  reason  to  believe  that 
he  will  perfect  the  system,  which  the  actual  perfection  of  it  in 
all  respects  but  one  can  furnish.  Having  done  all  things  neces- 
sary to  its  perfection  but  one,  is  there  not  a  moral  certainty 
that  he  will  do  that  also  ?  Having  done  so  much,  he  has  fur- 
nished, so  far  as  this  kind  of  evidence  is  concerned,  all  that  is 
possible  in  the  case,  more  being  impossible  without  giving  a 
revelation.  If  too  we  reflect  on  what  God  actually  does  to 
give  perfection  to  this  system,  how  the  object  stands  forth  the 
first  and  the  highest,  and  as  it  were  the  whole  and  sole  object 
of  nature,  of  providence,  and  of  grace ;  how  all  things  are  sub- 
ordinated to  this ;  how  all  influences  from  himself,  his  charac- 
ter, his  relations,  his  friendship  and  favor,  his  displeasure  and 
his  wrath — every  influence  from  man  himself,  every  influence 
from  earth  and  heaven,  from  time  and  eternity,  is  brought  to 
subserve  this  design,  who  can  doubt  that,  sooner  or  later,  the 
Being  with  whom  one  day  is  as  a  thousand  years,  and  a  thou- 
sand years  as  one  day,  will  give  to  such  a  system  perfection 
absolute  ?  The  probability  is  the  highest  of  which  the  nature 
of  the  case  admits.  If  the  acts  and  doings  of  God  can  prove 
any  thing,  they  show  that  he  would  give  a  revelation  to  men. 

It  is  easy  to  account  for  what  he  has  done,  on  the  supposition 
that  he  intends  to  do  more ;  but  it  is  not  possible  to  account 
for  what  he  has  done,  unless  you  suppose  that  he  intends  to  do 
more. 

God,  by  perfecting  the  system,  would  give  higher  proof  that 
he  preferred  holiness  to  sin,  than  he  would  or  could  give.  There 
is  no  reason  for  concluding  that  he  will  not  perfect  the  system  ; 
there  is  therefore  all  the  reason  for  concluding  that  he  will  per- 
fect it,  that  the  above  consideration  affords. 

I  proceed  to  show — 

Secondly.  That  the  necessity  of  a  divine  revelation  to  secure 


REVELATION    HIGHLY    PROBABLE.  413 

to  any  extent  any  useful  practical  knowledge  of  religions  and 
moral  truth  to  man,  in  connection  with  other  facts,  furnishes 
further  proof  that  God  would  give  a  revelation  to  man.  Let 
us  look  at  the  facts  as  already  established.  God,  as  we  have 
seen,  has,  as  the  Creator  and  Governor  of  this  world,  proposed 
the  best  conceivable  end,  and  has  also  adopted  the  best  system 
of  means  for  its  accomplishment,  with  the  single  exception  that 
it  does  not  include  a  revelation.  This  great  end  is  the  highest 
happiness  of  his  creation;  the  system  of  means  is  a  perfect 
moral  government  under  an  economy  of  grace.  This  end  will 
fail,  and  this  system  of  means  will  be  in  vain,  and  worse  than 
in  vain,  without  a  revelation.  If  facts — if  the  experience  of  a 
world  for  thousands  of  years  can  prove  any  thing,  it  has 
proved,  that  without  a  revelation  from  God,  all  the  generations 
of  men  will  live  and  die  in  sin.  At  the  same  time,  the  nature, 
the  immutable  principles  of  God's  perfect  moral  government, 
give  another  and  still  more  appalling  result — the  complete  and 
eternal  misery  of  all  these  creatures  of  God.  The  great,  the 
awful  experiment  has  been  made  in  respect  to  what  man  as  a 
subject  of  God's  moral  dominion,  will  do  without  a  revelation. 
It  has  proved  that  he  will  sin,  and  only  sin.  The  throne  of 
God,  though  a  throne  of  grace,  stands  on  the  pillars  of  eternal 
justice,  proffering  no  pardon,  giving  no  hope  to  impenitent 
transgressors,  but  frowning  in  terrific  majesty,  and  dooming  a 
world  of  such  transgressors  to  just  and  fearful  retribution.  The 
alternative  is,  either  the  failure  of  God's  great  end  in  creation, 
even  the  moral  perfection  and  consecpient  perfect  happiness,  of 
every  moral  being,  involving,  as  it  must,  the  utter  and  endless 
misery  of  all,  or  the  gift  of  a  revelation  from  God  to  this  lost 
world. 

I  maintain  the  high  probability  of  the  latter.  To  estimate 
this  aright,  we  must  recur  to  all  those  providential  dealings  of 
God  to  restore  man  to  virtue  and  to  happiness,  which  so  clearly 
and  so  impressively  disclose  his  design  as  a  moral  governor. 
If  it  be  said,  all  this  may  be  without  a  providential  purpose 
actually  to  restore  any ;  I  admit  the  bare  possibility  of  it,  but 
this  is  not  evidence,  it  is  only  probability.  How  then  is  this 
probability  to  be  estimated  ?  Is  there  even  the  slightest  pre- 
sumption that  God  would  give  existence  to  such  a  world,  to 
such  myriads  of  immortal  beings,  with  the  foresight,  and  there- 
fore with  the  providential  purpose  that  each  and  all  should  be 


414  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

miserable  forever?  Every  presumption  is  against  it.  The 
merest  surmise  of  such,  a  fact  without  evidence,  is  unauthorized 
and  injurious,  and  proscribed  by  every  principle  of  just  reason- 
ing. The  entire  want  of  evidence  of  such  a  fact, in  view  of  his 
perfect  benevolence,  is  proof  against  it.  Indeed  as  we  have 
already  shown,  there  is  the  most  satisfactory  proof,  that  the 
Creator  will  secure  such  results  in  the  holiness  and  happiness 
of  this  part  of  his  moral  creation,  as  will  furnish  bright  displays 
of  his  infinite  goodness.  Nay  more.  We  have  seen  in  that 
economy  of  grace  and  mercy  which  he  has  clearly  disclosed  in 
all  the  ways  of  his  providence,  the  sure  pledge  of  results,  in  the 
holiness  and  happiness  of  men  corresponding  with  its  benignity 
and  grace.  Who  are  the  objects  of  all  this  grace?  The  crea- 
tures of  his  power,  the  children  of  his  love !  Will  God  then 
adopt  such  a  system  of  means  to  reclaim  and  save,  giving  it 
every  conceivable  adaptation  and  tendency  to  such  an  end — will 
he  bring  all  creation  and  providence  to  attest  his  sincerity,  and 
his  overflowing  kindness  toward  his  disobedient  children,  with- 
out a  design  actually  to  reclaim  and  save,  and  with  the  knowl- 
edge and  the  purpose  that  the  only  result  shall  be  the  aggrava- 
tion of  the  guilt  and  the  ruin  of  all  ?  Reflect  and  see  what 
benignity  and  grace  assail  a  thoughtless,  wicked  world  at  every 
step  of  life!  What  solicitude  and  earnestness  to  reclaim  his 
wayward  children,  which  none  but  a  perfect  God  could  feel  or 
manifest !  What  riches  of  long-suffering  and  forbearance — 
(what  evil  that  is  not  the  infliction  of  paternal  love) — what 
goodness  leading  to  repentance  and  drawing  with  the  cords  of 
love  and  with  the  bands  of  a  man — what  yearnings  of  compas- 
sion, what  bowels  of  mercy — what  a  length,  breadth,  height, 
depth  in  God's  restoring  love  !  And  do  such  love  and  mercy 
thus  seek  their  objects  with  the  foresight  that  it  will,  and  the 
purpose  that  it  shall  augment  the  guilt  and  ruin  of  them  all  ? 
Is  such  the  errand  on  which  this  mercy  of  God  comes  to  this 
ruined  world  ?  Oh  no.  It  is  the  breaking,  the  bursting  forth 
of  the  heart  of  infinite  love  in  acts  of  sincerest  mercy  actually 
to  reclaim  and  save  all  that  can  be  saved !  It  is  the  mercy  of 
God,  doing  for  each,  and  for  all,  and  at  every  moment,  all  that 
can  be  wisely  done.  It  is  the  decree  of  God  unchangeable, actu- 
ally to  reclaim  and  save  a  multitude  which  no  man  can  num- 
ber, out  from  all  nations,  and  kindreds,  and  people  and  tongues 
— a  decree  of  God  unchangeable, to  bring  home  to  himself  bright 


STILL    ANOTHER    NECESSITY.  415 

hosts  of  holy,  happy  immortals,  to  satisfy,  and  bless, and  rejoice 
that  heart  which  sought  their  salvation  !  But  without  a  revela- 
tion all  will  be  lost — this  design  of  mercy  will  fail !  Surely  that 
mercy  will  not  withhold  from  the  guilty  beings  it  decrees  to 
save,  the  revelation  they  need.  No  act  of  paternal  kindness — 
no  gift  of  a  father's  love  is  so  sure,  as  that  of  revelation  from 
its  God  to  this  lost  world. 

Once  more — 

Thirdly:  The  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  the  discovery  of 
some  important  truths  which  man  could  not  discover  without 
it,  proves  that  God  would  give  a  revelation.  I  have  already 
taken  occasion  to  show  how  utterly  hopeless  would  have  been 
the  condition  of  this  sinful  world,  without  the  discovery  which 
the  Scriptures  make  to  us  concerning  the  manner  in  which  its 
redemption  is  achieved — in  other  words  the  revelation  of  the 
triune  God,  the  Father,  the  Son,  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  in  their 
respective  relations  to  the  work  of  man's  redemption  from  sin. 
The  two  great  problems  are,  how  shall  the  perverseness  of 
rebels  be  subdued  to  love  ;  and  if  subdued,  hoiv  can  a  just  God 
receive  them  to  favor  f  Here  all  is  mystery  unsolvable,  darkness 
impenetrable  and  appalling !  How  could  human  reason  alone 
and  unaided  have  discovered  the  mystery  of  redemption  ?  Even 
when  God  has  revealed  it,  reason  is  lost  in  this  abyss  of  love 
and  mercy,  and  needs  all  its  submission  to  believe!  Man, sin- 
ful as  he  is,  I  admit,  might  repent  and  might  hope  for  mercy 
from  his  Maker.  But  would  he?  What  bondage  so  strong  as 
bondage  to  sin — what  death  so  hopeless  as  death  in  sin  ?  Who 
shall  deliver?  What  power  shall  give  life,  and  health,  and 
beauty  immortal  to  these  victims  of  sin  and  death?  I  said 
man  might  hope  for  mercy.  But  with  a  just  apprehension  of 
God's  fearful  justice  and  his  own  desert  of  its  fearful  doom — 
looking  upon  a  sin-avenging  God  as  he  must,  and  asking  how 
can  such  a  God  show  the  same  abhorrence  of  sin  and  yet  for- 
give, as  he  would  by  turning  a  rebellious  world  into  hell,  then 
it  is  that  the  terrors  of  God  come  over  us  ;  hope  trembles  and 
expires.  ISTot  that  it  must  be  so,  but  it  always  has  been  and 
always  will  be,  with  exceptions  that  need  not  be  mentioned. 
It  is  not  hope  in  a  God  all  tenderness  which  we  need.  It  is  that 
which  looks  upon  a  just  God,  and  with  a  sense  of  his  righteous 
indignation  toward  sin,  reposes  calmly  and  sweetly  in  his  mercy. 
But  there  is  so  much  terror  here,  so  much  darkness  and  tern- 


416  ARGUMENT    FROM    NATURE    APPLIED. 

pest  around  the  throne  of  God,  that  in  the  eye  of  guilt,  the  rajs 
of  mercy  fade  and  will  not  suffice.     Guilt  will  look  up  with 
confidence,  only  when  it  sees  the  throne  of  God  upheld  by  "the 
man  that  is  his  fellow."     Take  away  "  the  incarnate  mystery," 
extinguish  the  light  that  reveals  the  great  atonement  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  where  is  hope  for  human  guilt  ?     Zeno,  Socrates, 
Plato,  Pythagoras,  Epicurus,  Porch,  Academy,  Lyceum,  Infi- 
delity, Deism,  Philosophy,  Human  Peason,  all,  what  can  ye  do, 
what  can  ye  substitute  for  the  blood  of  the  Son  of  God?     Ex- 
tinguish that  light  which  reveals  the  mercy  of  God  through  his 
Son,  and  let  in  the  terrors  of  guilt  and  of  God  on  this  sinful 
world,  and  how  would  each  and  all,  in  the  gloom  or  frenzy  of 
despair,  take  their  way  down  to  everlasting  burnings?     Will 
a  redeeming  God  then  withhold  that  light  from  the  world  he 
would  redeem  ?     Will  he  abandon  every  purpose  of  mercy — 
render  every  other  manifestation  of  it  vain,  and  worse  than  in 
vain;  will  he  give  up  his  lost  creature  to  the  perdition  of  hell, 
when  he  has,  for  the  light  of  nature  teaches  it,  actually  made 
an  atonement  ?     Will  he  do  this  by  concealing  from  their  view 
what  that  atonement  is  ?     Has  he  made,  and  given  abundant 
proof  that  he  has  made  the  only  atonement,  by  the  knowledge 
of  which  conscious  guilt  will  ever  be  emboldened  to  approach 
a  spotless  God — the  only  atonement,  the  knowledge  of  which 
will  ever  give  hope  and  peace  and  heaven  to  a  guilty  world ; 
and  will  he  refuse  to  give  the  knowledge  of  this  atonement  ? 
Has  he  done  all  this  in  fact  for  us,  and  will  he,  by  refusing  to 
tell  what  it  is,  leave  us  only  to  a  certain,  fearful  looking  for  of 
judgment  and  fiery  indignation !     It  is  incredible.     I  say  not 
at  what  time  in  this  world's  history,  nor  whether  in  this  or  a 
future  state ;  but  that,  sooner  or  later,  the  God  of  grace — that 
God  who  tells  us  in  all  his  works  and  ways  that  he  has  in  pur- 
pose or  in  fact,  made  an  adequate  atonement  for  human  guilt, 
will  also  reveal  its  nature  and  its  power.     Having  done  the 
greater,  he  will  also  do  the  less.     Xo  act  of  an  immutable  God, 
no  gift  of  his  mercy,  can  be  more  certain  than  that  of  a  revela- 
tion, declaring  to  the  faith,  the  wonder,  the  gratitude,  the  joy 
of  redeemed  men,  "  God  so  loved  the  world  that  he  gave  his  only 
begotten  Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him  should  not  per- 
ish, but  have  everlasting  life." 

I  have  thus  attempted  to  establish  my  third  leading  position : 
III.  That  the  importance  and  necessity  of  a  revelation  to  the 


THE    BIBLE,    WHAT    IT    CLAIMS    TO    BE.  417 

great  end  of  God  in  the  creation  and  government  of  the  world, 
give  a  strong  probability,  not  to  say  a  moral  certainty,  that  he 
would  give  a  revelation  to  men. 

The  next  and  last  position  now  claims  consideration,  viz. : 
IV.  That  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  revelation  from  God,  and 
which  is  contained  in  the  Bible,  is  what  it  claims  to  be. 

The  argument  is  this :  God  will  give  a  revelation  to  this 
world.  We  take  the  Bible,  and  if  we  had  heard  nothing  of  it 
before,  we  read,  examine,  understand  it ;  we  see  that  it  is  ex- 
actly such  a  book  as  we  have  decisive  reasons  to  believe  God 
would  give  to  man,  harmonizing  with  all  our  just  views  of  the 
character,  the  relations,  the  government  of  God ;  adapted  won- 
derfully and  perfectly  to  the  wants,  the  character,  the  condition 
and  prospects  of  man ;  fitted  to  secure  the  high  end  of  his  crea- 
tion, even  his  perfection  in  character  and  in  blessedness.  Its 
actual  effects  confirm  and  illustrate  its  j)erfection  as  the  means 
of  this  great  end.  The  writers  of  the  book  assert  its  divine 
origin.  It  had  not  a  human  origin,  for  we  have  proved  the 
necessity  of  just  such  a  book  from  God,  and  that  man  would 
never  make  such  a  book.  Now  I  ask,  whence  came  this  book  ? 
What  is  its  origin  ?     Is  it  from  God,  or  is  it  not  ? 


14  DAY  USE 

kb™ntoDESKfromwhichborrowed 

loan  dept. 


*   **•    *»*•      «»  .  tmm  "*;■ 


LD  21A-50w-8  '57 
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.General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


